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ABSTRACT 
Introduction 
Organizational change has emerged as an imperative for organizational competitiveness and survival. Amongst various change efforts a radical one is organizational turnaround of sick companies. It is a change effort that requires a 
large number of stakeholders to change their individual behavior. Coordination of 
stakeholders is at the core of governance during radical environmental change (Meyer, 2004). 
In turnaround literature, the role of communication receives attention when several elements 
such as leadership, motivation, image of the organization are dealt with. Communication is 
thus seen to play a role in enabling essential elements of turnaround. This research study 
focuses on communication strategies adopted by turnaround managements and explores the 
role and impact of communication in enabling this change. 
Justification for the Study 
Environment has become increasingly volatile and the percentage of sick Companies turning 
around and setting themselves on a growth path is very low. In the first half of 1990s, 
organizational failures continued to attain record levels. One in 38 active British businesses 
went into liquidation in the third quarter of 1992. Individual solvencies soared by 83% during 
the same period (Richardson, Nwankwo & Richardson, 1994). In a world-wide recession of 
1990s the number of manufacturing company bankruptcies in Australia increased by a factor 
of two-and-a-half (Marker & Sharma, 2000). The number of sick companies registered with 
BIFR' between 1987 and 31 December 2004 were 5147. As on 31 October 2005, only 389 
companies (7.56%) had been deregistered and declared no longer sick It is evident that while 
the number of companies turned sick at an epidemic rate, the turnarounds were not easy to 
come. 
Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, an appellate body set up by the government of India 
to assist sick companies aspiring to recover 
The literature on turnaround also indicates that factors affecting turnaround are embedded in 
regional contexts. Culture and the institutional environment coupled with different stages of 
development of Asian economies limit the usefulness of models derived from studies of 
turnaround in more developed economies. Enablers of change and restructuring in Asia differ, 
making different approaches to turnaround possible (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2004). Countries of 
Asia, while sharing many similarities, enjoy enough differences to require the study of 
phenomena within specific country contexts. Thus, researchers need to be clear on points of 
similarities and differences around the region to control country differences in the study of 
turnaround. (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2004). 
According to Ahlstrom & Bruton (2004), he issue of stakeholders and their role in the 
turnaround of organizations in Asia deserves greater attention. For instance, gpvemment is a 
key stake holder in Asian countries. In many nations such as India and Korea, unions can also 
be major stakeholders while in other economies such as that of China, Hong Kong and 
Singapore, they play a minimal role. Most of the studies documented are of companies in US 
or UK. Many researchers have identified a gap in turnaround research in developing countries 
and in Asia. The need for study in Indian context is therefore established. 
The literature also details the role of communication during change. But very few studies 
have been done to establish role and process of communication in enabling a turnaround. The 
role of communication receives attention when several elements such as leadership, 
motivation, image of the organization are dealt with. Communication is thus seen to play a 
role in enabling essential elements of turnaround. Thus, turnaround literature documents the 
role of communication as part of implementation process for several turnaround elements. 
However, not many studies have concentrated to explore whether a communication strategy is 
adopted by turnaround managements or not. A study of communication during turnaround of 
organizations in India may perhaps reveal communication strategies that successful 
turnaround managements have been adopting. Such a study on one hand would enrich the 
literature and on the other hand may prove worthwhile for managements striving for an 
organizational turnaround. A research to explore role of communication and propose a 
communication strategy to enable organizational turnaround is thus warranted and hence 
attempted hereof 
Review of Literature 
Change literature widely documents the important role that communication plays in the 
production of change. Several writers have stressed on the role of communication in the 
change process even to the extent of suggesting that change is a communication problem that 
can be resolved by having people understand the change and the role they play in its 
implementation (Kotter, 1990). In this chapter, literature on orgnizational change and 
communication has been reviewed and classified based on themes that have interested 
researchers in the past. 
Change however is defined differently in different studies. It varied from change due to 
diversification, joint ventures, globalization, localization or several other paradigms. For the 
purpose of this study, it was decided to study a radical change initiavtive - a turnround from 
organizational decline. Turnaround literature has been reviewed to present the research done 
on various themes such as predictors of organizational decline or turnaround, models of 
turnaround, turnaround strategies, organizational decline and innovation, leadership and 
turnaround, retrenchment and turnaround and several cases on turnaround, literature review 
revealed that while several studies focussing of aspects such a leadership, models, processes, 
retrenchment etc. mention the important role played by communication during the process, no 
study was found to be completely devoted to the aspect of communication during turnaround. 
Thus, in this study, an attempt has been made to develop a framework of communication 
strategy during organizational turnaround. Insights from literature on various themes 
pertaining to change, turnaround and communication have been employed to develop the 
framework. 
Theory Building and Propositions 
On the basis of literature reviewed, a theory on communication strategies during 
organizational turnaround is developed and presented in this chapter. Here, proposes that an 
organization is embedded into an environment, as depicted in Figure 3.1. There are disabling 
forces emanating from various stakeholders that are exerting themselves on a sick company, 
as depicted in Figure 3.2. The management/promoter (as discussed earlier) assume the centra! 
responsibility for managing the disabling forces. Appropriate managerial decisions direct 
managerial actions which lead to organizational turnaround, as depicted in Figure 3.3. The 
managerial actions include thought out communication actions/ interventions which are 
designed to meet strategic communication objectives for each stakeholder. The strategic 
communication objectives have one-to-one co-relation with strategic turnaround objectives. 
Figure 3.1: Organizational Changes in a Changing Environment 
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Figure 3.3: A Model of Communication 
Strategy for Organizational 
Turnaround (CS for OTA) 
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A literature review of studies on organizational turnaround was conducted to draw out the role 
of communication during turnaround, as documented by researchers in other studies. Through 
five stages of development a framework as given in Framework 3.2 was developed. It 
presents a comprehensive account of stakeholders, objectives identified for each stakeholder 
and communication actions adopted to achieve the objectives. This Framework was proposed 
as the theoretical framework for Communication Strategies for Organizational Turnaround 
(CS FOR OTA) and this research study has attempted to validate Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2, 
Figure 3.3 and Framework 3.2. 
FRAMEWORK 3.2; Proposed Framework of Communication Strategies for 
Organizational Turnaround (CS for OTA) 
Stal<eholder/ Turnaround Element (objective)/POSSMQ Communication Action 
Board of Directors/ Sliareholders 
Gain support and time in ttie future 
• Present detailed turn-around plan 
Staff and Employees 
Credibility building actions by the new management 
• Document, and communicate a strategic turnaround plan 
• Publicize success in resolving a current crisis or problem 
• Make decisions transparent 
• Exercise Communication Control 
Initial Control 
• Order preparation of daily, weekly and monthly cash forecasts 
• Exercise Communication Control. 
• Seek views on the general well being of the employees. 
Mobilization of organization for turnaround 
• Include key managers for development of industry wisdom 
• Include only key managers for development of vision 
• CEO should deliver the vision presentation in person and as often as possible. 
• Hold special sessions for non-participating managers after vision has been developed to 
share planned vision 
• Inject urgency in the communications plan. Explain what needs to be done and why 
• Listen to the views of all managers. Gauge their reaction 
Understand perceptions and focus minds of managing team. Set the scene for 
turnaround. 
Ensure all employees know what is going on, for what reason and how it will occur. 
Share the pulpit. 
Deal with concerns of employees in open and honest manner. Offer Follow up sessions 
Note any comments or queries and provide answers asap. 
CEO must get out of the office to interact with the employees and to listen to them 
Employ open ended communication style that encourages employees to find answers, 
take decisions. 
Repeatedly affirm the Company's mission, core values, and the primary goals of profit 
and growth. 
Articulate a few highly concrete targets for the company for the next few months 
Involve the staff to identify solvable problem areas and have their views on uninvolved 
areas. 
Rephrase people's roles to clarify managerial responsibilities. 
Top managers must emphasize on htegrity, fairness, hard work, resourcefulness and 
concern for the staff during interactions with the staff. 
Publicize and celebrate every employee and team success. 
Internal Co-ordination 
Offer constant feedback to keep organization on track 
Set up co-ordination committees for co-ordinating interdependent departments 
Institute a monthly performance review meeting of all senior managers chaired by the 
chief executive. 
Insist that lower level disputes be settled at that level on a face to face basis 
Keep the atmosphere light. 
Keep enhancing communication technology - email, mobile, ERP etc. 
Unions 
Negotiation of support of Unions and neutralization of Unions' pressures 
• Brief unions on the problems and strengths of the unit and some tentative turnaround 
plan. 
• Get them to suggest turnaround steps 
• Seek support, concessions etc. from the unions 
• Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy 
• Keep unions posted on the progress of the turnaround 
Banks and Financial Institutions 
Negotiation of support of Banks and/or FIs and neutralization of Banks and/or 
FIs pressures 
• Brief Banks and/or FIs on the problems and strengths of the unit and some tentative 
turnaround plan 
• Get them to suggest turnaround steps 
• Seek support, concessions etc. from Banks and/or FIs 
Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy 
Keep Banks and/or FIs posted on the progress of the turnaround 
Government 
Negotiation of support of Government and neutralization of Government 
pressures 
• Brief relevant government departments on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative turnaround plan. 
• Get them to suggest turnaround steps 
• Seek support, concessions etc. from the government 
• Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy 
• Keep the government posted on the progress of the turnaround 
Suppliers 
Negotiation of support of suppliers and neutralization of suppliers' pressures 
• Brief suppliers on the problems and strengths of the unit and some tentative turnaround 
plan. 
• Get suppliers to suggest turnaround steps 
• Seek support, concessions etc. from suppliers 
• Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy 
• Keep suppliers posted on the progress of the turnaround 
Customers 
Negotiation of support of customers and neutralization of customers' 
pressures 
• Brief customers on the problems and strengths of the unit and some tentative 
turnaround plan. 
• Get customers to suggest turnaround steps 
• Seek support, concessions etc. from customers 
• Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy 
• Keep customers posted on the progress of the turnaround 
Sourcing industry information for quick cost reduction 
• Increase costs incurred on communication technologies, if need be, for sourcing 
industry (market) information 
Revenue generation 
• Unfocused advertising and promotion be more sharply focused 
Propositions validated 
Proposition PIA' Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily have to 
address one or more of the communication objectives given in the framework though not 
necessarily all. 
Proposition PIB'- The list of communication objectives given in the proposed theoretical 
framework is comprehensive. 
Proposition P2A'- Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily have to 
address one or more of the critical stakeholders given in the framework. 
Proposition Pza' The list of critical stakeholders to be addressed daring a turnaround is 
comprehensive. 
Proposition Ps^: At least one of the communication actions listed in the proposed 
theoretical framework, is employed to realize a corresponding communication objective 
during turnaround. 
Proposition PSB'. The list of communication actions recommended for achieving the 
communication objectives is comprehensive 
Research Methodology 
Research Objectives 
The overall purpose of the research was to bentify communication strategies adopted by 
companies that have successfully enabled a turn around in the recent past (1995-2005). The 
study was focused on Indian companies that had turned around from a sick state and shown 
sustained growth for atleast three years. The objectives of the study were: 
• Exploring the importance of communication in the process of managing change 
• Identifying communication interventions employed during the change process 
• Identifying communication technologies adopted and implemented as part of the change 
process 
• Exploring challenges and opportunities created by emerging technologies 
• Identifying resources and skills required to facilitate development and implementation of 
an effective communication strategy 
• Appreciating the variables and their criticality in making a communication strategy 
effective 
• Identifying the challenges faced in developing and implementing an integrated 
communication strategy for managing change in organizations 
• Exploring if any existing theories of communication lii<e exchange model, socialization 
model or accommodation model have been applied 
• Identifying directions for improvement in communication strategies 
Selection of Research Methodology: Through a rejection process it was decided to 
adopt a case study methodology for the purpose of this research study. The chapter provides a 
detailed account of why this research methodology was considered most appropriate for the 
purpose. 
Case Study Technique: A Multiple-Case design is often considered more compelling 
evidence and therefore regarded as more robust (Herriot & Firestone, 1983). 
Unit of Analysis: 'Turnaround communication strategy' was the primary unit of analysis 
and 'Turnaround communication objectives set for each stakeholder', 'stakeholders addressed 
during turnaround' and 'communication interventions for each objective' were the embedded 
units of analysis. 
Thus, the research design employed was an embedded multiple-case research design, (see 
figure 4.1 
Figure 4.1 Multiple-case designs 
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Source: Adapted with some variation from Yin, R.K (2003). Case Study Research: Design and Methods, p40. 
y^ ed., New Delhi: Sage Publications, Applied Social Research Method Series 
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Linking Data to Propositions: The replication logic is analogous to that used in 
multiple experiments (Hersen & Barlow, 1976; Yin, 2003). Literal replication on successful 
organizational turnarounds was employed The process that was followed is given in figure 
4.2 
Figure 4.2: Protocol Adopted for Case Study Method 
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Scope of Study: For the purpose of this study, some critical terms were defined as 
follows: 
Change: Organizations target changes of various kinds such as diversifying into new 
markets or changing its product mix or globalizing or becoming transnational or enabling a 
turnaround (the list is indicative only) for the purpose of this study, focus was maintained on 
only one kind of change, as communication challenges in each kind of change could be 
different. The intent was to understand if there were common communication challenges in 
one kind of change initiative and whether a comprehensive communication strategy could be 
suggested for such a change initiative. 
Change can be an ongoing process in an organization or it can be a radical change. 
Communication challenges in each case can be very different from those in the other type 
Study of change as an ongoing process requires a longitudinal study. Since the Doctoral 
research was to be carried out in relatively shorter duration, it was decided to study a radical 
change initiative. 
In the recent past, many organizations faced turbulent times due to demands of globalization, 
increasing competition, shrinking margins, crowded marketplaces, cheaper labour etc. Many 
companies that could not quickly adapt to the changing scenario, failed miserably. Some 
companies, however, took the bull by the horns and enabled a turnaround for themselves. This 
kind of turnaround is perhaps one of the most radical change that a company can attempt. 
Communication challenges are expected to be significant during such an initiative. Therefore, 
for the purpose of this research, it was decided to study communication strategies during 
turnarounds. 
Type of Turnaround: There are three kinds of turnarounds, namely, economic, industry and 
organizational turnaround. For the purpose of this study, focus was maintained on 
organizational turnaround. 
Maturity of the organization being studied: The challenges before an organization during 
different phases of maturity are different. These may range from issues concerning delegation, 
co-ordination to collaboration in the first, second and third phase of maturity respectively. It 
was decided to select companies in the fourth phase of maturity. This was to ensure 
homogeneity in the sample. 
Thus, for the purpose of this research, turnarounds in organizations that had matured to the 
fourth level of maturity in times of good organizational health were selected for study. 
Net Worth: Net Worth of a Company is it's paid up capital plus its free reserves. 
Sick Organization: If the performance declined to an extent that the networth of a Company 
turned negative (that is the accumulated losses exceed the networth) then the Company was 
defined as a sick organization. 
Turned around Organization: For the purpose of this study, it was decided that 
organizations that had turned around from a sick state (negative net worth) to a healthy 
13 
growth (positive net worth for some years) be selected for study and henceforth be termed as 
turned around companies in this research wori<. 
To ensure that these organizations were at one time in the fourth stage of organizational cycle, 
only those organizations listed on a stock exchange were to be selected for study. 
Turnaround Cycle time. Prior research into business turnaround differs with regard to the 
length of the turnaround cycle. Bibeault (1982), Poston, Harmon & Gramlich, (1994) and 
Schendel, Patton & Rigs (1976) used a turnaround cycle time period of eight years (four years 
for the downturn and four for the upturn). Chowdhury & Lang (1996), Hambrick & Schecter 
(1983), Pearce & Robbins (1993), Smith & Gunalan (1996) and Smith & Graves, (2005) each 
used four years (two years for the downturn and two years for upturn). 
For the purpose of the current study, in order to ensure that the turnarounds were relevant in 
current context, it was important to select turnarounds that happened in the recent past. It was 
therefore decided that the point of turnaround of networth of the organization to be selected 
for study should be within the last ten years (1995-2005). 
A turnaround cycle of eight years would have been too long as the number of organizations 
that could be picked up for study could be too small. Also, the recall and interest of the 
turnaround management could fade in such a long span of time. On the other hand six years of 
turnaround cycle time was giving a decent sample and naturally was offering a more 
confirmed sample and a wider study period than that offered by a four year turnaround cycle. 
for this study, it was therefore decided that a turnaround cycle of six years (three years 
downturn and three years upturn) be used. 
Turnaround Organizations selected for research study 
1. Financial information of all the 5780 Companies whose information was available 
from the CMIE Prowess'^  databank was sourced. Prowess posts and updates 
information of listed companies only. The information sourced was for the period 
1995-2005. 
2. 705 Companies were found to have gone sick at some point of time between 1995 to 
2005. 
Prowess is a corporate database service from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). The 
database incorporates the profit and loss statement, balance sheets, cash flows, products manufactured, 
raw materials consumed etc. 
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3. From the 705 Companies, the net worth of 39 Companies was found to have 
remained negative for at least three years and then turned around to positive net worth 
for at least three years (turnaround cycle time - 6 years). 
However, after collection of secondary data or if after initial interaction with a Company, it 
was found that: 
1. the Company had just emerged from its initial gestation period and started making 
profits or 
2. the management refused to share information then the cases were rejected and not 
included in the research study. 
The rest of the companies that were identified to study, were contacted and the Companies 
whose top management agreed to spare time and share views were selected for the purpose of 
study for this research work. The list of these 9 companies selected thereof is given in the 
table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Companies that turned around and were identified for this study 
s. 
No Company Industry City 
1 Amrit Banaspati Ltd. Food & Beverages 
(Vanaspati) 
Ghaziabad, UP 
2 Howrah Mills Co. Ltd. Textile (Jute) Kolkata, W Bengal 
3 Naihati Jute Mills Co. Ltd. Textile (Jute) Kolkata, W Bengal 
4 Nambumadi Tea Co. Ltd. Food & Beverages (Tea) Kolkata, W Bengal 
5 Vegetable Products Ltd. Food & Beverages 
(Vanaspati) 
Kolkata, W Bengal 
6 Indian Poly fibres Ltd. Textile Lucknow, UP 
7 Asia Fab Textile Mumbai, Maharashtra 
8 Tasty Bites Food & Beverages 
(Packaged Food) 
Pune, Maharashtra 
9 Empee Sugars and 
Chemicals Ltd 
Food (Sugar) Neilore, Andhra Pradesh 
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Data Collection Protocol 
The research tools employed were detailed and research data collection protocol was 
defined thereafter. 
Research Tools: The research tools employed were: 
Personal Interviews 
Indicative Guide 
Secondary sources of information: Historical facts were built to whatever extent possible 
from secondary information, to conduct interviews as the most substantive part of building 
the case study and to collect factual information with the help of an indicative questionnaire/ 
guide and any relevant artifacts or secondary information from the primary source. For 
analysis of the factual information collected, the option of quantitative analysis (non-
parametric) was kept open. 
Collection of Data: During the period, October-December 2005, primary data was 
collected through semi-structured interviews with either members of the board of 
Directors and/or top management who were involved in the turnaround process. 
Special attention was paid to the content and feelings of the experiences shared. To make sure 
that minimal and if possible no bias appeared in the information collected and that the entire 
context of what was shared was captured, all the interviews were conducted personally. The 
researcher visited the premises of most of the Companies to get a better understanding of the 
context. These Companies were spread across the country and hence collection of primary 
data involved traveling to Delhi, Ghaziabad, Mumbai, Pune and Kolkata. for all the 
interviews conducted, complete notes were made and audio recording of interviews was also 
done to ensure that no information was missed out. 
This data was further supplemented by secondary data collected from internal sources. This 
secondary data was in the form of annual reports, minutes of the meeting, presentations etc. 
The availability of the same was dependant on the companies' willingness to share such 
information. As themes emerged and relationships got established, discussions via telephone 
and email were used to fill in remaining gaps in the data and to explore contradictory or 
disconfirming evidence. 
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steps taken to guard the quality of research: Protocol for ensuring validity 
and reliability of the research was defined (see Table 4.4.) 
Table 4.4: Ensuring validity of the Qualitative Research 
Measure Case Study Tactic adopted, as far as 
possible 
Phase of research in which 
tactic was employed 
Construct 
validity 
• Multiple sources of evidence 
employed 
• Chain of evidence established 
• Data collection 
• Data collection 
Internal 
Validity 
• Pattern matching done 
• Explanation building done 
• Rival explanations addressed 
• Logic models used 
• Data analysis 
• Data analysis 
• Data analysis 
• Data analysis 
External 
Validity 
• Replication logic used • Research Design 
Reliability • Case Study Protocol/ Audit Trail 
used 
• Case Study Database prepared 
• Data Collection 
• Data Collection 
Source: Adaped for this work from Yin, R.K (2003). Case Study Research: Design and Methods, p34 , 
3"* ed., New Delhi; Sage Publications, Applied Social Research Method Series 
While all measures suggested in literature to ensure the reliability and validity of the case 
studies will be observed, the outcome of the research work will be presented as purposive and 
not prescriptive. The findings and conclusions will be proposed for further investigations by 
other researchers to establish generalizability. 
An alternative perspective to judging qualitative research is to judge the authenticity and 
trustworthiness. This paradigm relies on the interpretive view of reality rather than the realist 
view held by quantitative researchers. This view recommends careful attention to ensure 
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (Daymon & Holloway, 2002; 92-
94). Strategies for ensuring these parameters such as peer debriefmg, demonstration of an 
audit trail, data and methodological trianguiation, thick description and reflexivity (see 
limitations of research study) have been candidly adopted to ensure a high quality qualitative 
research work. 
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Observations and Analysis 
The chapter presents case studies of 9 companies (given in Table 4.3) that had turned around 
during 1995-2005. Each case study is followed by an analysis of the context of 
communication during turnaround and framework of communication strategy adopted for 
organizational turnaround. 
Results and Discussion 
This chapter presents cross-case synthesis to test the propositions and validate the framework 
of communication strategies for organizational turnaround. 
Of the 6 propositions made, Pu, PIA and PJA were found to be true for all the 9 case studies. 
However, Pyg, Pj^ and Psn were not found to be true for all cases and hence rejected. The 6 
Propositions evaluated on the basis of cases written for different organizations, studied as part 
of this research study, revealed that the list of stakeholders, objectives and communication 
actions prepared from the literature review were mandatory to the extent that one or more cf 
the objectives and communication actions suggested to achieve these thereof, were adopted 
by each turnaround management during turnaround. However, all the three lists -
stakeholders, objectives and actions proposed in the theoretical framework were 
incomprehensive. Discussion of Proposition thus indicates that in all organizations without 
exception, communication played a role in enabling turnaround elements/ objectives. 
On the basis of further discussion and analysis of the cases it was concluded that while each 
of the companies was conscious of the impact that communication could have and was 
consciously strategizing its communication actions, the action strategy was not documented 
as a 'communication strategy document'. Interestingly, the pattern of documentation in the 
turnaround literature was found to be similar. While there was enough evidence to 
substantiate the need for a communication strategy during turnaround, no separate study was 
found on the subject. The need to develop a communication strategy to enable an 
organizational turnaround was therefore established. 
The framework proposed initially was augmented by adding to the framework the 
stakeholders, objectives identified for each and the communication action to achieve, 
identified in this study. 
This new framework was then analysed. Frequency of companies that employed each of these 
was tabulated and pictorially depicted in this chapter. These indicate which 
stakeholders/objectives or communication actions were more popularly employed by these 
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companies. Twenty five analytic tabulations and pictoral depictions clearly indicate how each 
variable was employed by each company studied. Three samples of the twenty five analytic 
pictorial depictions are given below: 
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Turnaround Objective Address through Communication 
Gain Support of Social Activist Groups 
Gain support and time in the future 
Cross Cultural Communication with customer 
Influence Government Policies 
Managing Retrenchment (Govt.) 
Managing Retrenchment (Union) 
Keep track of industry developments 
Ensure Desirable Quality of Supplies 
Build Credibility among suppliers 
Negotiation of support of customers 
Negotiation of support of Unions 
Find a new market 
Building Credibility among employees 
Revenue Generation 
Sourcing industry information 
Negotiation with suppliers 
Negotiation with Government 
Negotiation with Banks and/or Fis 
Internal Co-ordination 
Initial Control 
Mobilization of organization 
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Make decisions Exercise Document, and Publicize success 
transparent Communication communicate a in resolving a 
Control strategic TA plan current crisis or 
problem 
Communication Action 
The criticality of each component of the communication framework proposed, was found to 
vary from one company to another. On the basis of cross-case discussion and analysis, it was 
concluded that criticality of communication with various stakeholders varies owing to 
numerous factors ranging from variation in financial capabilities of the turnaround 
management, background of the turnaround management, product or customer requirements, 
industry etc. Thus, it was found that the results of this research study supported the 
contingency theory or the RBV theory as the turnaround management is expected to 
understand its own unique situation and identity the TA objectives suitable for its unique 
situation. The Communication Strategy framework suggested hereof may then be consulted to 
understand what communication intervention turnaround companies have been employing to 
address those objectives. 
Communication Resources for implementing CS for OTA 
In order to analyze the communication technologies employed during turnaround, Table 6.8 
(Appendix 6.4) was prepared to reflect the approach of the 9 companies studied and 
discussion reveals that communication technologies were adopted extensively but companies 
were also maintaining conscious control on use of technology. While LAN was widely 
implemented, WAN was yet to gain popularity. ERP was adopted by several companies. 
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While all the companies accepted the potential benefits of the ERP, implementing it to full 
potential was seen as a major effort. Internet and SMS were also not found to be popular 
media for communication during turnaround of the companies studied. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Lack of attention to Communication, in current turnaround literature 
On the basis of literature review, role and impact of communication during turnaround was 
established. Although no turnaround study was found to be completely devoted to 
communication during turnaround, several turnaround studies mentioned the role and impact 
of communication during turnaround. (Balgobin & Pandit, 2001; Marker & Sharma, 2000; 
Khandwalla, 1989, 1992; Kow 2004; Meliones, 2000). 
Need to constantly align managerial decisions to environmental reality 
Case studies of 9 companies that had turned around during 1995-2005, were written. Each 
case study was analysed to identify whether it's sickness was due to environment or 
managerial decision making or misalignment of the two. The results support the arguments of 
Sheppard & Chowdhury (2005) who asserted that "failure is not typically the fault of either 
the environment or the organization, rather it must be attributed to the misalignment of the 
organization to the environmental realities". The results of analysis of various cases support 
this view. ABCL took ten years to realign itself to changes brought in by globalization of 
Indian economy and the loss in the process was so significant, that it had to close down one of 
its units producing hydrogenated oil. AFL realized that there was rampant excise evasion in 
the industry and one of its units could not survive unless it aligned itself to the environmental 
reality. It resolved to maintain its ethical standard; it closed down the unit and diverted its 
energy to find an alternative route. TBEL realized that it had launched RTS food much before 
the Indian consumer was ready to consume it. It was eventually forced to switch its focus on 
markets abroad where the environment was ready to accept their products. The results are 
interesting as in the first organization (ABCL) the company owing to inability to realign in 
time was forced to close down one of its units; in the second organization (AFL) it purposely 
decided not to align itself to the environmental demands and therefore changed its future 
course. The third organization (TBEL) accepted the new reality and quickly realigned itself to 
the environmental demands and thereby exhibited a very quick recovery. Thus, the results 
support the view that both environment and managerial decisions contribute towards defining 
the fate of an organization. They further support the view that often managers make 
inadequate managerial decisions owing to blindness to environmental change (ABCL) or 
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resource constraints or inadequate information etc. and may make wrong managerial 
decisions that finally lead to sickness in an organization. 
Turnaround: a miraculous achievement 
From a list of 5787 listed companies (source: Prowess, CMIE), 705 companies were found to 
have turned sick during 1995-2005. However, only 39 companies from these 705 (7.69%) 
were able to turnaround. When these companies were contacted for research study, 6 
companies were found to have just turned around owing to equity brought in by the promoter 
but were still struggling to set themselves on the growth path. It is evident from this result that 
turnaround in sck organizations is a miraculous achievement worth a study and that many 
organizations, when faced with such tough times, may land up into any of the new states 
ranging from liquidation, languishing, struggling to turnaround. 
Sick state: A result of disabling forces emanating from stakeholders 
When an organization is in a sick state it faces numerous internal and external challenges 
Richardson, Nwankwo & Richardson (1994) note that such crises, damage the quality of life 
for the different groups of people associated with the organization, for example, at a personal 
level, big emotional and social costs are incurred as the organization becomes a less 
rewarding place in which to work (employees) or with which to do business (suppliers, 
customers, banks etc.). Organizational restructurings, lay-offs, redundancies, customer 
delivery breakdowns and failures to pay creditors, for example worsen traditional standards of 
working and living for a host of stakeholders. These challenges act as disabling forces 
emanating from various stakeholders and directed towards the sick company and also each 
other. They are depicted in Figure 3.2. In each of the organization studied, the results support 
the view, as each turnaround management interviewed, shared its experiences of challenges 
faced in dealing with various stakeholders. 
Central role of top management 
In order to turnaround a sick Company, the theoretical model proposed in this study purported 
that the first and foremost condition for initiation of turnaround effort was that the top 
management took responsibility of enabling a turnaround of the sick company. (Harker & 
Sharma, 2000; Hofer, 1980). Other researchers have emphasized on the importance of role of 
triggers and necessary managerial role of recognizing and analyzing these triggers to enable a 
turnaround. (Francis & Mariola, 2003; Gopinath, 2005; Scherrer, 2003). Khandwaila (1989) 
went to the extent of outlining 'Change in Top Management' as an essential element for 
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turnaround. This was depicted in the Chapter 3 Figure 3.3 by placing the management into the 
central position and indicating t as the entity that now managed the enabling and disabling 
forces emanating from other stakeholders. The exhibit further depicted the role of managerial 
action required, to manage these forces, to enable a turnaround. The results of this study 
support the theoretical proposal, as in all organizations studied, the management, when the 
promoter and management were separate and the management otherwise was responsible 
(IPL, NTCL), and the promoter management when the two were the same (TBEL, ABCL, 
NJMCL, HJMCL, AFL), consciously assumed responsibility to turnaround the ailing 
company. In all the cases, the management was clear on the objectives it had set for each 
stakeholder, to achieve the turnaround. The managerial actions taken thereafter resulted in the 
change for the better. 
Role of communication: an undocumented reality 
It is notable that none of these 9 companies had separately documented a communication 
strategy or plan though all of them had strategized the actions to be taken Partial 
documentation under varying titles was noticed in different companies studied. TBEL termed 
its mobilization efforts as Fun at Work programmes while NTCL employed what they call a 
two-way communication model for regular monitoring. ABCL on the other hand said it 
documented its decisions as minutes of the meeting while ESCL insisted that communication 
planning was an important regular ongoing process. 
Proposed theoretical framework: mandatory but incomprehensive 
Each component of the theoretical framework proposed in Framework 3.2, was completely or 
partially employed by all the 9 companies studied. This is to say that every turnaround 
management addressed atleast one of the objectives for atleast one of the stakeholder listed in 
the framework. It was also established that for the objective addressed, atleast one of the 
listed communication actions was employed by the turnaround management. However, the set 
of Proposition tested, ftjrther established that each of the framework components - list of 
stakeholders, objectives and communication actions, was incomprehensive. 
Framework 6.1: a more comprehensive framework 
The proposed communication framework in chapter 3 Framework 3.2 was augmented by 
adding to the list of stakeholders, the additional stakeholders that the 9 companies studied, 
had addressed. Similarly, the list of objectives and the communication actions employed 
thereof, by each company studied, were compared with the list of objectives and 
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communication actions mentioned for each stakeholder and the Msts given in the frameworic 
were augmented. The resulting framework given in Framework 6.1 is proposed as a more 
comprehensive framework than that proposed in Framework 3.2. The vaMdity of the 
framework is established as it is based on primary research data though whether it takes care 
of all the possible situations or challenges in different organizations is still not established. 
Most frequently addressed stakeholders 
A closer look at the stakeholders addressed during turnaround revealed that the 6 stakeholders 
mostly addressed by the 9 companies studied, were employees, unions, customers, banks and 
financial institutions, government and suppliers. Most of the turnaround strategy literature 
deals with employee communication (Balgobin & Pandit, 2001; Marker & Sharma, 2000; 
Khandwalla, 1989; Kow, 2004a, 2004b; Meliones, 2000) though Harker & Sharma (2000) 
also indicate the need to present a detailed turnaround plan to Board of Directors and Banks 
and Financial Institutions, to gain their support. However, Khandwalla (1989) in his study 
additionally identified communication actions adopted to address objectives set for unions, 
government, suppliers and customers. 
The results of the present study indicated that these six stakeholders were addressed most 
frequently by the 9 companies studied. Further, management of all the 9 companies studied, 
addressed the employees and the customers for some turnaround objective. The other four 
stakeholders however were not essentially addressed by managements of ail the 9 companies 
studied. 
New Stakeholders: less frequent though critical 
The two additional stakeholders addressed by some of the companies studied and not 
mentioned in the theoretical framework proposed, were Industry Association and Social 
Activist groups. TBEL had to address a social activist group as this group actively interacted 
with the union and the workers, and could influence the latter. To ensure that no anti-
establishment sentiment was promoted, the management interacted with the group, as and 
when required. Ravi Nigam shared how they had to address the hostile perceptions of this 
group towards the American origin of the new promoters. 
Both ESCL and NJMCL actively participated in the industry association activities as voicing 
their concerns to the government or interacting with peers to keep track of industry 
developments, had a significant impact on their business. In case of ESCL, the government's 
decisions on sugar levy and in case of NJMCL the government's decision on JMPA were very 
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critical. These companies had to remain updated on latest industry developments. Also, owing 
to their strong positions in the industry associations, they could influence the government and 
hence attempted to benefit from the clout. Thus, these two stakeholders though not addressed 
frequently cannot be rejected as less critical. 
It is therefore recommended that a turnaround management must consciously identify the 
stakeholders that may have the capacity to affect the company's performance. 
Most frequently addressed objectives 
The 10 most frequently addressed objectives by the 9 companies studied, were found to be: 
mobilization of organization, initial control, internal co-ordination, negotiation of support cf 
banks and FIs and neutralization of their pressures, negotiation of support of government and 
neutralization of its pressures, negotiation of support of suppliers and neutralization of their 
pressures, sourcing industry information for quick cost reduction, revenue generation, 
building credibility among employees, ignore current market and find a new market. 
The results supported the literature as the 9 most frequently addressed objectives by 
turnaround managements of companies studied, were also listed in the theoretical framework 
proposed originally in Chapter 3 Framework 3.2. 
However, the tenth most popular objective, 'Ignore current market and find a new market', 
identified from the 9 companies studied, was found to be more popularly addressed (6 out of 
9 companies addressed it) than the two objectives (negotiation of support of Unions and 
neutralization of Union's pressures and negotiation of support of customers and neutralization 
of customer's pressures) listed on the basis of literature review in the theoretical framework 
given in Framework 3.2. 
Additional Objectives identified: Nine new objectives namely, 'ignore current market 
and develop new market', 'build credibility among suppliers', 'ensure desirable quality of 
supplies', 'keep track of industry developments', 'managing retrenchment', 'influencing the 
government policies', 'ensuring cross cultural communication with customers' and 'gaining 
and neutralizing the support of Social Activist groups' were identified. The number of 
companies that addressed these objectives varied (6 for 1 st objective, 5 for 2!"' and 4 for next 
2 objectives, 3 for next 3, 2 for 1 and 1 for last 2 objectives). As discussed in chapter 6 
Results and Discussion the importance of these objectives was high. The list prepared by 
assimilating these objectives is presented in Framework 6.1 and is more comprehensive than 
that proposed on the basis of literature review. 
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Most frequently employed communication actions/ interventions 
Table 6.7 indicated frequency of communication actions that the 9 turnaround Companies had 
adopted to achieve a given objective. It was implicated from this table that those 
communication actions that were employed by most of the companies to achieve a given 
objective, have a significant impact on the outcome of the attempt to achieve the objective. 
Some of the more frequently adopted communication actions (7 or more companies adopted 
these actions) were 'make decisions transparent', 'inject urgency in the communication plan', 
deal with concerns of employees in an open and honest manner. Offer feedback sessions', 
'articulate a few highly concrete targets for the company for the next few months', 'top 
managers must emphasize on integrity, fairness, hard work, resourcefulness and concern for 
the staff during interactions with the staff, 'keep enhancing communication technology', 
'offer constant feedback to keep the organization on track, 'seek support and concessions etc. 
from Banks and/or FIs' , 'keep Banks and FIs posted on the progress of the turnaround', 'seek 
support, concessions etc. from the government' and 'brief relevant government departments 
on the problems and strengths of the unit and some tentative turnaround plan, 'focus 
advertising and promotion to be more sharply focussed'. All these objectives were also listed 
in the initial proposed framework developed from the literature. Thus, the findings support the 
turnaround literature. 
New Communication Actions/Interventions identified 
Forty one new communication actions/ interventions have been added to the initial framework 
and presented in Framework 6.1. This new list of 100 communication actions adopted by 
turned around companies is thus more comprehensive. Further studies may be done to make it 
still more comprehensive, if possible. 
Net Surfing: A skeptical though essential acceptance 
While all companies studied, provided net surfing facilities to its employees, some of them 
have highlighted benefits of providing these facilities in common computing areas. These 
benefits include increased interaction, improved time management, higher resource sharing, 
security checks and better discipline. 
Email: an official but monitored communication channel 
All companies studied, employed email as an official channel of communication. However, 
some companies adopted a policy of monitoring the email communications for reasons such 
as security and cross-cultural communication gaps. 
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LAN more popularly implemented than WAN 
While LAN was implemented to smoother! the communication flow within an office, several 
companies were found to be still struggling to have a WAN in place. 
ERR: a daunting challenge, worth the effort 
All companies that had employed ERP package agreed that implementing ERP was a major 
expense for a company reviving from sickness. However, all of them also agreed that it was a 
major challenge to implement it owing to the discipline required to reap its benefits. There 
was also a consensus that ERP implementation brought with it a significant improvement in 
performance 
Not so popular Communication technologies 
Many communication technologies such as SMS and websites still did not seem to have made 
a mark in proving their worth to reviving companies. These technologies were not extensively 
employed by the companies studied. 
Honing Communication Competencies: a prudent approach 
It would be pertinent to mention here that even for the limited number of organizations 
studied in this research work, no consistently applicable communication strategy was found. 
The strategy varied depending on the unique situation in which the organization was poised. 
Thus, any management preparing to turnaround a company can benefit from the 
communication strategy framework presented in this study in Framework 6.1, if it integrates it 
with the turnaround strategy of the company by prudently identifying the turnaround 
objectives for each stakeholder. 
Limitations of the Study 
This chapter identifies the limitations of the study The findings of the study propose a 
communication strategy for enabling organizational turnaround. The turnaround 
communication objectives, stakeholder communications and communication interventions 
have been studied. Organizational and managerial communication actions for enabling the 
turnaround of a sick company have been recommended. However, no research endeavour is 
final and there are limitations too. In this section, limits of this research are captured: 
• Case studies were primarily based on interviews of members of the top management. 
Their biases and perceptions might have affected their discourse of the turnaround 
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experience. While an attempt to verify facts from secondary sources was made, there 
is scope for more thorough verification. 
It was observed that many turnaround managements had not discretely identified a 
communication strategy. Thus, they left it to the researcher to identify communication 
elements or strategy from their turnaround experiences. It is possible that many 
experiences of communication interventions were not shared. A repeat study on the 
same pattern and methodology may make the list of stakeholders, objectives and 
communication interventions more comprehensive. 
It was observed in many organizations that the top management was reluctant in 
sharing some information. Some information therefore may not have been shared. 
The study focused on the strategy adopted by the top management and not on how it 
was perceived by other stakeholders. It was assumed that a successful turnaround was 
indicator of successful strategy. Further study may include views of other 
stakeholders too. 
Communication amongst various stakeholders also impacts turnaround. Further 
studies may focus on effect of these communications. 
• Given more time, a validated questionnaire on various communication dimensions 
could have been developed and administered to add more rigour to the study. 
• The conclusions of this study are not generalizations. These are suggestive and not 
prescriptive. 
Directions for Future Researcti 
This chapter maps the direction for future research in future studies. Keeping in mind the 
limitations and also the increasing importance and interest in the subject, the following 
section suggests scope for future research: 
• This study focused on the strategy adopted by the top management and not on how it 
was perceived by other stakeholders. A study that includes views of other 
stakeholders could provide better understanding of communications during 
turnaround. 
• Communication amongst various stakeholders also impacts turnaround. Further 
studies may focus on effect of these communications. 
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• 
Communication patterns in different regions may vary owing to differences in 
cultural variations. Comparison of communication in organizations from different 
regions may give revealing results. 
While cultures in a country, especially as diverse as India, cannot be called 
homogenous, yet one could expect variations in communication patterns adopted in 
different countries. Thus, other studies based on the same design but carried out in 
other countries could uncover several findings. 
This study has adopted the replication logic. Further studies may adopt theoretical 
replication and study communication strategies employed in sick companies. A 
comparison of communication patterns in turned around successes and turn around 
failures may further support the outcomes of this study. 
It is possible that communication strategies of organizations following theory E and 
organizations following theory O may differ. Further study exploring variations in 
communication strategies in organizations adopting these different theories of change 
may be undertaken. 
Content analysis technique can also be applied to study communication strategies for 
turnaround. 
Further studies may explore quantitative methods to measure impact of 
communication on turnaround. 
A study of communication pattern in the next phase (growth) of these organizations 
may reveal variation in communication strategies adopted during turnaround and 
communication strategies adopted during growth. 
Thanks 
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PREFACE 
'Communication for enabling change' has been a favoured research topic, in recent 
times. Numerous studies have documented the role of communication during change. 
The interest is peaked owing to the high paced changes in the environment, be these 
due to globalization, 'glocalization', deregulation, privatization, mergers, acquisitions, 
technological advancements et. al. As a result mankind's inert inertia to change has 
become all too evident, and several organizations are failing to keep pace with the 
changing envirorunent. Misalignment between environment and organizations due to 
faulty action choices of managers, is leading several organizations to their decline. In 
India, 5147 companies were registered sick with the Board for Industrial and Financial 
Reconstruction (BIFR) during 1987-2004. The rate of turnaround of these sick 
companies is dismal (7.56%). The change that a management must bring in, in such 
cases, is radical. However, the research on communication for radical change as in 
organizational turnaround is miniscule. 
Basis the turnaround literature review, this research work establishes that researchers in 
the past have to some extent noted the role of communication during turnaround. It 
therefore, proposes a theoretical model for Communication Strategies for 
Organizational Turnaround (CS for OTA). Nine listed Indian companies that have 
been successfully turned around in the last ten years (1995-2005) have been studied 
using multiple case study technique and an attempt to decipher communication during 
each tumaround, has been made. 
The thesis work that follows, presents the communication case studies of each of the 
nine companies studied followed by an analysis that tests the hypotheses developed to 
establish the theoretical framework proposed. A cross-case synthesis of the analysis of 
each case study, are then carried out. 
A communication strategy that details - the possible critical stakeholders, the various 
objectives that different tumaround managements identified for each of these 
stakeholders and the communication interventions for achieving each of these 
objectives, is proposed as the outcome of the study. 
This model is purposive and further research to make it more comprehensive and to 
generalize the model is recommended. As such every sick organization is expected to 
have its unique set of challenges and hence a unique set of communication strategy for 
enabling a tumaround. However, it is expected that the strategy can be derived from the 
model proposed as outcome of the research work that is presented in this thesis. 
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Communication Strategies 
for Organizational Turnaround: 
A Conceptual Foundation and Introduction 1 
Communication Strategies: Concepts, Models and Perspectives 
Concepts and Models: The study of communication as a process dates back to 1940s. 
Most of the initial communication models focused upon communication as primarily an 
exchange of information between parties- getting a message from one place or person to 
another place or person (Berlo, 1960; Schram, 1971; Schram & Roberts, 1971; Shannon & 
Weaver, 1949; Wofford, Gerloff, & Cummins, 1977). These models evolved from one way 
models to two-way interaction models and noted six components namely- source, transmitter, 
channel, receiver, noise and feedback (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). Later, the interaction 
models were developed to include sender's and receiver's perceptions of each other and of 
themselves, the communication context and the wider social and organizational settings in 
which the communication takes place. The two-person relationship model (Turner & 
Lombard, 1969) suggested that one considers not only each person's explicit behaviour but 
also how each perceives the other. According to this model, people tend to act in ways that 
confirm their self-perceptions. It illustrated the strong influence, self-view has on behaviour. 
The importance of self view, the perceptual point of view, and the concept of organic 
interdependence (two-way causality) constituted the key ideas in this model. (Fisher, 1994). 
Figure 1.1. The Two-Person Relationship Model 
A's view of, 
and behavior 
toward, B 
B's view of, 
and behavior 
toward, A 
A's view of A 
(way of thinking 
and feeling 
about) A 
B's view of B 
(way of thinking 
and feeling 
about) B 
Source: Turner, A.N. & Lombard, G.F.F. (1969). Interpersonal Behavior and Administration, p. 12. The Free Press, a division of 
MacmiUan. Copyright 1969 by Arthur N. Turner and George F. F. Lombard 
The communication-in-context model presented later asserted that all communication happens 
within some context and revealed three major new organizational factors, namely, group 
characteristics, organizational structure and culture, and task characteristics (Fisher, 1994) 
Figure 1.2. The Communication-in-Context Model. 
Organization 
stnicture 
and Culture 
Task 
characteristics 
Communicalion behaviour 
betiA'een individuafs 
Group 
•" Characteristics 
Source: Fisher, D. (1994). Communication in Organizations, p.l4, India: Jaico Publishing House. Copyright 1994 West 
Publishing Co. 
A system is a set of parts that depend on each other to perpetuate significant aspects of their 
being (Seiler, 1967). Since the communication-in-context model indicated two way 
dependence between the constituent parts, it was also termed as the system model (Seiler, 
1967; Fisher, 1994; Lorsch & Sheldon, 1972). 
Organizational communication also includes communications with parties in the environment 
outside the organization. External parties include clients, customers, suppliers, government 
officials and agencies, community groups, other organizations 
Figure 1.3. The Strategic Model: The Organization-Environment Transaction 
The organization 
Information received 
fi^om the environment 
I 
Strategy information 
The environment 
Information available 
in the environment 
from outside parties 
>• Information 
transmitted by the 
Source: Fisher, D. (1994). Communication in Organizations, p. 16. India: Jaico Publishing House. Copyright 1994 West 
Publishing Co. 
(with which the organization may be competing or cooperating) and the likes. The strategic 
model illustrated that the formation of an organization's strategy depends heavily on the flow 
of information between the organization and its environment. 
Dalmer (1994) suggested that all the five models of communication must be considered 
together to get a cohesive view of communication which is indeed a complex process. These 
five models progress from a narrow scope to a much broader one - from the individual 
communicator to the "big picture" of the total organization in communication with its 
environment. Taken together the models suggest that there is great value in zooming in and 
zooming out the focus to explore relationships at different levels. 
Varying Perspectives: Communication scholars regard organizational communication 
from four perspectives: the mechanistic, psychological (Dalmer, 1994; Jablin, 1979), 
interpretive-symbolic (Herbert, 1969), and systems-interactive (Putman & Jones, 1982). 
Implications of varying focus is captured and presented in Table 1.1 
Table 1.1. Four perspectives on Organizational Communication 
Perspective Principal Focus Features/Implications 
Mechanistic Message 
transmitted 
through a channel 
Focuses on accuracy, choice of chamel, amount of 
information, blocking or facilitating message flow 
Implies one-way or interaction model 
Psychological The receiver Perception is selective Individuals act as message 
interpreters Intemal barriers and noise affect the 
meanings people intend and perceive Contextual 
factors (as in the communication-in-context model) 
come into play 
Interpretive-
Symbolic 
Evolving shared 
meaning 
Meanings develop continuously as people interact 
Communication shapes organization structure and 
culture and is formed by them in tum 
People and organizations form, as well as respond to, 
their environments The two-person relationship, 
communication-in-context, and strategic models are 
related 
Systems-
Interactive 
Sequences of 
communication 
behavior 
Considers external action Identifies recurring patterns 
of action-reaction that predict outcomes Includes 
concepts of system and function Interaction, 
communication-in-corrtext, and strategic models are 
related 
Source: Fisher, D. (1994). Communication in Organizations, p.18. India: Jaico Publishing House. Copyright 1994 West 
Publishing Co. 
Yet another perspective is of communication researchers who have viewed communication 
flow within organizations from organizational theory point of view. Researchers prescribing 
to the classical perspective (Taylor's scientific management theory and Max Weber's 
bureucratic model of organizations), have viewed communication as an instrument of 
command and control. The flow of communication in this case is more downwards, 
centralized and formal (Hage, Aiken & Marrett, 1971; Jablin, 1987). Those prescribing to the 
human perspective (the Hawthome studies, Kurt Lewin's study of group dynamics and Mc 
Gregor's theory X and theory Y) maintain that the communication flow is less limited and 
also flows upwards and laterally. The socio-technical theory emphasized that the 
organizations must facilitate communication that accommodates new technology and serves 
personal and social needs of the employees. The system model implied that organizational 
communication includes external communication with customers, communities, governments, 
suppliers of goods and information, and others to whom the organization must respond and 
towards whom the organization must direct information and influence. Researchers 
supporting integrative perspective combined the socio-technical and systems perspective and 
asserted that the communication patterns would vary greatly from one effective organization 
to another or within the same organization at different times. 
The 1970s and 1980s produced a new view of organizations, a shift in perspective from 
objectivity to subjectivity (Morgan & Smircich, 1980). Morgan metaphorically referred to 
organizations as machines, organisms, brains, cultures, political systems, psychic prisons, and 
instruments of domination (Morgan, 1986). From this contemporary perspective, 
commionicatbn was seen as a critical element in an organization. The brain metaphor implied 
that organizations can learn. Whether it does or it does not was said to be dependant on its 
communication with its environment and among its members. It thus emphasized on the 
importance of collaborative coinmunication within organizations. Some researchers have 
asserted that communication is driven by the culture (basic assumptions people make to make 
sense out of their surroundings) and the communications create culture. Thus, managers and 
those who attempt to change organizational behaviour have to attempt to change the sense 
making patterns of its personnel, thus changing how they perceive the 'reality' of the 
organization. These researchers prescribe to the culture perspective. 
Organizational Change: Concepts and Models 
Change Models: The pace of global economic and technological developments has made 
change an inevitable feature of organizational life. The planned models of change that have 
received considerable attention are: Lewin 's change model, the action research model and the 
contemporary adaptations of action research model (Cummings & Worley, 2005). These 
models are presented in Figure 1.4 
Figure 1.4 Comparison of planned change models 
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All the three models described the phases in which planned change takes place and depend to 
varying degree on the knowledge of behaviour science. Lewin's model differed from the other 
two in that it focused on the general process of planned change, rather than on specific 
organizational development activities. Lewin's and action research model emphasize on the 
role of consultant with limited member involvement in the change process. Contemporary 
applications on the other hand treat both consultants and participants as co-learners who are 
heavily involved in planned change. Also, the first two were concerned with fixing problems 
while the latter focused on what the organization does well and leveraging those strengths. 
The difference in focus derives from the differences in defining reality as objective or socially 
constructed (Cummings & Worley, 2005; Gregen, 1985) 
Ramnarayan and Nilakant (2006) assert that change is complex and dynamic and put 
Leadership at the core of any change effort. Their change management model suggests four 
core tasks that are crucial to the success of any change initiative in organizations. These are 
appreciating change, mobilizing support for change, executing change and building change 
capability. They propounded that failures in change initiatives occur because managers fail to 
manage one or more of these tasks effectively. Change can be achieved by consciously and 
consistently attending to four practical points: a) tuning to the external environment and 
people's mindset b) influencing and persuading people and strengthening communication c) 
architecting change through cross-fimctional collaboration and challenging goals and d) 
creating positive contexts that enable people to have faith in their own capabilities, 
experiment, take risks and learn. 
On the basis of their study of failed effort of organizational transformation they proposed that 
an organizational change requires four leadership roles, namely, cognitive tuner, people 
cataliser, systems architect and efficacy builder for the four different tasks propounded in 
their model. 
Srinivasan (2006) presented the organizational effectiveness model developed to perform 
organizational diagnostics to facilitate transformation at Fritolay India (see Figure 1.5). The 
model was buih around four dimensions - vision and direction, organization and people, 
business processes & systems and the Frito Lay way. The key questions posed thereof were 
why and where to, who and what, how to and way to change. 
Kurt Lewin's theory propounded that there are powerful/orc^s that resist change. The main 
reasons for resisting are: no felt need to change; fear of the unknown; fear of changed 
relationships; threats to status and influence; organization structure; and lack of resources. 
Several researchers have suggested resistance reducing approaches. The most prominent 
being support (Cummings & Huse, 1989), education (Gersick, 1991) and participation 
(Cummings & Huse, 1989). 
Figure 1.5 Change management model with leadership at its core 
Source: Ramnarayan, S. & Nilakant, V. (2006). Altering mindsets: Heart of complex change. In P. Singh, 
J. Bhatnagar & A. Bhandarker (Eds.), Future of work: Mastering change, p. 331. New Delhi: Excel Books. Copyright 2006 
Authors 
Some organizational experts criticized the assertion that all changes are fundamentally alike. 
Arguing that situational factors can vary, they preferred a contingency framework in which an 
organization's approach to change depends on the situation. 
Porras and Hofer (1986) presented common behavioural changes in successful organization 
change efforts. These are presented in Table 1.2. 
Researchers have also indicated that significant ethical issues can exist in any planned effort 
(Cummings & Huse, 1989; Hellreigel, Slocum & Woodman, White & Wooten, 1983). French 
and Bell offer a set of ethical standards for planned change as given in Table 1.3. 
Table 1.2. Common Behavioural Changes in Successful Organization Change efforts 
Behavior Category Description 
All Organization Levels 
Communicating openly Behaviors promoting or reflecting the direct giving and receiving 
of information relevant to getting the job done 
Collaborating Behaviors promoting or reflecting the involvement of relevant 
persons in the processes of identifying and solving problems 
Taking responsibility Behaviors reflecting acceptance of responsibility and taking 
initiative in carrying out organizational tasks 
Maintaining a shared 
vision 
Behaviors reflecting a clear formulation, understanding, and 
commitment to organizational philosophy, values, and purposes 
and a commitment to high standards 
Solving problems 
effectively 
Behaviors reflecting a problem-solving orientation to difficult 
organizational issues 
Respecting/supporting Behaviors demonstrating respect and support for others as 
worthwhile individuals 
Processing/facilitating 
interactions 
Behaviors reflecting attention to and use of human process issues 
in one-on-one, group, and intergroup situations 
Inquiring Behaviors reflecting a probing, inquiring, diagnostic orientation 
to the organization and its environment 
Experimenting Behaviors promoting or reflecting an openness to trying new 
things 
Managerial Level 
Generating participation Behaviors involving relevant persons in important organization 
decisions 
Leading by vision Behaviors shaping, communicating, modeling, and reinforcing 
organizational goals, values, purposes, and high work standards 
Functioning strategically Behaviors reflecting a systemic and long-range perspective on 
organizational matters 
Promoting information 
flow 
Behaviors increasing the overall amount of information in the 
organization 
Developing others Behaviors that develop the knowledge, skills, and competency of 
subordinates and others in the org 
Source: Porras J.I. & Hofer S.I. (1986). Common Behavior Changes in Successful Organizational Developmenflifforts. The Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science!!, no. 4: 485. 
Table 1.3 Ethical Standards for planned change 
Principles Unfreezing Stages Changing Refreezing 
Redundancy and 
multimedia aids retention 
Multimedia 
campaign 
delineating 
rationale, of 
objectives, planning 
activities and 
expectations 
Frequent multimedia 
delivery including 
outcomes as they 
occur 
Use of media to 
celebrate success 
as warranted with 
phase out as new 
process is 
institutionalized 
Face-to-face medium is 
effective 
Group meetings at 
each level of the 
hierarchy 
Group meetings at 
each level of the 
hierarchy 
Reliance on 
supervisor at each 
level to convey 
change - relevant 
information with 
senior management 
playing a key role 
regularly but less 
fi^equently than in 
other stages (e.g. 
awards assembly, 
semi-annual 
progress report 
.etc.) 
Effectiveness of line 
management as 
communications channel 
See above with 
senior management 
of each unit 
presiding at stage 
setting meetings 
Emphasis (si 
delivering information 
through line 
management. Special 
emphasis is placed on 
the top and consistent 
knowledgeable 
participation of each 
supervisory level 
Direct supervision as key 
communicator 
Meetings 
subsequent to stage 
setting are 
conveyed and run 
by unit supervisor 
Opinion leaders as key 
communicators 
Opinion leaders are 
kept completely 
abreast of all 
relevant 
information through 
face-to-face 
meetings 
Same as in unfreezing Same as before 
Personal relevance of 
interpretation 
Expectations 
concerning personal 
impact of change 
should be conveyed 
via unit 
management and 
supervisors 
As more information 
becomes known, 
supervisors disclose 
relevant personal and 
job-related 
information to 
subordinates. 
Especially job and role 
expectations as each 
person may be 
affected 
This information is 
becoming 
increasingly 
accessible from 
personal 
experience but 
should be 
conveyed by 
supervisor when 
necessary. 
Clarifying personal 
impact is essential 
Communications should 
be consistent and 
reinforcing 
All communiques 
should carry the 
same message and 
be consistent with 
organization's core 
values as 
appropriate 
Same as unfreezing 
except more attention 
is placed on details as 
they become known 
Reaffirmation of 
successes in 
supporting core 
values and meeting 
objectives 
Source: Fisher, D. (1994). Communication in Organizations, p.498 India: Jaico Publishing House. Copyright 1994 West Pubhshing Co. 
Kotter and Schlesinger presented general strategies for overcoming resistance to change. 
These are presented in Table 1.4: Cummings and Huse (1989) identified human process 
issues, technology/structure issues, human resource issues and strategic issues as the four 
interrelated issues that all organizations face when undergoing change. They also suggested 
interventions to address resistance to change. These are interrelated and presented in the 
Figure 1.6, types of planned change interventions and organizational issues 
There are interrelationships within the four areas and it is important to integrate the 
interventions in each area with activity in other areas (Bowditch & Buono, 1990; Cummings 
& Huse, 1989; Hellreigel, Slocum & Osbom, 1992; Schermerhom, Hunt, & Osbom, 1991). 
Table 1.4. General strategies for overcoming resistance to change 
Approach Commonly Used in 
Situations 
Advantages Drawbacks 
Education + 
communication 
Where there is a lack 
of information or 
inaccurate information 
and analysis 
Once persuaded, people 
will often help with the 
implementation of the 
change 
Can be very time-
consuming if lots 
of people are 
involved 
Participation + 
involvement 
Where the initiators do 
not have all the 
information they need 
to design the change, 
and where others have 
considerable power to 
resist 
People who participate 
will be committed to 
implementing change, and 
any relevant information 
they have will be 
integrated into the change 
plan 
Can be very time-
consuming if 
participators 
design an 
inappropriate 
change 
Facilitation + 
support 
Where people are 
resisting because of 
adjustment problems 
No other approach works 
as well with adjustment 
problems 
Can be time-
consuming, 
expensive, and still 
fail 
Negotiation + 
agreement 
Where someone or 
some group will 
clearly lose out In a 
change, and where that 
group has considerable 
power to resist 
Sometimes it is a relatively 
easy way to avoid major 
resistance 
Can be too 
expensive in many 
cases if it alerts 
others to negotiate 
for compliance 
Manipulation + 
co-optation 
Where other tactics 
will not work or are 
too expensive 
It can be a relatively quick 
and Inexpensive solution 
to resistance problems 
Can lead to future 
problems if people 
feel manipulated 
Explicit + 
impBcit 
coercion 
Where speed is 
essential and the 
change initiators 
possess considerable 
power 
It is speedy and kind of 
resistance 
Can be risky if it 
leaves people mad 
at the initiators 
Source: Kotter & Schelesinger (1979). Choosing strategies for change. Harvard Business Review. Copyright 1979 
by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. 
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Figure 1.6 Types of planned change interventions and organizational issues 
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people's careers 
Human Resource 
Management 
Interventions 
Management by 
objectives 
Career planning and 
development 
Stress management 
Human Process Issues 
How to communicate 
How to solve problems 
How to make decisions 
How to interact How to 
lead 
Human Process 
Interventions 
Process consultation 
Team building Survey 
feedback 
Communication audits 
Source: Cummings, T.G. & Huse, E.F. (1989). Organization Development and Change (4* ed.), p 128. St. Paul: 
West Publishing Company. Copyright 1989 by West Publishing Company. 
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French and Bell (1990) emphasized on advantages of external consultants as they would be 
less easily drawn into organization's norms and thus be freer to examine the organization 
from a broad objective viewpoint. The guidelines given by French and Bell to change 
practitioners included the fr)llowing: See the organization, not an individual, as the client; 
develop mutual trust; avoid being the trust; intervene at the appropriate depth; avoid 
becoming part of the culture; practice what you preach (Fisher, 1994). 
Organizational Change and Communication Strategies 
Introduction: In his article, "Leading Change: why transformation efforts fail", Kotter 
(1995) listed "under-communication" as one of the major reasons of why change efforts do 
not succeed. He stated: 
"Transformation is impossible unless hundreds or thousands of people are 
willing to help, often to the point of making short-term sacrifices. Employees 
will not make sacrifices, even if they are unhappy with the status quo, unless 
they believe that useful change is possible. Without credible communication, 
and a lot of it, the hearts and minds of the troops are never captured" 
(Kotter, 1995). 
A study done by Melcrum publishing revealed that the single most important factor in 
building a committed and loyal workforce is to involve the senior leaders in internal 
communication efforts. This challenge is to involve not just the CEO or senior most official 
but a greater challenge identified was to involve the second rung i.e. the Vice-Presidents or 
GMs. The major challenges were identified to fall in four categories: lack of time. 
Unwillingness to communicate, lack of communication skill, and behaviour determined by 
style of leadership. Most people do not frilly comprehend the necessity for change or how it 
ultimately might affect them. Despite a Company's communication effort, rumours, mostly 
negative are aboimd. 
Varying Perspectives: Scholars have been studying communication and change from 
several perspectives such as barriers to communication (Galphin, 1995; Kotler, 1995), 
disclosure during crises (Kaufman, Kesner and Hazen, 1991), role of conversations and 
dialogues in leading change or bringing about intentional change (April, 1999; ford, 1995) 
and even advocating smart-talk as detrimental to change (Pfeffer, Jeffrey & Sutton, 1999). 
The second half of 1990s witnessed an increasing number of studies focused on management 
communication strategy for change (Klein, 1996). Most of these studies directed attention 
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towards role of and strategies for internal communication (Adams & Roebuck, 1997; Barret, 
2002; Kitchen, 2002; Proctor, Tony & Doukakis, 2003). Klien (1996) asserted that 
incrementally implemented change that may be non-inclusive at the start can be a fertile 
ground for rumours, anxiety and ultimately resistance. Barret (2002) suggested a generic 
strategic employee communication model for major change, which could be merger, 
acquisition, new venture, new process improvement approach or any other form. Kitchen 
(2002) explored the link between change, change management and internal communication. 
This change could have been strategic or operational but made in order to perpetuate survival 
and growth. Proctor and Donkakis (2003) looked at introduction of change in management 
structure of a large public sector organization. The definition of change is thus very broadly 
defined by various researchers. However, the inclination of research studies is tilted more 
towards employee communications during change. 
Kitchen and Daly (2002) discussed, how Matheson and Matheson's (1998) factors that 
impede successful implementation of change management, highlighted the pivotal role of 
employees in effective change management. Pfeffer (1978) and Mintzberg (1983) noted the 
role of organizational political processes while Matheson and Matheson (1998) looked at 
how information concerning change is disseminated within organizations and how that 
information could be interpreted by employees. Several researchers have asserted that 
employee engagement in the change process is a determining factor, in whether 
organizational change is achieved or not (Clarke and Clegg, 1998; Heller, 1998; Kanter, 1983; 
Peters & Waterman, 1982; Porter, 1985). 
Depending on their perception of the organization they communicate positive or negative 
messages to external publics, constituencies or stakeholders such as community members, key 
influentials, financial groups, politicians, and consumer groups (Kitchen, 1997). 
Stuart Klein (1996) developed a communication strategy model relating seven communication 
principles to stages of organizational change. The model is presented in Table 1.5: 
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Table 1.5. Management Communication Strategy for change 
Unfreezing Changing Refreezing 
Organizational Readying the Beginning the process Reinforcing the 
objective organization for Developing momentum change 
change Evaluating Pilot efforts Shoring up 
Challenging the weaknesses and 
Status correcting 
Provision of rational deficiencies 
Making the change 
demonstrably 
successful 
Institutionalizing the 
change 
Organizational Planning the Implementing change in Broadening the 
activities organizing for change selected areas change to all 
Assembling resources Monitoring impact of appropriate areas 
Designing Structure change Rewarding Successes 
Training personnel Modifying or fine Solidifying 
Targeting change tuning process as supporting monitoring 
areas warranted organizational 
Collecting baseline Extending changes as Structures 
data 
Soliciting participates 
input 
warranted 
Communication Explaining issues, Informing employees of Publicizing the 
needs needs, rationale progress success of the change 
Identifying and Getting input as to Spreading the word to 
explaining directives effect of the process employees 
Identifying and Developing 
explaining first few sophisticated knowledge 
steps among all supervisory 
Reassuring people management 
Informing Challenging 
management cadre misconceptions 
Continual reassurance 
of employees 
Delineating and 
clarifying role 
relationships and 
expectation 
Source. Klein, M.S. (1996). A management communication strategy for change, p. 2:9. Journal of Organizational Change 
Management, 9(2). 
Thus, we notice an increasing interest in strategic communication for managing change. This 
change as discussed above is very broadly defined by different researchers and the 
communication efforts studied are mostly internal. However, Barret (2002) notes that 
analytical phase for change communication is often the phase a management will omit or 
minimize because they fail to recognize its significance or fail to see communication planning 
as strategic, to allowing the time and attention it needs. 
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Organizational Turnaround 
Range of Definitions: In the turnaround literature, a range of definitions have been used to 
define distress, some based on change in either simple or industry-adjusted accounting ratios 
such as return on assets and some others based on stock returns. Altman (1968) popularized 
the Z- score as a measure of a firm's likelihood of bankruptcy. In the UK, Z-score model used 
by Banks and industrial firms was developed by Taffler (1983, 1984). Firms with a negative 
Z-score are classified as potential failures, as their financial profiles resemble those of 
previously bankrupt firms. The model, developed using linear discriminant analysis 
techniques, takes the following form: Z= CO + CI XI + C2 X2 + C3X3 + C4X4 where 
XI... .X4 denote the financial ratios and C1... C4 the coefficients that are proprietary. 
The turnaround of sick companies has been a subject of great interest to research scholars, 
consultants and managers (Bruton, Ahlstrom & Wan, 2001; Chanda 2002; Collins, 2001; 
Mone, Mickinley & Barker III, 1998). Varying definitions of organizational turnaround have 
been adopted by research scholars and practitioners. Schendel, Patton & Riggs (1976) defined 
tumaround as reversal of a firm's pattem of performance decline. Furman and McGahan 
(2002) defined it as a change in business segment profitability fi-om the lowest quintile among 
all businesses in a specific year to the highest quintile among all businesses in any subsequent 
year covered in the dataset. Yet another definition of tumaround compared the performance 
of the business segment during both its early poor years and its later superior years with the 
performance of all other businesses, regardless of whether they are in the same industry 
(Sudarsanam & Lai, 2001). This broad definition allows for the possibility that either 
industry-level factors or idiosyncratic factors drive the tumaround. BIFR, Board for Industrial 
and Financial Reconstmction, the appellate authority set up by the Government of India 
determines sickness in an industrial company on the basis of four criterion: (i) the 
accumulated losses of the company to be equal to or more than its net worth i.e. its paid up 
capital plus its free reserves (ii) the company should have completed five years after 
incorporation under the Companies Act, 1956 (iii) it should have 50 or more workers on any 
day of the 12 months preceding the end of the financial year with reference to which sickness 
is claimed, (iv) it should have a factory license. 
Types of turnarounds: There are many types of turnarounds and differing circumstances 
within each type. The principal types of tumarounds are: the management process 
turnaround, the economic or business cycle turnaround, the competitive environment 
turnaround, the product breaktitrougft turnaround, and finally, the government related 
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turnaround. The management process turnaround accounts for two-thirds of the tumarounds 
and Bibeault (1978) refered to it as the only "real" kind of turnaround. 
In a management process turnaround, the principle reason for decline is management 
problems and the key factors changed to accomplish the turnaround were management 
processes. It includes the fundamental correction of culture of the Company. The economic or 
business cycle turnaround affects cyclical industries. These industries have their up and down 
periods amplified. While both decline and upswing may be attributed to economic shifts, 
companies that perform poorly cannot blame the economy or their industry from a 
fiindamental standpoint. This is because the economic turnaround is not just a joyride up the 
roller coaster. Keeping things together during the downturn and keeping the business alive 
long enough for the economy to turnaround requires a tough management effort. The 
competitive turnaround is one in which the tumaround is attributed to the economic and 
competitive factors such as increased industry volume or competitive price increases. 
Researchers however assert that not all companies in a given sector in a given place and time 
may tumaround to exhibit similar growth paths, thereby demonstrating the critical role of 
management in this tumaround process as well. The product breakthrough tumaround 
accounts for about 4% of the tumarounds and take two major forms: breakthroughs in 
consumer tastes and technical or scientific breakthroughs. The Government-related 
tumaround are related to a major change in government procurement policies such as 
dissolution of contracts; a major shift in regulation such as environment controls; or direct 
government assistance for bridge financing etc. 
Turnaround strategies: Turning around a sick Company usually requires a tumaround 
strategy. The development of tumaround strategy is a complex process which happens in a 
demanding context. Timelines are usually short, and the need to build on a rapid analysis of 
the position of the troubled company is usually acute. Tumaround managers are seldom 
afforded the luxury of time to prepare the ground for change, as crises demand attention and 
stakeholders seek assurances and results (Harker & Sharma, 2000). Several researchers have 
studied the tumaround strategies (Gowen & Tallon, 2002; Kow, 2004a, 2004b) and found that 
organizations have adopted different approaches in turning around companies. 
Tumaround responses are also categorized as strategic and operating. Strategic turnarounds 
focus on changing or adjusting the business; the firm is currently engaged in and consists of 
major long term moves such as diversification, vertical integration, new market share 
initiatives and divestment. Operating turnarounds focus on the way a firm currently conducts 
its business and involves short run tactics geared towards cost cutting, asset reduction and 
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revenue generation. (Hofer, 1980; Schendel, Patton & Rigs, 1976). This generalization was 
later challenged by Chowdhary (2002) who suggested that a combination of strategies may be 
appropriate for a particular type of turnaround and the stage of decline at which the 
turnaround is attempted. 
According to views of one set of researchers retrenchment, defined as a reduction in firm 
assets and/or costs, was strongly associated with Return on Investment (Rol) increases and 
other performance increases for declining textile firms. Therefore, retrenchment should be an 
integral component of any tumaround strategy for declining firms {theory O) (Robins and 
Pearce, 1992). The other set of researchers purport that retrenching firms have on an average 
steeper performance declines. They contend that Robbins and Pearce recommendations 
contradict the existing tumaround theories and recommend strategic change as the primary 
route through which firms with weak strategic positioning recover (theory O) (Barker and 
Mone, 1994; Schendel, Patton & Rigs, 1976; Hofer, 1980). They warn that engaging in 
retrenchment activities may decrease a firm's chance of recovery (Grinyer & Spender, 1979; 
Herdberg, Nystrom & Starbuck, 1976). Beer and Nohria (2000) later suggested an alternative 
to theory E (change based on economic value) and theory O (change based on organizational 
capability) by combining the hard and soft approaches to change. 
Process of turnaround: While research on the content of successful tumaround strategies 
(what to do) is common, research on the process by which such strategies are implemented 
(how to do it) is rare (Balgobin & Pandit, 2001). Tumaround has been seen to proceed 
through several stages. Balgobin and Pandit (2001) classified the process into five stages, 
namely. Decline and crisis, triggers of change, recovery strategy formulation, retrenchment 
and stabilization and return to growth. Bibeault (1982) identified five discrete stages of the 
tumaround, namely: the management change stage, the evaluation stage, the emergency stage, 
the stabilization stage and the return-to-normal-growth stage. 
Literature also focuses on key factors in tumaround success. The four key factors widely 
accepted are: new competent management with fiill authority to make all the required 
changes; an economically and competitively viable core operation; 'bridge' capital fi-om 
extemal and intemal sources to finance the tumaround; a positive attitude and motivated 
people so that initial tumaround momentum is sustained (Bibeault, 1987). Several 
organizational factors influence tumaround actions taken by the change agents. These factors 
are group characteristics, ownership, corporate strategy, stracture, systems, industrial 
relations, organizational culture and leadership (Maheshwari, 2000). 
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The leader in a turnaround situation is the architect and implementer of the turnaround 
strategy. The four characteristics and skills that a turnaround leader must possess include: an 
entrepreneurial instinct coupled with professional management skills; broad business 
experience; expert negotiating skills and expert interviewing skills (Bibeault, 1987). Lately, 
the researchers have also attempted to understand the Board dynamics and Board and 
management relations and roles in governance and turnaround. (Barker & Barr, 2005; Daily 
& Dalton, 1995; Mellahi K, 2005) 
The regional context: It is clear from the current body of literature that the models of 
turnaround from the West are not uniformly applicable to Asia. Culture and the institutional 
environment coupled with different stages of development of Asian economies limit the 
usefulness of models derived from studies of tumaround in more developed economies. In 
addition, enablers of change and restructuring in Asia also differ, making different approaches 
to tumaround possible (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2004). Countries of Asia, while sharing many 
similarities, enjoy enough differences to require the study of phenomena within specific 
country contexts. Thus, researchers need to be clear on points of similarities and differences 
around the region to control country differences in the study of tumaround. (Ahlstrom & 
Bmton, 2004). 
The issue of stakeholders and their role in the tumaround of organizations in Asia is one that 
also deserves greater attention. Government is a key stake holder in Asian countries. In many 
nations such as India and Korea, unions can also be major stakeholders while in other 
economies such as that of China, HongKong and Singapore, they play a minimal role. 
Organizational Turnaround and Communication Strategies: 
A gap in the literature 
Organizational change has emerged as an imperative for organizational competitiveness and 
survival. Amongst various initiatives the most radical one is organizational tumaround of sick 
companies 
As discussed, environment has become increasingly volatile and the percentage of sick 
Companies tuming around and setting themselves on a growth path is very low. However, the 
literature survey reveals that turnarounds are happening and many researchers are working in 
the area. The literature also indicates that factors affecting tumaround are embedded in 
regional contexts. The need for study in Indian context is therefore established. Most of the 
studies documented are of companies in US or UK. Many researchers have identified a gap in 
tumaround research in developing countries and in Asia. 
The literature also details the role of cormnunication during change. But very few studies 
have been done to establish role and process of communication in enabling a turnaround. 
Organizational turnaround is a change effort that requires a large number of stakeholders to 
change their individual behavior. Coordination of stakeholders is thus at the core of 
governance during radical environmental change. (Meyer, 2004). The role of communication 
receives attention when several elements such as leadership, motivation, image of the 
organization are dealt with. Communication is thus seen to play a role in enabling essential 
elements of turnaround. Thus, turnaround literature documents the role of communication as 
part of implementation process for several tumaround elements. 
However, not many studies have concentrated to explore whether a communication strategy is 
adopted by tumaround managements or not. A study of communication during tumaround of 
Indian organizations may perhaps reveal communication strategies that successful tumaround 
managements have been adopting. Such a study on one hand would enrich the literature and 
on the other hand may prove worthwhile for managements striving for an organizational 
tumaround. A research to explore role of communication and propose a communication 
strategy to enable organizational tumaround is thus warranted and hence attempted hereof 
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Literature Review 2 
Role of Communication during Organizational Change 
Change literature widely documents the important role that communication plays in the 
production of change. Several writers have stressed on the role of communication in the 
change process even to the extent of suggesting that change is a communication problem that 
can be resolved by having people understand the change and the role they play in its 
implementation (Kotter, 1990). In this context, communication is seen as a tool for 
announcing and explaining change, preparing peopb for the positive and negative effects of 
change (Jick, 1993), increasing other's understanding of and commitment to the change 
(Beckhard & Pritchard, 1992; Morgan, 1998) and reducing confusion about and resistance to 
change (Kotter, 1990; Schlesinger, 1979). Communication has also been seen as a tool for 
diffiising dissatisfaction with the status quo in order to inspire people to change (Beer, 1980; 
Spector, 1989), as a mechanism for sustaining the change (Kritpatrick, 1985) and as a way to 
receive feedback on what change means to people and how they believe it will affect them 
(Kanter, Stein & Jick, 1992). It is considered a critical element in enabling people to change 
their attitudes and behaviours (Beckhard & Pretchard, 1992; Beer, Eisenstat, & Spector, 1990) 
and in their gaining ownership of the change. Kanter, Stein and Jick (1992) suggested that the 
key roles communication plays are providing and obtaining information, creating 
understanding, and building ownership. 
The role of intemal communication during change management has interested several 
researchers over the last two decades. Kitchen and Daly (2002) published a conceptual paper 
to explore the nature of the link between change, change management and intemal 
communications. They delved on theo-etical contributions in each of the domains and 
explored how intemal communication contributed to the successful implementation of change 
process. 
Klien (1996) put together some empirically founded communication principles and proposed 
that they can constitute a communication strategy. These principles were: message 
redundancy is related to message retention; the use of several media is more effective than the 
use of just one; face-to-face communication is a preffered medium; the line hierarchy is the 
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most effective organizationally sanctioned communication channel; direct supervisor is the 
expected and most effective source of organizationally sanctioned information; opinion 
leaders are effective changers of attitudes and opinions; and personally relevant information is 
better retained than abstract, unfamiliar or general information. He then combined the set of 
principles with Kurt Lewinian model of change and proposed a model of communication 
strategy for change that also detailed the objectives, activities and communication needs for 
each stage of the change model. 
A strategic employee communication model with best practice definitions, demonstrating a 
change communication approach to improving employee communications was proposed by 
Barret (2002). According to him, employee communication must play a strategic role in an 
organization to work effectively. That strategic role means that communication must be 
integrated into the Company's strategy and recognized for its strategic implications and 
effects. The traditional communication messages and media are at the heart of the model but 
the direct link to the company's strategic objectives and the business planning process and the 
overlay of supportive management with an on-going assessment of individual and company 
communication, move the model from tactical to strategic. Further, Barret asserted that there 
should be a one-to-one correlation between what the Company has established as its strategic 
objectives and what is listed as the objectives for communications. In addition, the 
communications must be structured to translate the central strategic messages (from vision to 
performance or financial goals) to all employees. Other important best practices defined in the 
model included supportive management, targeted messages, effective media/ forums, well 
positioned staff, ongoing assessment and integrated processes. 
Several researchers have asserted that organizational efforts fail due to employee resistance to 
change. Proctor & Doukakis (2003) studied management structure and communication in a 
large public organization and concluded that the key to successful implmentation of change 
lied in effective communication. Internal communication they argued, is important integral 
part of employee development and is one of the core parts needed to implement it. Further, 
they asserted that trust, commitment and loyalty can be developed with the help of internal 
marketing and empowerment of employees can be facilitated by it. 
Propositions that information of the change, feelings of a community within organization 
which is undergoing the change, and uncertainity have an influence on readiness for change 
and are influenced by the kind of change communication that takes place were suggested by 
Elving (2005). On the basis of these propositions he suggested a conceptual fi"amework for 
the study of communication during organizational change. However, he recommended 
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empirical research to establish the framework and suggested ways of measurement for the 
same. 
Chawla & Kelloway (2004) developed and tested a model of change management startegies 
that predict openness and commitment to large-scale change. Based on a sample of 164 
employees, a partially and fully mediated model were compared with the former providing the 
best fit to the data. They concluded that communication and job security predicted openness 
and trust both directly and indirectly via procedural trust. Participation predicted trust directly 
and indirecdy but predicted openness to change only indirectly (through procedural justice). 
Turnover intentions were negatively predicted by openness and trust. Also turnover intentions 
predicted neglect. These results highlighted the role of procedural justice perceptions in 
understanding organizational change. The evidence thus pointed towards importance of 
managing change perceptions at the early stages whilst cautioning them against becoming 
lackadiscical after go-live festivities. 
A completely different perspective proposes change as a phenomena that occurs within 
communication. Ford and Ford (1995) asserted that intentional change is a matter of 
deliberately bringing into existence, through communication, a new reality of social structures 
which effectively produces change. They proposed that although participants may engange in 
many conversations, there are four different combinations of speech acts that correspond to 
four different types of interactions in the intentional change process. These are initiative 
coversations, conversations for understanding, conversations for performance and 
conversations for closure. They challenge the models of change that identify communication 
as one step in a multistep change process. The models, acording to ford and ford, fail to 
specify the medium through which the other steps are accomplished. They thus assert that the 
entire change process happens within the context of communication. 
Several other studies done by researchers have explored and asserted the role of strategic 
employee communications or corporate communications or role of conversations or dialogue 
during the change process. Change however is defined differently in different studies. It is 
studied as a process targetted at varying outcomes such as diversification, joint ventures, 
globalization, localization or several other paradigms, for the purpose of this study, it was 
decided to study a radical change initiavtive - a tumround from organizational decline. 
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Table 2.1 Organizational Cliange And Communication: A Summary 
Tlieme Author (s) Title 
Cliange, Leadership And Communication 
Discusses leadership issues such as April, 1999 Leading through 
diversity, teams, collaboration, trust communication and 
formation, community, individual change. dialogue 
and relationships - in relation to dialogue 
and transformation. Where trust is high. 
change is managed more effectively and. 
where it is low, communication and co-
operation suffer and there is increasing 
tendency to resort to power. Concludes that 
change is a phenomena that occurs within 
conversation and dialogue and is therefore 
social construct within twenty-first century 
organizations 
Elaborates on eight steps to transforming an Kotter, 1995 Leading Change: why 
organization, one of them being transformation efforts 
'communicating the vision fail 
Discusses in detail PepsiCo India Holdings' Srinivasan, Leading Corporate 
Visioning processes, key actions taken in 2006 Transformation 
each of them, the people programmes that through Visioning 
supported them and how they helped the 
organization to master change and generate 
key insights for the future 
Change Management involves appreciating Ramnarayan Altering Mindsets: 
change, mobilizing support, building & Nilakant, Heart of Complex 
change capability and executing change. A 2006 Change 
case of failed transformation is analyzed to 
conclude that complex change requires 
sustained efforts and four leadership roles, 
namely cognitive tuner, people catalyser, 
systems architect and efficacy builder 
Change And Employee Communication 
Most perspectives on change propose that Ford & Ford The Role of 
communication occurs in the context of 1995 Conversations in 
change. This article inverts that perspective producing intentional 
by proposing both that commuiucation is change in 
the context in which change occurs and that organizations 
the change process unfolds in the dynamic 
of four types of conversations 
Future of work: mastering Change, edited Ramnarayan Altering Mindsets: 
by Pritam Singh, Jyotsna Bhatnagar and & Nilakant, Heart of Complex 
Asha Bhandarker, 329-352. 2006 Change 
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Theme Author (s) Title 
Based on a sample of 164 employees, a 
partially and a fully mediated model were 
compared with the former providing best fir 
to the data. Communication and job security 
predicted openness and trust direcdy and 
indirecdy through procedural justice. 
Chawla & 
Kelloway, 
2004 
Predicting openness 
and commitment to 
change 
Proposes Strategic Employee 
Communication Model and defines best 
practices and provides a case study of the 
successful use of the model during a major 
change program. 
Barret, 2002 Change 
Communication using 
strategic employee 
communication to 
facilitate major change 
Appropriate corporate communications 
promote better chances to dissolve 
resistance to changes brought by business 
process re-engineering. Proposed a 
communication model in the BPR context 
Betniro, 
Gardiner, 
Simmons, 
Santos & 
Rentes AF, 
2000 
Corporate 
Communications 
within a BPR context 
Presents how some familiar communication 
models such as Johari Window, 
Organizational Johari and Resistance 
Pyramid can be used to nip budding rumors 
on the office grapevine 
Galphin, 
1995 
I the Grapevine 
Explores the link between change, change 
management and internal communications 
and how the latter contributes to successfiil 
implementation of change management 
programmes 
Kitchen & 
Daly, 2002 
Internal 
Communication 
during Change 
Management 
Highlights the widely prevalent knowing-
doing gap and attributes it to extra emphasis 
given to smart talk against action. Presents 
five characteristics of leaders of 
organizations that consistently say smart 
things and then follow them up with action 
Pfeffer & 
Sutton, 1999 
lart-Talk Trap 
Content Analyzed 157 crises for crises 
types, initial and ongoing communication 
channels and sources, and respondent 
preferences for communication strategies. 
Results supported the literature but 
recommendations for expansion of crises 
communication plans with greater attention 
to methods and messages for internal 
stakeholder were made 
Adams & 
Roebuck, 
1997 
Exploring neglected 
terrain: 
Communication with 
employees during 
crises 
Asserts that key to successful introduction 
of change lies in effective communication 
and proposes employment of employee 
development programmes to change the 
attitude and behaviour of staff 
Proctor & 
Doukakis, 
2003 
Change management: 
the role of internal 
communication and 
employee 
development 
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Theme Author (s) Title 
Managing Group and Inter-group Relations Lorsch & 
Sheldon, 
1967 
The Individual in the 
Organization: A 
systems view 
Change And Communication Strategy 
Shows how communicators can link their 
strategies to organizational goals in a way 
that adds measurable value to the 
bottomline 
Moorcrofl, 
2003 
Linking 
communication 
strategy with 
organizational goals 
Discusses strengths and weaknesses og full 
disclosure during crises and suggests how 
to handle crises communications. Asserts 
finally that an organization must never lie 
when caught in a crises and advocates help 
of a lawyer in the situation 
Kaufman, 
Kesner & 
Hazen, 1991 
The myth of Full 
Disclosure: A look at 
organizational 
communications 
during crisis 
Describes changes in environment that have 
created the need for a stronger and more 
strategic employee communications effort 
through plaiming and staffing. Finally, it 
discusses ways to implement the right 
program for today's environment 
Argenti, 
1998 
Strategic Employee 
Communications 
A Case Study based on a constructionist 
approach and four methodological 
foundations 
Langer & 
Thorup, 2006 
Building trust in times 
of crises 
Stakeholder Influence And Change 
Proposes a conceptual model of 
communication during organizational 
change that emphasis on two roles of 
communication - the informative and the 
community building role. 
Elving, 2005 The role of 
communication in 
organizational change 
On the basis of 11 parting parties thrown in 
dying organizations, the authors elaborate 
on individual and organizational functions 
that parting ceremonies perform in dying 
units or organizations. They assert that 
people can exchange emotional support and 
edit self, social-system and event schemata 
while organizations can gain on account of 
member motivation, information 
dissemination, external stakeholder 
acceptance, impression management and 
guilt assuagement. 
Harris & 
Sutton, 1986 
Functions of parting 
ceremonies in dying 
organizations 
Source: Prepared by the researcher 
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Organizational Decline and Turnaround 
Overview: A turnaround is a unique phenomena that represents the capacity of an 
organization - a human collectivity - to revive itself from deathbed. Every successful 
turnaround reaffirms the capacity of human collectivities to rebuild what is decayed and 
transform it for a fresh lease of life (Khandwalla, 2001). What makes a turnaround happen has 
intrigued many researchers for a long time. Both qualitative and quantitative techniques have 
been employed in the past to capture and analyze what turnaround managements did to bring 
life to a decaying phenomena. 
The main themes on which researchers studying tumarorounds have focussed in the past 
range from identifying and understanding triggers of turnaround (Poston, Harmon & 
Gramlich, 1994; Scherrer, 2003) unravelling the strategies of turnaround (Schendel, Patton & 
Rigs, 1976; Hofer, 1980, Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Slatter, 1984; Pant, 1987; Chowdhary 
& Lang, 1996; Gowen & Tallon, 2002; Chanda, 2002 ), developing models to appreciate 
stages and processes of turnaround (Pant, 1991; Arogyaswamy, Barker & Ardekani , 1995; 
Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Mone, Mckinley, & Barker III, 1998; Barker & Mone, 1998; 
Balgobin & Pandit, 2001; Kow, 2004) and uncovering the role of leadership in enabling 
turnarounds (Bibeault, 1982; Barker & Patterson, 1996; Harker & Sharma, 2000; Barker & 
Barr, 2002; Francis & Mariola, 2003; Huang & Snell, 2003). 
A debate on theory E and theory O tumarounds is also widely evident amongst the 
researchers (Khandwalla 2001, 1991, 1989; Robbins & Pearce, 1992; Barker & Mone, 1994), 
as some managements are observed to retrench manpower and carryout surgical operations to 
cure the ailing enterprise while others adopt transformational leadership styles to revive the 
demotivated non-performing workforce. 
The vast literature on organizational decline and turnaround generally indicates two research 
approaches - the content approach and the process approach. Some researchers have adopted 
the content approach and have focussed on examing various factors related to tumaround on 
the basis of crosssectional statistical analysis of data collected from a number of organizations 
(Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Bibeault, 1982; Casfrogiovanni & Bruton, 2000; Chowdhary & 
Lang, 1996; Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Khandwalla, 2001, 1992, 1989; Manimala, 1991; 
O'Neil, 1986; Pant 1991; Robbins & Pearce, 1992; Schendel & Patton, 1976; Schendel Patton 
& Rigs, 1976; Thietart, 1988) while others have adopted the process approach that narrates a 
sequence of events as they unfold to cause a dependant variable to respond to an independent 
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variable (Van de Ven & Huber, 1990, Pandey, S.C. & Verma, P., 2005, Chowdhary, 2002, 
Maheshwari 2000). Some researchers have opined that it is the process through which 
turnaround strategies are implemented and not the content per se. Therefore, both content and 
process approaches are linked to each other and are equally important for developing a good 
theory (Bacharach, 1989; Van de Ven & Huber 1990; Whetten, 1989; Pettigrew, P92; 
Chowdhary, 2002). 
Case studies of companies that have enabled turnaround have also been documented and 
studied by researchers across the world (Bruton, Ahlstrom & Wan, 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; 
Furman & McGahan, 2002; Gupta & Wang 2004; Khandwalla, 2001; Kow, 2004; 
Maheshwari & Ravichandran, 2003; Maheshwari & Ahlstrom, 2004; Pearce & Robbins, 
1993; Patrick, 1999; Ruiz-Navarro, 1998; Saini & Bhatnagar, 2005; Wan, Kliener & Brian, 
2000). 
Models of turnaround: Four models of tumaround (Maheshwari, 2000; Balgobin & 
Pandit, 2001; Khandwalla, 2001; Chowdhury, 2002) have been refered to extensively in the 
tumaround literature. Balgobin & Pandit (2001) suggested decline and crisis, triggers of 
change, recovery strategy formulation, retrenchment and stabilization and return to growth as 
stages through which a turnaround process proceeds. They elaborated the role of external 
and internal causes in causing decline and role of triggers in initiating a tumaround. In 
describing the recovery strategy formulation pocess the role of comunication is highlighted 
for situation analysis, stakeholder management and improving motivation. Chowdhury 'sfour 
stage theory suggests decline, resource initiation, transition and outcome as the four stages of 
tumaround though Chowdhury accepted that no single stage theory can explain processes of 
all turnarounds as each happens in its own context (see Table 2.2). His paper made a mention 
of a host of variables including management style, organizational culture and leadership 
qualities of the top management (amongst others) that combine with individual actions, 
characteristics and skills of people and the tangible and occult properties of the organization 
that work during the implementation stage. Maheshwari, on the basis of extensive literature 
review presented a model that strikes a balance between the process and content approaches 
by following the stages (process) and the content in each stage. Maheshwari's contingency 
model emphasised on the action choice perspective and suggested that organizational factors 
such as group characteristics, organizational culture and leadership (among others) affect the 
tumaround actions of change agents (see Figure 2.1). Khandwalla on the other hand proposed 
a comprehensive theoretical model to provide understanding of transformational 
turnarounds. According to this model, the process begins with a jolt that leads to credible 
diagnosis of the problem followed by co-optation of extemal stakeholders, mobilization of 
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staff for turnaround and a mindset change that together leads to a turnaround performance 
(Khandwalla, 2001). The model proposed a two-way communication with staff on situation 
prognosis, vision, new operating paradigm, symbolic actions, setting up taskforces for 
changes and irmovations, group brainstorming for inovations and identification and training 
of change agents (see figure 2.2). Khandwalla (1989) on the basis of his study proposed a list 
of objectives that turnaround managements addressed and the actions they took to enable the 
process. 
Table 2.2: Chowdhary's 4-stage Model of Turnaround Process 
STAGES 
Incidents 1 
Decline 
2 
Response 
Indication 
3 
Transition 
4 
Outcome 
Key Events • K-decline 
• R-decline 
• Stimulus 
• Domain 
Definition 
• Scope 
Overlap 
• Strategic 
Contour 
• Elapsed time 
• Resource 
Commitments 
• Subunit 
policies and 
programmes 
• Structure 
• Rewards 
• People 
• Success 
• Failure 
Core 
concepts 
Performance Strategy Implementation Performance 
Source: As cited in Pandey S.C. & Verma P. (2005). Organizational Decline and turnaround: Insights from the 
WorldCom case, p 54. Vision- the Journal of Business Perspective, 9(2). 
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Figure 2.1: Maheshwari's Contingency Model of Organizational Decline and 
Turnaround Management 
Organizational 
Change 
Environmental 
Change 
Reduction of 
resources within the 
organization 
-severity 
-longevity 
Deterioration 
in organization 
environment fit 
Crisis 
Organizational Factors 
-Group characteristics 
-Ownership 
-Corporate Strategy 
-Structure 
-Systems 
-Industrial Relations 
-Culture 
-Leadership 
Environmental Factors 
-Munificence 
-Instability 
-Complexity 
Reduced 
Performance due to 
faulty actions 
-Productivity 
-Resource 
Impact on customers, 
suppliers, society, 
government, creditors, 
organizational members 
Turnaround Actions 
-Leadership Change 
-Domain Change 
-Retrenchment (Assets, People) 
-Technology upgradation 
-Cost reduction 
-HR Interventions (re 
deployment, training, VRS, 
participation) 
-Social intervention 
-Legal actions 
-Commercial borrowings 
Turnaround Performance 
-Productivity 
-Growth 
-Resources 
-Human Resource Development 
-Stability 
-Control 
Source: As cited in Pandey S.C. & Verma P. (2005). Organizational Decline and turnaround: Insights from the Worldcom case, p 
59. Vision- the Journal of Business Perspective, 9(2). 
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Figure 2.2 Khandwalla's Model of Transformational Turnaround 
Jolt from loss, Serious Decline 
Credible Diagnosis 
• expert diagnosis 
• participative diagnosis 
• CEO's interaction witli 
stakeholders to understand 
situation 
Cooptation of external 
stakeholders 
• unions 
• financial institutions 
• vendors 
customers 
relevant government agencies 
Cohesion for turnaround 
• coordinating committees 
• incentive structure for needed 
behavioural change 
• team building 
• OD 
Mobilization of Staff for Turnaround 
• Two-way communication with staff on 
• situation, prognosis, vision, new operating 
• paradigm 
• Symbolic actions 
• Task forces for changes and innovations 
• Group brainstorming for innovations 
• Identification and training of change agents 
Platform of Transformation 
Mindset Change 
• widespread acceptance of new key 
values and orientations 
• language change 
• institutionalization through 
reinforcement and actions 
compatible with needed reorientation 
Corporate Rejuvenation 
• change in strategy, structure, management systems, operations 
Turnaround Performance 
Source: Khandwalla, P. (2001), Turnaround Excellence: Insight from 120 Cases, p. 349. Response Books, New 
Delhi, adapted with little variation in the original diagram. 
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Turnaround Strategies: Turnarounds almost always require a major effort to 'turn the 
Company around'. A turnaround strategy is imperative for guiding all organizational actions 
so that scarce resources are not dissipated in unproductive ways. Schendel, Patton and Rigs 
(1976) examined the patterns of decline and turnaround of fifty-four companies with average 
sales of $ 400 million that competed in seventeen different industrial sectors of the economy 
and forty different industries. Based on Compustat data and periodicals, they categorized the 
reason for the declines and types of turnaround actions and listed various strategic responses 
adopted to tackle strategic causes of failure and operating responses to address strategic 
causes. 
Hofer (1980) analyzed written cases of 12 poorly performing firms and further categorized 
the turnarounds into two categories strategic and operating and asserted that operating 
responses seldom cured strategic problems. He considered a change in the current top 
management as a general pre-condition to turnaround and discussed several strategies 
including, operating turnaround strategies, revenue generating strategies, cost-cutting 
strategies, asset reduction strategies and combination effort strategies which he proposed must 
be selected on after thorough study of operating and strategic health of the company. A 
mismatch of the cause and the strategy, according to him, would cause a greater damage than 
even an immediate liquidation. Bibeault (1982) conducted a survey of 81 chief executives and 
in his book emphasized on organizational and human issues and provided some insights on 
formulating turnaround strategies. 
Three common types of successful turnaround 'gestalts' found by Hambrick and Scheter 
(1983) were: asset/cost surgery, selective product/market pruning, and piecemeal moves. 
They had studied short-term turnaround attempts of 260 mature industrial-product businesses 
on the basis of data collected from PIMS (Profit Impact of Market Strategies) project. They 
found that industrial-product business units found that efficiency oriented moves, but not 
entreprenuerial initiatives were associated with successful tumarounds. 
However, the effectiveness of startegies and underlying factors of effectiveness were 
identified by Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) to be - the effect of timing, intensity and 
implementation of strategies on corporate recovery. They employed Zscore to identify 
distress firms and finally studied 166 recovery and non-recovery firms. The study provided 
empirical evidence to show that recovery and non-recovery firms employed very similar sets 
of strategies and managers of non-recovery firms restructure more intensely than recovery 
firms but are far less effective in strategy implementation. They concluded that the recovery 
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firms adopted growth-oriented and external market focussed strategies while non-recovery 
firms engage in fire-fighting strategies. 
Culture and its impact on turnaround strategies: There is a significant evidence of 
impact of culture on organizational activity (Hickson & Pugh, 1995; Hofstede, 1991; Orru, 
Biggart & Hamilton, 1997; Pye, 2000). Organizational decline and turnaround are significant 
and challenging situations, that managers can face. According to Bruton, Ahlstrom and Wan 
(2003) there is a need to pay attention to variations in causes of decline and responses to 
address the causes owing to the cultural variation paradigm. They asserted that much evidence 
on how firms reverse performance decline is available predominantly fi-om the West and very 
little research on firm turnaround in other environments is found. Bruton Ahlstrom and Wan 
therefore provided first empirical investigation of the turnaround strategies of Overseas 
Chinese firms in East Asia. They examined tumaround efforts in three ethnic Chinese 
communities in East Asia. The study was on three phenomnas widely discussed in literature 
on the basis of studies of the West: retrenchment, asset/cost reduction and CEO (top 
management/ leadership) replacement. The researchers concluded that while it was expected 
that owing to influence of Chinese culture all the three may not be feasible or preferred 
strategies in the East Asian Chinese firms, the results depicted some contradictions. It was 
found that despite disagreement fi-om communities the firms attempting tumaround did resort 
to retrenchment though conclusions on asset/ cost reduction were not clear and inconclusive. 
However, replacement of top management was not observed in this community. The 
researchers therefore concluded that while culture did have the impact but there was need to 
investigate fiirther to get better insights on the phenomena in the cultural context. 
Leadership and ttte organizational turnaround: The literature on change delves on 
leadership styles of change leaders. Pandey and Verma (2005) anlayzed the Worldcom case to 
uncover the leadership styles of two contrast leaders - on one end was Bernard Ebbers who 
insisted on showing double digit growth and increase in revenues. His 'mergers and 
acquisition policy put the Company on the track of blind expansion and making Worldcom a 
hot favourite on the Wall Street. At the other end was Michael Capellas who joined a 
'bankrupt and corrupt' company. He rejuvinated its demoralized workforce and enforced a 
code of ethics at every level. 
Barker and Patterson (1996) observed the growing evidence of change in leadership for 
attempting turnarounds and studied 29 publicly traded companies, fi-om as many industries as 
possible, located within several hundred miles of major US metropolitan areas in the 
Midwest. Mid-Atlantic, East Coast, and West Coast, in the US. The selected firms had 
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declined and then tumedaround during 1990s. The study was an attempt to establish a 
relationship between top management team tenure and causal attributions made by top 
managers of decling firms attempting turnarounds. The study concluded that there was strong 
evidence that decline was more likely to be attributed to internal, stable and controllable 
sources and less likely to be attributed to extemal sources when the TMT (Top Management 
Tenure) had been replaced. Thus, top management exhibits self-serving biases while 
identifying or defining causal attributions of firm decline. These findings, the researchers 
claim, offer partial explanation for why researchers have often associated strategic change at 
declining firms with TMT changes. 
Following the debate on process and content of turnarounds, Harker and Sharma (1999) noted 
that there was need to further study of processes (how?) through which turnaround strategies 
(what?) were implemented. They therefore studied three firms in the heavy engineering 
industry undergoing transition from organizational decline to recovery and compared their 
process and performance to less successful rivals. The attempt was to provide insights into the 
turnaround process and the link between leadership and management of the tumaround 
process. The researchers concluded that the companies were in decline because organizational 
charecteristics were out of fit with the operating environment and the companies had lost their 
direction and competitive edge. They proposed a framework that demonstrated that the 
professional competent Board can provide leadership in the tumaround process and when 
working with and through the chosen CEO, can amplify his/her efforts and provide necessary 
support in the process. The CEO has the task of developing leaders through out the 
organization as tumaround strategies are developed and implemented, through the process of 
industry enlightenment, destiny development and organizational enhancement. 
Organizational decline and innovation: Yet another paradigm explored in 
organizational decline literature is the inconsistent perspective about the effect of 
organizational decline on innovation. Money, Mckinley and Barker (1998) atempted to 
adjugate between inconsistent perspectives and proposed a contingency framework that 
identified variables moderating the organizational decline-innovation relationship. They 
argued that the presence of highly institutionalized missions, widely diffused power structures 
and high levels of resource commitments negatively affect organizational innovation in 
response to decline. These conditions act as constraints on an organization's capacity to 
innovate when decline occurs. In contrast they proposed that less institutionalized missions, 
more concentrated power, and a higher level of uncommitted resources positively affect 
innovation in response to decline. These conditions, they proposed, relaxed the constraints 
and function as catlysts for innovation when organizational decline occurs. 
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Finding gaps in turnaround literature: Roie of communication during 
turnaround: Turning around the performance of declining firms naturally entails dealing 
with all the challenges thrown by the declining firms. There is evidence available that 
indicates that the image of a bankrupt firm is tarnished and the management of the company 
has to manage the stigma of Bankruptcy. Sutton & Callahan (1987) studied four Silicon 
Valley computer firms that had filed reorganization under Chapter 11 of Fedral Bankruptcy 
Code but were still operating. They interviewed informants (including top management 
whereevr possible) till they reached theoretical saturation. On the basis of grounded theory 
analysis the researchers proposed and validated a model of how stigma of Chapter 11 affects 
organizations and top management and identified strategies they adopted to deal with the 
stigma. The model asserted that top management and organization as a whole are percieved as 
discredited and their image is spoiled. There are as a result negative changes in organizational 
audience responses such as relationship disengagement, reduction in quality of participation, 
bargaining for a more favourable exchange relationship (changes in enacted relationships) and 
denigration via rumor, denigration via confrontation (changes in espoused evaluations). The 
researchers concluded that the five strategies that top management resorts to, to deal with the 
sitgma are concealing, defining, denying responsibility, accepting responsibility and 
withdrawing. 
Several researchers that have delved on issues pertaining to process of turnaround, 
implementation of turnaround strategies, transformational leadership for enabling tumaround 
of performance have in their studies indicated the role that communication plays in enabling a 
tumaround palgobin & Pandit, 2001; Barker & Sharma, 2000; Kandwalla, 1979; 1991; 
2001). However, not a single study was found to be completely devoted to understand the role 
of communications during the tumaround process. 
In keeping with the earlier discussions that provide evidence of the critical role of 
communication during the change process, it is felt that there is a need to explore the role of 
communication during the radical change process that some organizations undergo - the 
organizational tumaround. The following section is therefore devoted to building theory to 
first identify the context in which an organization declines and recovers followed by 
proposing a communication strategy framework employed by the top management to enable a 
tumaround. 
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Table 2.3: Organizational Turnaround Studies: A Summary 
Theme Author Tide 
Predictors of Organizational 
Decline or Turnaround 
Elaborates on signals of decline, internal and 
external business environments and strategies 
for reversal of decline 
Scherrer, 2003 Management 
turnarounds: Diagnosing 
business ailments 
Argues that a triggering event events needs to 
shock the incumbent management into 
realizing that different action is called for. 
These events also play a role in the 
tumaround process by influencing the 
strategies and inducing management changes. 
Gopinath 
Spring 2005 
Recognizing Decline: 
The Role of Triggers 
Expbres whether information contained in 
armual reports is usefiil in distinguishing 
between distressed companies that enact a 
tumaround and those that fail. Concludes that 
successful turnarounds are associated with the 
severity of the distressed state, its 
determinants, with the extent of change in the 
distressed state since the previous year, and 
firm size. 
Smith & 
Graves, 2005 
Corporate Tumaround 
and Financial Distress 
Elaborates on pitfalls in perceiving sources of 
decline and suggests guidelines to identify 
these 
Barker III, 2005 Traps in diagnosing 
organization failure 
Studied a broad cross-section of publicly 
traded companies, the turnarounds and the 
financial market retums and concluded that 
financial markets were not effective in 
identifying their impending turnarounds 
Furman & 
McGahan, 2002 
Turnarounds 
Provides an interesting insight into causes of 
decline and suggests a firamework to map the 
causes 
Richardson, 
Nwankwo & 
Richardson, 
1994 
Understanding the 
Causes of business 
failure Crises: Generic 
Failure Types: Boiled 
Frogs, Drowned Frogs, 
Bull Frogs and Tadpoles 
Analyzes the outcomes of fourteen strategic 
failures in a very large firm and attempts to 
explore what the firm learnt from its failures 
and whether the learning from small and large 
failures varies 
Baumard & 
Starbuck, 2005 
Learning from Failures: 
Why it may not happen 
35 
Theme Author Title 
Models of Turnaround 
On the basis of extensive literature review 
presented a model that strikes a balance 
between the procees and content approaches 
by following the stages (process) and the 
content in each stage. This model emphasises 
on the action choice perspective and suggests 
that organizational factors such as group 
characteristics, organizational culture and 
leadership (among others) affect the 
turnaround actions of change agents. 
Maheshwari, 
2000 
Organizational Decline 
and Tumaround 
Management: A 
Contingency Framework 
Proposed a four stage theory that suggests 
decline, resource initiation, transition and 
outcome as the four stages of turnaround 
though he accepts that no single stage theory 
can explain processes of all tumarounds as 
each happens in its own context. 
Chowdhury, 
2002 
Tumarounds: A stage 
theory Perspective 
Proposed a comprehensive theoretical model 
to provide understanding of transformational 
tumarounds. According to this model, the 
process begins with a jolt that leads to 
credible diagnosis of the problem followed by 
cooptation of external stakeholders, 
mobilization of staff for turnaround and a 
mindset change that together leads to a 
turnaround performance 
Khandwalla, 
2001 
Tumaround Excellence: 
Insights from 120 cases 
Proposes and elaborates on six elements of 
tumaround process, namely, appropriate 
strategic vision, organizational structure, set of 
business processes, human resource 
architecture that supports the vision, 
technological innovation and organizational 
culture 
Kow, 2004 Tuming around business 
performance Part I 
Investigates whether an organization that fails 
proceeds through the same sequential stages 
as the one that succeeds Asserts that "failure 
is not typically the fault of either the 
environment or the organization, rather it 
must be attributed to the misalignment of the 
organization to the environmental realities 
and that corrective actions are possible during 
any stage except the last. 
Sheppard & 
Chowdhury, 
2005 
Riding the wrong wave: 
organizational failure as a 
failed tumaround 
Adopted the content approach and focussed on 
examing various factors related to tumaround 
on the basis of crosssectional statistical 
analysis of data collected from a number of 
Barker & 
Duhaime, 1997 
Strategic change in 
Tumaround Process: 
theory and empirical 
evidence 
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Theme Author Title 
organizations Barker & Mone, 
1998 
The Mechanistic 
Structure Shift and 
Strategic Reorientation in 
Declining Firms 
attempting Turnaround 
Developed a turnaround stages framework and 
then tested this framework against the case of 
IBM UK which experienced a turnaround in 
1988-1997. This research was part of a larger 
research study that employed comparative 
case study method. The five stages suggested 
were Decline and Crisis; triggers for change; 
recovery strategy formulation; retrenchment 
and stabilization and retum to growth. The 
study concluded that the three of the four 
categories of events that aid the formulation of 
successful recovery plans, namely gaining 
control, managing stakeholders, and 
improving motivation employs several 
communication actions for successful 
implementation. 
Balgobin & 
Pandit, 2001 
Stages in the turnaround 
process: The Case of 
IBM UK 
Turnaround Strategies 
Examined the patterns of decline and 
turnaround of fifty-four companies with 
average sales of $ 400 million that competed 
in seventeen different industrial sectors of the 
economy and forty different industries. They 
categorized the reason for the declines and 
types of turnaround actions and listed various 
strategic responses adopted to tackle strategic 
causes of failure and operating responses to 
address strategic causes. 
Schendel, 
Patton & Rigs, 
1976 
Corporate Turnaround 
Strategies: A study of 
profit decline and 
recovery 
Analyzed written cases of 12 poorly 
performing firms and categorized the 
turnarounds into two categories - strategic and 
operating and asserted that operating 
responses seldom cured strategic problems. 
Hofer, 1980 Turnaround Strategies 
Studied short-term turnaround attempts of 260 
mature industrial-product businesses and 
found that that efficiency oriented moves and 
not entreprenuerial initiatives were associated 
with successful turnarounds. Three common 
types of successful turnaround 'gestalts' were 
found to be: asset/cost surgery, selective 
product/market pruning, and piecemeal 
moves. 
Hambrick & 
Schecter, 1983 
Turnaround strategies 
for mature industrial-
product business units 
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American and Japanese firms high-technology 
are examined in terms of the antecedents, 
actions, and resuhs of varying level of 
turnaround strategy implementation. They 
concluded that American firms achieved 
greater retum on investment, operating profit 
margin, and cash flow but lower sales growth 
and less unit kbour cost improvement than 
Japanese Corporations 
GowerL& 
Tallon, 2002 
Turnaround strategies of 
American and Japanese 
electronics corporations 
How do they differ in 
formulating plans and 
achieving results? 
Tested effectiveness of startegies and 
identified the underlying factors of 
effectiveness - the effect of timing, intensity 
and implementation of strategies on corporate 
recovery. They concluded that recovery firms 
adopted growth-oriented and external market 
focussed strategies, non-recovery firms 
engage in fire-fighting strategies. 
Sudarsanam & 
Lai, 2001 
Corporate Financial 
Distress and Turnaround 
Strategies: An Empirical 
Analysis 
Studied four Silicon Valley computer firms 
that had filed reorganization under Chapter 11 
of Fedral Bankruptcy Code but were still 
operating. They proposed and validated a 
model of how stigma of Chapter 11 affects 
organizations and top management and 
identified strategies adopted to deal with the 
stigma. 
Sutton & 
Callahan, 1987 
The Stigma of 
Bankruptcy: Spoiled 
Organizational Image 
and its Management 
Suggest an alternative to Theory E and 
Theory 0 approaches to change initiatives -
an approach that combines the two 
approaches 
Beer&Nohria, 
2000 
Cracking the Code of 
Change 
Organizational Decline and Innovation 
Atempt to a(|ugate between inconsistent 
perspectives on organizational decline and 
innovation and propose a contingency 
fi-amework that identified variables 
moderating the organizational decline-
innovation relationship 
Mone, 
Mckinley & 
Barker III, 1998 
Organizational Decline 
and Innovation: a 
contingency fi-amework 
Leadership and Turnaround 
Studied 29 publicly traded companies and 
concluded that there was strong evidence that 
decline was more likely to be attributed to 
intemal, stable and controllable sources and 
less likely to be attributed to external sources 
when the TMT (Top Management Tenure) had 
Barker & 
Patterson, 1996 
Top Management Team 
Tenure and Top 
Management Causal 
Attributions at Declining 
Firms attempting 
Tumarounds 
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Theme Author Title 
been replaced. The pattern was vice-versa 
when the TMT was long. Thus, established 
evidence of bias in perspectives. 
Journal of Business Research, 55, 963-979. 
Barker & Barr, 
2002 
Linking top manager 
attributions to strategic 
reorientation in declining 
firms attempting 
tumarounds 
Studied three firms in the heavy engineering 
industry undergoing transition from 
organizational decline to recovery and 
compared their process and performance to 
less successfLil rivals. They provided insights 
into the tumaround process and the link 
between leadership and management of the 
tumaround process. 
Harker & 
Sharma, 2000 
Leadership and the 
company tumaround 
process 
Investigates the effect of managerial 
ownership and tumover on the probability of a 
tumaround for companies that experience a 
decline in their profitability. Also examines 
whether CEO tumover determines the type of 
retrenchment strategy chosen so as to hasten 
the tumaround process. 
Francis & 
Mariola, 2003 
Managerial Ownership 
Impacts on Decline And 
Tumaround 
Journal of Business Ethic s, Springer 
Netherlands, 111-124. 
Huang & Snell, 
2003 
Tumaround, Corruption 
and Mediocrity: 
Leadership and 
Governance in Three 
State Owned Enterprises 
in Mamland China 
Analyzed the Worldcom case to uncover 
leadership styles of two contrast leaders-
Bernard Ebbers who insisted on showing 
double digit growth and increase in revenues 
and Michael Capellas who joined a 'bankrupt 
and corrupt' company but rejuvinated its 
demoralized workforce and enforced a code of 
ethics at every level. 
Pandey & 
Verma, 2005 
Organizational Decline 
and Tumaround: Insights 
from the Worldcom Case 
Retrenchment and Turnaround 
Investigates tumaround attempts of 32 US 
textile firms and concludes that retrenchment 
is an integral component of successfiil 
recovery from decline 
Robbins & 
Pearce, 1992 
"Tumaround: 
Retrenchment and 
Recovery" 
A critique that replicates and provides an 
altemative explanation for the assertion that 
refrenchment is integral to tumaround and 
concludes by offering several 
recommendations for tumaround researchers 
Barker & Mone, 
1994 
Retrenchment: Cause of 
Tumaround or 
consequence of decline? 
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Case Studies of Turnaround 
Asserts that innovative competition is not 
impossible in mature firms and that firms 
change by stages. He presented a case study 
of a ship yard fi^om competency point of view 
and shared how it redirected the technology 
and competencies previously employed in the 
military sector into profitable commercial 
applications. 
Ruiz-Navarro, 
1998. 
Tumaround and renewal 
in a Spanish shipyard 
Provided first empirical investigation of the 
turnaround strategies of Overseas Chinese 
firms in East Asia. They studied retrenchment, 
asset/cost reduction and CEO (top 
management/ leadership) replacement. 
Bruton, 
Ahlstrom & 
Wan, 2001 
Tumaround Success of 
Large and Mid-Size 
Chinese Ovraed Firms: 
Evidence fi-om Hong 
Kong and Thailand 
On the bases of a case study of Phoenix 
enterprises he modifies his previously 
suggested model to indicate bridge the gap 
between what appears to be organized well on 
paper and the reality. 
Kow (2004). Turning around business 
performance Part II 
The case details the initiatives taken to 
implement change and also makes a mention 
of communications during change. 
Saini& 
Bhatnagar 
(2005). 
North Delhi Power Ltd.: 
Dynamics of Change 
A first hand account of the Duke Children's 
hospital turnaround that he led in 1996. He 
illustrated the tools employed in the 
tumaround of the hospital and suggested 
survival strategies that he says are equally 
applicable to any industry. The first of the 
three strategies suggested was 'Communicate, 
communicate, communicate'. 
Meliones 
(2000) 
Saving Money, Saving 
Lives 
Other published Case Studies Pearce & 
Robbins (1993). 
Towards improved theory 
and research on business 
tumaround 
Nimwegen & 
Kliener (2000) 
Harley-Davidson Motor 
Company 
Khandwalla 
(2001) 
Tumaround Excellence: 
Insights from 120 cases 
Bruton, 
Ahlstrom & 
Wan (2003) 
Tumaround success of 
large and mid-size 
Chinese owned firms: 
evidence from ethnic 
overseas Chinese 
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Theme Author Title 
communities 
Maheshwari & 
Ravichandran 
(2003) 
Mangalore Chemicals 
and Fertilizers Ltd.: 
Strategic Renewal 
Bruton, 
Ahlstrom & 
Wan (2003). 
Turnaround in East 
Asian Firms: Evidence 
from ethnic overseas 
Chinese communities 
Bruton & 
Ahlstrom 
(2004). 
Turnaround in Asia: 
What do we know? 
Gupta & Wang 
(2004) 
From Corporate Crisis to 
Turnaround in East Asia: 
A Study of China 
Huajing Electronics 
Group Corporation 
Maheshwari & 
Ahlstrom 
(2004). 
Turning Around a State 
Owned Enterprise: The 
Case of Scooters India 
Ltd. 
Source: prepared by the researcher 
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Theory Building and Propositions 3 
Section I: Context of Communication during Turnaround 
Environment is an important situational element that has a strong impact on an organization's 
strategic direction, the process by which strategic direction is shaped and the way an 
organization's resources are secured (Hamel & Prahlad, 1994). With the globalization of 
economy and fast paced technological developments, the environment is constantly changing. 
The organizations therefore, also have to change so as to be able to survive and thrive in the 
changing environment. 
Evidence from studies on managerial decision making and strategic management suggest that 
managers often prove unable to account for environmental change in their plans owing to 
resource constraints, inadequate information or blindness to environmental changes 
(Maheshwari, 2000; Mezias & Starbuck, 2003; PfefFer & Salancik, 1978). Maheshwari (2000) 
examined the reasons for organizational decline and suggested context-specific tumaround 
process. According to this study, the decline is primarily an outcome of inaction of managers 
and inappropriate actions of mangers in response to environmental reality. The causality 
variables to explain inaction and inappropriate actions were classified as organization specific 
such as sunk investment, specialized assets etc. and environment specific such as legal, 
political, social and economic constraints. 
Organizations are at varying risk of experiencing changes in the environment for vMch they 
are not prepared (Aldrich & PfefFer, 1976; Carrol, 1984; Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; 
Khandwalla, 1992; Mone, Mckinley & Barker, 1998). Thus, based on the managerial 
response, organizations could on one hand outperform themselves in the new business 
scenario or on the other hand, deteriorate to the extent of sickness. 
Management of some sick Companies accept the failures and finally liquidate the Companies 
while on the other extreme there are companies that are able to revive from the sickness 
(tumaround) and once again flourish in the new environment. This scenario is depicted as 
'Organizational changes in a changing environment' in Figure 3.1. 
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Sutton and Callahan (1987) provided empirical evidence to assert how filing bankruptcy 
under Chapter 11 tarnishes the image of the management which is discredited by internal and 
external stakeholders for the failures. In accordance with Kurt Lewin's theory these 
stakeholders exert enabling or disabling forces on the organization. This is exhibited in 
Figure 3.2. During organizational decline the balance of forces tilts towards disabling forces. 
Literature provides enough evidence to substantiate the central role that management must 
play to enable the organizational turnaround (Barker & Barr, 2002; Barker & Patterson, 1996; 
Francis & Mariola, 2003; Marker & Sharma, 2000; Huang & Snell, 2003; Pandey & Verma, 
2005). Some researchers have asserted that it is imperative to change the management to 
initiate the process (Barker & Barr, 2002; Barker & Patterson, 19%; Francis & Mariola, 
2003). In any case, the management (Board along with the CEO) must own the managerial 
responsibility to turnaround performance of the declining organization ^rancis & Mariola, 
2003). The balance of forces must shift with the management assuming central role and 
experiencing the forces emanating fi-om various stakeholders. The management must define a 
turnaround strategy so as to manage the forces emanating fi-om various stakeholders. This is 
exhibited in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.1: Organizational Changes in a Changing Environment 
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Communication is critical in the strategy formation and implementation stages. 
According to Sloma (1985), for a turnaround to be successful there must be a plan 
and it must be documented and communicated. The plan must be tailored to the 
particular firm at a particular point in time. Motivation of the people in the 
organization in implementing the plan is also vital. 
Besides, total commitment to strategic management, organizational change, adequate 
communication, and accurate performance measures are key to definitive 
turnarounds. Farkas (1991) reviewed corporate tumaround literature and conducted 
four case studies to identify salient factors in organizational turnarounds and 
determined whether these factors were evident within transit organizations that had 
attempted to manage change strategically. All the four organizations had initiated 
turnarounds post organizational decline or perceived decline. He found that relatively 
minor reorganizations were made in all the cases and commitment to strategic change 
varied and that all cases could have improved their communication below the middle 
management levels. 
Literature also recommends that all segments of the organization be included in the 
information flow for a decline to be stopped. Guy (1989) found that most employees 
prefer to receive information from management; yet many receive it fi'om the 
'grapevine'. He asserted that it is important for formal channels of information to 
confirm information gained fi'om informal sources.. 
Khandwalla (1989) with the help of three cases (Canadian Cellulose Company (Can 
Cel), State Timber Corporation of Ceylon (STC) and Bharat Heavy Plate and Vessels 
of India) in three countries and literature survey of studies in the US, Britain, Europe 
and India outlined ten elements of corporate tumaround management. These elements 
are: change in top management, credibility building actions by the new management, 
initial control of finance, purchases, capital expenditure, negotiation of support of 
outside stakeholders and neutralization of external pressures, quick pay-off projects 
and actions, quick cost reduction, revenue generation, asset liquidation for generating 
cash, mobilization of the organization for tumaround and internal co-ordination, for 
each of these elements Khandwalla then illustrated the range of actions involved in a 
tumaround (See Annexure 3.1: Elements of Corporate Tumaround as suggested by 
Khandwalla, 1989). The role of communication as documented in these actions is as 
given in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Elements requiring communication intervention 
SNo Element Communication as possible action 
1 Credibility building 
actions by the new 
management 
Publicize success in resolving a current crisis or 
problem (that has been resolved by resourcefulness 
and perseverance) 
2 Initial Control Order preparation of daily, weekly and monthly cash 
forecasts 
3 Negotiation for 
support with outside 
stakeholders and 
neutralization of 
external pressures 
• Brief groups of stakeholders (including unions, 
financial institutions, major suppliers and 
customers) on the problems and strengths of the 
unit and some tentative tumaround plan. 
• Get stakeholders to suggest tumaround steps 
• Seek support, concessions etc. itom stakeholders 
• Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy 
• Keep stakeholders posted on the progress of the 
tumaround 
4 Quick Cost Reduction Increase certain essential costs such as those involved 
in installing a computer based better market and govt, 
policies-related information systems, budgeting etc. 
5 Revenue Generation Unfocused advertising and promotion be more sharply 
focused. Eg: Sophisticated equipment manufacturers 
may cut down advertising and step up promotion; 
FMCG manufacturers may contact small grocery 
shops for retailing; may contact mass distributors for 
distribution of products etc. 
6 Mobilization of 
organization for 
turnaround 
• Repeated affirmation by corporate management of 
the Company's mission, core values, and the 
primary goals of profit and growth and the 
relationship of these three 
• Brief the staff on the actual state of affairs to 
displace rumors and gossip 
• Articulate a few highly concrete targets for the 
company for the next few months 
• Involve the staff in identifying solvable problem 
areas through management meetings, quahty 
circles, task forces etc. 
• Clarify managerial responsibilities, get managers 
to identify work-related goals for themselves, and 
to plan achievement of key result areas. Give them 
operating autonomy but strengthen accountability 
for quantitative performance. Reward good 
performance by a mix of intrinsic motivators and 
pecuniary incentives 
• Top managers must set an example for integrity, 
fairness, hard work, resourcefulness and concem 
for the staff by their actions and in their 
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SNo Element Communication as possible action 
interactions with the staff 
7 Internal Co-ordination • Set up co-ordination committees for co-ordinating 
interdependent departments 
• Institute a monthly performance review meeting 
of all senior managers chaired by the chief 
executive, to review previous decisions, fix 
monthly corporate targets for sales, production, 
collections etc. share operating information and 
discuss policy issues and aimounce policy 
decisions 
• Insistence by top management that as far as 
possible lower level disputes should be directly 
settled at the level on a face to face basis 
8 Change in top 
management 
-
9 Quick Pay-off projects -
10 Asset liquidation for 
generating cash 
-
Source: Developed by the researcher on the basis of study done by Khandwala (1989) 
It is evident from Table 3.1 that turnaround managements were found to be 
employing several communic ation actions to enable turnaround elements/ objectives. 
The role of communication in enabling a turnaround is thus clearly evident. 
Section II: Communication during Organizational Turnaround 
Steyn (2003) asserted that overall strategic management is inseparable from strategic 
management of relationships. He recommended that a strategy should be in place for 
each stakeholder group, for each major stakeholder the management must identify the 
strategic issues that affect the stakeholder and must understand h3w to formulate, 
implement and monitor strategies with that group. The strategic management 
literature, however, points to the lack of integrated approaches for incorporating 
stakeholder concerns into the strategic decision making process. Many organizations 
do it well with one stakeholder group but few have the processes needed to integrate a 
number of stakeholder concerns. Barret (2002) asserted that there should be a one-to-
one correlation between what the Company has established as its strategic objectives 
and what is listed as the objectives for communications. In addition, the 
communications must be structured to translate the central strategic messages (from 
vision to performance or financial goals) to all employees. 
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It is important therefore, to identify the critical stakeholders and the turnaround 
objectives (element) directed towards each stakeholder. Table 3.1 is therefore 
reorganized and presented in Table 3.2 to indicate the turnaround elements 
(objectives) and recommended action plan thereof, stakeholderwise. 
Table 3.2: Turnaround element and possible communication action, classified 
stakeholder-wise 
s. 
No 
Stakeholder Turnaround 
Element 
Possible Communication Action 
1 Staff and 
Employees 
Credibility 
building actions 
by the new 
management 
Publicize success in resolving a current crisis or 
problem (that has been resolved by 
resourcefiilness and perseverance) 
Initial Control Order preparation of daily, weekly and monthly 
cash forecasts 
Mobilization of 
organization for 
tumaround 
• Repeated affirmation by corporate 
management of the Company's mission, 
core values, and the primary goals of profit 
and growth and the relationship of these 
three 
• Brief the staff on the actual state of affairs to 
displace rumors and gossip 
• Articulate a few highly concrete targets for 
the company for the next few months 
• Involve the staff in identifying solvable 
problem areas through management 
meetings, quality circles, task forces etc. 
• Clarify managerial responsibilities, get 
managers to identify work-related goals for 
themselves, and to plan achievement of key 
result areas. Give them operating autonomy 
but strengthen accountability for quantitative 
performance. Reward good performance by 
a mix of intrinsic motivators and pecuniary 
incentives 
• Top managers must set an exanple for 
integrity, fairness, hard work, 
resourcefulness and concern for the staff by 
their actions and in their interactions with 
the staff 
Internal Co-
ordination 
• Set up co-ordination committees for co-
ordinating interdependent departments 
• Institute a monthly performance review 
meeting of all senior managers chaired by 
the chief executive, to review previous 
decisions, fix monthly corporate targets for 
sales, production, collections etc. share 
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s. 
No 
Stakeholder Turnaround 
Element 
Possible Communication Action 
operating information and discuss policy 
issues and aimounce policy decisions 
• Insistence by top management that as far as 
possible lower level disputes should be 
directly settled at the level on a face to face 
basis 
2 Unions Negotiation of 
support of outside 
stakeholders and 
neutralization of 
external pressures 
• Brief unions on the problems and strengths 
of the unit and some tentative turnaround 
plan. 
• Get them to suggest tumaround steps 
• Seek support, concessions etc. from 
stakeholders 
• Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy 
• Keep stakeholders posted on the progress of 
the tumaround 
3 Financial 
Institutions 
Negotiation of 
support of outside 
stakeholders and 
neutralization of 
external pressures 
• Brief groups of stakeholders (including 
unions, financial institutions, major suppliers 
and customers) on the problems and 
strengths of the unit and some tentative 
tumaround plan. 
• Get stakeholders to suggest tumaround steps 
• Seek support, concessions etc. from 
stakeholders 
• Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy 
• Keep stakeholders posted on the progress of 
the tumaround 
4 Government Negotiation of 
support of outside 
stakeholders and 
neutralization of 
external pressures 
• Brief groups of stakeholders (including 
unions, financial institutions, major suppliers 
and customers) on the problems and 
strengths of the unit and some tentative 
tumaround plan. 
• Get stakeholders to suggest tumaround steps 
• Seek support, concessions etc. from 
stakeholders 
• Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy 
• Keep stakeholders posted on the progress of 
the tumaround 
Quick Cost 
Reduction 
An improvement in systems to source 
government policies information. 
5 Suppliers Negotiation of 
support of outside 
stakeholders and 
neutralization of 
external pressures 
• Brief groups of stakeholders (including 
unions, financial institutions, major suppliers 
and customers) on the problems and 
strengths of the unit and some tentative 
tumaround plan. 
• Get stakeholders to suggest tumaround steps 
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s. 
No 
Stakeholder Turnaround 
Element 
Possible Communication Action 
• Seek support, concessions etc. from 
stakeholders 
• Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy 
• Keep stakeholders posted on the progress of 
the tumaround 
6 Customers Negotiation of 
support of outside 
stakeholders and 
neutralization of 
external pressures 
• Brief groups of stakeholders (including 
unions, financial institutions, major suppliers 
and customers) on the problems and 
strengths of the unit and some tentative 
tumaround plan. 
• Get stakeholders to suggest tumaround steps 
• Seek support, concessions etc. from 
stakeholders 
• Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy 
• Keep stakeholders posted on the progress of 
the tumaround 
Quick Cost 
Reduction 
An improvement in systems to source customer 
information. 
Revenue 
Generation 
Unfocused advertising and promotion be more 
sharply focused. Eg: Sophisticated equipment 
manufacturers may cut down advertising and 
step up promotion; FMCG manufacturers may 
contact small grocery shops for retailing; may 
contact mass distributors for distribution of 
products etc. 
Source: Developed by the researcher on the basis of Table 3.1 
Moorcroft (2003) elaborated three types of communication strategies namely master 
sfrategic plan, operating plan and project plan. The sfrategic plan addresses what 
needs to be done and takes a medium approach of one to three years, so that its broad 
themes mirror the corporate sfrategy. The operational plan addresses how it is to be 
done and details the behavioural outcomes that the plan will deliver and the tactics 
and actions needed for each target audience. According to him, the plan must list the 
target audience - media, employees, government, analysts, customers etc. and should 
list the desired outcome or behaviour from the target audience. 
Therefore, a list of objectives of communication with each stakeholder along with the 
possible communication actions, if created, could provide a basis for developing a 
specific Communication Strategy for an Organizational Tumaround (CS for OTA) for 
a given tumaround process/ situation (See Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3: A Model of Communication 
Strategy for Organizational 
Turnaround (CS for OTA) 
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A literature review of studies on organizational turnaround was conducted to draw out 
the role of communication during turnaround, as documented by researchers in other 
studies. 
Managements of a company attempting a turnaround lead the attempt to revive the 
declining company. Marker and Sharma (2000) explored the way in which leaders 
manage the company turnaround process. They studied the process of managing 
strategies and operational changes and the relationship between those processes and 
improved turnaround performance in the heavy engineering industry in one state of 
Australia. The research approach involved development of four case studies of firms 
of medium size over a time scale of 1980-1996. Of the four companies two were 
successfully turned around, in another the company was split up and half of it was 
sold off in a leveraged management buy-out and the bought out company was the 
fourth case as the new owners embarked on the rescue of the ailing business. The 
study concluded that the companies were in decline because organizational 
characteristics were out of fit with the operating environment and the companies had 
lost their direction and competitive edge. The study provided empirical evidence of 
relationship between turnaround success and leadership. The challenge, it concluded, 
is to develop intangible assets through the concepts of industry wisdom , destiny 
development and organizational enhancement. 
The authors in the discussion and analysis of the three tangible assets concluded that 
the leaders present their turnaround plans to their sponsors in order to gain their 
support, they encourage inquiry, communicate destiny and take several other 
communication actions. "This was the case with the successfiil turnaround at 
companies Autosoft and Southern Cross. The CEO of Walker's produced a strategic 
plan for his new board of directors which was: ...130 pages and 38 page/hancials -
it was a history, a vision, an in -depth analysis, and a gut feel- and at the end of the 
day it was a plan that had to be put in place and not changed" (Harker & Sharma, 
2000). 
Kow (2004) developed a model of turnaround of business performance. According to 
the model a successful business turnaround requires a right mix of six elements 
namely, 1) an appropriate strategic vision; 2) an organizational structure 3) a set of 
business processes; 4) a human resource architecture that will support the vision 5) 
technological irmovation that will nourish the organization as well as enhance the 
product ranges; and 6) an organizational culture that will accept and commit to the 
effort. As he elaborated each of these, he wrote about the communication action 
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required thereof. According to Kow, a strategic vision is key to sustainable 
performance but he wrote that the turnaround strategic vision should be developed 
with key managers and not all. He laid emphasis on when and who to share the vision 
with and why, and also the need to ensure that the vision is understood and bought in 
completely. This, he recommended, must be done through a thought out 
communications plan with visible involvement of the CEO. He recommended that the 
communication plan be expanded to communicate urgency and to create 
understanding at large. Again in development and implementation of business 
processes Kow emphasized the need to communicate, to not only develop sound 
processes but to also motivate and strengthen commitment. Kow on the other hand 
warned against too many meetings with too large number of participants but 
recommended periodic interviews to seek views. He also recommended a 
comprehensive communications plan to address defence mechanisms of managers 
and employees who are terrified in the environment of organizational culture change. 
This communication plan must be a road map for employees to follow, so as to 
understand what is going on, for what reason and how it will occur. Kow insisted that 
the CEO be at the helm of the communication plan. Kow (2004) later modified the 
earher model to show how the six elements of the model interrelate. He emphasized 
that the reality is complex and chaotic and there are no quick-fix solutions and that 
each turnaround would have its unique path. He illustrated this by following the 
developments during the turnaround of the Phoenix Corporation. 
Yet another account of the turnaround that demonstrated the important role of 
communication during turnaround was documented by Meliones (2000). He wrote a 
first hand account of the Duke Children's hospital turnaround that he led in 1996. He 
illustrated the tools employed in the turnaround of the hospital and suggested survival 
strategies that he says are equally applicable to any industry. The first of the three 
strategies suggested was 'Communicate, communicate, communicate'. He detailed 
the importance of honestly clarifying to everyone that survival depended on cost 
management; the need to listen to employees; sharing the pulpit; preparing goal-
oriented teams; constanly offering feedback; publicly celebrating employee and team 
success; cultivating a sense of humour. Meliones account in the article clearly 
indicated the critical role of communication in the turnaround process. 
Turnaround was noted to proceed through several stages. Balgobin and Pandit (2001) 
in order to study how a turnaround was enabled developed a turnaround stages 
framework and then tested this framework against the case of IBM UK which 
experienced a turnaround in 1988-1997. This research was part of a larger research 
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/ Adc. No. 
Study that employed comparative case study method. The five stages suggested were 
decHne and crisis; triggers for change; recovery strategy formulation; retrenptnVtcffT' 
and stabilization and retum to growth. The study concluded that the three of ffle fouF' 
categories of events that aid the formulation of successfLil recovery plans, namely 
gaining control, managing stakeholders, and improving motivation, employ several 
communication actions for successfiil implementation. 
In the turnaround studies studied some of the objectives and communication actions 
recommended were found to be repetitious. Communication actions as mentioned in 
all the above studies are tabulated in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Objective of communication and possible communication actions 
(stakeholder-wise) 
s. 
No. 
Stakeholder Turnaround Element 
(Objective) 
Possible Communication Action 
1 Board of 
Directors/ 
Shareholders 
Gain support and time in 
the future (Harker & 
Sharma, 2000) 
Present detailed turn-around plan 
Open to accept the help and advice 
of senior management (Harker & 
Sharma, 2000) 
2 Financial 
Institutions 
Negotiating a contract for 
support (Harker & 
Sharma, 2000) 
Present detailed turn-around plan 
(Harker & Sharma, 2000) 
3 Employees Involvement and 
Commitment for 
execution of the vision 
(Kow, 2004) 
Develop vision with key managers 
(not all) responsible for the critical 
elements of the business 
Hold special sessions for non-
participating managers after the 
vision has been developed to 
gauge their reactions, to listen to 
their views and to gain their 
commitment (Kow, 2004) 
Signals to shareholders 
and employees a 
disciplined approach of 
the leadership(Harker & 
Sharma, 2000) 
Documenting, and communicating 
to shareholders and employees, a 
strategic plan (Harker & Sharma, 
2000) 
Collect industry wisdom 
(Harker & Sharma, 2000) 
Include key managers in the 
process. (Balgobin & Pandit, 
2001; Harker & Sharma, 2000) 
Ascertain employees' 
perception on what 
Hire consultant to hold interviews 
with a cross-section of business 
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s. 
No. 
Stakeholder Turnaround Element 
(Objective) 
Possible Communication Action 
business is and where it 
should go. 
Set the scene for strategic 
workshop 
Focus the minds of the 
participants (Kow, 2004) 
including those selected for 
strategic workshop. Before these 
individual interviews, each 
participant should be given a 
questionnaire on the issues of the 
business and its lack of 
profitability and growth. (Kow, 
2004) 
Consistency in 
reaUzation of objectives 
(Kow, 2004) 
Key managers should through 
similar exercises develop purpose 
statements for their key functions 
(Kow, 2004) 
Report progress and 
share lessons learnt 
(Kow, 2004) 
Strategic vision and its 
implementation progress be made 
a consistent agenda item in all 
management team meetings 
Vision targets be reiterated with 
conversations focusing on how to 
ensure that they are met 
satisfactorily (Kow, 2004) 
Managers and employees 
understand and 
internalize the vision 
Have views especially on 
areas in which they are 
not directly involved 
(Kow, 2004) 
Inject urgency in the 
communications plan Explain 
what needs to be done and why 
(Kow, 2004) 
Prevent the workforce 
from thinking that the 
management is only 
guessing and is not 
capable of making 
decisions - to avoid 
demoralized workforce 
(Kow, 2004) 
Make organizational structure 
flexible but the decisions 
transparent (Kow, 2004) 
Not to raise unnecessary 
expectations (Kow, 
2004) 
Do not promise too much to 
managers (Kow, 2004) 
Don't have too many meetings 
Participants should be invited only 
on the basis of having a need to 
know And the ability to contribute 
and with overriding purpose of 
gainful employment (Kow, 2004) 
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s. 
No. 
Stakeholder Turnaround Element 
(Objective) 
Possible Communication Action 
Reduce turnover of 
qualified, competent 
employees (Kow, 2004) 
HR department should arrange for 
periodic interviews of both new 
and existing employees, both 
individually and collectively to 
seek their views on the general 
well being of the new employees 
(Kow, 2004) 
Ensure that all employees 
regardless of level or location 
know what is going on, for what 
reason and how it will occur 
CEO should be the principle 
person to deliver the presentation 
in person and as often as possible. 
If logistics preclude then video 
presentation of CEO giving 
messages; senior manager well 
versed in message and eager to 
listen to the concerns of the 
audience, fijlly committed to the 
effort be present; alongwith 
handouts that address FAQs (Kow, 
2004) 
Concerns of employees 
dealt in open and honest 
manner (Kow, 2004) 
Follow up sessions offered (Kow, 
2004) 
Buy-in and support of all 
staff especially frontline 
staff (Kow, 2004; 
Meliones, 2000) 
Note any comments or queries and 
answers be provided asap 
Be open and honest (Kow, 2004; 
Meliones, 2000) 
Engage employees to 
find out their concerns, 
answer their questions 
and to get their inputs on 
how to make the 
company a better place to 
work (Kow, 2004) 
Information gathering for 
situation analysis 
(Balgobin & Pandit, 
2001) 
Generate goodwill by 
showing that 
management is 
reasonable, optimistic 
and determined to save 
CEO must get out of the office to 
talk to the employees and to listen 
to them (Kow, 2004; Meliones, 
2000; Balgobin & Pandit, 2001) 
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s. 
No. 
Stakeholder Turnaround Element 
(Objective) 
Possible Communication Action 
the Company (Balgobin 
& Pandit, 2001) 
Identify competent staff 
(Balgobin & Pandit, 
2001) 
Win trust and build 
collaborative 
environment (Kow, 
2004) 
Open Communication Style 
(Encourage employees to find 
answers, take decisions); (Kow, 
2004) 
Lead by example to build 
open and trusting culture 
(Kow, 2004) 
Seize every opportunity to be seen 
as fair and trustworthy (Kow, 
2004) 
Gain competitive 
advantage (Kow, 2004) 
Keep enhancing communication 
technology - email, mobile, ERP 
(Kow, 2004) 
People with other 
expertise can help build 
consensus (Meliones, 
2000) 
Share the pulpit (Meliones, 2000) 
Change people's roles; instead of 
identifying with an individual job 
(I am a nurse), employees should 
identify with goal-oriented teams 
("We, the ICU team, work 
together to help children with 
heart problems") (Meliones, 2000) 
Keep organization on 
track (Meliones, 2000) 
Offer constant feedback 
(Meliones, 2000) 
Motivation; Employees 
feel their opinion 
mattered (Meliones, 
2000) 
Publicize and celebrate every 
employee and team success 
(Newsletter, award, appreciation 
in open forum). (Meliones, 2000) 
Make people respond 
(Meliones, 2000) 
Cultivate sense of humour -
people will respond if you can 
laugh at yourself (Meliones, 2000) 
Get cooperation of all 
stakeholders: banks, 
suppliers, customers and 
employees/unions 
(Meliones, 2000) 
Establish and communicate 
credibility (Meliones, 2000) 
Source: developed by the researcher on the basis of literature review 
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While all these studies recommended communication actions or a communication 
plan, not even a single study was found to be focused completely on communication 
during turnaround. The gap is evident and therefore the need for research in the area 
is reaffirmed. 
SECTION III: Developing A Framework of Communication 
Strategies For Organizational Turnaround (CS for OTA) 
A framework of communication objectives and communication actions thereof 
directed towards different stakeholders during the turnaround process was 
created by combining Table 3.2 and Table 3.3. This framework is given in 
framework 3.1. 
FRAMEWORK 3.1 = ^ ^ = ^ = = ^ 
Possible Communications with stakeholders for achieving turnaround 
elements (objectives), extracted from the study of literature on 
Turnaround 
Stakeholder / Turnaround Element (objective)/ 
Possible Communication Action 
Board of Directors! Shareholders 
Gain support and time in the future 
• Present detailed turn-around plan 
• Open to accept the help and advice of senior management 
Staff and Employees 
Credibility building actions by the new management 
• Publicize success in resolving a current crisis or problem (using resourcefiilness 
and perseverance) 
• Make decisions transparent. It enhances workforce confidence in the 
management. Prevents them from being demoralized. Helps them understand 
impopular decisions. 
• Exercise Communication Control. Do not make unattainable promises to 
managers. Avoid raising unnecessary expectations 
Initial Control 
• Order preparation of daily, weekly and monthly cash forecasts 
• Exercise Communication Control. Don't have too many meetings, hivite 
participants on the basis of their need to know, the ability to contribute. 
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• 
• Seek views on the general well being of the employees. Arrange for periodic 
interviews of employees, both individually and collectively. May hire a 
consultant for the purpose. Helps reduce turnover of qualified, competent 
employees 
Planning the turnaround: Develop a plan; gain Involvement and 
commitment in the process 
• Include only key managers for development of vision 
• Hold special sessions for non-participating managers after vision has been 
developed 
• Listen to the views of all managers. Gauge their reactions 
• Understand perceptions and focus minds of managing team. Set the scene for 
turnaround. Hire a consultant to hold interviews with a cross-section of 
business including members of the strategic team. Before these individual 
interviews, each participant should be given a questionnaire on the issues of the 
business and its lack of profitability and growth. 
Mobilization of organization for turnaround 
• CEO should deliver the vision presentation in person and as often as possible. 
If logistics preclude the CEO from delivering the presentation then video 
presentation of CEO giving messages along with a senior manager well versed 
in the message and eager to listen to the concerns of the audience, folly 
committed to the effort should be present alongwith handouts that address 
FAQs 
Inject urgency in the communications plan. Explain what needs to be done and 
why. Managers and employees should be able to see where they are headed 
(Kow, 2004). 
Managers and employees understand and internalize the vision 
Ensure all employees know what is going on, for what reason and how it will 
occur. This must be ensured regardless of level or location. Helps displace 
rumors and gossip 
Share the pulpit. People with other expertise can help build consensus 
Deal with concerns of employees in open and honest manner. Offer Follow up 
sessions 
Note any comments or queries and answers be provided as soon as possible. 
This will ensure buy-in and support of all staff especially frontline staff 
CEO must get out of the office to talk to the employees and to listen to them 
Engage employees to find out their concerns, answer their questions and to get 
their inputs on how to make the company a better jiace to work. This is a 
channel for information gathering for situation analysis; generate goodwill by 
showing that management is reasonable, optimistic and determined to save the 
Company; Identify competent staff; 
Employ open ended communication style that encourages employees to find 
answers, take decisions. It will help to win trust and build collaborative 
environment 
Repeatedly affirm the Company's mission, core values, and the primary goals 
of profit and growth. The relationship of these three to the strategic vision and 
its implementation progress be made a consistent agenda item in all 
management team meetings 
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• Articulate a few highly concrete targets for the company for the next few 
months 
• Involve the staff to identify solvable problem areas and have their views on 
uninvolved areas. Management meetings, quality circles, task forces etc could 
be employed in achieving this. 
• Rephrase people's roles to clarify managerial responsibilities. Instead of 
identifying with an individual job (I am a nurse), employees should identify 
with goal-oriented teams ("We, the ICU team, work together to help children 
with heart problems") 
• Top managers must emphasize on integrity, fairness, hard work, 
resourcefulness and concern for the staff during interactions with the staff. 
Seize every opportunity to be seen as fair and trustworthy. This must be 
supported by action. 
• Publicize and celebrate every employee and team success. Newsletter, awards, 
appreciation in open forum are some of the ways of achieving the same. Makes 
the employees feel their opinion matters 
Internal Co-ordination 
• Offer constant feedback to keep organization on track 
• Set up co-ordination committees for co-ordinating interdependent departments 
• Institute a monthly performance review meeting of all senior managers chaired 
by the chief executive. This is to review previous decisions, fix monthly 
corporate targets for production, sales, collections etc. share operating 
information and discuss policy issues and announce policy decisions 
• Insist that lower level disputes be settled at that level on a face to face basis 
• Keep the atmosphere light. Cultivate sense of humour - people will respond if 
you can laugh at yourself 
• Keep enhancing communication technology - email, mobile, ERP and gain 
competitive advantage 
Unions 
Negotiation of support of outside stalieholders and neutralization of external 
pressures 
• Brief unions on the problems and strengths of the unit and some tentative 
turnaround plan. 
• Get them to suggest turnaround steps 
• Seek support, concessions etc. from the unions 
• Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy 
• Keep unions posted on the progress of the turnaround 
Banks and Financial Institutions 
Negotiation of support of outside stalieholders and neutralization of external 
pressures 
• Brief Banks and FIs on he problems and strengths of the unit and some 
tentative turnaround plan 
• Get them to suggest turnaround steps 
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• Seek support, concessions etc. from FIs 
• Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy 
• Keep FIs posted on the progress of the turnaround 
Government 
Negotiation of support of outside stakeholders and neutralization of external 
pressures 
Brief government on the problems and strengths of the unit and some tentative 
turnaround plan. 
Get them to suggest turnaround steps 
Seek support, concessions etc. from government 
Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy 
Keep government posted on the progress of the turnaround 
Suppliers 
Negotiation of support of outside stakeholders and neutralization of external 
pressures 
• Brief suppliers on the problems and strengths of the unit and some tentative 
turnaround plan. 
• Get suppliers to suggest turnaround steps 
• Seek support, concessions etc. from suppliers 
• Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy 
• Keep suppliers posted on the progress of the turnaround 
Customers 
Negotiation of support of outside stakeholders and neutralization of external 
pressures 
• Brief customers on the problems and strengths of the unit and some tentative 
turnaround plan. 
• Get customers to suggest turnaround steps 
• Seek support, concessions etc. from customers 
• Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy 
• Keep customers posted on the progress of the turnaround 
Quick Cost Reduction 
Improve systems to source industry information. 
Revenue Generation 
Unfocused advertising and promotion be more sharply focused. Eg: Sophisticated 
equipment manufacturers may cut down advertising and step up promotion; FMCG 
manufacturers may contact small grocery shops for retailing; may contact mass 
distributors for distribution of products etc. 
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Framework 3.1 is abbreviated to prepare Framework 3.2. Framework 3.2 is proposed 
as a comprehensive list of communication objectives of companies attempting a 
turnaround and coimnunication actions for addressing various stakeholders, proposed 
to achieve the same. 
FRAMEWORK 3.2 
Proposed Abridged Framework of Communication Strategies for 
Organizational Turnaround (CS for OTA) 
Stakeholder/ Turnaround Element (objective)! Possible Communication Action 
Board of Directors! Shareholders 
Gain support and time in the future 
• Present detailed turn-around plan 
Staff and Employees 
Credibility building actions by the new management 
Document, and communicate a strategic turnaround plan 
Publicize success in resolving a current crisis or problem 
Make decisions transparent 
Exercise Communication Control 
Initial Control 
Order preparation of daily, weekly and monthly cash forecasts 
Exercise Communication Control. 
Seek views on the general well being of the employees. 
Mobilization of organization for turnaround 
Include key managers for development of industry wisdom 
Include only key managers for development of vision 
CEO should deliver the vision presentation in person and as often as possible. 
Hold special sessions for non-participating managers after vision has been 
developed to share planned vision 
Inject urgency in the communications plan. Explain what needs to be done and 
why 
Listen to the views of all managers. Gauge their reaction 
Understand perceptions and focus minds of managing team. Set the scene for 
turnaround. 
Ensure all employees know wiiat is going on, for what reason and how it will 
occur. 
Share the pulpit. 
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Deal with concerns of employees in open and honest manner. Offer Follow up 
sessions 
Note any comments or queries and provide answers asap. 
CEO must get out of the office to interact with the employees and to listen to 
them 
Employ open ended communication style that encourages employees to find 
answers, take decisions. 
Repeatedly affirm the Company's mission, core values, and the primary goals 
of profit and growth. 
Articulate a few highly concrete targets for the company for the next few 
months 
Involve the staff to identify solvable problem areas and have their views on 
uninvolved areas. 
Rephrase people's roles to clarify managerial responsibilities. 
Top managers must emphasize on integrity, fairness, hard work, 
resourcefiilness and concern for the staff during interactions with the staff. 
Publicize and celebrate every employee and team success. 
Internal Co-ordination 
Offer constant feedback to keep organization on track 
Set up co-ordination committees for co-ordinating interdependent departments 
Institute a monthly performance review meeting of all senior managers chaired 
by the chief executive. 
Insist that lower level disputes be settled at that level on a face to face basis 
Keep the atmosphere light. 
Keep enhancing communication technology - email, mobile, ERP etc. 
Unions 
Negotiation of support of Unions and neutralization of Unions' pressures 
Brief unions on the problems and strengths of the unit and some tentative 
turnaround plan. 
Get them to suggest tumaround steps 
Seek support, concessions etc. from the unions 
Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy 
Keep unions posted on the progress of the tumaround 
Banks and Financial Institutions 
Negotiation of support of Banks and/or FIs and neutralization of Banks and/or FIs 
pressures 
• Brief Banks and/or FIs on the problems and strengths of the unit and some 
tentative tumaround plan 
• Get them to suggest tumaround steps 
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• Seek support, concessions etc. from Banks and/or FIs 
• Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy 
• Keep Banks and/or FIs posted on the progress of the turnaround 
Government 
Negotiation of support of Government and neutralization of Government pressures 
• Brief relevant government departments on the problems and strengths of the 
unit and some tentative turnaround plan. 
• Get them to suggest turnaround steps 
• Seek support, concessions etc. from the government 
• Evolve jointly a broad tumaround sfrategy 
• Keep the government posted on the progress of the tumaround 
Suppliers 
Negotiation of support of suppliers and neutralization of suppliers' pressures 
Brief suppliers on the problems and strengths of the unit and some tentative 
tumaround plan. 
Get suppliers to suggest tumaround steps 
Seek support, concessions etc. from suppliers 
Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy 
Keep suppliers posted on the progress of the tumaround 
Customers 
Negotiation of support of customers and neutralization of customers' pressures 
• Brief customers on the problems and strengths of the unit and some tentative 
tumaround plan. 
• Get customers to suggest tumaround steps 
• Seek support, concessions etc. from customers 
• Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy 
• Keep customers posted on the progress of the tumaround 
Sourcing industry information for quick cost reduction 
Increase costs incurred on communication technologies, if need be, for sourcing 
industry (market) information 
Revenue generation 
Unfocused advertising and promotion be more sharply focused 
Framework 3.2 is a comprehensive list of various stakeholders that may be 
considered critical for enabling a tumaround. Further, the framework also lists the 
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communication objectives that a turnaround management may have for each critical 
stakeholder during the turnaround period. Communication actions that management 
of different successful turnaround companies employed to achieve objectives of 
turnaround strategy (tumaround elements) are also compiled in this framework. 
An attempt has been made to prepare or comprehensive list of stakeholders 
considered critical during the tumaround process, based on literature survey of 
tumaround studies carried out across the world and reviewed for this study. Since 
none of the studies reviewed, provide a comprehensive communication strategy for 
tumaround, it may be assumed that the framework developed is not completely 
mandatory for every tumaround. This is to say every company that is able to enable a 
tumaround would necessarily have to deal with some of the critical stakeholders but 
not necessarily all of them. Though an attempt has been made to prepare a 
comprehensive list of communication audiences (stakeholders), communication 
objectives and communication actions (interventions), there is need to establish 
whether or not the lists are comprehensive. If the validity of the framework is 
established, then pattems in findings may be studied to understand the role and 
impact of communication in enabling change in general and tumaround in specific. 
Propositions to be validated 
Proposition PIA'. Every company that undergoes a tumaround would necessarily 
have to address one or more of the communication objectives given in the framework 
though not necessarily all. 
Proposition PIB'- The list of communication objectives given in the proposed 
theoretical framework is comprehensive. 
Proposition P2A: Every company that undergoes a tumaround would necessarily 
have to address one or more of the critical stakeholders given in the framework. 
Proposition P2B'- The list of critical stakeholders to be addressed during a 
tumaround is comprehensive. 
Proposition PJA: At least one of the communication actions listed in the proposed 
theoretical framework, is employed to realize a corresponding communication 
objective during tumaround. 
Proposition PSB'- The list of communication actions recommended for achieving 
the communication objectives is comprehensive 
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Proposed Model of Communication Strategies for 
Organizational Turnaround 
It is proposed that an organization is embedded into an environment, as depicted in 
Figure 3.1. There are disabhng forces emanating from various stakeholders that are 
exerting themselves on a sick company, as depicted in Figure 3.2. The 
management/promoter (as discussed earlier) assume the central responsibility for 
managing the disabling forces. Appropriate managerial decisions direct managerial 
actions which lead to organizational turnaround, as depicted in Figure 3.3. The 
managerial actions include thought out communication actions/ interventions which 
are designed to meet strategic communication objectives for each stakeholder. The 
strategic communication objectives have one-to-one co-relation with strategic 
turnaround objectives. Framework 3.2 presents a comprehensive list of stakeholders, 
objectives and communication actions which is proposed as the theoretical framework 
for Communication Strategies for Organizational Tumaround (CS for OTA). 
This study will attempt to validate Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3 and 
Framework 3.2. 
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Research Methodology and Design 4 
Research Objectives 
The overall purpose of the research was to identify communication strategies adopted 
by companies that have successfully enabled a turn around in the recent past (1995-
2005). The study was focused on Indian companies that had turned around from a 
sick state and shown sustained growth for atleast three years. The objectives of the 
study were: 
• Exploring the importance of communication in the process of managing change 
• Identifying communication interventions employed during the change process 
• Identifying communication technologies adopted and implemented as part of the 
change process 
• Exploring challenges and opportunities created by emerging technologies 
• Identifying resources and skills required to facilitate development and 
implementation of an effective communication strategy 
• Appreciating the variables and their criticality in making a communication 
strategy effective 
• Identifying the challenges faced in developing and implementing an integrated 
communication strategy for managing change in organizations 
• Exploring if any existing theories of communication like exchange model, 
socialization model or accommodation model have been applied 
• Identifying directions for improvement in communication strategies 
Research Propositions 
This study attempted to establish the context by validating Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 
and propose a Strategic Communications Model for Organizational Turnaround (CS 
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for OTA) by validating Figure 3.3 and propositions for validating Framework 3.2. 
(Details as per Section I and II of Theory Building and Propositions (Chapter 3). 
Research Methodology 
Selection of Research Methodology: A realist worldview has dominated 
research in the field of communications. It assumes that reality is an objective, 
observable entity which is 
independent of those involved in it. Quantitative research that is concerned with 
discovery of universal laws of cause and effect which apply across different times and 
contexts is usually employed by researchers and practitioners who agree with the 
realist paradigm. This is because quantitative techniques seek to distance the 
researcher from the data, both in the methods of collecting data and also in analysis 
where numbers and statistics are favoured over words and the organization of 
language. Mainstream research on managed communication has been realist in its 
approach. 
However, the contemporary books on research indicate a great potential for study of 
communication from the viewpoint of those involved in it (Daymon & Holloway, 
2002; Yin, Robert K, 2003; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). In recent years, modem 
organizations have shifted focus from control to coordination. As a result, a subtle 
change has taken place in the disciplines of public relations and communications. 
These disciplines are turning their attention to notions of dialogue and collaboration -
communicating with people rather than to audiences. Creating a collaborative 
dialogue means negotiating meanings in an interactive manner - in other words 
finding out what each is about and adjusting to each other. It is not sufficient for 
organizations to state the identity they require, unless they have first heard, 
appreciated and taken on board the concerns and opinions of those with whom they 
are talking. (Daymon & Holloway, 2002: 10). Fill (1999) wrote that 'good 
relationships are developed by appreciating the views held by others' and by 'putting 
oneself in their shoes'. The companies are becoming 'mindfiil' in their 
communications and thus do not merely propagate their view; they rather listen to the 
stakeholders' perspective and empathize (which does not necessarily mean they agree 
but it certainly indicates mindfiilness in dialogue) (Daymon & Holloway, 2002: 11). 
It was found that the role of communication as documented in existing literature on 
turn around also indicated an inclination towards mindfial approach. 
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Meyer (2004) wrote that organizations often find it hard to change their corporate 
strategy radically, even if the need for change is widely recognized as in the Asian 
crisis of 1997. Such change requires large numbers of stakeholders to change their 
individual behavior. He considered the coordination of stakeholders as the core of 
governance during radical environmental change and argued that radical change 
requires leaders to communicate and create common knowledge about the 
organization's future strategy. This view of reality emphasizes on subjectivity and 
professes that a study of communication be done within its context. Companies that 
turnaround are therefore expected to adopt mindful dialogue with stakeholders, for 
the purpose of this research, it was thus important to understand the social reality 
constructed during the phase of this radical change in organizations. 
Thus, in accordance with Daymon and Holloway (2002), aim of this research study, 
which was to delve in communication, resonated better with the aims of qualitative 
research studies rather than with those of quantitative research methods. Qualitative 
research methods could help to unravel the phenomena such as mindfulness or 
mindlessness, as it is based on words as the unit of analysis rather than numbers. 
Also, to understand the undocumented communication plans that practitioners might 
have adopted, this research methodology made sense. A small-scale study that 
ensured close involvement of the researcher with the context under investigation, 
flexibility, participant view points, and a holistic focus, amongst other features were 
all desired and qualitative research therefore offered an edge over quantitative 
research that assumes a more realistc rather than an interpretive approach. Thus, it 
was decided to adopt a qualitative research methodology. 
Qualitative Researcii Teciinique Selection: The various qualitative research 
methods are ethnography, discourse analysis and phenomenology, grounded theory or 
case study. Ethnographic approach to research has the potential to reveal how 
communication exchanges and interactions are influenced by culture. It entails 
researchers immersing themselves in a group, organization or community for an 
extended period of fieldwork. Making the desirable time commitment for field work 
was not possible given the constraints of the doctoral work to be carried out in a 
stipulated time period. Besides, the possibility of organizations permitting deep 
immersion and interaction with various stakeholders was not very high, in the 
absence of which this methodology could not ensure reliable outcome. 
Discourse analysis and phenomenology is a qualitative research method that enables 
a researcher to bring out the implied meanings and tacit coding in the respondent's 
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language use in all its various forms of communication. The researcher attempts to 
study the linguistic pattems to draw the reality in which the communications are 
embedded. Though, discourse analysis was not the primary research technique 
adopted, it was to some extent employed to analyze the interviews of various 
respondents. 
Phenomenology provides means to the researcher to set aside its own ideas and 
assumptions about the subject and then collect data to later carry out thematic 
analysis of the data collected. However, research methodology literature warns that 
unless one has a sound understanding of the philosophy of phenomenology, one 
would find it difficult to successfiilly apply this research. It also warns that finding 
people who have experienced the phenomena one wishes to study and who are 
willing to spend the time required for extended discussions could be problematic. 
Considering these constraints it was decided to not to adopt this methodology as well. 
Yet another qualitative research approach that was explored was the grounded theory 
approach. When a researcher wishes to generate, develop theory or offer 
interpretations different fi"om what theorists have been offering about the subject 
phenomena, a grounded theory research is recommended. An initial review of 
literature on turnaround did not present much done exclusively to establish 
communication strategies for enabling organizational turnaround. However, whatever 
little was documented as part of studies focused primarily on other areas, did not offer 
any interpretations that were found to be conflicting with the researchers view on the 
same. Thus, while the need to develop a framework to extend the existing theory was 
felt, the need to essentially offer different interpretations to existing work (which 
actually was little) was not felt. Thus a grounded theory approach was not the most 
suited approach to carry out this study. 
Yet another qualitative research method that could be adopted was the case study 
approach. A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates contemporary 
phenomena within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomena and context are not clearly evident. This was expected to be the situation 
in the current study as it was possible that respondents may not very finely distinguish 
between what they did especially for a tumaround situation, for instance, a 
management deciding to incorporate ERP may not be able to decide whether the 
decision was for tumaround cr for growth. The distinction then between when the 
efforts shifted fi-om tumaround to growth could be very difficult to make. 
71 
A case study copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there are many 
more variables of interest than data points, as one result relies on multiple sources of 
evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion. Here a result 
benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis. Thus it allows an investigator to retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristic of real life events - such as individual life cycles, 
organizational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, international 
relations and the maturation of studies (Yin, Case Study Research, Sage Publications, 
1987, pl4). In the current study, number of variables (stakeholders, objectives and 
communication interventions) under study, are very large and must triangulate to 
make one real life event - the organizational tumaround. A case study methodology is 
ideally suited for such a case. 
In the current research, it was possible that the management of the organizations 
being studied had not documented or captioned a communication strategy as a 
communication strategy. The purpose of the research was however to figure out 
whether the management subconsciously (if not consciously) strategized how it 
would conduct its communications with various stakeholders. This meant that there 
was a need to make the respondent share his or her experiences of the tumaround and 
extract from their versions, meanings that indicate whether or not a communication 
strategy was agreed upon while enabling the tumaround. Questions such as how did 
the sickness impact relationship with suppliers, customers, employees etc. were 
expected to fetch descriptive responses such as impact on credibility, trust, 
cooperation, willingness etc. The communication strategies adopted to tackle various 
implications of sick companies had to be deciphered from responses to questions such 
as how did you build back the trust, how did you decide to follow the method you 
did? 
According to Yin (1987), the first and most important condition for differentiating 
among the various research strategies is to identify the type of research question 
being asked. In general "what" question may either be exploratory (in which case any 
of the strategies be used) or about prevalence (in which surveys or analysis of 
archival records would be favored). "How" and "why" questions are likely to favor 
the use of case studies, experiments or histories. 
Yet another question to be addressed was to identify the impact of communication on 
tumaround. In any communication, it is obvious that the impact of communication 
would be dependant on both the objective of communic ation and delivery of the 
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message. Objective of communication duringtumaroundhowever, is dependant on 
thetumaroundstrategy and thus the outcome of communication is dependant on both 
the quality oftumaroundstrategy and the quality of communication. The two cannot 
be separated as the communication has to happen in the context of 
thetumaroundstrategy. 
If one assumes that communication has some role and impact on turnaround, then to 
be able to measure the impact of communication one would have to segregate the 
impact of the communication objective and impact of communication delivery as the 
former is perhaps more dependant on the turnaround strategy than on communication 
strategy. 
Thus, it is possible to quantify the impact, if experiments under controlled conditions 
(control objectives and vary communications) could be carried out to measure impact 
of communication delivery in a given situation. In the current research study, each 
organization was expected to have turned around from a different situation ii a 
different environment. The researcher had no control on the environment or the 
incidents that had led to the turnaround. Experimentation under controlled conditions 
was therefore not possible. 
A survey to understand the perceptions of impact of communication is another 
possible method for research. However, the results in this case are dependant on how 
clearly can respondents differentiate between the impact of turnaround strategy and 
impact of its communication. Since the researcher had no control on conditions and 
the variables under study were large, case study technique was considered most 
appropriate for the study and hence adopted. 
The case study technique also permits a researcher to record and analyze the subject's 
impressions and employ secondary information for validation. This is not possible in 
the survey method. Since, one would rather not depend on the respondent's capability 
to segregate impact of turnaround strategy and turnaround communications, case 
study method provides an edge over the survey method. Although, it does not permit 
experimentation for quantifying the impact, it does provide the researcher the 
flexibility to gauge the impact from the information available. A subjective 
impression, either of the practitioner or of the researcher substantiated by secondary 
information was therefore considered the best measure of impact of communication 
during turnaround. It was decided to adopt the case study research methodology, for 
the purpose of this study. 
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Unit of Analysis: The proposed CS for OTA comprised of three components, 
namely, stakeholders, communication objectives and communication interventions. 
Thus, the proposed model of CS for OTA was to be tested against communication 
strategy of successful turned around organization. The research design selected was 
thus employed 'Turnaround communication strategy' as the primary unit of analysis 
and 'Turnaround communication objectives set for each stakeholder', 'stakeholders 
addressed during turnaround' and 'communication interventions fcr each objective' 
as the embedded units of analysis. 
Case Study Design: A single case study is analogous to a single experiment and 
many of the same conditions that justify a single experiment also justify a single -case 
study. One rationale for a single-case study is when it represents a critical case in 
testing a well formulated theory. This however was not true for this research, where a 
new framework was being developed. The second rationale for a single case 
represents an extreme case or a unique case which again was not relevant in the 
present study. This third rationale for a single case is the representative or typical 
case. The objective here is to capture an everyday commonplace situation. Since 
sickness and the turnaround thereafter could be a result of a large variety of reasons it 
was not considered pragmatic to select one organization as a representative sample of 
organizations that have turned around. The fourth rationale for a single-case study is 
the revelatory case. This situation exists when an investigator has an opportunity to 
observe and analyze a phenomenon previously not accessible to scientific 
investigation. This again was the not the situation in the present study. The fifth 
rationale is the longitudinal case: studying the same case at two or more different 
points of time. This was again not feasible as it was not very likely that an 
organization going through the turnaround would permit an investigator to study the 
ongoing process. Besides, the time constraints attached to the doctoral work also 
limited the feasibility of such a study. 
A Multiple-Case design on the other hand is often considered more compelling 
evidence and therefore regarded as being more robust (Herriot & Firestone, 1983). 
Though it required extensive resources in terms of money and time, these were 
considered within the reach of the researcher. The multiple-case design was thus 
selected for the purpose of this study. 
Thus, the research design employed was an embedded multiple-case research design. 
(see figure 4.1) 
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Figure 4.1 Multiple-case designs 
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Source: Adapted with some variation from Yin, R.K (2003). Case Study Research: Design and 
Methods, p40. V^ ed.. New Delhi: Sage Publications, Applied Social Research Method Series 
Linking Data to Propositions: Replication logic is analogous to that used in 
multiple experiments (Hersen & Barlow, 1976; Yin, 2003). The logic therefore is to 
select each case carefully so that it either (a) predicts similar results (a literal 
replication) or (b) predicts contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical 
replication). Yin (2003) wrote that 6 to 10 case studies, arranged effectively within 
multiple-case design are analogous to conducting 6 to 10 experiments on rehted 
topics; a few cases (2 or 3) would be literal replications, where as a few other cases (4 
to 6) might be designed to pursue different patterns of theoretical replications. If all 
the cases turn out as predicted, these 6 to 10 cases, in aggregate, would have provided 
compelling support for the initial set of propositions. If the cases are in some way 
contradictory, the initial propositions must be revised and retested with another set of 
cases. 
It was expected that collecting data/ organizing interviews with failed or failing 
turnaround managements to candidly share the bitter experiences and faulty decision 
choices, could be difficult or problematic. Literal replication on a number of 
successM organizational turnarounds was therefore thought to be a more practical 
technique and hence adopted. 
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Figure 4.2: Protocol Adopted for Case Study Method 
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Source: Adapted with some variation from Yin, R.K (2003). Case Study Research: Design and Methods, p50,3"* ed., New Delhi: 
Sage Publications, Applied Social Research Method Series. 
Scope of Study: For the purpose of this study some critical terms were defined as 
follows: 
Change: Organizations target changes of various kinds such as diversifying into new 
markets or changing its product mix or globalizing or becoming transnational or 
enabling a turnaround (the list is indicative only), for the purpose of this study, focus 
was maintained on only one kind of change, as communication challenges in each 
kind of change could be different. The intent was to understand if there were common 
communication challenges in one kind of change initiative and whether a 
comprehensive communication strategy could be suggested for such a change 
initiative. 
Change can be an ongoing process in an organization or a radical change. 
Communication challenges in each case can be very different from those in the other 
type Study of change as an ongoing process requires a longitudinal study. Since the 
Doctoral research was to be carried out in relatively shorter duration, it was decided 
to study a radical change initiative. 
76 
In the recent past, many organizations faced turbulent times ouc to. demands of 
globalization, increasing competition, shrinking margins, crowded marketplaces^ 
cheaper labour etc. Many companies that could not quickly adapt to the chaffgiiig 
scenario, failed miserably. Some companies, however, took the bull by the horns and 
enabled a turnaround for themselves. This kind of turnaround, is perhaps one of the 
most radical change that a company can attempt. Communication challenges are 
expected to be significant during such an initiative. Therefore, for the purpose of this 
research, it was decided to study communication strategies during turnarounds. 
Type of Turnaround: There are three kinds of tumarounds, namely, economic, 
industry and organizational turnaround, for the purpose of this study, focus was 
maintained on organizational turnaround. 
Maturity of the organization being studied: The challenges before an organization 
during different phases of maturity are different. These may range from issues 
conceming delegation, co-ordination to collaboration in the first, second and third 
phase of maturity respectively. It was decided to select companies in the fourth phase 
of maturity. This was to ensure homogeneity in the sample. 
Thus, for the purpose of this research, tumarounds in organizations that have matured 
to the fourth level of maturity in times of good organizational health were selected for 
study. 
Net Worth: Net Worth of a Company is it's paid up capital plus its free reserves. 
Sick Organization: If the performance declined to an extent that the networth of a 
Company turned negative (that is the accumulated losses exceed the networth) then 
the Company was defined as a sick organization. 
Turned around Organization: As discussed inchapter2 Literature Review, 
tumarounds have been defined in several ways. However, as is obvious, the 
challenges before a management that has to tumaround a sick company, whose net 
worth is eroded to a negative figure, are perhaps most daunting, for the purpose of 
this study, it was decided that organizations that had tumed around from a sick state 
(negative net worth) to a healthy growth (positive net worth for some years) be 
selected for study and henceforth be termed as tumed around companies in this 
research work. 
To ensure that these organizations were at one time in the fourth stage of 
organizational cycle, only those organizations listed on a stock exchange were to be 
selected for study. 
y 
A 
/ 
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Turnaround Cycle time: Prior research into business turnaround differs with regard 
to the length of the turnaround cycle. Schendel, Patton & Rigs (1976), Bibeault 
(1982) and Poston, Harmon & Gramlich,. (1994) all used a turnaround cycle time 
period of eight years (four years for the downturn and four for the upturn). 
Chowdhury & Lang (1996), Hambrick & Schecter (1983), Pearce & Robbins (1993), 
Smith & Gunalan (1996) and Smith & Graves, (2005) each used four years (two 
years for the downturn and two years for uptum). 
For the purpose of the current study, in order to ensure that the turnarounds were 
relevant in current context, it was important to select tumarounds that happened in the 
recent past. It was therefore decided that the point of turnaround of networth of the 
organization to be selected for study should be within the last ten years (1995-2005). 
A turnaround cycle of eight years would have been too long as the number of 
organizations that could be picked up for study could be too small. Also, the recall 
and interest of the turnaround management could fade in such a long span of time. On 
the other hand six years of turnaround cycle time was giving a decent sample and 
naturally was offering a more confirmed sarrple and a wider study period than that 
offered by a four year turnaround cycle, for this study, it was therefore decided that a 
turnaround cycle of six years (three years downturn and three years uptum) be used 
Selection of turned around Organizations for the researcii study: 
Organizations listed on the stock exchange whose networth was eroded and remained 
negative for atleast three years and then turned around to become positive for atleast 
three years were to be selected. 
1. Financial information of all the 5780 Companies whose information was 
available from the CMIE Prowess' databank was sourced. Prowess posts and 
updates information of listed companies only. The information sourced was 
for the period 1995-2005. 
2. 705 Companies were found to have gone sick at some point of time during 
1995 to 2005. 
3. From these 705 Companies, the networth of 39 Companies was found to have 
remained negative for atleast three years and then turned around to positive 
networth for atleast three years (turnaround cycle time - 6 years). The list of 
these 39 Companies is as given below in Table 4.1: 
' Prowess is a coiporate database service from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy 
(CMIE). The database incorporates the profit and loss statement, balance sheets, cash flows, 
products manufactured, raw materials consumed etc. 
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Table 4.1: Companies that turned around during 1995-2005 
S.No. Company Industry City 
1 Amrit Banaspati Ltd. Food & Beverages 
(Vanaspati) 
Ghaziabad, UP 
2 +Howrah Mills Co. Ltd. Textile (Jute) Kolkata, W Bengal 
3 Naihati Jute Mills Co. Ltd. Textile (Jute) Kolkata, W Bengal 
4 Nambumadi Tea Co. Ltd. Food & Beverages (Tea) Kolkata, W Bengal 
5 Vegetable Products Ltd. Food & Beverages 
(Vanaspati) 
Kolkata, W Bengal 
6 Indian Polyfibres Ltd Textile Lucknow, UP 
7 Asia Fab Ltd Textile Mumbai, 
Maharashtra 
8 Tasty Bites Eatbles Ltd. Food & Beverages 
(Packaged Food) 
Pune, Maharashtra 
9 Pettavaittalai Sugars and 
Chemicals Ltd 
Molasses and Sugar Chennai, TN 
10 Radico Khaitan Ltd. Champagne Delhi 
11 Associated Pigments Ltd. Chemical Kolkata, W Bengal 
12 Empee Sugars and 
Chemicals Ltd 
Molasses and Sugar Nellore, Andhra 
Pradesh 
13 Gujarat Themis Bisyn Ltd Antibiotic Drugs and 
Rifampicin 
Valsad, Gujrat 
14 Elder Projects Ltd Pharmaceuticals Assam, india/ 
Mumbai 
15 Mangalore Chemicals and 
Fertilizers Ltd 
Urea Bangalore, 
Kamataka 
16 Henkel India Ltd Rectified Spirit Chennai, TN 
17 Teesta Agro Industries 
Ltd. 
Fertilisers- Single Super 
Phosphate 
Jalpaiguri, W. 
Bengal 
18 Uniroyal marine exports 
Ltd 
Kozhikode, Kerela 
19 Sheel International Ltd New Delhi 
20 Kongrar Integrated Fibres 
Ltd 
Palani, TN 
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S.No. Company Industry City 
21 Shaba Chemicals Ltd Pharmaceuticals Ratlam, MP 
22 India Polyfins Ltd Textiles- Weaving Surat, Gujarat 
23 Sarita Synthetics India Ltd 
24 Torrent Gujarat Biotech 
Ltd 
Penicillin Ahmedabad 
Gujarat 
25 Recron Synthetics Ltd Textiles-Manmade Fibre Allahabad, UP 
26 Pasari Spinning Mills Ltd Cotton yam Banglore, 
Kamataka 
11 Godrej Foods Ltd Edible Oil Bhopal, MP 
28 JJ Spectrum Silk Ltd Silk Fabrics Processed Kolkata, India 
29 Belapur Industries Ltd Mumbai, 
Maharashtra 
30 Champagne Indage Ltd Alcoholic Breweries Mumbai, 
Maharashtra 
31 Delta Polysters Ltd Cloth Processed Mumbai, 
Maharashtra 
32 Hitkari Fibres Ltd. Textile Carpets Mumbai, 
Maharashtra 
33 Mihijam Vanaspati Ltd Vanaspati Dhanbad, 
Jharkhand 
34 Modem Dairies Ltd Ghee, Butter and Infant 
Milk 
Kamal, Haryana 
35 Ahlcon Parentrals India 
Ltd 
Pharmaceuticals New Delhi 
36 KMG Milk Food Ltd Ghee New Delhi 
37 Rathi Graphic 
Technologies Ltd 
New Delhi 
38 Sheena Textiles Ltd Terry Towelling & similar 
Woven Terry Fabrics 
New Delhi 
39 Pearl Engineering 
Polymers Ltd 
polymers like pet chips New Delhi/ Pune, 
Maharashtra 
Source: Prowess CMIE 
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To decide as to which organizations to study, no further distinction was made on the 
basis of industry, region, extent of sickness or size of organization (although ensuring 
the fact that these Companies were Hsted on a stock exchange of India ensured a 
minimum size of the organization). Since the study was to be mainly based on 
interviews of either members of the Board of Directors or Top Management of the 
organization, their openness and agreement to spare time and share views were the 
prime criteria for including their case, for an in-depth study in this research work. 
However, if, after collection of secondary data or initial interaction with a Company, 
it was found that: 
1. the Company had just emerged from its initial gestation period and started 
making profits or 
2. the management refiased to share information 
then the cases were rejected and not included in the research study. The list of these 
companies along with reasons for rejection are as given in Table 4.2: 
Table 4.2: List of companies that turned around but were not studied 
Company Status Reason for not studying 
Torrent Gujarat 
Biotech Ltd 
Rejected sample When checked with them, it was found that 
the promoters had invested fiinds that made 
the networth positive. However, the 
management is still struggling to figure a way 
out of the difficult times. VA Shah, Director-
in-Charge TGBL, says that price restrictions 
imposed by the Government of India and the 
inflow of Chinese materials at a much lower 
cost are impeding the recovery process. 
According to him, the Chinese products are a 
poor quality and hence cheap but owing to the 
price restrictions, Indian Companies are forced 
to sell a lower quality for they donot have the 
choice of increasing the price with the 
improved quality. The Company was therefore 
not accepted as a valid sample for the research 
study. 
Company Status Reason for not studying 
Recron 
Synthetics Ltd 
Rejected sample Their were conflicting views picked up from 
different members of the organization. 
RajaRam, the Reliance financial , i 
informed that the Company had turned around 
though due to inherent disadvantages such as 
locational disadvantage it will not be as 
profitable as the other units. MP Garg, the MD 
of Recron Synthetics on the other hand was a 
disillusioned lot who felt that owing to 
locational disadvantage and the state rules on 
power supply, Recron was a bleeding uni. 
This was supplemented by the fact that 
REcron's networth has started eroding again. 
This implies that the turnaround was owing to 
the money pumped into the Company rather 
than a true management turnaround. 
Pasari Spinning 
Mills Ltd 
Rejected sample PSML promoters brought in equity and paid 
up the debts of the company and brought the 
networth to a positive figure. However, the 
Company is still struggling to find its way out. 
GS Gupta, Chairma PSML attributes the 
downfall to the textile industry that was 
rendered sick in 1995-96. He shares that 
during this period, the cotton prices soared and 
the exports declined. The margins were highly 
squeezed, less than 15% while the 
compounded finance cost was more than 40-
50%. However, the management has not lost 
hope. At the moment they have paid up all the 
debt, employees salary and incentives are 
ensured and therefore the market and the 
employees are not hopeful too./ Since the 
Company is yet to enable a sustainable 
turnaround, the sample was rejected. 
Godrej Foods 
Ltd 
Rejected sample The manufacturing business of Godrej Foods 
Ltd (GFL) was demerged in 2001 and its 
marketing, sales, finance and other related 
functions were merged into Godrej Industries 
Ltd (GIL). The face value of the share has 
reduced from Rs 10 to Re 1. With this a new 
foods division has been created in GIL, which 
will be headed by MP Pusalkar, who was 
earlier with GFL as executive Director. The 
division is taking care of the manufacturing, 
marketing, sales and distribution of the brands 
such as Jumpin & Xs fiiiit beverages, Cooklite 
and Godrej brand vegetable oils, vanaspati and 
bakery fats. 
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Company Status Reason for not studying 
JJ Spectrum Silk 
Ltd 
Rejected 
Sample 
Since the Company was incorporated in 1994 
its networth was negative in the initial years 
and turned poistive in 1996. It therefore 
cannot be considered as a turnaround case 
study for this research. 
Belapur 
Industries Ltd 
Rejected sample Close look at the financial results reveal that 
while the networth did turn positive in 1997, it 
started declining in 1999 again. From 1998 to 
2005 it has eroded from 2.6 crore to 0.4 crore. 
The turnaround therefore has not been 
sustainable. The sample ids rejected. 
Champagne 
Indage Ltd 
Rejected sample It was their gestation period. Their networth 
became positive seven years after taking the 
plunge. It was thus not a turnaround case as 
defined in this research. 
Delta Polysters 
Ltd 
Rejected sample It appears the Company has closed down or is 
delisted. The results have not been posted on 
BSE since April 1, 2003. No announcements/ 
archives were available on BSE. No 
information on shareholding pattern was 
available. 
Hitkari Fibres Rejected sample Aditya A Hitkari, MD Hitkari Fibres Ltd shares 
that the shareholders have merely brought in 
equity and but the Company is still not doing 
well. "China produces low quality goods 
cheaper products. The public in general is not 
able to appreciate the difference that quality 
brings in. So tough competition from Chinese 
products pushed the Company into red. We are 
are still struggling to find our way. and hope to 
revive in an year or two. 
Mihijam Vanaspati Ltd, Modem Dairies Ltd, Ahlcon Parentrals 
India Ltd, KMG Milk Food Ltd, Rathi Graphic Technologies Ltd, 
Sheena Textiles Ltd, Pearl Engineering Polymers Ltd, Pettavaittalai 
Sugars and Chemicals Ltd, Radico Khaitan Ltd., Associated 
Pigments Ltd., Empee Sugars and Chemicals Ltd, Gujarat Themis 
Bisyn Ltd, Elder Projects Ltd, Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilizers 
Ltd, Henkel India Ltd, Teesta Agro Industries Ltd., Uniroyal marine 
exports Ltd, Sheel Intemational Ltd, Kongrar Integrated Fibres Ltd, 
Shaba Chemicals Ltd, India Polyfins Ltd, Sarita, Synthetics India 
Ltd 
Reluctant 
share 
Information 
to 
83 
The rest of the 9 companies that had been identified to stud, were contacted and the 
first 9 Companies whose top management agreed to spare time and share views were 
selected for the purpose of study for this research work. The list of 9 companies 
selected thereof is given in the table 4.3 below: 
Table 4.3: Companies identified for this study 
s. 
No 
Company Industry City 
1 Amrit Banaspati Ltd. Food & Beverages 
(Vanaspati) 
Ghaziabad, UP 
2 Howrah Mills Co. Ltd. Textile (Jute) Kolkata, W Bengal 
3 Naihati Jute Mills Co. Ltd. Textile (Jute) Kolkata, W Bengal 
4 Nambumadi Tea Co. Ltd. Food & Beverages (Tea) Kolkata, W Bengal 
5 Vegetable Products Ltd. Food & Beverages 
(Vanaspati) 
Kolkata, W Bengal 
6 Indian Polyfibres Ltd. Textile Lucknow, UP 
7 Asia fab Textile Mumbai, Maharashtra 
8 Tasty Bites Food & Beverages 
(Packaged Food) 
Pune, Maharashtra 
9 Empee Sugars and 
Chemicals Ltd 
Food (Sugar) Nellore, Andhra Pradesh 
Data Collection Protocol 
Data Collection Protocol is recommended for qualitative research studies to ensure 
that any other researcher repeating the qualitative research study carried out is able to 
replicate it as best as possible. The following was thus recorded to detail the protocol 
adopted for this study. 
Investigator Skills ensure that the investigator has key investigator skills, such as 
question asking, listening, adaptive ness and flexibility, grasp of issues being studied 
and lack of bias. The researcher consiciously maintained these all along the data 
collection phase. 
Protocol content 
a. Define purpose of case study and research questions 
b. Schedule for doing case studies 
i. Preparation period 
ii. Arrangement of site visit 
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iii. Conduct of site visit 
iv. Follow-up activities (sample thank-you email etc.) 
V. Preparation of case study report 
vi. Connect again with the respondent to fill gaps, if any 
c. Review of case study protocol 
i. Discussion of relevant theoretical frameworks and literature 
ii. Development or review of hypothetical logic model 
iii. In-depth discussion of protocol topics (discuss importance of 
topic and possible types of evidence to be collected in 
relation to each topic) 
d. Outline of case study report (have a draft outline, showing the major 
potential headings for the report) 
e. Conduct interviews, collect information, write case studies and fill 
gaps for each organization studied 
Research tools: The research tools employed were: 
Personal Interviews 
Indicative Guide: An indicative guide to quickly record responses to the questions 
of 'who, which, how many' types of questions during the interview was considered 
appropriate as each of these questions had to be followed by questions for further 
probing to get descriptive narrations of experiences of the members of the 
management. Open ended questions to solicit information on purpose, style and 
channels of communication employed for each stakeholder, were developed. The 
responses had to be collected from the top management being interviewed. It is 
appended as Appendix 4.1 
Secondary sources of information: Events being discussed were either 
contemporary (for turnarounds that happened after 2000) or from the recent past. 
Archival and historical facts, were collected to the extent possible, to support 
developing descriptive case studies built primarily through information gathered by 
interviewing the key people that enabled turnarounds. 
It was thus decided to build historical facts to whatever extent possible from 
secondary information, to conduct interviews as the most substantive part of building 
the case study and to collect factual information with the help of an indicative 
questionnaire/ guide and any relevant artifacts or secondary information from the 
primary source. For analysis of the factual information collected, the option of 
quantitative analysis (non-parametric) was kept open. 
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For each organization, some initial insights into the reasons of sickness, background 
of industry, turnaround process, financial results etc were collected from secondary 
data available from external sources. Extemal secondary data sources were in the 
form of journal articles, web pages, books, newspaper reports and investor reviews. 
Once this process was complete, the emphasis shifted to collection of primary data 
and also secondary data from internal sources. 
Collection of Data: during the period, October-December 2005, primary data was 
collected through semi-structured interviews with either members of the board of 
Directors and/or top management who were involved in the turnaround process. 
Special attention was paid to the content and feelings of the experiences shared. To 
make sure that minimal and if possible no bias appeared in the information collected 
and that the entire context of what was shared was captured, all the interviews were 
conducted personally. The researcher visited the premises of most of the Companies 
to get a better understanding of the context. These Companies were spread across the 
country and hence collection of primary data involved traveling to Delhi, Ghaziabad, 
Mimibai, Pune and Kolkata. for all the interviews conducted, complete notes were 
made and audio recording of interviews was also done to ensure that no information 
was missed out. 
This data was ftirther supplemented by secondary data collected from internal 
sources. This secondary data was in the form of annual reports, minutes of the 
meeting, presentations etc. The availability of the same was dependant on the 
companies' willingness to share such information. As themes emerged and 
relationships got established, discussions via telephone and email were used to fill in 
remaining gaps in the data and to explore contradictory or disconfirming evidence. 
Assessment of Quality of Research 
Reliability and validity are measurements of objectivity, which is a cenfral research 
issue in quantitative research. In qualitative research, however, subjectivity is a more 
salient feature. 
Ensuring Reliability: Objectivity and neutrality are almost impossible to achieve. 
However, to improve reliability, 'audit trail' (as given in Section II above) also called 
'decision trail' has been developed. According to Daymon and Holloway (2002), an 
audit frail allows other researchers to follow the same process as followed in a given 
study; it helps readers understand the decisions made; indicates the quality of the 
study; and presents a means of evaluating the entire study. 
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Ensuring Validity: The most contentious concerns voiced against validity of 
Qualitative research are issues of internal validity, generalizability or external validity 
and relevance or construct validity. 
To ensure validity of the study, the following measures (as given in Table 4.4) 
suggested by literature will be adopted during the course of the study: 
Table 4.4: Tactics adopted to ensure validity of the Qualitative Research 
Measure Case Study Tactic adopted, as far 
as possible 
Phase of research in which 
tactic was employed 
Construct 
validity 
• Multiple sources of evidence 
employed 
• Chain of evidence established 
• Data collection 
• Data collection 
Internal 
Validity 
• Pattern matching done 
• Explanation building done 
• Rival explanations addressed 
• Logic models used 
• Data analysis 
• Data analysis 
• Data analysis 
• Data analysis 
External 
Validity 
• Replication logic used • Research Design 
Reliability • Case Study Protocol/ Audit Trail 
used 
• Case Study Database prepared 
• Data Collection 
• Data Collection 
Source: Adaped for this work from Yin, R.K (2003). Case Study Research: Design and 
Methods, p34, 3' ed.. New Delhi: Sage Publications, Applied Social Research 
Method Series 
While all measures suggested in literature to ensure the reliability and validity of the 
case studies were observed, the outcome of the research work was presented as 
purposive and not prescriptive. The findings and conclusions were proposed for 
fiirther investigations by other researchers to establish generalizability. 
An alternative perspective to judging qualitative research is to judge the authenticity 
and trustworthiness. This paradigm relies on the interpretive view of reality rather 
than the realist view held by quantitative researchers. This view recommends careful 
attention to ensure credibility, transferability, dependability and conflrmability 
(Daymon & Holioway, 2002). Strategies for ensuring these parameters such as peer 
debriefing, demonstration of an audit trail, data and methodological triangulation, 
thick description and reflexivity (see limitations of research study) were candidly 
adopted to ensure a high quality qualitative research work. 
87 
Observations and Analysis 
Case Studies 5 
Case 1 
TASTY BITE EATABLES LTD ( T B E L ) 
Deciphering Communication during Turnaround 
Bacl^ground 
Tasty Bite Eatables Ltd (TBEL) was incorporated in 1986, as wholly owned subsidy 
of Grand Foods. It set up a state-up-of-the-art Ready to Serve (RTS)^ food and frozen 
vegetables production facility in India in 1988-89. When its unsuccessful attempt to 
sell in the Indian markets failed it switched focus to markets in the Middle East, 
Russia and the US. However, the sales failed to pick up. 
In 1992, Pepsi, owing to its export obligation (due to a Government of India (Gol) 
regulation for foreign multinationals), collaborated with TBEL for exports of TBEL 
products. At this time Preferred Brands International (PBI), a US based natural food 
marketing and distribution Company was given the charge of marketing TBEL 
products internationally. TBEL committed resources to the joint efforts. However, in 
1994 the reforms in Government of India regulations released Pepsi of its export 
obligations. Pepsi thus decided to stay with its core business and thus exited the 
collaboration with TBEL (Subhadra, 2003). 
In 1995, PBI was given exclusive brand rights in key global markets and Tasty Bite 
products were launched in the US. In 1996, (HLL) Hindustan Lever Ltd. acquired 
Grand Foods and TBEL thus entered the umbrella of HLL group. But by this time, 
TBEL had accumulated losses to the tune of Indian Ruppee (TNR) 112 mn. It was 
declared a sick unit and referred to BIFR . 
^ The RTS food market can be categorized into ready-to-eat foods, mixes and powders, salted 
snacks and sweets 
^ Board of Industrial and Financial Restructuring constituted to assist Companies that come 
under the purview of Government of India Sick Industrial Companies Act (SIC A) 1985 
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In 1999 TBEL registered profit for the first time in 13 years. Its networth in 1999 
increased to INR 52 mn and by 2002 had reached INR 124 mn. (source: Prowess 
CMIE)'. (See Figure 5.1.1: Networth fi-om 1987 to 2005). BIFR de-registered TBEL 
in 1999 - first time for a food company in the history of India (TBEL Aimual 
Communication Meeting Presentation, April 19, 2002). 
Table 5.1.1: TBEL performance during 1995-2005; turnaround in 1999 
Tasty Bite Eatables Ltd. 
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Gross sales 
(in INR 
mn) 
22 21 39 31 76 124 133 161 123 222 
Net worth 
(in INR 
mn) 
-112 -71 -74 52 62 91 124 135 111 108 
Chart 5.1.1: Performance of TBEL during 1995-2005; turnaround in 1999 
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Unraveling the turnaround (from 1996 to 2002) 
New management takes charge: In 1997, HLL converted its INR 120 n 
unsecured loans to preference capital at a premium of INR 19.50 per share (Subhadra, 
2003). However, HLL had decided against venturing into frozen foods business. 
Therefore, other than representation on the Board, HLL withdrew from all activity. 
Ashok Vasudevan and Kartik Kilachand of PBI who had been responsible for 
marketing the TBEL products in the foreign markets along with three more members 
took charge as Members of the Board of Directors of TBEL with Ashok Vasudevan 
as the Chairman BoDs. Ravi Nigam, who until then was working with Britannia 
Industries Ltd., was appointed as Chief Executive Officer of TBEL and he became 
the sixth member of the BoDs of TBEL. 
"We met to ask each other as to whether we were ready to work for INR 30 mn 
company or were we ready to take on the task of a major tumaround to make the 
exercise worth the effort of quitting the MNCs we all were working with earlier. It 
was clear to us that we were looking at much more than a simple financial tumaround 
(Ravi Nigam, Chief Executive Officer, TBEL, personal communication, October 20, 
2005)". So, the group embarked on the project of management tumaround to make 
the financial tumaround sustainable. 
The management then set before itself the task of identifying and understanding 
issues and developing an overall strategy to improve the Company's performance. 
Internal Issues: The factory was located at Bandgaon village close to Pune, a city 
around 200 km from Mumbaf, vJhere the TBEL corporate office was located. The 
communication infrastructure connecting the ojjice to the factory was inadequate. 
'The factory telephone lines were perpetually non-working and the closest STD 
booth was 3 km away. When Nigam and the corporate office staff started to spend 3 
to 4 days in the factory they realized that the factory needed managerial intervention 
day-to-day, to resolve issues that only the management could address. 
The foremost issue glaring at them was a basic humanitarian cause for which "we 
were not prepared. 70% of the work force did not eam minimum wages as stipulated 
by the Government of India. The regulatory norms were not followed. Salaries were 
paid fifteen to twenty days late. Statutory dues such as PF were delayed for months 
together. Year after year increment was pathetic and it was evident that no reflection 
Commercial capital of India situated in Western part of the country. 
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was given to basic cost of living (R. Nigam, personal communication, October 20, 
2005)". 
A 26 acres farm contiguous to the factory was a virtual dumping ground. There were 
thousands of babool* trees in the swamp that had got collected in the farm. The 
overflow was creating a swamp of its own. The issues staring in their face were 
therefore such as how to treat the effluent rather (or more) than how to sell Tasty Bite 
products. "But these simple things indicated that no one was interested in the factory 
or its workers. Not even the workers themselves (Nigam, personal communication, 
October 20, 2005)". 
However, workers themselves had to be handled carefully. "For instance, three 
managers including the factory manager were the cynical power centres. They 
propagated dogmatic views such as 'the management only talks and does not support 
the workers; attribute non-performance to non-availability of resources etc'. But they 
enjoyed huge support from the workforce. Since there was little work to occupy the 
workers, they all criticized together. In the process they had formed regional lobbies 
(Maharashtrian' and North Indian) and some kind of politics between them to keep 
them occupied. There was thus a need to motivate the workers and develop team 
spirit in the organization. Besides, the company was not run professionally, for 
instance, there was a need to create a management structure and introduce some 
layers. This had to be done carefully - keeping the team together and carefiilly 
avoiding bureaucracy (Nigam, personal communication, October 20, 2005)". 
"PBI being an American Company, the workers were apprehending a hire and fire 
policy and hence the trust was also low (Kartik Kilachand, personal communication, 
Oct 20, 2005)". 
On the other hand, the management was perturbed by the prevailing value system. "In 
India a lot of things can't get done unless you grease the palms'*. Ten years back, 
corruption due to red tape was rampant and the situation was worse than what it is 
today. Technology depth and quality concepts of the employees were other concerns. 
'TBEL needed brighter people who could create a vision for technology (Nigam, 
personal communication, October 20, 2005)". 
The understanding of the term 'quality' was very different in India from that in the 
US. In India quality implied making the food microbiologically safe. This implied 
A plant that grows in swap 
^ People who belong to the Maharashtra state of India 
^ colloquial term used to express the act of paying a bribe to get work done 
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that all research was focused towards how to best preserve the food so that it could be 
packaged. The concept was to devise methods to kill pathogens. 'This was a 
nationwide phenomenon for even in the research labs of agriculture universities all 
researches were directed towards such goals". In the US however, quality also 
implied issues pertaining to the look, feel and taste of the food. Similarly, the term 
'standardization' had a different meaning for the two parts of the world. 'There were 
plenty of complaints in the past but some of those were dramatic in nature". See 
exhibit TBEL 1. Semantics was therefore a major issue that TBEL management had 
discovered. Since, TBEL products were sold in the US and manufactured in India this 
was a major gap demanding attention. 
To carry out the daunting tasks, TBEL needed professional managers who would 
believe in the new management and its targets. "This meant that we immediately 
needed to recruit good people". Considering that the Company was sick for ahnost 11 
years; had just recovered by financial infusion; was neither a big brand nor capable of 
offering a 'handsome' salary package, recruitment too was an issue. TBEL decided to 
select middle managers fi-om large Companies and offer them senior positions along 
with hand holding to join the TBEL tumaround team. "/ must have personally 
interviewed 200 people over an year before I found a fit in Parth Hor who left 
Mercedeez Benz to join TBEL. Similarly, we picked up the quality chief from HLL." 
External Issues: The external communication issues addressed at TBEL were: 
Customer related issues: TBEL realized the Indian retailers in the US were not 
showcasing TBEL products in their shelves. Entering US retail chains required 
considerable amount of money. Payments for placing a product in just one store of a 
chain in US ranged between US $ 5000 and US $ 10,000. Even with a narrower base 
of natural food store chains, it was diflficult for PBI to pay $10,000 to each of the 200 
stores. (Subhadra, 2003). Analysts were claiming that the domestic market was not 
ready and the past experience supported the view. TBEL had to look for viable 
options to penetrate the US market and reach the consumer. 
Banking Issues: When the new management took over, TBEL was a FNR 3 mn 
Company with huge losses and a zero working capital limit'. It needed money. "But 
the Banks were themselves going through a tough time. Post liberalization, the Banks 
' Presentation made by Nigam on April 19, 2002 
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were made accountable for NPAs'" and therefore not many of them were ready to 
take risks"". 
Supplier Related Issues: TBEL had to pay dues to almost every supplier and the 
total sum was due to the tune of INR 10 mn. "This was a fairly serious problem and 
the management had to build financial credibility to avoid litigation"' ^  
On the other hand, the new management had issues with the supply mechanism at 
TBEL. TBEL sourced vegetables fi'om Mumbai on account of lower prices. This was 
spelt out as the major fiinction that corporate office carried out at Mumbai. The new 
management refuted this argument and insisted on looking for Suppliers who would 
supply in Pune at similar prices. TBEL was thus faced with the task of identifying and 
retaining Suppliers. Besides, in order to meet the quality standards, TBEL had to 
ensure that the Suppliers supplying raw materials (such as pulses, cardamoms, spices 
etc.) follow appropriate cleaning and processing norms. Thus, there was need to 
create awareness at the supplier end as well. 
The Turnaround Journey 
Internal Communications at TBEL 
A core value that the top management decided to adorn and resolved to ensure in 
TBEL was 'to be honest and transparent. Live what you say and people will 
understand and follow. Infact they will contribute to further propel the cause'" 
The second objective the management set for itself was to work closely with workers 
at the factory, enable extensive interaction with them to understand the problems and 
help them resolve these. 
The first meeting: CEO shares the Vision: Ravi Nigam was introduced by 
Ashok Vasudevan in a meeting at the factory, attended by approximately 120 
workers. Nigam shared with the workers, the vision of the management, the market 
potential of TBEL products, the need to look at the international markets and the 
responsibility of the workers in the process. He mentioned how they could 
respectfully earn the wages that the government thought they could earn. 
'" Non Performing Assets 
'' Interview with Sohail Shikari, CFO TBEL on Oct 20, 2005 
'^  Nigam interview on Oct 20, 2005 
'^  Interview with Kartik Kilachand, Director TBEL on Oct 20, 2005. Interview with Nigam on 
Oct 20, 2005 
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During this meeting, the workers shared their apprehensions about the future of 
TBEL. "Statements such as 'We are here because we lay the foundation stone of the 
Company 'revealed to us a rare level of commitment among the workers. We 
continue to work with the same workforce''*". 
The first announcement: announcing grievance redressal to unions: 
After the first meeting, the directors met in the evening to consider options, an 
important one being how to pay the worker dues and stipulated wages especially at a 
time when the Company was in red? An annual calendar, defining how over a period 
of one year TBEL would repay all the worker's dues and also ensure dispersal of 
wages rightfully deserved, was worked out. The new management therefore made the 
first announcement, "that there would be no salary cut; that over a period of one year 
all efforts would be made to raise the wages, of all the workers, to minimum wages 
level; that all accounting delays will be put into speedy action". Thus, the new team 
in place ensured job security for all. "This instilled confidence in workers and also 
curtailed the hostile view that the workers held towards the new management". 
In return however, they asked the workers to commit that in years 1997-1999, they 
would ensure that production is not stalled for even one day. "This was to make them 
realize that the management could pay only if the Company made money". 
This announcement was shared by the management with the union leaders and some 
senior workers (a group of about 10 people) who then communicated the message to 
the workers. "We could do this because we had noticed that the union was not a 
hostile union. It was not troublesome and there had been instances in the past when 
they had voiced their concerns by wearing black bands etc. They could thus be 
trusted". 
The second announcement: Enhancing day-to-day interaction: TBEL 
management tried to manage the factory located at Khutbao and Bandgaon villages 
near Pune, from the Corporate office in Mumbai 'We were spending, 16 hours a day, 
3 to 4 days a week, at the factory for almost four months but the factory needed more 
time and attention. Face to face interaction on a day-to-day basis was absolutely 
necessary. Simple things like understanding their needs (they need a water cooler or 
if a particular change could be made they could work better) could be addressed only 
by being there physically. In fact we wondered that if the market was in the US and 
the factory in Pune then what role were we playing in Mumbai? " 
'" Interview with nigam, Oct 20, 2005 
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Nigam decided that managing the factory from Mumbai was not feasible and that 
they must shift the Corporate office closer to the factory, in Pune. This was the 
second major announcement. 
Shifting from Mumbai to Pune was not an easy decision to implement. There was a 
major resistance from the staff. Company issues such as sourcing vegetables, spices 
and other raw material, well developed banking relations and issues such as Mumbai 
being a port facilitates shipping of goods to US were some of the reasons forwarded 
for not shifting from Mumbai. Personal problems such as issues in changing 
children's school, living in Mumbai for ages, attachment to parental home etc were 
voiced. But TBEL management refiised to accept any such reasons. 
During that period, Nigam called on Feroz Bander (a very pragmatic man according 
to Nigam), a Director in HLL to help him deal with the issues. Both Nigam and 
Bander took several counseling sessions with the staff and their families - they visited 
their homes, talked to them and tried to convince them of the need to shift. 
They restructured their salary package to accommodate the shifting; spoke to the 
Principals of the best schools in Pune "and thankfiiUy the Principals also agreed to 
pitch in by agreeing to accommodate the children of TBEL staff". 
From a total of eighteen that staffed the Mumbai office, three had genuine problems 
and TBEL helped them relocate. Others were given a choice to move with TBEL to 
Pune or to quit. Five of them moved, some of them offered to commute up and down 
daily but that was not acceptable to TBEL. So they and the rest decided to stay on in 
Mumbai and look for other avenues. 
The management once again organized itself to take stock of the situation. They 
worked very closely with the workers to resolve day-to-day issues. There were 
several occasions, especially concerning social issues, that called for extensive 
communication. There had to be continuous interaction and a lot of talking to get the 
message across. "We worked 9 to 5 in the factory and 5 to 9 around the beer bar. Ravi 
did a wonderful job. Ashok Vasudevan and myself, both were personally involved in 
the process. The need was to drive the values into the moral fabric of the Company"" 
The third announcement: Sending a message on values to be imbibed: 
Typically a Company requires several kinds of licenses for different purposes. TBEL 
also needed boiler inspection every year. Early in the turnaround process "I got a 
message from the factory that the inspector's hands need to be greased to get the 
" Interiew with Kartik Kilachand on Oct 20, 2005 
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inspection certificate. I realized tiiat TBEL had to either go through the rigmorale of 
tedious tasks (more of harassment than inspection) hsted for getting the certification 
or adopt the easy way out by bribing the inspector. After confirming from my people 
that the boiler was OK, I insisted that TBEL would neither pay any money nor go to 
the court. It would rather wait for the other side to file a case, if they so desire. TBEL, 
it was decided, will also not stop production. Rather it would arrange to get a 
certification of the boiler from an independent agency and if need be, ask the other 
party to verily the procedures in the court. There was immense pressure from all 
quarters but I would not budge. A few days later the inspector came in like a mouse 
and issued the certification. From that day onwards I did not have to bother for any 
kind of certification. The workers managed on their own. I believe that incidents like 
this, go deep into the organizational memory and play a crucial role in developing 
core values that a company imbibes". 
"TBEL believes that posters work well when the technical procedures have to be 
followed or quality processes have to be propagated. Vision and Mission are to be 
imbibed and that happens through extensive interaction, sharing and demonstration. 
We therefore depended on dialogue and discussion to have a complete buy-in and 
looked for opportunities to demonstrate what we said. This keeps the message alive 
for longer duration as it goes deep down in the thought process ". 
Bringing about social change: Talldng, explaining and listening over 
and over again and not through a dictat: One of the crucial interventions 
required at TBEL was implementation of behavioural norms and cultural changes to 
offer quality standards. America, its core market, is a litigious society and 
maintaining high standard of cleanliness was a must. 
In Maharashtra, women wear big bindis on the forehead, flowers in the hair, glass 
bangles on the wrist and a Mungal Sutra around the neck'^ These are artifacts they 
wear from both religious and beauty point of view. The Bindi and the Mungal Sutra, 
according to the local culture were signs of good marital relations and families and 
religion demand that these be adomed regularly all the time. 
"In a RTS factory these could lead to major problems. Even if one in a million bindi 
falls off the forehead into the food and the American consumer finds it floating in the 
Bindi is a decorative sticker worn by traditional women in India. Mungal sutra is a chain 
with black beads that a man gifts to his wife at the wedding. The wife is expected to wear it all 
the time till the husband is alive. Removing the mungal sutra is considered inauspicious. 
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ready to serve meal, the Company is surely heading for payment of major claims. So, 
I7„ these had to be done away with and this was asking for a real social change ". 
"The only way out was to talk to workers, in groups, over and over again. Make them 
see the management's point and how it could impact the work and the factory. There 
was a huge cry amongst the women who said that their mother-in-laws would throw 
them out and that these were 'suhag-artifacts^' that they can't even dream of taking 
off. It took three to four months of patient talking and listening to workers. One fine 
day when I walked into the factory, I felt there was something different. I couldn 't 
spot it initially but it troubled me. I looked around carefully and I was wonderstruck 
- all women had removed the big round bindi. This was a big social change. 
Interestingly, the men accepted the logic earlier than the women and they persuaded 
the women to give-in. There used to be several informal meets amongst the workers 
where they discussed the pros and cons of the management suggestions^". 
Transparency for empowerment and decision making: TBEL adopted a 
Model of Accountability which they called: D - Decide; A - Act; R - Review; E -
Enhance (DARE). "According to this system, employees had a right to know what 
was expected of them. Then they were empowered to take a decision and act. It was 
repeatedly drilled that never should an action be pending for want of decision. It was 
alright to take a wrong decision and act - we never penalized them for a wrong 
decision (unless it was a grave issue violating values and principles adopted by the 
Company). This was because the action was to be followed by review and 
enhancement. So the employees leamt over a period of time." 
Create Internal Image: India's most respected Company A concerted effort 
was made to identify what TBEL stood for. The management and the employees met 
several times to ask themselves: "Can we be India's most profitable Company? Or 
Can we be India's largest Company? And several such options but the answer was a 
clear NO. Finally we decided that we would like to be India's most respected 
Company (TBEL Vision Statement)". Actualizing this meant that TBEL developed 
an internal and external reputation. 
Develop Internal Reputation: In 1999, TBEL hired Image Equity as their 
communication consultant, and developed and implemented several programmes to 
'^  Interview with Juhi Raikhy on Oct 20, 2005. She had spent hours together talking to the 
women in the factory during that period. 
Suhag artifacts are artifacts that indicate that a women is married. A tradition held very 
strongly by women in India following the Hindu religion 
" ibid 17 
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build a corporate culture. "A Vis (A Visvanathan) played a very important role in 
dissemination of mission statement in the organization. There was a time when 
everyone, even at the shopfloor, was talking about if ". 
Fun at Work Programmes: Under this programme, every month a group of 
people devised a mission for themselves. They worked out a mission statement, 
chalked out the method of achieving it, set deadlines for targets and then worked 
towards it. 
"Once a group took up the 'Are you a Bonzer project'. On another occasion, a group 
took the task of making presentations in leading B-Schools like Jamna Lai Bajaj, 
turnaround Pai Institute of Management and the likes to recruit from these institutes 
and also to share with them the true picture of where TBEL was headed " . 
Yet another exemplary task taken by a group was 'to make the affluent treatment 
plant, the disgusting part of the workplace, into the most beautiful part of the factory'. 
They set a budget, set the deadlines and developed a course of action. The senior 
managers coached them in the process and also provided all support needed to 
achieve the same. Many managers would go from the office and spend time digging 
the stuff with them, if need be. The entire company could see the management 
commitment behind the actions. Today, TBEL g-ows vegetables on that land and the 
entire community is proud of the achievement". 
Several other initiatives such as: Reduce Power usage, improve electro conductivity 
or PH level of the soil and many such programmes were taken up by the community. 
Once a task was complete, TBEL made it a point to celebrate the achievements and 
acknowledge the contributions of the workers. "This was a very important part. After 
some time it became contagious and people were very enthusiastic about the entire 
process". 
In 1999, TBEL began celebrating, TBEL Annual Day. On this occasion, families of 
all the employees are invited and several activities such as drawing competition for 
children, games like tug of war, cycling, limited over cricket match are organized. 
The accompanying interesting commentary makes the event more colourful and 
interesting. This is followed by an award ceremony and a message from the Board 
wherein TBEL management posts them with developments in markets, quality 
standards and other developments. 
20 
'^ ibid 20 
Nigam interview on April 5, 2006 
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Training was made an ongoing process. "There are 700 man-days of training done 
every year which works out to be roughly 6 days training for each employee". These 
programmes are both: skills based and attitudinal or team building kind of 
programmes. The latter are meant to weave a moral fabric for the company. These 
programmes are highly interactive. Many of them are designed and conducted 
internally though TBEL maintains a list of consultants for quality programmes. 
To enable team building and motivation among workers and employees, TBEL along 
with Image Equity organized regular Management Leadership Programmes (MLPs). 
Team exercises led by the consultant were organized to decide as to what attributes 
would connote that TBEL was India 's most respected Company? And finally, the 
groups identified several milestones that would connote that TBEL was moving in the 
right direction. Some of these were as follows: 
• ICAl" awards 'Best Balance sheet presentation in India' award every year. TBEL 
decided that if they can bag this prize they are a respected Company 
• For retailing they identified the five most coveted retailing chains in the world. 
They decided that if they can get these chains to sell TBEL products they are a 
respected Company 
• For recruitment: If they could recruit from one or more of students from the best 
B-schools or Best Technical institutes in the country then they are a respected 
Company 
Similarly, they defined milestones for each activity to indicate what it requires to be 
the most respected company in the country. 
Then they identified what all attributes should the company have, for instance: speed, 
integrity, systems ... and against each attribute they put a Company name to connote 
the benchmark (see Annexure 2: Benchmarks at TBEL). These, according to Nigam 
and Kilachand were extremely successful programmes that built motivation and team 
spirit and also greatly enhanced the internal image of the Company. 
Investing in communication teclinoiogy for future returns: In 1999 TBEL 
made its single largest capital investment - this was the implementation of Move-Ex 
ERP software. "It costed Rs 4.5 mn which was very big money for TBEL especially 
during that period when our tumover was INR 60 million, but we wanted to do 
^^  ICAI is Institute of Chartered Accountants of India 
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everything world class . TBEL requirement was not so crucial but this was an 
investment for future. 
However, "it was an arduous task to have the workers adopt the ERP system. Many 
workers in the company had never seen a computer in their lifetime. The system 
required changes at the very basic le vel. It required the data entry operators to make 
timely and correct entries. The data flows in a chain and there is an inbuilt rigour in 
the system that demanded a cultural change. Now there were no excuses for not 
having done a particular task for want cf information. This system thus turned out to 
be a huge driver of accountability in the system". 
"It took TBEL almost 18 months to fully implement the system but the work culture 
transformed. People worked overtime as benchmarks became stretch marks. Today 
(in 2006), ERP at TBEL is multi-locational and integrated system in the office and 
factory at India, Australia and the US are all online. Though, Nigam does accept that 
the regular data feeding task at the ground level is still an ominous task and requires 
weekly and monthly interventions to take care of the backlogs . 
There are hotlines that connect the factory and the office. In the factory there are 6 
nodes that connect the office through dedicated lines. Video conferencing is yet to be 
enabled. TBEL management does not monitor the emails that move in and out of the 
organization, "though the more I think about it the more I feel the need for it". Mobile 
phones have increased the speed of communication but within the factory premises 
the usage is not permitted for issues pertaining to quality as distraction during 
production hours can be very harmful. 
95% of Tastybite business comes from Indians abroad. Tasybite.com earns 8 to 10% 
of the business in US and Canada. The Indian techies ^' buy off the site. TBEL 
management accepts that they have not yet fully exploited the potential that internet 
offers. 
Empowerment Pays: a feedback: When TBEL CEO suggested that TBEL office 
be given a facelift, some of the managers came back and advised against it asking him 
to be thrifty. This Nigam feels is an indicator of responsibility that comes through 
empowerment. 
Yet another behaviour that Nigam considers a positive feedback is the worker 
behaviour during times of dissonance. 'There were times when issues such as salary 
" Interview with Kilachand on Oct 20, 2005 
^* Interview with Nigam on April 5, 2006 
^^  techies 
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etc. did crop up. But there has never been a violent scene except once during the 
initial phase. Normally, the union wore black badges and workers went slow. 
Thereafter, the factory manager led the negotiations and resolved the issues. 
External Communication Strategy 
TBEL wanted to see itself as India's leading food brand in the US in a span of two to 
three years. They decided that although they were an Indian Company, they would 
not restrict themselves to Indian food or Indian markets. Their approach and reach 
had to be global. But what they needed was money to carry out their plans. 
Arranging Finance: A major Communication effort "Sourcing funds was a 
tough task. Ashok, Meera and Kartik were extensively involved in exercising their 
networks, talking all day and every day to BIFR, HLL and financial institutions and 
preparing documents to get some waivers from the banks owing to BIFR registration 
and to get the company deregistered from BIFR. 
Arranging loans thereafter was yet another critical activity. Shikari and Hans under 
the guidance of Vasudevan and Kilachand met almost any banker who was ready to 
give them an ear. They made presentations, repeating time and again that they were 
betting on the future and not on the past. They asked the Bankers to evaluate their 
plans and if found promising, have faith on TBEL team and give them a chance. 
Finally, they met a senior official in ICICIwho could see promise in what TBEL team 
was talking and then they met various people in the bank to make their case. In 1999, 
TBEL got a debt fiuiding of INR 35 million. ICICI continues to be our Banker". What 
both Shikari and Nigam emphasize is that it is important not to loose hope and to 
continue in the face of all odds that any sick company is bound to face. Loans require 
high credibility and assured performance and it is for the turnaround team to make the 
Banks see that character and strength in them. 
Speaking the language of the Consumer: Since the Indian retailers in US were 
not displaying TBEL products to give them the differentiation they sought from 
commodity products, TBEL decided to sell its products through the US retail chains. 
However, this segment was both expensive and brand conscious. TBEL therefore 
undertook a cluster analysis study in various US cities t) narrow their focus on 
smaller number of chains. 
To enter these chains, TBEL got both the product and its communications redesigned 
to suit the US customer. It realized that the average American customer was unable to 
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appreciate the products being offered and the names in Indian language did not make 
much sense. The products were thus renamed in English for instant identification and 
easy understanding. Thus, 'Palak Paneer' became 'Kashmir Spinach', 'Navratna 
Korma ' became 'Jaipur Vegetables', and 'Alu Chole' became 'Bombay Potatoes' 
and so on. 
It was important that the package designs were such that the display was 'eye-
catching and attractive'. TBEL got the packaging redesigned and its logo improved 
upon by Charlie Buendo^^ such that the logo was clearly visible and its location was 
fixed. To make the communications consistentfor better brand recognition, the design 
of the pack was made uniform for all the ten countries where RTS meals were sold. 
Suppliers Relations: To start with, "we had to pay dues to almost every suppHer. 
We therefore talked to each of the suppliers individually and committed that we 
would pay the current bills and also a part of the previous dues with every bill 
cleared, over a period of one year. We confirmed that we would clear all the dues in 
one year and were able to do that without any litigations, within the stipulated time". 
To ensure that quality of purchase met HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Point) requirements, TBEL continuously educated the suppliers, to he^ 5 them develop 
the quality they were looking at. A quality manager appointed to manage the supply-
chain regularly visited the supplier sites to give talks and develop formats for them to 
fill. The quality manager therefore coordinated to ensure that the systems that the 
suppliers followed were similar to those followed by TBEL. "As a result, for about an 
year and half now, we have stopped dealing with brokers and source from one or two 
sole suppliers". 
"We believed in building relationships and valued loya Ity and transparency. Thus, we 
informed them of what we were looking at in the future and they in turn went the 
extra mile to partner with us" Kilachand preferred to classify suppliers as internal 
stakeholders rather than external stakeholders". 
Media: "In August 1999, the script of TBEL reached around INR 148. This was a 
42.2% increase over its price of INR 3.50 in 1996". Interestingly, till 1998 the 
Company was still making losses (See Chart 5.1.1). Nigam attributes the rise in share 
price to the sudden boom in the Bombay Stock Exchange and the heavy media 
reporting of the same. 
*^ Charlie Buendo, a designer 
" Interview with Kilachand on Oct 20, 2005 
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"Since India was not a focus market, we interacted with media only for a short while 
- when the share market brought us into limelight". 
Social Groups: As it happens in all countries, there are social interest groups that 
are guardians of society. "Our interaction with social groups was minimal exceptfor 
its interactions with one group. This was a well informed group that professed the 
communist agenda and always kept the workers informed of industry practices and 
other developments. Initially this group was much against liberalization and saw an 
American Company, a projection of capitalism and its ills. 
However, we talked to them and remained absolutely transparent We asked them to 
check for themselves the improvement in the wages, living conditions, employment 
status etc. and urged them to assess how TBEL was achieving less than any other 
communist agenda". Ravi feels that these groups can be receptive and that 
transparency is the key approach. "If they can see your point they are with you". 
Finally, the TBEL leadership believed that "a small Company is more creative, quick 
axiAfast in communication, and thereby more nimble. It felt that it was therefore as 
important to retain these characteristics of a small Company as to imbibe a 
professional approach and scale of operation of an MNC. 
Analysis 
The case of the turnaround of TBEL supports the first stage of the theoretical 
framework proposed in Figure 3.1 of this study. When TBEL realized that the market 
in India was not ready for RTS food it decided to sell its products abroad. It attempted 
to fiirther the exports by collaborating with beverage multinational Pepsi Co. but the 
change in government regulation impacted the latter's interest and Pepsi Co. backed 
out from the joint initiative which was a setback for TBEL. These developments 
indicate that both TBEL and the managerial decision making in TBEL were impacted 
by the external environment. 
Considering that in the same envirormient, the new management was able to revive 
the Company later, we may conclude that in case of TBEL, the managerial decision 
making caused the company's decline. The faulty managerial decisions could be 
because of inadequate information or incapable managerial decision making, for 
instance TBEL launched RTS food assuming that the Indian market was ready for the 
product. Later it realized that the market was not ready for the product. 
It then launched the products abroad without understanding the impact cf cultural 
variations. Thus, we may conclude that both environment and managerial decisions at 
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TBEL adversely affected TBEL and the company became sick. The case thus 
supports Figure 3.1. 
The TBEL case also supports the second stage of the framework as it illustrates how 
disabling forces emanating from both internal and external environment come into 
play when a Company is sick. In case of TBEL, the workers despite their 
commitment to the organization were de-motivated and casual in their approach. 
Political forces were active among the groups of workers and there were 
apprehensions about the capabilities and intentions of the new management. Workers 
had a laid back approach that was evident from the working conditions, quality 
consciousness or acceptance of red tape mechanisms. 
Bankers were not inclined to trust the capabilities of the sick company, customers (the 
Indian retailer in the US) did not give any cognizance to its presence, suppliers were 
on the verge of filing suits for non-payment of dues and social activists were 
questioning the sanctity of motives. Thus, disabling forces were playing from all 
directions which is in consonance with second stage of the theoretical framework 
proposed. 
The TBEL case also supports the third stage of the framework which proposes that 
the promoter/top management has to consciously take charge of the turnaround and 
work its way through with various stakeholders keeping the overall sfrategy in view. 
Nigam categorically mentioned the event when the TBEL management team met to 
decide whether they were ready to take the formidable challenge of enabling a 
sustainable turnaround at TBEL. 
Thereafter, the new management prepared, documented and adopted a 4-C tumaround 
sfrategy. This sfrategy was prepared by the top management which also happened to 
be the Board of Directors in case of TBEL. The management did think it worth the 
time and effort to document the turnaround strategy. It appears therefore that 
documentation of tumaround plan was to confirm collective support for fixture action. 
The CEO along with the Chairperson of the Board of Directors shared the vision of 
the company with all the workers, in the very first meeting. They also used the 
opportunity to listen to the workers to gauge their levels of commitment, motivation, 
worries and apprehensions. 
The first issue that the new management addressed was the worries of the workers 
with regard to payment of their salaries and other dues. This also helped them build 
their credibility and some confidence into the workers. However, it is important to 
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note that the new management committed payment and in retum demanded 
commitment to work to be able to make profits insisting that then and only then they 
will be able to make the payments. The case thus supports the proposition that the 
tumaround management must listen, care, exercise communication control and 
indicate urgency in its communications. 
The case emphasizes the importance of intensive day-to-day interactions between the 
tumaround management and the team to the extent that TBEL shifted its corporate 
office from Mumbai to Pune even at the cost of loosing senior staff members of the 
TBEL team. However, even at this stage they demonstrated careful listening to the 
incumbents and the extra efforts, needed to talk to the families, arrange school 
admissions for their children and adjust salary structures. But no amount of excuses 
could hold the management back from its decision. The case thus additionally 
demonstrates the need to filter genuine problems from insignificant ones and respond 
to each individually as per the need. The importance of listening is demonstrated over 
and over again whether it had to do with resolving day-to-day problems such as 
arranging a water cooler or modifying a working technique or it had to do with major 
issues as the social change required to ensure quality. The case further supports the 
highlighting of critical incidents that send messages into the memory of an 
organization. In case of TBEL this happened when the management insisted on not 
bribing the inspector in face of age-old tradition of acceptance of red tape and fear of 
litigation. Once the management was able to demonstrate its will to establish certain 
values, the event played a critical role in shaking the value system and changing the 
culture of the organization. 
In consonance with the proposed model, the case also demonstrates that it is 
important to translate the mission of an organization into specific goals for employees 
to understand and achieve. At TBEL this was done through the Fun at Work 
programme wherein the mission was jointly worked out and benchmarks were 
identified to specify goals. Besides these obvious gains, the process greatly 
contributed in mobilizing the workers to build a future for themselves. The case also 
demonstrates the need for transparency to truly enable empowerment and the need for 
empowerment for accountability. 
As regards the external communication strategy, the case supports the framework 
only partially. While it does mention that extensive documentation was required to be 
done to satisfy BIFR and to get waivers that a sick company could get owing to 
governmental support, it does not indicate similar stance for customers or suppliers. 
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In case of customers, TBEL shifted focus from the erstwhile customer base to a new 
customer base and began the process almost afresh. The case demonstrates the need 
to understand its market and consumer very intricately. It did not develop the industry 
wisdom with its current employees. Infact it instituted a research study to gain a 
thorough understanding and plan accordingly. The case also does not indicate the 
need to brief customers on its problems or strengths or to include them in developing 
a turnaround strategy. Similarly, in case of suppliers the case does not support the 
recommendation of including suppliers in designing a turnaround strategy though it 
does indicate the need to build financial credibility and long term relations through 
continuous interactions backed by supporting action. 
Although TBEL had media interactions that contributed towards increase in TBEL 
share prices, the company did not pursue it as part of turnaround strategy. Infact, 
Nigam mentioned that since India was not a focus market they did not pursue media 
interactions beyond what came as a surprise to them. Thus TBEL case does not 
purport media interaction as a communication action for turnaround. 
However, the case does indicate a need to maintain a transparent and direct contact 
with social activist groups to dislodge any misconceptions that they might have 
towards the organization's motives or actions. 
TBEL case sfrongly supports the need to invest in enhancing communication 
technologies as it invested heavily and reaped benefits in ways more than it had 
expected. As regards the ERP package Nigam goes to the extent of calling it the 
second major development (the other being the turnaround itself). 
Framework 5.1 
The Match between the CS for OTA framework and the Communication 
strategy of TBEL during turnaround. 
X No —Don'tKnow </ Yes A^£^« -^Newly Identify 
Theoretical Pattern Case Pattern 
Stakeholder/ Turnaround Element (objective)/ 
Possible Communication Action 
1. Board of Directors X 
1.1. Gain support and time in the future — 
1.1.1. Present detailed tum-around plan ^ 
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Staff and Employees ^ 
2.1. Credibility building actions by the new management ^ 
2.1.1. Document, and communicate a strategic turnaround plan ^ 
2.1.2. Publicize success in resolving a current crisis or problem >/ 
2.1.3. Make decisions transparent >/ 
2.1.4. Exercise Communication Control >* 
2.2. Initial Control ^ 
2.2.1. Order preparation of daily, weekly and monthly cash 
forecasts — 
2.2.2. Exercise Communication Control. *• 
2.2.3. Seek views on the general well being of the employees. ^ 
2.3. Mobilization of organization for turnaround ^ 
2.3.1. Include key managers for development of industry wisdom X 
2.3.2. Include only key managers for development of vision — 
2.3.3. CEO should deliver the vision presentation in person and as 
often as possible. •^ 
23 A. Hold special sessions for non-participating managers after 
vision has been developed to share plarmed vision v 
2.3.5. Inject urgency in the conmiunications plan. Explain what 
needs to be done and why s/ 
2.3.6. Listen to the views of all managers. Gauge their reaction ^ 
2.3.7. Understand perceptions and focus minds of managing team. 
Set the scene for turnaround. ^ 
2.3.8. Ensure all employees know what is going on, for what 
reason and how it will occur. v* 
2.3.9. Share the pulpit (Empowerment) v 
2.3.10. Deal with concems of employees in open and honest 
manner. Offer Follow up sessions ^ 
2.3.11. Note any comments or queries and provide answers asap. — 
2.3.12. CEO must get out of the office to interact with the 
employees and to listen to them <^  
2.3.13. Employ open ended communication style that encourages 
employees to fmd answers, take decisions. >/ 
2.3.14. Repeatedly affirm the Company's mission, core values, and 
the primary goals of profit and growth. >/ 
2.3.15. Articulate a few highly concrete targets for the company for 
the next few months v 
2.3.16. Involve the staff to identify solvable problem areas and have 
their views on uninvolved areas. ^ 
2.3.17. Rephrase people's roles to clarify managerial 
responsibilities. X 
2.3.18. Top managers must emphasize on integrity, faimess, hard 
work, resourcefulness and concern for the staff during 
interactions with the staff. >/ 
2.3.19. Publicize and celebrate every employee and team success. v 
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2.4. Internal Co-ordination "^ 
2.4.1. Offer constant feedback to keep organization on track — 
2.4.2. Set up co-ordination commit tees for co-ordinating 
interdependent departments ^ 
2A3. Institute a monthly performance review meet ing of all senior 
managers chaired by the chief executive. — 
2.4.4. Insist that lower level disputes be settled at that level on a 
face to face basis — 
2.4.5. Keep the atmosphere light. <y 
2.4.6. Keep enhancing communication technology - email, mobile, 
ERP V 
3 . Unions «/ 
3.1. Negotiation of support of Unions and neutralization of 
Unions' pressures v* 
3.1.1. Brief unions on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative turnaround plan. ^ 
3.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps — 
3.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the unions •^ 
3.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy — 
3.1.5. Keep unions posted on the progress of the tumaround ^ 
4. Banks and Financial Institutions ^ 
4.1. Negotiation of support of Banks and/or FIs and neutralization of 
Banks and/or FIspressures ^ 
4.1 .1 . Brief Banks and/or FIs on the problems and strengths of the 
unit and some tentative tumaround plan ^ 
4.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps X 
4.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from Banks and/or FIs ^ 
4.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
4.1.5. Keep Banks and/or FIs posted on the progress of the 
tumaround «/ 
5. Government </ 
5.1. Negotiation of support of Government and neutralization of 
Government pressures ^ 
5.1.1. Brief relevant government departments on the problems and 
strengths of the unit and some tentative tumaround plan. «/ 
5.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps v 
5.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the government ^ 
5.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround sfrategy ^ 
5.1.5. Keep the government posted on the progress of the 
tumaround ^ 
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6. Suppliers ^ 
6.1. Negotiation of support of suppliers and neutralization of 
suppliers 'pressures >^  
6.1.1. Brief suppliers on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative turnaround plan. «/ 
6.1.2. Get suppliers to suggest turnaround steps X 
6.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from suppliers ^ 
6.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
6.1.5. Keep suppliers posted on the progress of the tumaround «/ 
6.2. Build credibility NEW 
6.2.1. Commit payments to build credibility NEW 
6.3. Ensure desirable quality of supplies NEW 
6.3.1. Educate supplier for better quality and quantity NEW 
7. Customers ^ 
7.1. Negotiation of support of customers and neutralization of 
customers 'pressures X 
7.1.1. Brief customers on the problems and strengths of the unit 
and some tentative tumaround plan. X 
7.1.2. Get customers to suggest tumaround steps X 
7.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from customers X 
7.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
7.1.5. Keep customers posted on the progress of the tumaround X 
7.2. Ignore current market and find a new market (customers) NEW 
7.2.1. Design communications to suit customer/ consumer needs 
and tastes NEW 
7.2.2. May rename products NEW 
7.2.3. May redesign packaging NEW 
7.2.4. May redesign logo NEW 
7.2.5. Make communications consistent NEW 
7.2.6. Build brand image NEW 
7.2.7. Train people on cross cultural communication NEW 
7.3. Sourcing industry information for quick cost reduction «/ 
7.3.1. Increase costs incurred on communication technologies, if 
need be, for sourcing industry (market) information v 
7.4. Revenue Generation ^ 
7.4.1. Have much more focused advertising and promotion </ 
l.A.l. Build Brand Image NEW 
8. Social Activist Groups NEW 
8.1. Gain support and neutralize pressures NEW 
8.1.1. Maintain transparent and direct contact NEW 
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Validating the propositions 
Proposition Pi A'. Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the communication objectives given in the framework 
though not necessarily all. 
10 of the 12 objectives listed in the framework were addressed by the TBEL 
management during the tumaround phase of TBEL. Although communication action 
(1.1.1) for one of the objectives (1.1) is found in the description of the case, the 
objective of the action is not clear. However, one of the communication objective 
(7.1) was not a communication objective for TBEL. 
Thus, the tumaround of TBEL supports Proposition P,A as it addressed some (most) 
of the communication objectives given in the framework but not all of them. 
Proposition PJB'. The list of communication objectives given in the proposed 
theoretical framework is comprehensive. 
10 of the 12 communication objectives proposed in the framework were 
addressed in TBEL. Four new objectives addressed in TBEL and not mentioned in the 
proposed framework were 
1. Build credibility among suppliers (6.2) 
2. Ensure desirable quality and quantity of supplies (6.3) 
3. Shift from current market to a new market (7.2) 
4 Maintain a transparent and direct contact with social activist groups (8.1) 
Thus, we notice that while there is a considerable overlap of the empirical findings of 
TBEL case with suggested pattern of communication objectives, there are 
differences too. 
The case of the tumaround of TBEL therefore does not support Proposition PIB as 
the conformance to the framework is high though not complete. Thus, we may say 
that the list of communication objectives in the framework proposed is certainly 
suggestive though not comprehensive. 
Proposition P2A'- Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the critical stakeholders given in the framework. 
Framework 5.1 indicates that TBEL management addressed all the 7 stakeholders 
listed in the proposed theoretical framework. 
It thus supports Proposition P2A-
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Proposition IIB- The list of critical stakeholders to be addressed during a 
turnaround is comprehensive. 
TBEL in addition to addressing the 7 critical stakeholders suggested in the proposed 
framework, addressed an additional critical stakeholder, namely social activist 
group. (For the purpose of this study, if the management has identified a 
communication objective for any stakeholder, it may be considered as a critical 
stakeholder). 
The TBEL case therefore suggests that the list of critical stakeholders proposed in the 
framework is not comprehensive. It thus does not support Proposition P^B 
Proposition P}A'- At least one of the communication actions listed in the proposed 
theoretical framework is employe d to realize a corresponding communication 
objective during turnaround. 
Framework 5.1 reveals that TBEL adopted some of the communication actions of all 
objectives identified in the framework and addressed by TBEL. However, there were 
some objectives that were not listed but addressed by TBEL (6.2, 6.3 and 7.2) and 
one that was listed but not addressed (7.1) by TBEL. With the exception of these, all 
objectives were addressed and communication actions listed thereof were found to 
have been adopted by TBEL. These findings support Proposition PJA 
Proposition PSB'. The list of communication actions recommended for achieving 
the communication objectives is comprehensive 
Framework 5.1 indicates that TBEL employed 41 communication actions from the 
list of 60 communication actions listed in the theoretical framework proposed. It did 
not employ 11 communication actions listed while information on 8 actions was not 
made available to the researcher. However, Framework 5.1 also indicates 11 new 
communication actions (6.2.1, 6.3.1, 7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.2.3, 7.2.4, 7.2.5, 7.2.6, 7.2.7, 
7.4.2, S.l.y adopted by TBEL management during the turnaround. 
Thus, the tumaround of TBEL does not support Proposition PSB as it indicates that 
list of communication actions recommended for achieving the communication 
objectives is not comprehensive. 
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Case 2 
EMPEE SUGARS AND CHEMICALS LTD. 
Deciphering Communication during Turnaround 
Background 
Empee Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. was originally incorporated as Raghav Sugars (P) 
Ltd. in 1988. After its public issue in 1990, Empee Distilleries held 51.09% shares in 
its paid up capital and became the holding Company of Raghav Sugars (P) Ltd. which 
was renamed as Empee Sugar and Chemicals Ltd. Later, Empee Distilleries Ltd. 
retained only 40% shares of Empee Sugar and Chemicals Ltd. and ceased to be the 
holding company. M Sreenivasulu Reddy and Sudhakar Reddy promoted the project 
and MP Purushothaman, a promoter of Empee Distilleries, got associated with the 
project. 
The Company set up a sugar factory for manufacture of white crystal sugar with a 
crushing capacity of 2500 TCD at Naidupet in Andhra Pradesl^*. However, in the 
year 1995 the Company incurred losses of INR 101 mn and its networth became INR 
(7.8) mn. It remained negative till 1999 but turned positive in year 2000. By 2003, the 
networth of the Company had increased to INR 147mn. (source Prowess V2.0: Centre 
for Monitoring Indian Economy Pvt. Ltd.). 
Table 5.2.1: ESCL performance during 1995-2005; turnaround in 2000 
Empee Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. 
1995 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Gross sales 
(INR in 
mn) 
299 366 527 440 390 384 364 359 644 928 
Net worth 
(INR in 
mn) 
-78 -29 -27 -9 26 104 109 147 147 101 
' Andhra Pradesh is a state located in the South of India. 
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Chart 5.2.1: Performance of ESCL during 1995-2005; turnaround in 2000 
Empee Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. 
1000 
-200 
Year 
•Gross sales (mn) -M-Net worth (mn) 
External Issues 
Government Policies: In India, Sugar and Sugarcane were essential commodities 
under the Essential Commodities Act 1955. Government of India followed policy of 
partial control and dual pricing for sugar. Under this policy, a certain percentage of 
sugar produced by sugar factories was requisitioned by the Government as 
compulsory levy at a price fixed by Government in every sugar season. The levy 
sugar was distributed through the Public Distribution System (PDS). The non-levy, 
free sale sugar was allowed to be sold as per the quantity released by the Government 
under the free sale sugar release mechanism. The compulsory levy obligation of sugar 
factories until year 2000 was 40% of total production^'. (Department of Food and 
Public Distribution, Directorate of Sugar website) 
"Like all other sugar mills, we were also incurring losses because there was no means 
of making profits. The government decided the price at which the raw material was to 
be bought, it also decided the price at which it had to be sold ^ °" 
29 Under this obligation a sugar manufacturer had to sell 40% of its produce to the 
Government of India at a pre-determined price determined by the Government of India. 
Interview with R Chandramohan, Senior Vice President ESCL on December 3, 2005 
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Banks: Chandramohan felt that the biggest challenge was to handle the banks. 
"They were reluctant to lend money to us and money was a critical requirement". 
Suppliers: "Since groundnut and paddy crop yielded two to three times in an year, 
the farmer preferred it over sugarcane that yielded once an year. There was a need to 
develop suppliers to produce more sugarcane as the demand for finished product was 
more than the available raw materiaf. 
Unraveling the turnaround 
Govt lifts control: "Since the government lifted its controls, the industry began to 
blossom and Empee Sugar and Chemicals Ltd. also therefore started doing well. Until 
some time back, sugar was sold at Rs 10,000 a ton and now the same sugar is sold at 
Rs 16,000 a ton. Naturally the company is now able to recover its costs and make 
profit. The turnaround may therefore be attributed to the government policies for the 
industry rather than any operational changes brought into the running of the 
Company". 
A study of the policies of Government of India (see annexure 1) reveals that the 
Essential Commodities Act which had been implementing levy system for 42 years 
was revised several times over after 1997. The policy changes reduced control by 
reducing the compulsory levy obligation from 40% in 2000 to 10% in the Year 2002. 
Similarly several measures were taken to promote export of sugar while imports were 
discouraged. (See Table 5.2.2) 
Table 5.2.2: Policy changes in sugar industi-y post 1997 
Policy Change With effect from 
date/ Price in INR 
Year 1997 
Export of sugar decanalised 15'" January, 1997 
Year 1998 
Whole sale price of non-levy sugar 1333-1620 per 
quintal 
Retail Price of Sugar 15.00-17.50 per kg 
Basic Custom Duty on imports increased from zero to 5% 27.4.1998 
Year 1999 
Whole sale price of non-levy sugar 1326-1700 per 
quintal 
Retail Price of Sugar 14.00-18.00 per kg 
Basic Custom Duty increased from zero to 20% and by end of 
year to 40% 
14.1.1999 
reintroduced the system of release mechanism on imported December 1999 
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Policy Change With effect from 
date/ Price in INR 
sugar 
Year 2000 
Levy reductionfrom 40% to 30% Jan 1, 2000 
Whole sale price of non-levy sugar 128.5-165.0 per 
quintal 
Retail Price of Sugar 14.00-17.50 
SMP (Statutory Minimum Price) of Sugarcane 59.50 per quintal 
Basic Custom Duty increased from 40% to 60% 9 Feb 2000 
levy obligation imposed on the importers 17.2.2000 
Year 2001 
Levy reductionl5% February 1,2001 
Levy sugar supply under the PDS (Public Distribution 
System) has been restricted only to the BPL (Below Poverty 
Line) families in all states /UTS except the North Eastern 
States, Hill States and Island Territories. 
The minimum per head per month quantum of levy sugar 
allotted under the PDS was increased from 425 gms to 500 
gms The Monthly levy quota under the PDS for various states 
/UTS with effect from is 2.16.Lakh Tonnes. 
February 1,2001 
Clearances to 3 proposed exchanges given in 
principle. Trading from two exchanges has already 
commenced. 
May 2001 
Whole sale price of non-levy sugar 1285-1630 per 
quintal 
Retail Price of Sugar 13.60-17.50 per kg 
SMP (Statutory Mmunum Price) of Sugarcane 62.05 per quintal 
Quantitative ceiling on Export of Sugar removed. 
Registration-Cum-Allocation Certificates (RCAC) by APEDA 
not required. Export Release Order by Directorate of Sugar 
required 
1.4.2001 
Year 2002 
Levy reduction 10%) March 1,2002 
Release of non levy free sale sugar 1625 per quintal 
All-India levy sugar price INR. 1259.99 per 
quintal 
Retail price of levy sugar under the PDS INR 13.50 per kg March 1,2002 
Whole sale price of non-levy sugar 1130-1575 per 
quintal 
Retail Price of Sugar 12.30-16.00 per kg 
SMP (Statutory Minimum Price) of Sugarcane 69.50 per quintal 
Year 2003 
The Essential Commodities Act, 1955 amended. No producer, 
importer or exporter of sugar shall sell or otherwise dispose of 
June 2003 
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Policy Change With effect from 
date/ Price in INR 
or deliver any kind of sugar except under and in accordance 
with the direction issued by the Government 
Release of non levy free sale sugar 1483.8 quintal 
All-India levy sugar price Increased from INR 
1259.99 to 1305.92 
per quintal 
Whole sale price of non-levy sugar 1271-1800 per 
quintal 
Retail Price of Sugar 13.00-20.00 per kg 
SMP (Statutory Minimum Price) of Sugarcane 73.00 per quintal 
Year 2004 
Export promotion scheme rescinded June 21, 2004. 
(source: prepared from information given by Directorate of Sugar at www.fcamin.nic.in/dfid) 
Investment of Personal Equity: "To begin with, the promoters brought in a 
personal equity of INR 250 mn to pay the debts and that brought the Company's 
networth from negative to positive. Though the communication strategy was not 
documented, communication is important for carrying out any business. We had 
regular meetings with the Chairman to strategize and decide how we take the 
business ahead ". 
External Communication at ESCL 
Banks: "The ESCL Chairman had regular meetings with the Bank 's chairman and 
the financial management team with the General Managers of the Banks. So 
communication channels were operating at all levels to convince the Banks. 
Presentations had to be made to make them understand the problems at the field level 
and the plans to address these problems ". 
Suppliers: "Since groundnut and paddy crop yield two to three times in an year, the 
farmer prefers it over sugarcane that yields once an year. Therefore the farmers have 
to be given subsidy in the form of seed, fertilizer etc. to encourage them to grow more 
sugarcane. With such measures, ESCL is still trying to improve the raw material 
supplies to be able to achieve optimum utilization of their plants. The procurement 
team has to therefore meet the farmers and explain the facilities offered to them. 
Government: The government in India decides how much sugar can be sold in the 
open market. "We therefore have to send requests to the government to permit release 
of larger quantities of sugar. Since it comes in the purview of the centtal government 
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usually written communication is resorted to. Incase of more urgent tasks face to face 
communication is what we need to resort to ". 
Industry Associations: "We are a member of the Sugar Mills Association and we 
participated in meetings both in Hyderabad and Chennai to keep track of events and 
developments of the industry". 
International Agencies: ESCL did not have to interact with any Intemational 
agencies for any of its business operations. 
Media Relations: "ESCL kept the media posted with its issues and developments 
on a regular basis. There was a separate department that managed media relations". 
Internal Communication Strategy 
Employees: "The demoralized employees were tackled at the unit level through 
informal group meetings. These were held at all levels - with the engineering cadre, 
the field employees or the top position employees. We explained to them their role in 
shaping the future. The employees could see that if they did not cooperate the 
company would collapse and so they would loose employment. Since, the industry 
was not doing well there was no other place to move to also. Thus, getting workers 
was not a major problem. Even if we could get 60% workforce, the work would roll 
on. 
Communication Technology Interventions: Everyone at ESCL had a terminal 
on the desk and the broadband surfing facility was available to all. ESCL was 
planning to implement ERF software at the time of the interview. "All senior 
executives have a mobile phone and that has improved the speed of communication. 
The SMS technology is not employed for any business/ marketing purposes". 
Training is not part of the mandate. Internet surfing is used extensively to keep track 
of markets though the ESCL website was not a focus area for enhancing business 
operations. 
Analysis 
The case of the turnaround of ESCL indicates that owing to the policies of the 
Government of India, ESCL as an organization became sick. Also, with the change in 
government policies, it recovered and tumed around later. It thus supports the first 
proposition that environment has an impact on organizations and organizations 
change with changes in the environment. It however indicates that sometimes the 
impact of environment on organization is so strong that it renders the impact of 
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managerial decision making inconsequential. The case of the turnaround of ESCL 
thus confirms the first stage of the theoretical framework proposed and displayed in 
Figure 3.1. 
Further, Chandramohan asserts that the reason for sickness of the Company was the 
policies of the Government of India and thus there were no means to make profits. 
The Banks were hostile. The farmers (suppliers) were not interested in producing the 
raw material as it reaped no benefits. Thus, disabling forces were exerted by the three 
external stakeholders (government, banks and suppliers) when the Company became 
sick. However, the case does not attribute the failure to any of the internal reasons 
and does not indicate any enabling/disabling forces emanating from internal 
stakeholders. Thus, the case of the tumaround of ESCL partially confirms the second 
stage of the theoretical framework suggested. 
The prowess data studied as part of this research indicated that four sugar companies 
had turned sick during the period 1995 to 2005 and two of these four recovered 
during this period. The BIFR data reveals that a total of 28 Sugar companies were 
registered sick during 1995 to 2005 but none has been deregistered as a healthy unit. 
(Although ESCL turned sick, it was not referred to the BIFR). While Chandramohan 
mentioned that all sugar mills were sick earlier and that with change in government 
policies these mills are reviving, this data does not support the argument. As is 
evident from this data, there were other sick companies that have not turned around 
despite changes in the government policies. This finding therefore indicates that while 
Chandramohan might attribute the tumaround entirely to changes in government 
policies (external environment), data suggests otherwise. It would therefore be 
appropriate to maintain that the proposition of the theoretical framework that 
management has to play a central role and manage stakeholders to enable a 
tumaround is correct. 
The final stage of the theoretical framework suggests that the tumaround 
managements adopt formal or informal communication strategies for each 
stakeholder. The tumaround of ESCL indicates that no formal sfrategy was worked 
out although for all communications emanating from the Company, the management 
and the Chairman were working and discussing management of ESCL 
communications very closely. Therefore, communication sfrategy was an 
evolutionary process and not a documented sfrategy. Since the management does not 
attribute tumaround to managerial actions, therefore it refused to elaborate on 
communication objectives addressed and communication actions taken there of 
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Since our data collected from secondary sources indicates that ESCL management did 
play a central role in enabling the turnaround, we believe that the management did 
take managerial actions; it did identify communication objectives for critical 
stakeholders and it did employ appropriate communications actions, in consonance 
with the Figure 3.3 to enable a tumround. However, it was unable to articulate its 
actions and hence unable to share these with the researcher. Thus, the case of ESCL 
definitely supports a part of the Figure 3.3 (that management played a central role in 
tumaround) but it leaves room for doubt for the other part (addressing communication 
objectives for each stakeholder through communication actions) though it cannot be 
said that it does not support this part. The pattern of communication actions as 
identified from the ESCL case study are given In Framework 5.2 below. 
Framework 5.2 
The Match between the CS for OTA framework and the Communication 
Strategy of ESCL during turnaround 
X No —Don't Know v Yes A^ ^^ PF- Newly Identify 
Theoretical Pattern Case Pattern 
Stakeholder/ Turnaround Element (objective)/ 
Possible Communication Action 
1. Board of Directors — 
LL Gain support and time in the future X 
1.1.1. Present detailed tum-around plan X 
2. Staff and Employees </ 
2.L Credibility building actions by tfie new management X 
2.1.1. Document, and communicate a sfrategic tumaround plan X 
2.1.2. Publicize success in resolving a current crisis or problem — 
2.1.3. Make decisions transparent — 
2.1.4. Exercise Communication Control — 
2.2. Initial Control — 
2.2.1. Order preparation of daily, weekly and monthly cash 
forecasts — 
2.2.2. Exercise Communication Control. — 
2.2.3. Seek views on the general well being of the employees. X 
2.3. Mobilization of organization for turnaround <^  
2.3.1. Include key managers for development of industry wisdom v 
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2.3.2. Includeonly key managers for development of vision — 
2.3.3. CEO should deliver the vision presentation in person and 
as often as possible. — 
2.3.4. Hold special sessions for non-participating managers after 
vision has been developed to share planned vision — 
2.3.5. Inject urgency in the communications plan. Explain what 
need to be done and why >^  
2.3.6. Listen to the views of all managers. Gauge their reaction — 
2.3.7. Understand perceptions and focus minds of managing 
team. Set the scene for tumaround. X 
2.3.8. Ensure all employees know what is going on, for what 
reason and how it will occur. >/ 
2.3.9. Share the pulpit (Empowerment) — 
2.3.10. Deal with concerns of employees in open and honest 
manner. Offer Follow up sessions — 
2.3.11. Note any comments or queries and provide answers asap. — 
2.3.12. CEO must get out of the office to interact with the 
employees and to listen to them — 
2.3.13. Employ open ended communication style that encourages 
employees to find answers, take decisions. — 
2.3.14. Repeatedly affirm the Company's mission, core values, 
and the primary goals of profit and growth. v 
2.3.15. Articulate a few highly concrete targets for the company 
for the next few months — 
2.3.16. Involve the staff to identify solvable problem areas and 
have their views on uninvolved areas. — 
2.3.17. Rephrase people's roles to clarify managerial 
responsibilities. — 
2.3.18. Top managers must emphasize on integrity, fairness, hard 
work, resourcefiilness and concern for the staff during 
interactions with the staff. — 
2.3.19. Publicize and celebrate every employee and team success. — 
2.3.20. Vision and mission statements were conveyed and 
displayed NEW 
2.4. Internal Co-ordination — 
2.4.1. Offer constant feedback to keep organizafion on track — 
2.4.2. Set up co-ordination committees for co-ordinating 
interdependent departments — 
2.4.3. Institute a monthly performance review meeting of all 
senior managers chaired by the chief executive. — 
2.4.4. Insist that lower level disputes be settled at that level on a 
face to face basis — 
2.4.5. Keep the atmosphere light. — 
2.4.6. Keep enhancing communication technology - email, 
mobile ERP </ 
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3. Unions ^ 
3.1. Negotiation of support of Unions and neutralization of 
Unions' pressures X 
3.1.1. Brief unions on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative turnaround plan. <y 
3.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps X 
3.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the unions ^ 
3.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy — 
3.1.5. Keep unions posted on the progress of the tumaround -/ 
4. Banks and Financial Institutions ^ 
4.1. Negotiation of support of Banks and/or FIs and neutralization 
of Banks and/or FIs pressures >/ 
4.1.1. Brief Banks and/or FIs on the problems and strengths of 
the unit and some tentative tumaround plan ^ 
4.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps — 
4.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from Banks and/or FIs </ 
4.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround sfrategy X 
4.1.5. Keep Banks and/or FIs posted on the progress of the 
tumaround ^ 
4.1.6. Educate concerned bank officials on working of business/ 
industry NEW 
5. Government </ 
5.1. Negotiation of support of Government and neutralization of 
Government pressures v 
5.1.1. Brief relevant government departments on the problems 
and strengths of the unit and some tentative tumaround 
plan. — 
5.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps — 
5.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the government ^ 
5.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy — 
5.1.5. Keep the government posted on the progress of the 
tumaround — 
7. Suppliers v/ 
7.1. Negotiation of support of suppliers and ne utralization of 
suppliers 'pressures «/ 
7.1.1. Brief suppliers on the problems and strengths of the unit 
and some tentative tumaround plan. — 
7.1.2. Get suppliers to suggest tumaround steps — 
7.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from suppliers v/ 
7.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround sfrategy — 
7.1.5. Keep suppliers posted on the progress of the turnaround — 
7.1.6. Educate supplierfor better quality and quantity NEW 
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9. Customers -^ 
9.1. Negotiation of support of customers and neutralization of 
Customer's pressures '^  
9.1.1. Brief customers on the problems and strengths of the unit 
and some tentative turnaround plan. -/ 
9.1.2. Get customers to suggest turnaround steps X 
9.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from customers ^ 
9.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy X 
9.1.5. Keep customers posted on the progress of the turnaround X 
9.2. Sourcing industry information for quick cost reduction ^ 
9.2.1. Increase costs incurred on communication technologies, if 
need be, for sourcing industry (market) information ^ 
9.3. Revenue Generation ^ 
9.3.1. Have much more focused advertising and promotion — 
10. Industry Association NEW 
10.1. Voice concerns to government through Industry Association NEW 
10.1.1. Actively participate in association meetings NEW 
Validating ttie propositions 
Proposition PIA'- Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the communication objectives given in the framework 
though not necessarily all. 
Framework 5.2 indicates that ESCL management addressed 7 (2.3, 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7.1, 
7.2, 7.3) of the total of 12 communication objectives listed in Framework 3.2 of 
theoretical framework proposed inchapter3. 3 communication objectives (1.1, 2.1, 
3.1) listed in the theoretical framework proposed were not addressed by the ESCL 
management while information on 2 communication objectives (2.4, 2.2) was not 
shared with the researcher. 
It is evident therefore that ESCL addressed some of the communication objectives 
given in the framework but not all. The case of the turnaround of ESCL therefore 
supports Proposition P,A-
Proposition P,B: The list of communication objectives given in iie proposed 
theoretical framework is comprehensive. 
Framework 5.2 indicates that while ESCL addressed 7 communication objectives 
(2.3, 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3) listed; did not address 3 communication objectives 
(1.1, 2.1, 3.1); and did not provide information on 2 communication objectives (2.4, 
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2.2), it did address an additional communication objective (8.1 - Voice concerns to 
government through Industry Association) that was not listed in the theoretical 
framework proposed. 
The case of the tumaround of ESCL therefore does not support Proposition PJB as it 
indicates that the list of communication objectives in the theoretical framework 
proposed is suggestive and not comprehensive. 
Proposition PJA- Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the critical stakeholders given in the framework. 
Framework 5.2 indicates that ESCL management addressed all the 7 stakeholders 
listed in the proposed theoretical framework. 
It thus supports Proposition P2A-
Proposition PB- The list of critical stakeholders to be addressed during a 
turnaround is comprehensive. 
Framework 5.2 indicates that ESCL management addressed communication 
objectives set for 6 stakeholders (Employees, Banks and FIs, Government, Suppliers, 
Customers) listed in the theoretical framework. Thus, it had to deal with 5 critical 
stakeholders. However, top management's objectives vis-a-vis Board of Directors are 
not known. However, the mention of a new critical stakeholder (Industry Association) 
is noticed. This stakeholder was not included in the theoretical framework suggested 
in this study. 
Thus, the tumaround of ESCL does not support the Proposition P2B as it indicates 
that the list of critical stakeholders proposed in the theoretical framework is not 
comprehensive. 
Proposition PSA'. At least one of the communication actions listed in the proposed 
theoretical framework is employed to realize a corresponding communication 
objective during turnaround. 
Framework 5.2 indicates that for each of the 7 communication objectives addressed 
by ESCL management during tumaround, it employed atleast 1 communication 
action from the listed communication actions for that objective in the theoretical 
framework. However, for 1 objective (7.3 - revenue generation), the theoretical 
framework proposes only one communication action (7.3.1 - Have much more 
focused advertising and promotion). ESCL did not provide any information on 
whether it employed this communication action for the said objective or not. In the 
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absence of availability of information, we may derive our conclusion on the basis of 
the information available for the other 5 communication objectives addressed by 
ESCL management during turnaround. 
Thus, the case of turnaround of ESCL supports Proposition PJA as it confirms that 
atleast one of the list of communication actions recommended in the theoretical 
framework must be employed to realize the corresponding communication objective. 
Proposition PJB'. The list of communication actions recommended for achieving 
the communication objectives is comprehensive 
Framework 5.2 indicates that ESCL employed 18 communication actions from the list 
of 60 communication actions listed in the theoretical framework proposed. It did not 
employ 7 communication actions listed while information on 35 actions was not made 
available to the researcher. However, Framework 5.2 also indicates 4 new 
communication actions (2.3.20 - Vision and mission statements were conveyed and 
displayed; 4.1.6 - Educate concerned bank officials on working of business/ industry; 
6.1.6- Educate supplier for better quality and quantity; 8.1.1 - Actively participate in 
association meetings) adopted by ESCL management during the turnaround. 
Thus, the case of turnaround of ESCL does not supports Proposition PJB as it 
indicates that list of communication actions recommended for achieving the 
communication objectives is not comprehensive 
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Case 3 
AMRIT BANASPATI COMPANY LTD. 
Deciphering Communication during Turnaround 
Bacifground 
Amrit Banaspati Company Ltd. (ABCL) was established in 1940 to manufacture 
hydrogenated oil, more commonly known as 'vanaspati ghee' in India. The first 
manufacturing facility was set up in Ghaziabad^ and in 1968 edible oil operations 
were expanded by putting up a plant in Rajpura'^. hi 1980s, it expanded the product-
mix to include edible refined oils along with 'vanaspati'. In 1989, ABC Paper, a 
division of ABCL was set up at Sailakhurd in the state of Punjab, 108 kms from 
Chandigarh^^. ABC paper is a wood free paper plant that uses agro-wastes like wheat, 
husk, rice-straw, kana grass etc. to manufacture printing and writing paper^ "*. "In 
1989, there was a short supply of milk. So we thought that Soya milk could be a 
viable ahemative and so we invested INR 200 mn to set up a plant for Soya milk 
production. Perhaps that was the beginning of the downfall"". 
The performance of ABCL started declining. Its networth declined fi^om INR 229.2 
mn in 1996 to INR -138.9 mn in 2000. Consequently, the Company was declared a 
sick industrial undertaking by BIFR in 1997. The networth of ABCL fiirther eroded to 
INR -232.8 mn in 2002 but the performance started to pick-up thereafter and in 2003 
the networth became positive. The results of ABCL have since been improving. (See 
Table 5.3.1 and Chart 5.3.1). By 2005, the networth of ABCL had risen to INR 369.8 
mn, an all time high in its 65 years of existence. 
Table 5.3.1: Performance of ABCL during 1995-2005; turnaround in 2003 
Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. 
1995 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Gross sales (INR in mn) 4976 4097 5786 4351 3247 3243 3802 4231 4679 4836 
Net Worth (INR in mn) 229 201 16 -139 -213 -233 -174 190 304 330 
33 
an industrial town in Uttar Pradesh, a northern state of India 
a city located in Punjab, a northern state of India 
Chandigarh is the capital of Punjab, a state located in the north of India. 
^^  ABCL 63"* Annual Report 2003-2004 
" Interview with AK Bajaj on October 21, 2005 
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Unraveling the turnaround 
External Issues 
Government policies: India's new economic policy was launched in June 1991. 
The government began to liberalize the economy by reforming trade, financial, tax 
and investment policies. Public enterprises were restructured and the budget 
controlled more closely. Specific policy reforms included abolishing most industrial 
licensing, removing import licensing, reducing tariffs and relaxing foreign investment 
regulations. Ashwini Bajaj, Managing Director, ABCL in his interview shared the 
impact of this liberalization on ABCL. He stated, "Post liberalization it became 
difficult for ABCL to qjerate a vanaspati plant in UP. The labour cost in UP was 
very high. Electricity was expensive. To add to these woes, UP government gave sales 
tax exemption to new units for 5 years " (Ashwini Bajaj, personal communications, 
October 21, 2005). As a result, several new units like Suraj Banaspati, Super 
Banaspati & others came up while old players such as Modi and HLL had to close 
down. ABCL also, due to several players, high cost of production, tax exemptions to 
new units and low profit margins, became in-competitive. 
Health of the Paper Industry: The domestic paper industry was broadly 
classified into writing & printing paper, industrial paper, and specialty paper. ABCL 
operated in the writing and printing paper segment which accounted for nearly 40% 
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of the total paper and paper board consumption (ABCL Annual Report 2003-2004). 
In 1996 came a worldwide downtum in the paper industry. This was a usual dip in the 
cyclic market but ABCL started making losses. 
Arranging Finance: In 2002-03, ABCL's debt payable to the Banks was to the 
tune of INR 743.66 mn and that to the Financial institutions was INR 435.76 mn 
(ABCL Annual Report 2002-2003). "Since, several companies were going through a 
rough patch at that time, even the banks didn't know how much to believe and how 
much to probe. It was therefore extremely tough to convince the Banks or gain their 
confidence"." 
Customer Blues: The cultivated oilseeds and edible oils, from all domestic 
sources, were never able to meet the demand in the country. (See Table 5.3.2 
for figures of 1996-2001) 
Table 5.3.2: Demand/availabilitj' of edible oils during 1996-2001 
OU Year 
(November -
October) 
Production of 
Oilseeds 
[In Lakh Tonnes] 
Net availability of 
edible oils from all 
domestic sources 
#Demand of Edible 
OUs 
[In Lalch Tonnes] 
1996-1997 243.80 70.90 85.06 
1997-1998 213.20 60.32 72.98 
1998-1999 247.48 69.61 95.83 
1999-2000 208.70 61.07 103.03 
2000-2001 182.00 54.54 94.29 (Est.) 
# Demand has been taken as net availability of edible oils from domestic sources + import of edible oils. 
Source: (i) In respect of production of oilseeds: Agricultural Statistics, at glance 2001, Ministry of 
Agriculture. 
(ii) In respect of net availability of edible fats from all domestic sources & demand edible oils: 
Directorate ofVanaspati, Vegetable Oils & Fats. 
The low production of oil was owing to the shortfall in availability of raw material. 
So much so that most of the units were underutilized. (See Table 5.3.3) 
36 Ibid 35 
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Table 53.3: Capacity Utilization in Vegetable Oil Industry 
Type of Vegetable Oil 
Industry 
No. of 
Units 
Annual Capacity 
(LakhMT)) 
Average 
Capacity 
Utilisation 
Oilseed Crushing Units 1,50,000 
(Approx.) 
425 
(In terms of Seeds) 
10-30% 
Solvent Extraction Units 766 360 
(In terms of Oil-
bearing Material) 
44% 
Refineries attached with 
Vanaspati 
100 10 40% 
Refineries attached with 
Solvent Extraction Plant 
200 12 35% 
Independent Refineries 
(RU / Edible) 
500 25 30% 
Total Refineries 800 47 35% 
Vanaspati Units 226 40 
(In terms of 
Vanaspati) 
35% 
Source: Directorate of WO&F 
Thus, the characteristics of the domestic Vegetable Oil industry were as follows:-
The capacity utilisation of oilseeds crushing units (both in the small scale sector and 
in the organised sector) varied fi-om an average of 10% for ghanis (small scale sector) 
to around 30% in case of expellers in the organised sector. However, consequent 
upon de-licensing of the vegetable oils industry there was unrestricted growth in the 
industry. This creation of capacity was not at all incommensurate with availability of 
raw materials. This coupled with the obsolete technology that was commonly 
employed resulted in very low margin because of stiff competition, inefficiency of 
operations etc. Owing to the dependence of these units on the import of raw material, 
the cost of which therefore depended on the customs duty, the nature of the trade was 
speculative. (Department of Food and Public Distribution System, www.fcamin. 
nic.in/dfid) 
In the Pre-liberalization era, the licensing policy empowered the manufacturers / 
suppliers. They could make money, if they had acquired the license for operation. "In 
ABCL, both the management and the executives were used to having distributors 
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queue up for supplies. Customers' opinions were, therefore, not a concern. Post 
liberalization, the scene changed. Suddenly there were plenty of manufacturers / 
suppliers and distributor queues vanished. ABCL was in a new reality that it had to 
accept to initiate a renewed process of marketing and sales. But ABCL was not 
prepared mentally to accept these new realities (Ashwini Bajaj, personal 
communications, Oct 21, 2005)". 
Supplier-related issues: As can be noted from Table 5.3.2, the raw material for 
producing vanaspati and edible oil was in short supply in the domestic market. 
Increased number of edible oil and vanaspati producers further enhanced the scarcity. 
Production facilities were thus dependent on import of raw material from neighboring 
countries like Nepal and SriLanka. (Department of Food and Public Distribution 
System, www.fcmai.nic .in/dfid. May 1, 2006). This was not an issue till the 
government ensured supplies and also the sales. However, in the changed 
environment, companies like ABCL had to compete to get the raw material as well. 
Other Stakeholders: There were no issues pertaining to shareholders, industry 
associations, international agencies or media. 
Internal Issues 
Closing Down the Gaziabad unit: As mentioned earlier, post 1991, running the 
Vanaspati plant in UP had become a loss making proposition for ABCL. However, 
ABCL management took seven years to realize that the changed market realities were 
there to stay. Thus, in 1998, ABCL management decided to shut down the factory at 
Gaziabad. "This was a very difficult decision to make and accept, as this unit was the 
first unit set up by ABCL and it had reaped huge profits in the past. The emotional 
attachment to the unit was thus high" (Ashwini Bajaj, personal communications, Oct 
21, 2005). But by 1998, it was making losses. ABCL management decided to shift the 
entire capacity of Gaziabad unit to its unit at Rajpura and to consequently relieve the 
labour employed at Gaziabad. 
Resistance to change: an organizational issue: The culture at ABCL did not 
promote innovation and change. Customer orientation was completely missing. The 
Company continued to operate as it had always done, for almost a decade, the 
management continued to bask in past glory and took no cognizance of the changed 
reality post liberalization. 
ABCL employees were also comfortable doing what they had been doing all along. 
"For instance pushing one button and after 15 minutes pushing another button. They 
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were habitual to that routine and to change, for example to make a new product, they 
had to make an effort to change. This was a difficult task (Ashwini Bajaj, personal 
communications, October 21, 2005)". There was an undefined resistance to change. 
Suddenly, superficial problems clouded their minds. The management was thus faced 
with the task of not only asking them to change but asking them to accept the fact that 
this was not the last change - that continuous change was the new reality. 
External Communications atABCL 
Preferring veterans for interactions witti Government: Since the companies 
in the sector depended on imports of raw material from neighbouring countries, the 
import policy of the country which was undergoing continuous changes, post 1995, 
was an been important concern for instance, the custom duty on various Crude 
Edible Oil except Soyabean Oil, was raised with effect firom 1.3.2001. The duty on 
refined oils was also raised except in the cases of refined Soyabean Oil and refined 
Mustard Oil where the duties were maintained as they were. (Information from 
Directorate of Food and Public Distribution System, www.fcamin.nic/dfid May 2, 
2006). Though the respondents did not mention any communication strategy that they 
had adopted for interactions with the Government, the annual report 2002-2003 does 
indicate a conscbus decision that ABCL took to induct GN Mehra as a regular 
Director on the board of Directors of ABCL. The report states: ''Shrf' G.N. Mehra is 
a retired bureaucrat having wide ranging experience in administration and industrial 
development. Shri Mehra has had distinguished career as a member of the Indian 
Administrative Service. He held top positions in the Government of India as Secretary 
in the Ministry of Industry, Information and Broadcasting etc. He was the Chief 
Secretary to the UP state government besides being industries commissioner in UP 
and Chairman PICUP. He was also associated with the management of various 
public sector companies Of his career with the Government spanning 37 
years, Shri Mehra has spent 20 years in the field of industrial development and 
management The Board of Directors felt that experience, expertise and image 
will be of immense value to the Company in speedy revival and, therefore, 
recommended his appointment. (62"'' Annual Report 2002-2003, pp 6)". The 
emphasis on the experience of GN Mehra fetching him the Director's position in the 
Company does indicate that such experience, expertise and image carried value for 
the company. There is, therefore, a reasonable probability that ABCL might have 
^^  salutation used in the local language 
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adopted an informal (if not formal) communication strategy to interact with the 
government. 
Persistent presentation of good records personally: build credibility and 
divert precipitating situations: ABCL was a company with a history. Ashwini 
Bajaj claimed that it had been a good client for their Banks, all along. However, by 
late 1990s it was making losses and their need for both a Working Capital debt and a 
Long Term debt was urgent. 
To start with, the ABCL management drew the Banking officials' attention to the past 
records to build ABCL's credibility. They repeatedly made presentations to different 
banks to highlight facts and figures, their plans and the changes that they could 
foresee. "Convincing the banks was the toughest part. We had to listen to a lot of 
harsh words and still keep high spirits and keep talking. We shared the real situation 
personally at many levels. Several banks mentioned to us that in many other cases the 
representatives of the companies have made presentations that didn 't work. But when 
the promoters present the case themselves, it helps. Even if the Banks were hard with 
us, the personal appearance ensured that the situation did not precipitate " (Ashwini 
Bajaj, personal communications, Oct 21, 2005). 
During this phase, ABCL witnessed in Banks all kinds of approaches - from 
professional to laid back, from understanding to truly harsh. But they received 
immense support from the Punjab National Bank, which had been their banker from 
their good times. This benefited them in negotiations with other Banks as well. 
However, Bajaj emphasized that besides paying back the debt in time, ABCL also 
kept meeting the Banking officials at several levels to keep them abreast of the 
situation. This convinced the Banking officials that ABCL was clear in its dealings. 
Once the credibility was rebuilt, it was an easy sail. 
Building brands and selling niche products: With production capacities 
exceeding far beyond the actual production in India, margins on commodity products 
were getting squeezed. ABCL therefore diversified into niche products and seriously 
approached marketing of these products. The product basket included edible oil, 
margarine, mayonnaise, packed ice-cream and the likes. They also started 
concenfratmg on institutional sales such as those to Nestle, McDonalds etc. 
In the paper business as well, ABCL added new products to its portfolio. The 
company started to sell branded paper. They began looking at types of paper, at 
market needs and at developing the products accordingly. 
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Internal Strategy 
A downfall of almost 10 years forced ABCL management to accept that the new 
business realities were there to stay. However, Ashwini Bajaj accepted that they took 
a long time to accept the change. 
Labour negotiations: Closing down the plant at Ghaziabad 
It was obvious even to the workers that the unit at Gaziabad was making losses. 
When the management decided to close the unit permanently, the workers had no 
choice; they had to go. "ABCL management decided to adopt an open and honest 
approach to the labour negotiation for settlement of dues. This meant that the 
company had to commit resources at a time when it was running short of funds. This 
was a tough call but a step to strengthen the image & reputation of the group as one 
that follows the right path in an honest & just manner" (A.K. Tyagi, Chief Executive 
Officer, personal communications, Oct 21,2005). 
The second strategy adopted during negotiations was that all meetings were held with 
all the workers and not just the Union leader. This was to ensure that there was no 
scope for miscommunication. 
Tyagi and two unit heads along with the management were involved in the 
negotiation process. Thirteen to fourteen meetings were held with the entire labour 
community so that the communication was clear and each of the workers heard what 
the management had to say. 
In the first meeting the management made the announcement. They shared that they 
were incurring losses and so they had to close the unit as they had no other choice. 
They also committed in the very first meeting that they will give the workers the 
money due to them legally. "We told them that ABCL was an ethical organization and 
would continue to be so. Also, we knew that in first meeting they could digest just 
that much", says Tyagi. 
In the second meeting, discussion on what were their legal rights was initiated. Both 
parties presented what they had found and understood of the process and demands. 
These discussions consumed four to five meetings before a mutual consensus was 
reached. 
During this period, the labour went to government offices, sometimes created 
nuisance to harass the management, to ask for a rise of three times. ''Even if you are 
legally right it is important that you present your case" says Tyagi. ABCL 
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management team made presentations to several authorities or entities such as the 
Labour commissioner, the DM office etc. Through these presentations the ABCL 
representatives made it clear that they were doing what was legally expected from 
them. "We told them that this is what your act says & we are giving compensation 
accordingly. Then if the labour approaches them, what could they do. If the Labour 
Commissioner is satisfied, then he tells the labour that they can 7 help any more. The 
labour may approach the Administration - say the DM office - where also ABCL had 
already made presentations to clarify their stand "says Tyagi. 
There were instances of harassment as well. Once the labour locked up the raw 
material at one of the depots. Since these were perishable goods the damage had to be 
controlled immediately. So ABCL sought help from the police to access it. 
"Sometimes one has to employ force to get the way" laments Tyagi. 
One or two meetings followed where the labour demanded that they be given more 
than their legal rights. "So we gave atleast what was legally their rightful and in 
some cases more than is what was legally stipulated. These were on the spot 
decisions." 
Tyagi had been with ABCL since 1987 and the closure happened between 1998 to 
2000. "Every one knew me and we were attached to each other. This helped in 
resolving the issues. Since the management was not asking us to carry out any 
unethical orders so it wasn't very difficult." 
Once the terms were settled, the legal department came into picture. The job of 
management was over then. The legal department prepared papers and got them 
processed. 
Making of a learning organization: Fortunately, there was no retrenchment at 
Rajpura though thinking & cultural change had to be ensured. It was important to get 
the employees to understand that they must hink of the consumer demands. The 
management therefore set out explaining to them not just the new routine but also the 
fact that those were not the end of the changes and the changes would keep on going 
happening. So the need to keep themselves open to change was emphasized over and 
over again. Because of the closing down of the Gaziabad plant, a fear lingered - that 
if they do not adapt then the Rajpura plant could also meet the same fate. "It is sad 
but that made them adapt to change faster" (Ashwini Bajaj, personal communications, 
October 21, 2005). 
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New people were also recruited. These were professionals in their fields and that also 
brought in the desired cultural change. 
The Quality department was separated from the R & D (new) department though they 
worked in tandem to develop team work. Later the Company also went in for ISO 
certification. Extensive training was given in ISO system to document SOPs, all 
processes and procedures. It involved training the employees on standard procedures, 
auditing the system and then retraining them to develop requisite skills. "ISO is not so 
much for quality as it is being used for knowledge management. It ensures that 
systems are followed and processes are documented and that auditing and monitoring 
is continuous" (Ashwini Bajaj, personal Communications, October 21, 2005) 
The plant in Ghaziabad is highly automated and the systems are sealed. ABCL gets 
milk in tankers and the milk is checked against standards at the receiving point. 
Thereafter, the entire process is automated. Therefore training for quality of product 
was not a very major issue in Ghaziabad. 
When ABCL started to supply dairy products to Mc Donalds, HACCP (Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Point) was introduced. To implement HACCP 
management began talking to the employees. "We had to make them understand the 
advantages and the fact that Institutional buyers are big customers and their 
requirements had to be met." In the Ghaziabad plant only 30-35 people were 
involved. The automated parts were not so difficult to handle. But getting people to 
record data was important". Extensive fraining was given. A technologist came down 
from UK and trained them. Since most of the employees were graduates (there were 
only a few casual workers but they were not involved in the process) it was easier to 
communicate and make them see the benefit of the change implemented. 
Training is an ongoing process at ABCL. Training programs were organized atleast 
once in six months. Sometimes these were done by internal senior members. 
"Initially, there was a lot of inhibition in talking to anyone outside the company. The 
' / know it all attitude ' was there. Now, it is different. We are more open. We realize 
that we will learn more by exchanging ideas. 
However, the HR department fiinctions more like a personnel department. They are 
involved with unit heads in recruitment and in fulfilling of training needs. The 
company faces no retention issues. 
134 
Communication Technology: Promising a future 
ABCL also extensively employed technology to enhance communication and process 
flow in the Company. Internet and email were used extensively. LAN within the unit 
was set up (though different units are still not linked through satellite). 
At Rajpura, the products required an extensive distributor aid depot system. The 
products moved from the factory to the depot to the distributor. Therefore, a SAP 
system was implemented. The factory and all the depots (around 35) were SAP 
enabled. ABCL aims to SAP enable all the distributors, spread in North India -
Punjab, Haryana, UP, Rajasthan, Himachal, J&K, MP, Delhi. 
"But SAP implementation took us a long time. We started using it but then there were 
issues. Since the flexibility level was very little it bound one to do things in time. If 
one person did not make a particular entry, several others were affected which on the 
surface was a constraint but in effect it was a good thing as it ensured accountability. 
It took us almost three years to really get grips on it", says Ashwini Bajaj. 
"Implementation of SAP was the second real change that happened in the company, 
the first one being adapting oneself to change itself Adapting to SAP was in effect 
adapting to discipline" he added. 
SAP implementation was an investment of more than a crore rupees. "At that moment 
it was fully operational only in the edible oil unit because the need in this unit was 
higher. In other units the number of customers are not so many and hence the process 
of learning is relatively slow" acknowledged Ashwini Bajaj. 
The process was indeed tedious. Despite their resolve, sometimes even the top 
management wondered whether they did the right thing to adopt it. However, 
acknowledged Ashwini Bajaj, it was definite that once it is operational it is a big boon 
for an organization that has many SAQs (the no. of variable units), for instance, 
ABCL is selling Vanaspati in polypack, in tins, in various sizes, at different pricing 
for different states and then different varieties of these products. Therefore, there is a 
big matrix which is to be managed. On the receiving end different kinds of oils, their 
timing especially because these are perishable items have to be managed. If you stock 
more in a depot from where the stuff is not getting lifted then the dead inventory is 
lost money as these are perishable products. ABCL did have manual systems but SAP 
enabling has made these more efficient and more accountable. However, the matrix is 
not so large for dairy products and hence SAP is not such an urgent need. 
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Firm action: Sending a strong message: "In India there is a general nature to 
take it easy. But the management has to make it clear where the buck stops, that the 
excuses will not lead you anywhere. ABCL believes that it is important to be honest 
and blunt and to take firm action ". 
"For instance, if a person is supposed to deliver and I get to know from my customer 
that he/she has not done the job as desired, I would check. If that person is making ten 
excuses to wriggle out, I will tell him that that is not acceptable. I will also tell him 
that this was your last chance and next time it will not be accepted. We have set such 
examples in the company by taking stem action even to the extent of asking them to 
leave" confirms/ed Ashwini Bajaj. 
Communication Technology issues: ABCL adopted a cautious approach to 
adopting technological changes, for instance, at ABCL one would not notice a 
computer every table. Even the MD's desk didn't have one! This is because ABCL 
installed terminals in common area (EDP department). These computers are time 
shared by people. "Whoever needs to work, goes to the terminal to do the job. If a 
person's job is to feed data only for 15 minutes why does he need a separate terminal? 
for instance, at the entry gate a computer is provided to enter data and no intemet 
facility is provided there. So data flows in but no more facility than that is available 
because the guy doesn't need it. So we are conservative to that extent" (Ashwini 
Bajaj, personal communications, October 21, 2005) 
ABCL is thus updating technology but the enhancement is need based. ''We also 
believe that it is good for people to move around. We encourage that as it builds team 
environment. If computers are provided at each point then people don 't move and less 
interaction results ". 
In the Rajpura unit, each member in marketing department or accounts department 
has a terminal. However, in Ghaziabad marketing team is very small and we have few 
institutional customers so the marketing activity or distribution activity is very 
limited. 
However, for edible oil, the sales executive is booking orders in the retail market, 
getting orders from retail shops - so he is generating data which if sent to the office 
instantly, through handheld device with internet facility, will make the data more 
accurate and timely. The sale s executive is generating a lot of data on paper which 
reaches the office in about a weeks' time. If that can be real time probably ABCL can 
benefit. So ABCL is planning to give the communication facility to each sales 
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executive. Thus, where ever there is a need, ABCL is adopting communication 
technology. 
SMS technology is becoming a money earning system for many marketing oriented 
companies. ABCL is not using it currently. "However, we are thinking of how we can 
use this marketing activity where one does not incur much cost. Involving people in a 
gaming activity is a worthwhile proposition to consider as a business opportunity 
opened by the current developments in communication technology. 
Feedback System: ABCL tried setting up suggestion boxes but it didn't work. 
What they began to receive were ambiguous messages that had more to do with 
individual issues rather than work related issues. So they stopped paying any heed to 
the process. 
Management Review meeting was held once a quarter and was a meet of the unit 
head, department head and if need be anyone else from the unit. We have divided all 
the functional issues of the company into various types 
Social 
Training 
New production 
R & D 
Quality 
Marketing feedback 
Personnel issues 
which are reviewed and then recorded. So all good things, issues, their remedies, 
responsibilities and timing are recorded and followed up in the next meeting. Each 
point is coded so that no point is missed out. 
Focus Groups: ABCL also initiated the process of focus group meetings. It has 
four focus groups to focus on issues related to plant parameters or standards to be 
met, quality issues, distribution issues and social accountability issues. 
These groups meet once in 15 days or more. These are inter-functional groups from 
various levels. 
Management Meetings: NK Bajaj Chairman and CMD and J K Khaitan MD 
(based in Chandigarh; took care of the business in Punjab - the Rajpura plant & the 
paper plant) Ashwini Bajaj managed the food division (dairy business), corporate 
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affairs (taxation and finance) and the real estate business. The three met twice a 
month at top level to ensure coordination and overall direction for the company. 
Each unit had a professional unit head. The MD reviewed each unit with their 
respective unit heads on en ongoing basis. The management talked to the unit heads 
and then to unit heads and departments together and then they in turn to talked to the 
workers. 
The generic message is that honesty is a must and that change is inevitable and you 
better adapt it. 
Analysis 
Post 1991, when the Government of India initiated the process of change 
(liberalization) through policies such as de-licensing, varying import and export 
policies, concessions for promoting new players in the industry etc., ABCL failed to 
recognize the impact of these policies. In fact, it took its management almost ten 
years to realize that the policy changes had brought in a new reality and to survive in 
this new reality it was imperative for organizations to not just change but to adopt a 
culture that supports change on a continuous basis. The management's inertia to 
accept this new paradigm resulted in the downfall of the Company, to the extent that 
it turned sick. Thus, as suggested in Figure 3.1, the environment impacted the 
organization. However, owing to the blindness to impact of enviroiunental changes, 
faulty managerial decisions were made that eventually led to the decline of ABCL. 
Thus, the case of the turnaround of ABCL supports the first stage of the theoretical 
model proposed in this study and given in Figure 3.1. 
When the Company was sick, both external and internal stakeholders were exerting 
disabling forces on the sick organization, for instance, the government policies such 
as supporting new players through tax exemptions were putting ABCL to a 
disadvantage in an already competitive, low margin industry. The Banks doubted the 
financial credibility of a veteran client with good records! The customer (distributors) 
that used to 'queue up' vanished. On the other hand neither the promoters cum 
management nor the employees took an early initiative to give cognizance to the 
changing environment or the losses incurred by the Company, thereby exerting 
disabling forces on the sick Company. However, the case does not suggest that any 
disabling forces were exerted by the Industry Associations or NGOs or media or any 
other stakeholder. Thus, this case strongly supports the second stage of the theoretical 
framework given in Figure 3.2. 
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During the turnaround of ABCL, it was only when the management accepted the fact 
that the changed economic environment was a real time phenomena - there to stay, 
that the process of turnaround got initiated. Thereafter, it got down to the task of 
identifying the problems and the strategy to address the same, for instance, ABCL 
realized that it could not have the government policies changed and it was difficult for 
it to fiinction in the then prevailing competition. It therefore decided to close dovm 
the unit at Ghaziabad. It also decided to shift focus to niche products and identify new 
markets for itself Similarly, it identified objectives for interaction with the banks and 
despite all hindrances and rebuke invested persistent effort to achieve their objectives. 
This required repeated interactions at various levels and hence several 
communications actions (as tabulated in Framework 5.3). Well informed 
communication actions with various stakeholders thus enabled the turnaround 
elements that in turn ensured an organizational turnaround at ABCL. Thus, the 
tumaround of ABCL strongly supports stage 3 of the theoretical model given in 
Figure 3.3. 
Framework 5.3 
The Match between the CS for OTA framework and the communication 
strategy of ABCL during turnaround 
X No —Don'tKnow v Yes A^^'ff-Newly Identify 
Theoretical Pattern Case Pattern 
Stakeholder/ Turnaround Element (objective)/ 
Possible Communication Action 
1. Board of Directors 
1.1. Gain support and time in the future X 
1.1.1. Present detailed turn-around plan X 
2, Staff and Workers ^ 
2.1. Credibility building actions by the new management </ 
2.1.1. Document, and communicate a strategic tumaround plan X 
2.1.2. Publicize success in resolving a current crisis or problem X 
2.1.3. Make decisions transparent ^ 
2.1.4. Exercise Communication Control v 
2.2. Initial Control ^ 
2.2.1. Order preparation of daily, weekly and monthly cash 
forecasts — 
2.2.2. Exercise Communication Control. ^ 
2.2.3. Seek views on the general well being of the employees. X 
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2.3. Mobilization of organization for turnaround ^ 
2.3.1. Include key managers for development of industry wisdom — 
2.3.2. Include only key managers for development of vision X 
2.3.3. CEO should deliver the vision presentation in person and as 
often as possible. X 
2.3.4. Hold special sessions for non-participating managers after 
vision has been developed to share planned vision X 
2.3.5. Inject urgency in the communications plan. Explain what 
needs to be done and why >^  
2.3.6. Listen to the views of all managers. Gauge their reaction X 
2.3.7. Understand perceptions and focus minds of managing team. 
Set the scene for turnaround. v' 
2.3.8. Ensure all employees know what is going on, for what reason 
and how it will occur. ^ 
2.3.9. Share the pulpit (Empowerment) X 
2.3.10. Deal with concerns of employees in open and honest manner. 
Offer Follow up sessions ^ 
2.3.11. Note any comments or queries and provide answers asap. X 
2.3.12. CEO must get out of the office to interact with the employees 
and to listen to them X 
2.3.13. Employ open ended communication style that encourages 
employees to find answers, take decisions. X 
2.3.14. Repeatedly affirm the Company's mission, core values, and 
the primary goals of profit and growth. «/ 
2.3.15. Articulate a few highly concrete targets for the company for 
the next few months — 
2.3.16. Involve the staff to identify solvable problem areas and have 
their views on uninvolved areas. X 
2.3.17. Rephrase people's roles to clarify managerial 
responsibilities. X 
2.3.18. Top managers must emphasize on integrity, fairness, hard 
work, resourcefulness and concern for the staff during 
interactions with the staff ^ 
2.3.19. Publicize and celebrate every employee and team success. X 
2.3.20. Exercise Control on Communication Technology NEW 
2.4. Internal Co-ordination ^ 
2.4.1. Offer constant feedback to keep organization on track ^ 
2.4.2. Set up co-ordination committees for co-ordinating 
interdependent departments •y 
2.43. Institute a monthly performance review meeting of all senior 
managers chaired by the chief executive. v 
2.4.4. Insist that lower level disputes be settled at that level on a 
face to face basis ^ 
2.4.5. Keep the atmosphere light. — 
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2.4.6. Keep enhancing conimunication technology - email, mobile, 
ERP ^ 
3. Unions ^ 
3.1. Negotiation of support of Unions and neutralization of 
Unions' pressures X 
3.1.1. Brief unions on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative turnaround plan. X 
3.1.2. Get them to suggest turnaround steps X 
3.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the unions X 
3.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
3.1.5. Keep unions posted on the progress of the tumaround X 
3.2. Managing retrenchment of a dying unit NEW 
3.2.1. Address all the workers directly and together to avoid 
misunderstandings and rumours NEW 
3.2.2. Quantity of information shared at a time should be 
controlled and based on capacity of recipients to absorb it NEW 
3.2.3. Make it clear to the workers that the management would 
ensure a fa ir deal for them NEW 
3.2.4. Let a manager who has dealt with workers and enjoys their 
goodwill handle the negotiations NEW 
4. Banks and Financial Institutions ^ 
4.1. Negotiation of support of Banks and/or FIs and neutralization of 
Banks and/or FIs pressures </ 
4.1.1. Brief Banks and/or FIs on the problems and strengths of the 
unit and some tentative tumaround plan ^ 
4.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps — 
4.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from Banks and/or FIs ^ 
4.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
4.1.5. Keep Banks and/or FIs posted on the progress of the 
tumaround >/ 
5. Government </ 
5.1. Negotiation of support of Government and neutralization of 
Government pressures -/ 
5.1.1. Brief relevant government departments on the problems and 
sttengths of the unit and some tentative tumaround plan. »/ 
5.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps >/ 
5.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the government ^ 
5.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround sfrategy </ 
5.1.5. Keep the government posted on the progress of the 
tumaround </ 
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5.2. Managing retrenchment of dying unit NEW 
5.2.1. Proactively, keep all relevant government officials and 
departments, posted on the fair deal being offered to 
workers to be retrenched NEW 
Suppliers X 
6.1. Negotiation of support of suppliers and neutralization of 
Supplier's pressures X 
6.1.1. Brief suppliers on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative turnaround plan. X 
6.1.2. Get suppliers to suggest tumaround steps X 
6.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from suppliers X 
6.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
6.1.5. Keep suppliers posted on the progress of the tumaround X 
7. Customers v 
7.1. Negotiation of support of customers and neutralization of 
Customer's pressures X 
7.1.1. Brief customers on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative tumaround plan. X 
7.1.2. Get customers to suggest tumaround steps X 
7.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from customers X 
7.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
7.1.5. Keep customers posted on the progress of the timiaround X 
7.2. Sourcing industry information for quick cost reduction ^ 
7.2.1. Increase costs incurred on communication technologies, if 
need be, for sourcing industry (market) information ^ 
7.3. Revenue Generation </ 
7.3.1. Have much more focused advertising and promotion >/ 
7.3.2. Build Brand Image NEW 
Validating the propositions 
Proposition P,^: Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the communication objectives given in the framework 
though not necessarily all. 
Framework 5.3 reveals that ABCL management addressed 8 (2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 4.1, 
5.1, 7.2, 7.3) of the 12 communication objectives but did not address 4 
communication objectives (1.1, 3.1, 6.1, 7.1) hsted in the theoretical framework 
proposed. 
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Thus, the turnaround of ABCL supports Proposition Pi A as it confirms that ABCL 
management addressed some (most) of the communication objectives given in the 
framework though not all. 
Proposition P,B: The list of communication objectives given in the proposed 
theoretical framework is comprehensive. 
Framework 5.3 reveals that ABCL management addressed 8 (2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 4.1, 
5.1, 7.2, 7.3) of the 12 communication objectives but did not address 4 
communication objectives (1.1, 3.1, 6.1, 7.1) listed in the theoretical framework 
proposed. 
It also indicates that there were 2 new communication objectives (3.2, 5.2) addressed 
by ABCL management during the turnaround and therefore the list of communication 
objectives proposed suggestive but not comprehensive. Therefore, the tumaround of 
ABCL does not support Proposition P,B. 
Proposition P2A- Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the critical stakeholders given in the framework. 
Framework 5.3 reveals that ABCL management considered 5 of the 7 stakeholders 
listed in the proposed theoretical framework as critical. 
It thus supports Proposition P2A-
Proposition IIB' The list of critical stakeholders to be addressed during a 
turnaround is comprehensive. 
Framework 5.3 reveals that ABCL management considered 5 of the 7 stakeholders 
listed in the proposed theoretical framework as critical. The 2 stakeholders not 
earmarked as critical in the table were Board of Directors and suppliers. This was 
because the group of promoters and the Board of Directors were largely overlapping. 
The promoters therefore played the central role of the top management in enabling 
the tumaround. As regards the suppliers, the ABCL management categorically 
mentioned that there were no issues faced with the suppliers (JC Rana, ABCL, email 
communications, 11 April 2006). Also, ABCL management addressed no stakeholder 
other than those listed in the proposed theoretical framework. 
Thus, it is noted that the list of critical stakeholders given in the proposed framework 
was found to be comprehensive. The tumaround of ABCL thus support Proposition 
P2B-
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Proposition PJA: At least one of the communication actions listed in the proposed 
theoretical framework, is employed to realize a corresponding communication 
objective during turnaround. 
Framework 5.3 reveals that, of the 8 communication objectives given in the 
theoretical framework and addressed by ABCL management to deal with the 5 critical 
stakeholders, the company employed at least one communication action to achieve 
the corresponding communication objective. 
Thus, for the turnaround of ABCL at least one of the communication actions listed 
was adopted to address corresponding communication objective. Thus it supports 
Proposition Pj^. 
Proposition PJB'- The list of communication actions recommended for achieving 
the communication objectives is not comprehensive 
Framework 5.3 reveals that the ABCL management adopted 28 communication 
actions, did adopt 27 communication actions and did not provide information on 5 
communication actions listed in the proposed theoretical framework. It also indicates 
that 7 new communication actions (2.3.20 - Exercise Control on Communication 
Technology, 7.3.2 - Build Brand Image; 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.2.4, 5.2.1) were 
adopted by the ABCL management during the turnaround of ABCL. 
Thus, turnaround of ABCL does not supports Proposition PJB as it indicates that the 
list of recommended communication actions given in the proposed theoretical 
framework is not comprehensive. 
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Case 4 
VEGETABLE PRODUCTS LTD. 
Deciphering Communication during Turnaround 
Baci^ground 
Vegetables Products Ltd was established in 1946. It set up a facility for the 
production of hydrogenated oil, popularly called vanaspati in the local Indian 
language, at Kolkata, the capital of West Bengal state in India. It was promoted by the 
Tantia group till 1995. However, by 1994 the company had begun incurring losses, 
was declared a sick company and referred to the BIFR^^. In 1995-96, the current 
management bought it from the Tantia group and took upon itself the task of reviving 
the ailing Company. 
The financial data of the Company reveals that the networth of the company declined 
from INR -4.2mn in 2001 to INR -5.58 mn in 2002. It then turned around in year 
2002 when its networth became INR 2 mn. By 2004 its networth was declared to be 
33.9 mn (See Chart 5.4.1) 
Table 5.4.1: Performance of VPL during 2000-2005; turnaround in 2003 
Vegetable Products Ltd, 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Gross sales (in mn) 324 254 208 935 303 260 
Net worth (in mn) -12 -4.2 -5.8 1.8 18.5 33.9 
38 Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction 
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Chart 5.4.1: Performance of VPL during 2000-2005; turnaround in 2003 
Vegetable Products Ltd. 
1000 
-200 
Year 
'Gross sales (mn) HK-Net worth (mn) 
Unraveling the Turnaround 
When the new management took charge of the company it was faced with many 
challenges - extemal and internal. 
External Issues 
The changing government policies: In 1991 the Indian government took the 
historical decision of liberalizing the Indian economy and what followed were a series 
of policy changes to transform a closed economy into an open economy. The edible 
oil industry also wimessed its share of changed polices. The government abolished 
the licensing policy that controlled the entry of companies into the industry. "To 
further support the capacity building process, it announced a 9% tax exemption to 
new units for a span of 10 years. 9% was a major rebate in the edible oil sector as the 
commodity product offered just 2% margin to the producer^'. (DS Jain, personal 
communications, December 14, 2005). 
The crude oil, raw material for vanaspati industry, available from the domestic 
sources was in short supply as compared to the demand. Indian companies therefore 
had to import the raw material. The custom duty on various crude edible oil 
except Soyabean Oil was raised. (See Annexure 3) "However, in Sri Lanka and Nepal 
import of oil was dutyfree. These companies were exporting Vanaspati to India and 
naturally we could not compete with them. We have now represented our case to the 
PM also'' (DS Jain, personal communications, December 14, 2005). Thus, it became 
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very difficult for the old players of the industry to compete with the new units. 
Several companies such as Shwaija, United Vegetables, Kusum Company and HLL 
closed down during that period. VPL was also declared sick. 
The West Bengal Government, towever, through the BIFR, offered assistance in 
several ways, to the sick Companies attempting to revive. VPL which was also 
referred to BIFR thus looked forward to avail the assistance so as to make faster 
recovery. 
Banker's Issues: Getting concessions: In 1994, when VPL was referred to 
BIFR, it owed INR 35 mn to the Banks. Their major objective of interaction with the 
Banks was to get a waive off on dues, as much as possible. 
Customer Issues: finding a space: The customers in case of VPL were shop 
keepers. While quality was extremely important for some institutional customers like 
biscuit manufacturers, for shopkeepers who were the major chunk of customers, cost 
effectiveness and timely supply were extremely important elements in customer 
retention. 
Since, the Vanaspati manufacturers of India were unable to compete in cost 
competitiveness with suppliers from Nepal and Sri Lanka, relationship building with 
the shop keepers was therefore very important for survival. 
Suppliers: the import duty levy - a heavy duty: There were four types of 
suppliers that the Company had - suppliers of crude edible oil, packing material, 
machines and machine parts. Oil constituted 80% and packing materials another 10% 
of the cost of regular supplies. However, it was most difficult to procure the oil. On 
one hand it was expensive and on the other hand it was not given on credit unless 
there was a personal guarantee or a third party guarantee. This was because the 
margins were very low. There was, therefore, a need for promoters/ management to 
build relationship with the suppliers as well. 
Other Stakeholders: The two major industry associations are Vanaspati 
Manufacturing Association of India (VMA) and Indian Vanaspati Producers 
Association, Delhi (IVPA). Their task was to negotiate with the Government on 
behalf of the industry. Local VMA represents the eastern zone. While VPL directors 
were members of both the Associations, the Association's role was not important for 
reviving the Company. Also the management felt no need for communication with 
the media or public at large. 
147 
Internal Issues 
Shareholders: Since VPL was a sick Company, the promoters brought in equity 
and acquired 90% shares of the Company. Thus, the main promoters were themselves 
managing the new company. The objective of communication with other shareholders 
was to maintain transparency to let them see how the Company was reviving. 
Employee Issues: The new management at VPL felt that the company was 
overstaffed and, therefore, it decided to cut down the manpower. This had to be 
handled carefixlly, considering that they were fiinctioning in West Bengaf^. 
Besides retrenchment, there were also times when the Company was unable to give 
the employees the same incentives as given in good times or was offering a smaller 
pay package or was unable to offer increments for a few years. Under such 
circumstances it was important to motivate the workers to keep working for the 
Company. 
Since those were times of fmancial crisis for the company, wastage had to be 
curtailed. There was need to ensure minimum cost and highest efficiency. They also 
wanted to emphasize the need for quality products. 
External Communications at VPL 
VPL management decided not to appoint any advisor for government interactions. 
They preferred to maintain a direct contact as it enabled faster and flexible decision 
making and it was felt that every delay was a loss that an already sick Company 
could not afford. 
"The Government has to be sure that the Company is actually attempting to revive 
itself, for instance, if the Company has 100 employees on rolls and keeps paying 
salaries for over an year, there is a positive indication that a sincere effort is being 
made. Once that is clear to them, they are eager to help" (DS Jain, personal 
communications December 14, 2005). 
VPL management ranks its relationship as successful as it was able to get several 
concessions such as electricity subsidy, sales tax exemption and assistance even in 
labour settlement. 
' Since the independence of India in 1947, West Bengal had always elected a communist 
government that supported the unions in accordance with the communist philosophy 
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DSJain and Goenka personally interacted with the Bankers and their Board (United 
Bank of India). Project Reports had to be submitted while there were ongoing 
discussions through personal meetings practically every day. 
''The Bank waived off the penal interest from the total amount of INK 35 mn and a 
settlement of returning INR 18.5 mn over a period of 18 months was finalized' 
(Goenka, Director VPL, personal communications, December 14, 2005). "We have 
never taken a loan thereafter and believe that if the fund supply is short, the 
management is always more careful as it cannot afford to make wrong investment^'' 
(DS Jain,. Personal communications, December 14, 2005). 
Customers: The customers of vanaspati ranged from shopkeepers to bakeries and 
institutional customers such as HLL, Britania etc. DS Jain revealed that while shop 
keepers and institutional buyers were obvious customers targeted by any vanaspati 
manufacturers, small biscuit manufacturers (bakeries) were an ignored or less obvious 
customer. VPL realized that these small bakeries put together were a huge untapped 
market and it therefore focused the promotion of its products towards this market 
segment. It also kept the costs competitive and supplies timely. 
In times of crises its management maintained that the shop keeper/ small bakery had 
less capacity to absorb losses and therefore they were considerate in dealing with 
them. Thus, they were ready to bear losses and protect the shop keepers' interests to 
develop long term relationships. 
DS Jain a veteran from the industry enjoyed a reputation of being a knowledgeable 
practitioner and he took the task of relationship building upon himself "Many times 
when the customer is puzzled by business intricacies, a fair and intelligent advice, 
helps them come through difficult times and at times even helps them earn better 
money. This requires investing time to develop a trust between the supplier and the 
customer, who then perceive each other as true friends. The message was that we are 
with them in good times and bad times and we sought their interest alway^' (DS Jain, 
personal communications, December 14, 2005). 
Supplier Relations: The philosophy that VPL management maintained was that, 
'keeping one's word was extremely important in trade'. "This enables one to earn 
word guarantee for no one wishes to take the matters to the court. It is also very 
important to be transparent. In case there is a problem it is best to let the supplier 
know it rather than camoufiage the real situation. This is mutual. So, when others 
come to us in their difficult times we do render assistance" (DS Jain, personal 
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communications, December 14, 2005). The message was of genuineness and in case 
of VPL the reputation of the promoters helped. 
Internal Communications at VPL 
Shareholder: VPL was progressing slowly. Quarterly results were published and 
circulated. The AGM was held most of the times at the factory so that the 
shareholders could see for themselves the progress happening. "While the number of 
shareholders were small (7 /8), the questions raised were valid and informed. Some 
times the suggestions were valuable and taken note of" (DS Jain, personal 
communications, December 14, 2005). 
Retrenchment, motivation and reduction of wastages: VPL had to reduce 
the manpower employed in the Company. A strategic decision to close soap 
manufacturing was taken. This brought down the strength by 40 heads. ''Some more 
workers retired. Some were asked to leave and the strength was brought down from 
286 to 110 workers" (DS Jain, personal communications, December 14, 2005). The 
closing of the soap manufacturing unit sent a message that little salary was better than 
no salary at all. 
All members of the management were involved in the process. There were talks with 
the union leader and also with Shanti Ghatak, the MLA and Labour Minister from 
their constituency. Since DS Jain was an advocate with extensive experience of 
vanaspati industry, he was personally involved in explaining the situation to the Govt, 
union leader and the workers. 
Since the workers had already suffered due to closure of the soap manufacturing unit, 
it was easier to tell them that the management was solving their problems by making 
the Company run under such circumstances. 
Members of the erstwhile management of VPL began to pull out money from the 
Company. However, when the new management took over, the process of investment 
began. By that time the Company had to pay heavy debt to the Bank and the workers. 
The new management began investing money in the Company to the extent that 
whatever money the company earned thereafter was sown in the company itself and 
the Directors took no remuneration for a long time. Also, since the Company was sick 
the workers needed sympathy. This required a lot of talking. The action and the 
talking put together, motivated the workers to participate in the turnaround process. 
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Ensuring Quality: VPL believed in quality and honesty and thus they ensured that 
proper quantity & quality was supplied. They were selected by HLL to supply to 
them the vanaspati oil which HLL sold under the Dalda"" brand name. 
Reduce Wastage and inefficiency: For a sick Company, communication is all 
the more important because the Company cannot withstand any losses due to a 
communication gap. So fast decisions enabled by continuous and extensive 
communication were essential. VPL management was a close knit team that had 
regular meetings but no formal communication strategy as such. Besides, it believed 
in direct communication for better management of labour and employed least via 
medias. 
Communication Tecfinologies: Phone calls and emails had replaced the letters. 
The Company set up a LAN to facilitate smooth working between the factory and the 
office. Mobile phones were provided to employees on a need basis. To curtail the 
costs, prepaid cards were provided. SMS was not very extensively employed. 
It was important to note that even if emails had extensively replaced the letters, in 
Government communication, it was important to supplement emails with letters 
supported by signed receipts from officers in charge. "This is so because the officers 
in charge Iceep moving between the posts and hence it is important to maintain your 
own correspondence records" (DS Jain, personal communications, December 14, 
2005). 
Analysis 
VPL declined to sickness owing to changes in the environment (government policies). 
It is not clear whether the erstwhile management like the management of Amrit 
Banaspati did not respond to the changes in the environment or whether it did attempt 
to change but failed. In either case the company turned sick as a result of the 
environmental changes. Thus, the case of the turnaround of VPL supports the first 
stage of the theoretical model given in Figure 3.1. 
The external stakeholders, namely, government, suppliers and customers were all 
exerting disabling forces on the sick organizations. The unfriendly policies for old 
vanaspati producers, the shortage of raw material and the customer with a variety of 
options were all contributing to the creation of a tough environment. An over staffed 
organization, indulging in wastages and low on motivation was again exerting 
Dalda was a well entrenched brand, a household mane to the extent that was used as a 
synonym for vanaspati 
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disabling forces on the sick company. Thus, the case supports the second stage of the 
model as given in Figure 3.2. 
The case supports the third stage of the proposed theoretical model as the tumaround 
was initiated only when the new management assumed the central role of enabling a 
tumaround. It then identified the essential tumaround elements such as restoration of 
financial stability, retrenchment, reduction of wastages etc and achieved these 
through informed communication actions such as interactions direct personal, 
rendering free advice, presenting factual reports etc. Thus, the case supports the third 
stage of the theoretical model suggested. The communication actions undertaken by 
the VPL management in enabling the essential elements of tumaround are tabulated 
in the table given below: 
Framework 5.4 
The Match between the CS for OTA framework and the communication 
strategy of VPL during turnaround 
X No —Don'tKnow </ Yes A^£fF-Newly Identify 
Theoretical Pattern Case Pattern 
Stakeholder/ Turnaround Element (objective)/ 
Possible Communication Action 
1. Board of Directors X 
1.1. Gain support and time in tite future X 
1.1.1. Present detailed turn-around plan X 
2. Staff and Workers •/ 
2.1. Credibility building actions by tlte new management ^ 
2.1.1. Document, and communicate a strategic tumaround plan X 
2.1.2. Publicize success in resolving a current crisis or problem X 
2.1.3. Make decisions transparent v 
2.1.4. Exercise Communication Control >/ 
2.2. Initial Control «/ 
2.2.1. Order preparation of daily, weekly and monthly cash 
forecasts — 
2.2.2. Exercise Communication Control. — 
2.2.3. Seek views on the general well being of the employees 
(informally-new) /^ 
2.3. Mobilization of organization for turnaround «/ 
2.3.1. Include key managers for development of industry wisdom — 
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2.3.2. Include only key managers for development of vision X 
2.3.3. CEO should deliver the vision presentation in person and as 
often as possible. X 
2.3.4. Hold special sessions for non-participating managers after 
vision has been developed to share plaimed vision X 
2.3.5. Inject urgency in the communications plan. Explain what 
needs to be done and why >/ 
2.3.6. Listen to the views of all managers. Gauge their reaction X 
2.3.7. Understand perceptions and focus minds of managing team. 
Set the scene for turnaround. X 
2.3.8. Ensure all employees know what is going on, for what reason 
and how it will occur. X 
2.3.9. Share the pulpit (Empowerment) X 
2.3.10. Deal with concerns of employees in open and honest manner. 
Offer Follow up sessions •^  
2.3.11. Note any comments or queries and provide answers asap. v 
2.3.12. CEO must get out of the office to interact with the employees 
and to listen to them X 
2.3.13. Employ open ended communication style that encourages 
employees to find answers, take decisions. X 
2.3.14. Repeatedly affirm the Company's mission, core values, and 
the primary goals of profit and growth. X 
2.3.15. Articulate a few highly concrete targets for the company for 
the next few months — 
2.3.16. Involve the staff to identify solvable problem areas and have 
their views on uninvolved areas. X 
2.3.17. Rephrase people's roles to clarify managerial 
responsibilities. X 
2.3.18. Top managers must emphasize on integrity, faimess, hard 
work, resourcefialness and concern for the staff during 
interactions with the staff. ^ 
2.3.19. Publicize and celebrate every employee and team success. X 
2.4. Internal Co-ordination ^ 
2.4.1. Offer constant feedback to keep organization on track ^ 
2.4.2. Set up co-ordination committees for co-ordinating 
interdependent departments X 
2.4.3. Institute a monthly performance review meeting of all senior 
managers chaired by the chief executive. — 
2.4.4. Insist that lower level disputes be settled at that level on a 
face to face basis — 
2.4.5. Keep the atmosphere light. — 
2.4.6. Keep enhancing communication technology - email, mobile, 
ERP ^ 
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3. Unions >^  
3.1. Negotiation rfsupport of Unions and neutralization of Unions' 
pressures ^ 
3.1.1. Brief unions on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative turnaround plan. >^  
3.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps ^ 
3.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the unions </ 
3.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
3.1.5. Keep unions posted on the progress of the tumaround X 
4. Banks and Financial Institutions </ 
4.1. Negotiation of support of Banks and/or FIs and neutralization of 
Banks and/or FIs pressures '^ 
4.1.1. Brief Banks and/or FIs on the problems and strengths of the 
unit and some tentative tumaround plan ^ 
4.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps — 
4.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from Banks and/or FIs ^ 
4.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround sfrategy — 
4.1.5. Keep Banks and/or FIs posted on the progress of the 
tumaround v 
4.1.6. Requires personal interaction of promoter/ top management 
with Bank senior officials NEW 
5. Government ^ 
5.1. Negotiation of support of Government and neutralization of 
Government pressures ^ 
5.1.1. Brief relevant government departments on the problems and 
strengths of the unit and some tentative tumaround plan. ^ 
5.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps — 
5.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the government v 
5.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy — 
5.1.5. Keep the government posted on the progress of the 
tumaround ^ 
5.1.6. Maintain direct contact; avoid via medias or advisors NEW 
6. Suppliers ^ 
6.1. Negotiation of support of suppliers and neutralization of 
Supplier's pressures v 
6.1.1. Brief suppliers on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative tumaround plan. — 
6.1.2. Get suppliers to suggest tumaround steps X 
6.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from suppliers •^  
6.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
6.1.5. Keep suppliers posted on the progress of the tumaround X 
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6.2. Build Credibility 
6.2.1. Always keep your word New 
Customers '^ 
7.1. Negotiation of support of customers and neutralization of 
Customer's pressures ^ 
7.1.1. Brief customers on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative turnaround plan. X 
7.1.2. Get customers to suggest turnaround steps X 
7.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from customers X 
7.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy X 
7.1.5. Keep customers posted on the progress of the turnaround ^ 
7.1.6. Offer support, concessions etc. to the customer NEW 
1.1.7. Offer advice or assistance in their times of crisis Assume 
the role of a consultant NEW 
7.2. Sourcing industry information for quick cost reduction X 
7.2.1. Increase costs incurred on communication technologies, if 
need be, for sourcing industry (market) information X 
7.3. Revenue Generation ^ 
7.3.1. Unfocused advertising and promotion be more sharply 
focused •^ 
132. Build Brand Image NEW 
Validating the propositions 
Proposition PIA'. Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the communication objectives given in the framework 
though not necessarily all. 
Framework 5.4 indicates that VPL management addressed 9 (2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.1, 
4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7.1); and did not address 3 (1.1, 7.2, 7.3) of the 12 communication 
objectives listed in the theoretical framework proposed. 
Thus, the turnaround of VPL indicates that VPL addressed scxne of the list of 
objectives given in the proposed framework but not all. It thus supports Proposition 
P,A. 
Proposition PJB'. The list of communication objectives given in the proposed 
theoretical framework is comprehensive. 
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Framework 5.4 indicates that VPL management addressed 9 (2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.1, 
4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7.1); and did not address 3 (1.1, 7.2, 7.3) of the 12 communication 
objectives listed in the theoretical framework proposed. 
Thus, for the turnaround of VPL, the list of communication objectives listed in the 
framework is not just suggestive, it is rather comprehensive. It thus supports 
Proposition P,B. 
Proposition P2A- Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the critical stakeholders given in the framework. 
Framework 5.4 indicates that the VPL management addressed 6 (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) of 
the 7 critical stakeholders during the turnaround of VPL. The only stakeholder not 
earmarked as being addressed is the Board of Directors. This is because the promoter, 
Board of Directors and top management happened to be the same. 
It thus supports Proposition P2A-
Proposition PZB'. The list of critical stakeholders to be addressed during a 
turnaround is comprehensive. 
Framework 5.4 indicates that the VPL management addressed 6 (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) of 
the 7 critical stakeholders during the tumaroimd of VPL. The only stakeholder not 
earmarked as being addressed is the Board of Directors. This is because the promoter. 
Board of Directors and top management happened to be the same. 
Thus, for turnaround of VPL the list of critical stakeholders was comprehensive. It 
thus supports the Proposition P2B 
Proposition Ps^: At least one of the communication actions listed in the proposed 
theoretical framework, is employed to realize a corresponding communication 
objective during turnaround. 
Framework 5.4 indicates that for each of the 9 communication objectives addressed 
by VPL management atleast one communication action was employed by the VPL 
management during turnaround. However, it also indicates 6 new communication 
actions (4.1.6, 5.1.6, 6.1.6, 7.1.6, 7.1.7, 7.3.2) adopted by VPL management for the 
addressing these 9 commimication objectives during turnaround. The other 3 
communication objectives (1.1, 7.2, 7.3) listed in the proposed theoretical framework 
have not been addressed by VPL management and hence communication actions 
suggested thereof have not been employed. 
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Thus, the turnaround of VPL indicates that it employed atleast one communication 
action listed in the proposed theoretical framework to realize a corresponding 
communication objective. It thus supports Proposition PSA-
Proposition PJB'. The list of communication actions recommended for achieving 
the communication objectives is comprehensive 
Framework 5.4 indicates that VPL management adopted 21 communication actions; 
did not adopt 20 communication actions; and did not provide information on 19 
communication actions of the total of 60 communication actions listed in the 
theoretical framework proposed. It also indicates that VPL management employed 6 
new communication actions (4.1.6, 5.1.6, 6.1.6, 7.1.6, 7.1.7, 7.3.2). These actions 
were not listed in the theoretical framework proposed. 
The turnaround of VPL thus suggests that the list of communication actions given in 
the theoretical framework proposed is not comprehensive. It thus does not support 
Proposition Pjg. 
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Cases 
HowRAH MILLS CO. LTD. 
Deciphering Communication during turnaround 
Background 
The jute industry is one of the oldest traditional industries in India. It consists of 73 
composite jute mills, 59 of them are located in West Bengal This is an installed 
capacity of around 19.5 lakh metric tonnes per annum, a large part of which remains 
unutilized due to a mismatch between demand and supply. 
This hdustry is beset with many problems, including competition from the synthetic 
sector, high labour cost and obsolescence of machinery and uneconomic working. 
These factors have led to large-scale sickness in the industry 
One of the older Companies of jute h Kolkata is Howrah Mills Co. Ltd. (HMCL). It 
was established by the Jardine Henderson Group in 1825 at Kolkata, the capital of 
West Bengal state of India. It manufactures jute goods like Hessian cloth, Hessian 
bag, sacking, jute yam and now food grade products. HMCL, like many other jute 
mills in the industry, became a sick unit in the year 1987. OP Mall a supplier to the 
company decided to takeover the Company. "Perhaps I had no choice but to take it 
over because they had to pay my dues worth INR 10 mn. If I would not have 
recovered that money, I would have been doomed. Since, I had revived several sick 
companies in the past, I was confident that I would be able to revive this Company as 
well." (OP Mall, personal communications, December 15, 2005). 
The rew management took charge of turning around the Company. In 1998, the 
networth of HMCL turned positive and has since been improving consistently (See 
Table 5.5.1, Chart 5.5.1) 
Table 5.5.1: Performance of HMCL during 1995-2005; turnaround in 1997 
Howrah Mills Co. Ltd. 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005 
Gross sales 
(inmn) 
582 817 852 748 766 1345 928 1048 1386 1083 
Net worth 
(inmn) 
-34 -15 -8 4 9 16 21 26 74 135 
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Chart 5.5.1: Performance of HMCL during 1995-2005; turnaround in 1997 
Howrah Mills Co. Ltd. 
-200 
Year 
•Gross sales (mn) -W- Net worth (mn) 
Unraveling the turn around 
The sick unit of HMCL was faced with a host of issues 
Internal Issues 
Labour Relations: The labour relations at HMCL had deteriorated. The 
productivity was low and there was lack of trust in the management. The irregularity 
in labour payments pertaining to worker's ESI (Employee Security Insurance), PF 
and gratuity amounted to INR 150 mn. Naturally, the workforce was de-motivated. 
Excerpt from Minutes of the meeting held on 5.10.97 at 11.30 am 
Jb Abbas Ali, in his address said that:-
1) Management should make arrangement for enhanced canteen facilities 
while introducing straight shift duty in the mills. 
Excerpt from Minutes of the meeting held on 3.08.97 at 11.00 am 
1) Jn Abbas: When the trend for output is good, suddenly there is a 
change in the quality of fabric which affects production. He said, if the 
quality of jute is good, it does not necessarily mean that the sliver/ yam 
will also be good 
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External Issues 
Bankers: The bank had lost confidence in the previous promoters. A balance of INR 
50 mn was due to the SBI and some suppliers. 
Customers: "Our predecessor, the Jardine Henderson Company was a well 
established name in the industry. They owned four to five mills and maintained a very 
high quality. When the new management took over, the market was watching 
carefully to see whether the new management will be able to maintain the quality or 
not. It was, therefore, critical for the new management to produce quality products 
and ensure timely delivery to retain the reputation earned by the company in the 
past." (OP Mall, personal communications, December 15, 2005) 
Government: In the Indian jute industry a mill has very little direct interaction with 
the customer. The produce is bought by the Government or by the Brokers except in 
case of sugar bags. The Government buys through the Jute Commissioners office. 
This office allots quota according to the capacity of the mill. (Jute Packaging 
Materials Act, 1987). 40% of the HMCL's purchases were done by the Govemment. 
Thus, it was important to keep the govemment informed especially on regulatory 
concerns. 
Since HMCL was a sick unit referred to BIFR, it was important to ensure appropriate 
communication and coordination with it to get the benefits that HMCL could get. 
Suppliers: The company had irregularities in supplier payments that had to be 
sorted out. It was also important for it to get good quality supplies in time and to get 
adequate credit when need be. "There was thus a need to build a confidence that the 
new management will be fair in its dealings and all payments will be made in time." 
(OP Mall, personal communications, December 15, 2005) 
Industry Associations: HMCL management maintained that since Industry 
Associations presented the industry's views to the Govemment Departments, 
participation in its activities enables one to share one's problems and understand the 
Government's view point. 
"These Associations are also a source of usefiil information such as monthly 
production achieved by other Companies, Govemment regulations and any other 
industrial information. Besides, they can help upgrade technology and adopt best 
practices from the industry." (OP Mall, personal communications, December 15, 
2005) 
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Internal Strategy 
Exhibit 
JK Jute Udyog Kanpur was using one w)rker for 4 looms of size 32" (Reed 
Space). However, at Howrah Mills, one worked on two looms of 371/2". The MD 
then visited Kanpur and came back with the experience that he shared with the 
union. A group of representatives of unions alongwith management 
representatives visited Kanpur to actually see the process up and running. 
Thereafter, it was easier to share experiences, train and make one worker agree to 
run 4 looms. Whatever machine upgradation was required was affected 
immediately. The production doubled as a result and cost of production came 
down drastically. 
Employees 
Exercise Communication Control: Win the Trust: "I have revived 5 sick 
Companies and I can say with my experience that trust in employees is at the core of 
managing a Company. You have to win their trust and they must know that you are 
not cheating them. This is important because whenever you run into losses, the first 
pay off is from workers' dues. A Company pays direct wages & indirect wages keep 
getting accumulated. The bankers and other stakeholders are affected much later. As a 
result, a management tends to over commit to the workers to gain their confidence". 
(OP Mall, personal communications, December 15, 2005) Mall strongly warned a 
turnaround management about making commitments that cannot be kept and insisted 
that it was more important to be able to live by the commitments made to gain the 
trust. 
Introduce transparency in decisions: Earn credibility: HMCL management 
considered communication with workers to be an extremely important element in the 
process of turnaround. It believed that a Company must let the workers know the true 
picture of where the management and product market stands. "If you are not 
transparent then they are not cooperative. They have their own feelings." (OP Mai, 
personal communications, December 15, 2005). Transparency was thus considered at 
the core of the turnaround process and HMCL management claims that labour forces 
become cooperative instead of being adverse, for instance. Employee Welfare 
Manager took care of problems of the workers. He assisted them in understanding 
what ESI or other benefits they were entitled to. He offered assistance in matters such 
as school admissions or other family related issues. He was also responsible for 
161 
ensuring that labour utilities were property maintained, food in the canteen was a 
decent quality etc. 
HMCL constituted a committee of workers, plant management & office management 
to enable smooth communication between each group for transparency and smooth 
planning. This committee set targets for production & payment schedules, to pay off 
old liabilities. They met on a monthly basis to check where they had defaulted and 
took corrective actions. From Sept 1987-88 to 1990-91 the committee met on a 
monthly basis. Thereafter, the frequency was reduced to a quarterly and the Company 
continued to follow that schedule. Minutes of each of these meetings were 
documented. 
The objective was to inform the employees of the actual condition of the Company. 
This meant informing them of the cost of production in comparison with others in the 
industry, also laying bare before them the shortcomings. This was done on a 
quarterly basis. The idea was that instead of the employees telling the management, 
what had not been done, the management took the initiative to own up what had not 
been done. Thereafter, the employees were asked to submit suggestions for remedies. 
The objective was to gain trust, cooperation and involvement. 
The Message: The message that HMCL management wanted to communicate to the 
employees was that the Company was fair in its dealing and it actually removed any 
doubts that might cloud the workers' mind. "This was to avoid misconceptions, which 
only create problems ". 
Another message that the HMCL management wanted to deliver was that all must 
accept the reality of the Company and the industry. Then a fair process be developed 
for improvement. It had to be understood that "the worker is married to the 
organization while the management is not. The management can sell the Company 
assets and walk out any day. However, the worker has to earn his wages from the 
Company. Their bond is unbreakable" (OP Mall, personal communications, 
December 15, 2005) 
The HRD President H Hazra alongwith the Works President S Basu managed the 
4000 employees of HMCL. They regularly interacted with the union leaders of the 
three unions and with the floor (department) leader from each floor. The MD also 
met them twice in a year, once in January and then before Pooja time. 
"Today's' workers are smart, whereas underestimate them. Through their contacts 
and colleagues they do have the initial information. Due to increased communication 
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they are so much more educated" says OP Mall. The Howrah management 
considered this a positive shift and went a step ahead to organize seminars and 
conferences and invite professionals from industry to tell them of the latest 
developments & trends in operations, material handling and labour relations. Senior 
people from Industry and Government department were invited to educate the 
employees on ESI, PF and other benefits that they can get. Sessions on "how the 
production on machines can be improved, " were also held. 
Thus, the workers were educated through seminars and conferences. The frequency 
then was three times in a year and now is once in a year. Then there were regular 
meetings between the management representatives and the union and floor leaders. 
Thus, HMCL began the process of turnaround by strengthening its HRD and making 
all aspects of salary and other dues to labour, known to them. The management lay 
bare before the workforce all the pending accounts and constituted a body to monitor 
reduction of dies on a month to month basis keeping the financial results of the 
Company in mind. "We faced problems for an year or so but ultimately the workers 
accepted that the management was not hiding anything. So the workers started 
cooperating resulting in reduction of cost of production. " (OP Mall, personal 
communications, December 15, 2005) 
"Save one strike industry wide that lasted from 10 days to 1 month, the Company has 
lost only 3 man days" claims OP Mall proudly. 
Communications Technology Interventions: Mobile phones have been 
provided to employees at all levels from a Sardar to the MD. This tool has infact 
become an essential commodity for smooth running of the day-to-day business 
activity. "The impact is so much that we feel that one person can now do the job of 
three persons - thanks to the mobile phone technology "says OP Mall. SMS is not yet 
used to a large extent. 
In 2003, much after the turnaround period as defined for this study, HMCL set up a 
LAN in the Company and this development has improved coordination between the 
Mill and the office. The export and accounts department are connected to internet 
through a broadband connection. The Company has not installed any ERP packages 
in the Company 
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External Strategy 
Bankers: The new management of HMCL regularized the bank account as soon as it 
took it over. Since the Company was with a new management and the management 
had cleared all the dues, had a track record of reviving sick companies and was in the 
process of doing so at Howrah Mills also, it regained the trust of the bank on the 
changed management of the Company. The management thereafter graded the 
Bankers to renegotiate the terms with the Banks to get better rate of interest and more 
funds. "We brought in promoters' equity to settle the bank credits and then began 
negotiation for operating funds" (OP Mall, personal communications, December 15, 
2005) 
Once or twice in an year the MD met the senior management in the Banks. The 
Financial Director handled the tasks day-to-day and interacted with the Chief 
Manager of the Bank. These were personal interactions on a day-to-day basis. Two 
types of reports including Term Loan (Full project report) and WC report were 
submitted. The latter included Working projections and justification for increasing the 
WC required. Mall considers HMCL interactions with the bank are very successfiil. 
"For instance, the loan that we got initially was INR 15 mn which has increased to 
INR 90 mn later." (OP Mall, personal communications, December 15, 2005) 
Government: HMCL kept the Labour Department of the Govt, informed of any 
developments. "Whenever there were any updates of machines and we had to 
regularize the work force we kept Government in the loop ". (OP Mall, personal 
communications, December 15, 2006). Also, for issues pertaining to excise, pollution 
and the likes we kept the Government informed. 
Supplier: Since the supplier morale was very low, HMCL settled some accounts by 
down payment and some through installments on new terms and conditions such as 
reduced credit limit of 3 months as against 12 months. 
Mall's younger brother, managed the purchase department. "Since he was related to 
the MD the suppliers would trust his word more than they would have trusted anyone 
else doing the job " says OP Mall. As mentioned earlier, there was need to build 
credibility and the management believed that payments speak for themselves. 
In the jute industry, the prices of the raw jute fluctuate on a daily basis. The company, 
therefore, regularly followed rates published by the East India Jute & Hessian 
Exchange Ltd. 
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Industry Associations: Initially, the MD OP Mall handled the interaction with 
industry associations. He was an active member of various committees such as the 
Government's production development department etc. However, later the CEO 
Sanjay Mall began dealing with them and is now on committees such as the Export 
Promotion committee. 
International Agencies: Sometimes, the International agencies as mentioned 
earlier gave opportunities for development by installing two to three machines and 
allowing Companies to experiment, develop a process and then either sell to the 
Company or if they so desire sell to anyone else. HMCL got a yam processing 
machine in 1992 under a similar scheme. This, says Mall, was enabled through the 
industry associations. 
Customer: It was important for the new management to maintain the quality and 
timely delivery to retain the reputation earned by the Company in the past. The 
marketing department managed the sales. Sanjay Mall, son of the MD and CEO of the 
Company handled the exports. Tools such as brochures, websites and internet 
communications were used extensively to promote sales. 
Shareholders: Since the share holding with shareholders other than the promoters 
was little, this was not a great concem. However HMCL wanted the shareholders to 
have patience as the new management brought the Company out of red. 
The only communication that happened was during the AGM and through the Annual 
Report. The share holders would come, share their views (suggestions) and gain the 
confidence through the discussion that HMCL would come through soon. 
Analysis 
The case of the turnaround of Howrah Mills Company Ltd. supports the first stage of 
the theoretical iramework proposed in this study. While the new management did not 
elaborate on reasons of sickness of HMCL, a study of the jute industry in that period 
reveals that various external changes such as preference to synthetic fibre posed 
major competition to jute industry. This coupled with other factors such as 
obsolescence of machinery and uneconomical economies of scale rendered 
companies in this industry sick. Mall in one of his personal communications also 
mentioned that the company Jardine Henderson had decided to quit operations in 
India and, therefore, lost interest in the Company. Thus it is obvious that both -
environment and wrong/faulty managerial decisions owing to disinterested 
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management resulted in the downfall of HMCL. Thus, the case supports stage 1 of the 
theoretical model proposed in the study and given in Figure 3.1. 
The case also supports the second stage of the theoretical framework that suggests 
that enabling or disabling forces are exerted by different stakeholders on the sick 
company. In case of HMCL, the internal stakeholders, namely, the workers had not 
received their salary and other dues for a very long time. A demotivated workforce 
that had lost trust on the management exerted disabling force on the sick HMCL unit. 
The banks, financial institutions and also the suppliers had lost trust in HMCL. Thus 
disabling forces were getting exerted on the sick HMCL. 
The case strongly supports the third stage of the communication framework as the 
turnaround was initiated only when the management assumed a central role in the 
process. It took charge and immediately enabled turnaround elements such as 
credibility building, initial control, mobilization of organization, coordination, 
negotiations etc. To enable these elements the Company employed several 
communication strategies and actions such as sharing the vision, bringing 
transparency in decision making, spreading awareness, organizing meetings and 
sessions, exercising communication control, listening to all employees etc. as 
tabulated in the table given below. Thus the case of the turnaround of HMCL strongly 
supports the third stage of the proposed model of communication. 
Framework 5.5 
The Match between the CS for OTA framework and the communication 
strategy ofHI\/ICL during turnaround 
X No —Don't Know ^ Yes A^£H -^Newly Identify 
Theoretical Pattern Case Pattern 
Stakeholder/ Turnaround Element (objective)/ 
Possible Communication Action 
1. Board of Directors/Shareholders X 
1.1. Gain support and time in the future X 
1.1.1. Present detailed turn-around plan — 
2. Staff and Employees • 
2,1. Credibility building actions by the new management >/ 
2.1.1. Document, and communicate a strategic turnaround plan v 
2.1.2. Publicize success in resolving a current crisis or problem — 
2.1.3. Make decisions transparent w 
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2.1.4. Exercise Communication Control (control on promises rolled 
out) ^ 
2.2. Initial Control «/ 
2.2.1. Order preparation of daily, weekly and monthly cash 
forecasts ^ 
2.2.2. Exercise Communication Control. ^ 
2.2.3. Seek views on the general well being of the employees. • 
2.3. Mobilization of organization for turnaround ^ 
2.3.1. Include key managers for development of industry wisdom ^ 
2.3.2. Include only key managers for development of vision — 
2.3.3. CEO should deliver the vision presentation in person and as 
often as possible. X 
2.3.4. Hold special sessions for non-participating managers after 
vision has been developed to share plarmed vision v 
2.3.5. Inject urgency in the communications plan. Explain what 
needs to be done and why v 
2.3.6. Listen to the views of all managers. Gauge their reaction <^ 
2.3.7. Understand perceptions and focus minds of managing team. 
Set the scene for turnaround. v' 
2.3.8. Ensure all employees know what is going on, for what reason 
and how it will occur. ^ 
2.3.9. Share the pulpit (Empowerment) ^ 
2.3.10. Deal with concems of employees in open and honest manner. 
Offer Follow up sessions ^ 
2.3.11. Note any comments or queries and provide answers asap. ^ 
2.3.12. CEO must get out of the office to interact with the employees 
and to listen to them — 
2.3.13. Employ open ended communication style that encourages 
employees to fmd answers, take decisions. ^ 
2.3.14. Repeatedly affirm the Company's mission, core values, and 
the primary goals of profit and growth. */ 
2.3.15. Articulate a few highly concrete targets for the company for 
the next few months •/ 
2.3.16. Involve the staff to identify solvable problem areas and have 
their views on uninvolved areas. sc 
2.3.17. Rephrase people's roles to clarify managerial 
responsibilities. X 
2.3.18. Top managers must emphasize on integrity, fairness, hard 
work, resourcefiilness and concern for the staff during 
interactions with the staff. ^ 
2.3.19. Publicize and celebrate every employee and team success. X 
2.3.20. Emphasize that employees loss or gain is higher. 
Management 
can quit any time NEW 
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2.3.21. Organize seminars for educating workers on their rights and 
developments in industry. This dispels misconceptions. NEW 
2.4. Internal Co-ordination ^ 
2.4.1. Offer constant feedback to keep organization on track </ 
2.4.2. Set up co-ordination committees for co-ordinating 
interdependent departments -^ 
2.4.3. Institute a monthly performance review meeting of all senior 
managers chaired by the chief executive. «/ 
2.4.4. Insist that lower level disputes be settled at that level on a 
face to face basis ^ 
2.4.5. Keep the atmosphere light. — 
2.4.6. Keep enhancing communication technology - email, mobile, 
ERP ^ 
3. Unions s/ 
3.1. Negotiation of support of Unions and neutralization of Unions' 
pressures v 
3.1.1. Brief unions on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative turnaround plan. ^ 
3.1.2. Get them to suggest turnaround steps ^ 
3.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the unions ^ 
3.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy «/ 
3.1.5. Keep unions posted on the progress of the turnaround ^^  
4. Banks and Financial Institutions ^ 
4.1. Negotiation of support of Banks and/or FIs and neutralization of 
Banks and/or FIs pressures ^ 
4.1.1. Brief Banks and/or FIs on the problems and strengths of the 
unit and some tentative tumaround plan X 
4.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps X 
4.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from Banks and/or FIs •/ 
4.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
4.1.5. Keep Banks and/or FIs posted on the progress of the 
tumaround X 
4.1.6. Protracted negotiations with the banks and Financial 
institutions NEW 
5. Government </ 
5.1. Negotiation of support of Government and neutralization of 
Government pressures ^ 
5.1.1. Brief relevant government departments on the problems and 
strengths of the unit and some tentative tumaround plan. «/ 
5.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps — 
5.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the government s/ 
5.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy — 
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5.1.5. Keep the government posted on the progress of the 
tumaroxuid '•^ 
5.1.6. Maintain direct contact; avoid via medias or advisors NEW 
Suppliers ^ 
6.3. Negotiation of support of suppliers and neutralization of 
Supplier's pressures ^ 
6.3.1. Brief suppliers on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative turnaround plan. >/ 
6.3.2. Get suppliers to suggest tumaround steps X 
6.3.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from suppliers >/ 
6.3.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
6.3.5. Keep suppliers posted on the progress of the tumaround «/ 
6.4. Build Credibility 
6.4.1. Commit payments to build credibility NEW 
6.4.2. Always keep your word NEW 
Customers ^ 
7.4. Negotiation of support of customers and neutralization of 
Customer's pressures — 
7.4.1. Brief customers on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative tumaround plan. — 
7.4.2. Get customers to suggest tumaround steps — 
7.4.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from customers — 
7.4.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy — 
7.4.5. Keep customers posted on the progress of the tumaround — 
7.5. Sourcing industry information for quick cost reduction ^ 
7.5.1. Increase costs incurred on communication technologies, if 
need be, for sourcing industry (market) information ^ 
7.6. Revenue Generation ^ 
7.6.1. Unfocused advertising and promotion be more sharply 
focused ^ 
7.6.2. Build Brand Image NEW 
Validating the propositions 
Proposition P,A: Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the communication objectives given in the framework 
though not necessarily all. 
Framework 5.5 indicates that HMCL management addressed 10 (2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 
3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7.2, 7.3), did not address 1 (1.1) and did not share information on 1 
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(7.1) of the 12 communication objectives listed in the theoretical framework 
proposed. 
Thus, the turnaround of HMCL indicates that HMCL addressed some of the list of 
objectives given in the proposed framework but not all. It thus supports Proposition 
PlA. 
Proposition Pis'. The list of communication objectives given in the proposed 
theoretical framework is comprehensive. 
Framework 5.5 indicates that HMCL management addressed 10 (2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 
3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7.2, 7.3), did not address 1 (1.1) and did not share information on 1 
(7.1) of the 12 communication objectives listed in the theoretical framework 
proposed. 
Thus, for the turnaround of HMCL, the list of communication objectives listed in the 
framework is not just suggestive, it is rather comprehensive. It thus supports 
Proposition P/g. 
Proposition P2A'- Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the critical stakeholders give n in the framework. 
Framework 5.5 indicates that the HMCL management addressed 6 (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) of 
the 7 critical stakeholders during the turnaround of HMCL. The only stakeholder not 
earmarked as being addressed is the Board of Directors. This is because the promoter. 
Board of Directors and top management happened to be the same. 
The turnaround of HMCL therefore supports Proposition P2A 
Proposition P2B: The list of critical stakeholders to be addressed during a 
turnaround is comprehensive. 
Framework 5.5 indicates that the HMCL management addressed 6 (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) of 
the 7 critical stakeholders during the turnaround of HMCL. The only stakeholder not 
earmarked as being addressed is the Board of Directors. This is because the promoter, 
Board of Directors and top management happened to be the same. 
Thus, for the turnaround of HMCL the list of critical stakeholders was 
comprehensive. It thus supports the Proposition P2B-
Proposition PSA'. At least one of the communication actions listed in the proposed 
theoretical framework, is employed to realize a corresponding communication 
objective during turnaround. 
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Framework 5.5 indicates that for each of the 10 communication objectives addressed 
by HMCL management at least one communication action was employed by the 
HMCL management during turnaround. However, it also indicates 7 new 
communication actions (2.3.20, 2.3.21, 4.1.6, 5.1.6, 6.1.6, 6.1.7, 7.3.2) were adopted 
by HMCL management for the addressing these 10 communication objectives during 
tumaround. The other 2 communication objectives (1.1, 7.1) listed in the proposed 
theoretical framework have not been addressed and not been shared with researcher 
respectively by HMCL management and hence communication actions suggested 
thereof have not been employed. 
Thus, the tumaround of HMCL indicates that it employed atleast one communication 
action listed in the proposed theoretical framework to realize a corresponding 
communication objective. It thus supports Proposition PSA-
Proposition PSB'. The list of communication actions recommended for achieving 
the communication objectives is comprehensive 
Framework 5.5 indicates that HMCL management adopted 39 communication 
actions; did not adopt 9 communication actions; and did not provide information on 
12 communication actions of the total of 60 communication actions listed in the 
theoretical framework proposed. It also indicates that HMCL management employed 
7 new communication actions (2.3.20, 2.3.21, 4.1.6, 5.1.6, 6.1.6, 6.1.7, 7.3.2). These 
actions were not listed in the theoretical framework proposed. 
The tumaround of HMCL thus suggests that the list of communication actions given 
in the theoretical framework proposed is not comprehensive. It thus does not support 
Proposition PSB-
111 
Case 6 
NAIHATI JUTE MILLS COMPANY LTD. 
Deciphering Communication during Turnaround 
Background 
Naihati Jute Mills Company Ltd. (NJMCL) was set up in 1905, by the British. It was 
bought by the Bhagats, a rich family from Kolkata, in the year 1958 and was later 
inherited by JK Bhagat, the current Managing Director of the Company. Till 1966, 
Kolkata was home to a thumping jute industry. This was followed by a cyclic low. 
Unfortunately, the reasons to stay low kept increasing and Naihati like many other 
jute mills in the country began incurring losses. 
By 1997, the netwoth of the company had eroded to INR -32 mn. The company was 
declared sick and referred to the BIFR, under the legislation of Sick Industries Act 
(SICA), in 1998 for rehabilitation. The management kept working to revive the 
Company. The Company networth turned positive in 1999 and the financial results 
improved thereafter. 
(See Table 5.6.1 and Chart 5.6.1) 
Table 5.6.1: Performance of NJMCL during 1995-2005; turnaround in 1999 
Naihati Jute Mills Co. Ltd, 
1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Gross 
sales (in 
mn) 
527 672 639 695 821 784 679 809 754 893 
Net worth 
(inmn) 
-30 -32 -10 1 7 33 19 21 21 9 
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Chart 5.6.1: Performance of NJMCL during 1995-2005; turnaround in 1999 
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Challenges before the management 
External Issues 
Supplier Issues 
Non-availability of Raw Material: The jute industry of India was dependant on 
Bangladesh for raw material supplies. The high import duty on the raw material made 
the Indian Jute products uncompetitive as these mills had to compete with mills in 
Bangladesh. 
Exploitation by traders and brokers of raw material: "Jute crop comes in the 
month of July and continues till January-February. However, there is no crop in the 
period between March-June. The traders of jute material, therefore, restrict jute 
supplies between July-February so that they can retain supplies for the lean period 
and sell these at a high price during March-June when the companies have no other 
source to depend on. 
Since NJMCL was running into losses, they were not in a position to buy bulk 
supplies or to get credit. They thus became vulnerable to exploitation by brokers and 
traders as any short supply of material implied a shut down - a proposition too 
expensive especially for a sick Company." (JK Bhagat, personal communications, 
December 14, 2006) 
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Government: Jute as a product faced intense competition from the Polythene 
industry. The cost of jute bags is higher than polythene bags so the industry prefered 
polybags over jute bags. However, polybags were not eco-friendly. Since, 
Government of India was a major customer for both kind of Companies 0ute and 
polythene) a tilt in the Government policies balance in either direction had major 
impact on the industry. 
Government reviewed the JPMA (Jute Packaging Materials Act) 1987 annually and 
accordingly earmarked how much food grain or say sugar was to be packaged in jute 
bags. When the Govt, of India announced its policy to package all of fertilizer and 
cement in HDP bags instead of jute bags, it was a major setback for the industry as it 
lost the biggest customer base. 
One of the important policies for this sector was the import duty imposed on raw 
materials. If it was high, the raw material and hence the product became 
uncompetitive against the product produced in Bangladesh. Industrial Associations 
therefore lobbied to get the import duty on raw material reduced or to get it increased 
on jute products. Depending on the political party in power, the protectionist policies 
got a boost or a set back. 
Jute industry was home to thousands of workers. Naihati itself employed 4000 
workers. "Almost all political parties had interest in these vote banks. Thus, policies 
that impact jute industry are sensitive to political changes".(Ashutosh Bahgat, 
personal communications, December 18, 2006). 
All this becomes more significant because Jute is a major industry in West Bengal. 
The performance of Jute industry impacts the economy of the state. The Government 
therefore also has in place several schemes for subsidizing the running or giving 
grants for modernization of Jute industry. 
"However, the bureaucratic delay in implementing any of the measures dilutes the 
Government efforts" laments JK Bhagat. 
Internal Issues 
Labour Intensive Industry: The jute industry in India was not modernized. In the 
traditional labour intensive industry, the workers have a stronghold owing to the 
communist regime that has continued in West Bengal for decades. Thus the worker 
unions are a major force to reckon with. 
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The number of workers employed by NJMCL was nearly 4000, 90% of which were 
permanent employees. According to the government regulation, the company was 
bound to pay them for 240 days in an year while workers on Special Badli or 
contractual labour had to be paid for 200 days in an year. However, there was no legal 
binding for Badli i.e. casual labour. In case of NJMCL, Special Badli and Badli 
workers were only 10%. Therefore, irrespective of whether there was work or not, 
NJMCL was bound to pay the wages. 
Misuse of facilities: The Company had 800 houses for the workers and 40-50% 
workers were housed there. It provided for such amenities as electricity, water etc. 
However, there were electricity thefts and other such wastages. 
Low Productivity: The modem machinery was too expensive for the Sick 
Company to install. The productivity in this labour intensive Company was naturally 
dependant on its workforce. They therefore continued to depend on traditional 
equipment. "Unskilled labour fi-om Bihar, UP and WB was employed to perform as 
skilled labour jabs. Naturally the productivity was low" (Ashutosh Bhagat, personal 
communications, December 18, 2005) 
Naxalite movement: "There was an anti establishment movement by a group that 
called itself Naxals. They opposed anything that the management or other unions had 
to say and did get a foothold in the short term." (Ashutosh Bhagat, personal 
communications, December 18, 2005) 
External Communication at NJMCL 
Government: NJMCL management maintained that major crisis in jute industry 
was owing to external factors and that remedy for most of it also was with the 
government. It participated actively in the industry association activities to be able to 
voice its concerns to the government, and also received several benefits through the 
BIFR. 
The West Bengal government had initiated several incentive schemes for Companies 
referred to BIFR. The objective of NJMCL was to avail these concessions during the 
revival period. 
NJMCL got various deferments of loans and concessions under the Jute 
Modemization Scheme. Special loans for the payment of statutory dues like PF at 
subsidized interest rate, sales tax loans, loans for arrears, and other concessions given 
to sick industries such as reduced electricity rates were availed. 
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"At the peak of crisis me and my father were involved whenever possible. If we would 
have avoided then revival would not have been as smooth and fast as it was. There 
was a need to develop in BIFR a confidence that we are not out to cheat them. 
Through monitoring of accounts and operations and periodic review meetings at the 
BIFR level this was ensured. " (Ashutosh Bhagat, December 18, 2005) 
Industry Associations: Industry Associations played a major role in aiding 
revival. This Association membership assisted the management to discuss with peers 
in the industry the common problems that they faced and provided a platform to voice 
the concerns to the government, for instance, since the raw material was expensive 
owing to the high import duty, the industry associations influenced the government to 
lower import duty on raw material and increase tariffs on import of finished product. 
The Industry Associations also lobbied with the Central government to retain Jute 
Mandatory Packaging Act, 1987. Thus it was important to be active in the 
Associations so as to be perceived as a significant opinion leader in the Association. 
"Earlier my father was on the committee and now I have taken his place " (Ashutosh 
Bhagat.personal communications, December 18, 2005). 
The Association also enabled the management to foster relationship with various 
associates including brokers, competitors, customers etc. and develop contacts to 
keep update on industry development and market fluctuations. This was important 
even in day-to-day functioning as it laid networks to source rates of raw material that 
fluctuate on a daily basis. 
Bankers: NJMCL was defaulting in their term loan commitments. They had to pay 
Income Tax (IT) and Provident Fund (PF) dues amounting to nearly INR 50 mn. And 
the monetary situation was such that there was also shortage of fiinds even for raw 
material and payment of wages. 
The Company then prepared a scheme of viability which was approved under the 
rehabilitation scheme of BIFR but it could not arrange for an operating agency for the 
same. The management then discussed the scheme with Bankers and attempted to 
convince them sharing ailments of the industry and past records of the Company and 
finally NJMCL gave a collated security of INR 10 mn and got the WC limit 
enhanced. 
The Banks monitored Company's account operations and also conducted periodic 
review meetings with promoters at BIFR level NJMCL was very forthcoming in 
sharing all information. Since NJMCL was under the rehabilitation scheme of BIFR 
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each cheque signed by the Company had to be counter signed by 4ie Bank. The 
practice was continuing till the time of the interview (2005) but was due for 
withdrawL The bankers employed internal auditors; officers checked the stock, 
however, NJMCL refused to get perturbed as it was not fiddling with funds. 
Customers: Jute products were sold through brokers. NJMCL had relationships and 
dealings with several Brokers. However, since NJMCL was in short of fluids, it was 
forced to sell its products at discounted rates for cash sales. As a result, NJMCL was 
selling materials at lower prices and when the prices went up, they had no material to 
produce any further. "We realized how the brokers were encashing on our strengths 
and weakness" (Ashutosh Bhagat, personal communications, December 18, 2005) 
NJMCL, therefore, examined sifted to find out who were the major offenders and 
reduced business with them. Elimination process was initiated and Naihati began 
dealing with only those who were financially sound, did not seek credit even if they 
were new in the business. But arriving at this list required identifying leakages, cross 
checking with other mills and developing new relationships. This required insights at 
various levels. The team developed relationships with customers, suppliers and 
competitors at various levels. 
NJMCL made a renewed effort of marketing in India and abroad. The objective was 
to increase sales of value added products - an upcoming export area. Its attempt was 
to get recognized as an export house that delivered quality, met delivery schedules 
and provided services to buyers. It developed a flexible system of production wherein 
the product mix was varied depending on the market demands, for instance, NJMCL 
initially produced only 50 kg Hessian bags for packing pulses. With this market size 
depleting, NJMCL began producing Jute Bleach Cloth Bags used by Rice 
manufacturers in Delhi. Similarly, they began producing carpet yam which was sold 
in foreign markets. This increased volumes of production to a large extent. The 
message was that NJMCL offered good quality in affordable prices. Ravi Bhagat, the 
elder son of JK Bhagat and Director in the Company was responsible for marketing 
communications. He worked with a team of 5 people. 
Developing, creating and exporting niche products was a strategy. NJMCL developed 
new value added products, for instance it entered the niche area of producing 
bleached Jute fabrics which could be sold at INR 5000/ton as against Asian jute sold 
at INR 3500/ton. These products were then promoted abroad by regularly 
participating in and visiting fares. 
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"It is extremely important to keep oneself informed of trends because only then an 
effective product mix can be developed. Tapping information from various sources 
through informal feedback is the key to all the planning " (Ravi Bhagat, personal 
communications, December 14, 2005) 
Suppliers: NJMCL supply-chain management was not in place. Payments were 
long overdue. Considering that the financial situation was not so good, there was 
need to agree on time frames to liquidate the dues. The directors therefore, held 
frequent meetings with the suppliers and explained to them the Mill's position. Once 
the Company started generating funds, funds oiled the wheels. 
NJMCL was also not ready to accept substandard material as that would have 
adversely affecte d quality and production levels, for instance if the Company wanted 
to produce jute with more strength and thus higher spin ability, they went back to the 
supplier who in turn suggested several methods which then had to be discussed and 
implemented in the factory and that was an ongoing process. 
"Relationship building helps " says Ashutosh Bhagat. "It makes clear to the supplier, 
what the customer is looking for and in case there are practical problems they are 
able to come and tell you " he adds. The Directors also made it a point to collect 
feedback from the workers, on quality of material and suppliers whenever they visited 
the mills. 
The company was very firm on quality of supplies and several suppliers did get 
eliminated in the process of maintaining this objective. The MD and Ashutosh Bhagat 
themselves interacted with the suppliers. 
Other Stakeholders: There was no interaction with media or intemational 
agencies as well. The communication with shareholders was restricted to as it much 
by was stipulated as legal requirement - annual reports and AGMs. 
Internal Communication Strategy 
NJMCL did not have a very formal strategy but all along the management met to 
strategize and draw plans to figure out how they could overcome obstacles to get 
optimum results. 
Employees: No retrenchment 
Even though there was a large workforce on rolls, NJMCL did not resort to 
retrenchment of employees. The number of workers were reduced from 4000 to 3700 
in 9 years. 
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Cost Cutting Measures: However, several facilities which were freely flowing in 
good times were cut down, for instance, electricity theft was checked and water 
supply restrictions from 24 hrs to 16 hrs a day in worker homes had to be imposed to 
reduce expenses. "Naturally we had to explain to the workers why that cannot be 
allowed" fAshutosh Bhagat, personal communications, December 18, 2005). 
Productivity: However, there was need to increase productivity and reduce 
wastages in the processes. "For instance, suppose in our mill one person was 
working on 2 machines end in other companies they were working on 4 machines 
then the management attempted to convince them for better productivity. If there was 
resistance to change then the management took them to neighboring mills to make 
them see for themselves how their competitors were accomplishing the task " shares 
Ashutosh Bhagat. If there was a difference in the machines, the management took 
some capex & replaced the machines. Once the mills were technically at par, the 
workers had to change. But, the competitors permitted the visits solely because of 
good relations with them. 
The capacity of production was also increased to absorb the spare workers. Thus "Our 
productivity increased from 64 workers producing one ton in 1974-75 to 34/35 
workers producing one ton in 2004-2005" (JK Bhagat, personal communications, 
December 16, 2005) 
Quality circle meetings - Departmental heads or supervisors & workers of 
concemed department met outside working hours to discuss quality processes, 
disciplinary action, machines repair and maintenance, incentive schemes for 
productivity and the likes. The company on its recommendation instituted 'Best 
weaver of the month' and 'Best spinner of the month' awards. 
Hoardings were put up on the factory shop-floor. There were posters in the 
vernacular language so that the labour could comprehend the messages. 
Head of the unit at the plant level and the Personnel Manager who was also the head 
of the labour dept. interacted with the union leaders of the 8 unions ofNJML (now 
there are 10 unions). There were Jive to six HR officers who interacted with the 
Sardars and the influential workers at different levels. 
The management identified influential workers and then communicated with them. 
The number of employees was large (4000) and the manning pattern was also 
detailed. Besides, the managers had grown up in the environment and they 
understood the intricacies. Therefore, they knew when hierarchy was not important 
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and convincing two or three workers who were more vocal and influential would do 
the job better. Thus, the effort was to make them understand the problem and solution 
and then they could carry the house through. 
Feedback was also collected in an unstructured manner at all the levels to make sure 
that everyone was in the loop for anything to do with them. "Everyone is not very 
open in meetings. But they go out and make comments to colleagues. Once the 
informal feedback is received the management has to work on it. " (Ashutosh Bhagat, 
personal communications, December 18, 2005) 
Tackling the Naxals: Both formal and informal feedback played an extremely 
important role in resolving issues with the workers, for instance, there was an anti 
establishment movement by a group that called itself Naxals. They opposed anything 
that the management or other unions had to say and did get a foothold in the short 
term. But, with the support of major unions the management convinced their 
members that the Naxal group was misguiding them and that ultimately the viability 
of the factory was necessary. 
Analysis 
The case of the turnaround of NJMCL reveals how stiff competition from synthetic 
fibre, import duty on raw material, government policies such as JPMA 1987, tariffs 
imposed by textile ministry, labour policies and the likes impacted the working of the 
jute industry in general and NJMCL in particular. Thus, environmental changes were 
drastic and NJMCL was unable to respond to those changes effectively resulting in a 
decline that led to a sick state. Thus, the case strongly supports the first stage of the 
theoretical model proposed. 
When NJMCL was in a sick state, the brokers of raw material and the end product 
were aware of NJMCL's constraints and as NJMCL management revealed, they took 
fiill advantage to sell or buy at uncompetitive rates. The Bankers refused to give loans 
until NJMCL brought in equity to establish intent to revive. The workers were 
indulging in wastage and anti establishment movements. Thus there were disabling 
forces emanating from various stake holders. The industry associations and some of 
the government policies, however, were supportive and exerted enabling forces but 
probably were not strong enough to counteract the disabling forces. 
The case of turnaround of NJMCL strongly supports the third stage of the model as 
the process of mmaround got initiated only when the management assumed the 
responsibility, invested a sum of INR 10 mn as security to get more fluids to establish 
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their intent to turnaround the Company. The management then worked with various 
stakeholders to enable the turnaround objectives such as initial control to curb 
wastages and improve productivity, improve co-ordination, mobilization, negotiation 
and development of industry wisdom. The management enabled these through 
various as formal and informal communication actions that are tabulated in the table 
given below. Thus the case strongly supports the third stage of the theoretical model 
proposed in this study. 
Framework 5.6 
The Match between the CS for OTA framework and the communication 
strategy of NJIVICL during turnaround 
X No —Don'tKnow ^ Yes TVf'Pf-Newly Identify 
Theoretical Pattern Case Pattern 
Stakeholder/ Turnaround Element (objective)/ 
Possible Communication Action 
1. Board of Directors/Shareholders X 
1.1. Gain support and time in tlte future X 
1.1.1. Present detailed turn-around plan — 
2. Staff and Employees >/ 
2.1. Credibility building actions by the new management X 
2.1.1. Document, and communicate a strategic turnaround plan — 
2.1.2. Publicize success in resolving a current crisis or problem X 
2.1.3. Make decisions transparent X 
2.1.4. Exercise Communication Control (control on promises rolled 
out) — 
2.2. Initial Control •y 
2.2.1. Order preparation of daily, weekly and monthly cash 
forecasts ^ 
2.2.2. Exercise Communication Control. — 
2.2.3. Seek views on the general well being of the employees. — 
2.3. Mobilization of organization for turnaround «/ 
2.3.1. Include key managers for development of industry wisdom -/ 
2.3.2. Include only key managers for development of vision — 
2.3.3. CEO should deliver the vBion presentation in person and as 
often as possible. X 
2.3.4. Hold special sessions for non-participating managers after 
vision has been developed to share planned visio n X 
2.3.5. Inject urgency in the communications plan. Explain what 
needs to be done and why X 
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2.3.6. Listen to the views of all managers. Gauge their reaction N/ 
2.3.7. Understand perceptions and focus minds of managing team. 
Set the scene for turnaround. ««' 
2.3.8. Ensure all employees know what is going on, for what reason 
and how it will occur. X 
2.3.9. Share the pulpit (Empowerment) X 
2.3.10. Deal with concerns of employees in open and honest manner. 
Offer Follow up sessions — 
2.3.11. Note any comments or queries and provide answers asap. — 
2.3.12. CEO must get out of the office to interact with the employees 
and to listen to them — 
2.3.13. Employ open ended communication style that encourages 
employees to find answers, take decisions. X 
2.3.14. Repeatedly affirm the Company's mission, core values, and 
the primary goals of profit and growth. X 
2.3.15. Articulate a few highly concrete targets for the company for 
the next few months ^ 
2.3.16. Involve the staff to identify solvable problem areas and have 
their views on uninvolved areas. ^ 
2.3.17. Rephrase people's roles to clarify managerial 
responsibilities. X 
2.3.18. Top managers must emphasize on integrity, fairness, hard 
work, resourcefulness and concern for the staff during 
interactions with the staff. X 
2.3.19. Publicize and celebrate every employee and team success. ^ 
2.4. Internal Co-ordination ^ 
2.4.1. Offer constant feedback to keep organization on track ^ 
2.4.2. Set up co-ordination committees for co-ordinating 
interdependent departments v 
2.4.3. Institute a monthly performance review meeting of all senior 
managers chaired by the chief executive. «/ 
2.4.4. Insist that lower level disputes be settled at that level on a 
face to face basis </ 
2.4.5. Keep the atmosphere light. — 
2.4.6. Keep enhancing communication technology - email, mobile, 
ERP X 
Unions >/ 
3.1. Negotiation of support of Unions and neutralization of Unions' 
pressures «/ 
3.1.1. Brief unions on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative turnaround plan. y/ 
3.1.2. Get them to suggest turnaround steps ^ 
3.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the unions "Z 
3.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy X 
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3.1.5. Keep unions posted on the progress of the turnaround ^ 
3.1.6. Collect informal feedback for better negotiations NEW 
4. Banks and Financial Institutions </ 
4.1. Negotiation of support of Banks and/or FIs and neutralization of 
Banks and/or FIs pressures ^ 
4.1.1. Brief Banks and/or FIs on the problems and strengths of the 
unit and some tentative turnaround plan <^ 
4.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps ^ 
4.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from Banks and/or FIs ^ 
4.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy ^ 
4.1.5. Keep Banks and/or FIs posted on the progress of the 
tumaround v 
4.1.6. Protracted negotiations with the banks and Financial 
institutions NEW 
4.1.7. Requires personal interaction of promoter/ top 
management with Bank senior officials NEW 
5. Government ^ 
5.1. Negotiation of support of Government and neutralization of 
Government pressures ^ 
5.1.1. Brief relevant government departments on the problems and 
strengths of the unit and some tentative tumaround plan. ^ 
5.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps ^ 
5.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the government ^ 
5.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy — 
5.1.5. Keep the government posted on the progress of the 
tumaround ^ 
5.1.6. Maintain direct contact; avoid via medias or advisors NEW 
5.1.7. Approach Government through industry associations NEW 
6. Suppliers ^ 
6.1. Negotiation of support of suppliers and neutralization of 
Supplier's pressures ^ 
6.1.1. Brief suppliers on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative tumaround plan. X 
6.1.2. Get suppliers to suggest tumaround steps X 
6.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from suppliers ^ 
6.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
6.1.5. Keep suppliers posted on the progress of the tumaround X 
6.1.6. Seek new suppliers who are willing to give credit and 
cooperate NEW 
183 
7. Customers '•^ 
7.1. Negotiation of support of customers and neutralization of 
Customer's pressures "^ 
7.1.1. Brief customers on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative turnaround plan. ^ 
l.\2. Get customers to suggest turnaround steps — 
7.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from customers — 
7.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy </ 
7.1.5. Keep customers posted on the progress of the turnaround — 
7.2. Sourcing industry information for quick cost reduction v' 
7.2.1. Increase costs incurred on communication technologies, if 
need be, for sourcing industry (market) information ^ 
7.2.2. Active association with industry association NEW 
123. Develop informal contacts with peers in industry NEW 
7.3. Revenue Generation «^  
7.3.1. Unfocused advertising and promotion be more sharply 
focused «^  
7.3.2. Build Brand Image NEW 
8. Industry Association 
8.1. Influence government policies 
8.1.1. Build image of a senior member of the company as 
significant opinion holder NEW 
8.1.2. Actively participate in the association's activities NEW 
8.2. Keep track of industry developments NEW 
8.2.1. Actively participate in the association's activities NEW 
Validating the propositions 
Proposition P,A: Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the communication objectives given in the frameworit 
though not necessarily all. 
Framework 5.6 indicates that NJMCL management addressed 10 (2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.1, 
4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3) and did not address 2 (1.1, 2.1) of the 12 communication 
objectives listed in the theoretical framework proposed. 
Thus, the turnaround of NJMCL indicates that NJMCL management addressed some 
of the list of objectives given in the proposed framework but not all. It thus supports 
Proposition P,A. 
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Proposition PJB: The list of communication objectives given in tlie proposed 
theoretical framework is comprehensive 
Framework 5.6 indicates that NJMCL management addressed 10 (2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.1, 
4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3) and did not address 2 (1.1, 2.1) of the 12 communication 
objectives listed in the theoretical framework proposed. In addition, NJMCL also 
addressed 2 communication objectives (8.1, 8.2) that were not listed in the theoretical 
framework suggested. 
Thus, for the tumaround of NJMCL, the list of communication objectives given in the 
framework is suggestive but not comprehensive. It thus does not support Proposition 
PIB-
Proposition P2A: Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the critical stakeholders given in the framework. 
Framework 5.6 indicates that the NJMCL management addressed 6 (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) of 
the 7 critical stakeholders during the tumaround of NJMCL. The only stakeholder not 
earmarked as being addressed is the Board of Directors. This is because the promoter, 
Board of Directors and top management happened to be the same. However, NJMCL 
management also considered industry associations as a critical stakeholder. 
The tumaround of HMCL therefore supports Proposition P2A 
Proposition P2B: The list of critical stakeholders to be addressed during a 
turnaround is comprehensive. 
Framework 5.6 indicates that the NJMCL management addressed 6 (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) of 
the 7 critical stakeholders during the tumaround of NJMCL. The only stakeholder not 
earmarked as being addressed is the Board of Directors. This is because the promoter. 
Board of Directors and top management happened to be the same. However, NJMCL 
management also considered industry associations as a critical stakeholder. 
Thus, for the tumaround of NJMCL the list of critical stakeholders was mandatory 
but not comprehensive. It thus does not support the Proposition P2B-
Proposition PSA'. At least one of the communication actions listed in the proposed 
theoretical framework, is employed to realize a corresponding communication 
objective during turnaround. 
Framework 5.6 indicates that for each of the 10 communication objectives listed in 
the theoretical framework and addressed by NJMCL management, at least one 
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communication action listed thereof was emptoyed by the NJMCL management 
during turnaround. However, it also indicates 9 new communication actions (3.1.6, 
4.1.6, 4.1.7, 5.1.6, 5.1.6, 5.1.7, 6.1.6, 7.2.2, 7.2.3, 7.3.2) were adopted by NJMCL 
management for the addressing these 10 communication objectives during 
turnaround. The other 2 communication objectives (1.1, 2.1) listed in the proposed 
theoretical framework were not addressed by NJMCL management and hence 
communication actions suggested thereof have not been employed. Also 3 new 
communication actions (8.1.1, 8.1.2, 8.2.1) were adopted to achieve the 2 new 
communication objectives (8.1 and 8.2) 
Thus, the turnaround of NJMCL indicates that it employed atleast one communication 
action listed in the proposed theoretical framework to realize a corresponding 
communication objective. It thus supports Proposition PSA-
Proposition PJB'. The list of communication actions recommended for achieving 
the communication objectives is comprehensive 
Framework 5.6 indicates that NJMCL management adopted 29 communication 
actions; did not adopt 17 communication actions; and did not provide information on 
14 communication actions of the total of 60 communication actions listed in the 
theoretical framework proposed. It also indicates that NJMCL management employed 
12 new communication actions (3.1.6, 4.1.6, 4.1.7, 5.1.6, 5.1.6, 5.1.7, 6.1.6, 7.2.2, 
7.2.3, 7.3.2, 8.1.1, 8.1.2, 8.2.1). These actions were not hsted in the theoretical 
framework proposed. The turnaround of NJMCL thus suggests that the list of 
communication actions given in the theoretical framework proposed is not 
comprehensive. It thus does not support Proposition PSB-
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Case 7 
INDIA POLYFIBRES LTD. 
Deciphering Communications during Turnaround 
Background 
RP Goenka (RPG) Group in technical collaboration with DuPont USA set up India 
Polyfibres Ltd. (IPL) to manufacture 15,000 MT per annum of Commodity Polyester 
Staple Fibre (PSF) at Barabanki, UP"' in 1985. The production was commissioned in 
1987 and the company was doing well until 1991 when it was hit by the new 
industrial policy of India (1991) that exempted industrial undertakings from licensing 
requirements subject to some conditions. From a time when the PSF was in short 
supply owing to restricted capacity, IPL was now in a market where the supply 
exceeded the demand. Further, with the reduction of import duty the industry was 
thrown open to global competition. Thus, the products had to additionally compete 
with foreign goods. ''Cost effectiveness and marketing became essential for survival. 
IPL was not prepared for either. "(Narendra Kumar, personal communications, 24 
November 2005) 
The downfall of IPL began and continued till 1997 and its networth was reduced to 
INR (103.3) mn. In 1997, Reliance Group holding Companies bought IPL from the 
RPG Group. There was a strategic alliance between Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd 
(RPCL) and IPL and the turnaround process was initiated. IPL's changed 
performance started to show results and by year 2000 turned positive (INR 275 mn) 
The company has since been doing well. (See Table 5.7.1 and Chart 5.7.1) 
Table 5.7.1: Performance of IPL during 1996-2005; turnaround in 2000 
India Polyfibres Ltd. 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Gross sales 
(inmn) 
1706 1284 978 1090 279 862 1101 1866 2398 2398 
Net worth 
(in mn) 
-835 -1033 -1291 -378 275 293 310 330 423 244 
"" Barabanki is a small town located 30 km from Lucknow, the capital of Uttar Pradesh (UP). 
UP is the largest state of India located in northern part of the country. 
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Chart 5.7.1: Performance of IPL during 1996-2005; turnaround in 2000 
India Polyfibres Ltd. 
Year 
'Gross sales (mn) - * - Net worth (mn) 
Unraveling the Turnaround 
Sapra, President of the Polyester Division of the Reliance Group spearheaded the 
process of turnaround. As a policy, RPCL management decided to appoint the 
Managing Director from the Company itself "This was to send a message that 
Reliance firmly believed in the Company's capabilities and that with improved 
direction from the promoters the company could really do well" (Raja Ram, Director 
RPCL, personal communications, April 4, 2006). Narendra Kumar, the plant head at 
IPL was promoted as the Managing Director of IPL while the Chairman was eased 
out. 
When Reliance took over IPL the external and internal challenges that IPL was facing 
at that time were as follows 
External Issues 
Government Policies: "The decision of establishing IPL at Barabanki in 1984 
was also a politically guided decision that proved to be strategically incorrect. This 
was because the raw material for the product had to be sourced from Maharashtra 
and Gujarat and the market for the end product was also mainly in Maharashtra and 
Gujarat. Owing to the additional freight charges the product was uncompetitive in 
the market. 
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Also, the power supply was available in UP at INR 4 per unit as against INRl per 
unit available in competing states of Maharashtra and Gujarat. This made the cost of 
production further uncompetitive in national markets." (Narendra Kumar, personal 
communications, 24 November 2005). 
Customer confidence: "Since IPL was a sick unit, the customers naturally had 
fears on how long will the supply continue and also had concerns about quality. 
Though, owing to reasonably good quality fibre produced at IPL in the past, quality 
issues were not so serious. " (Raja Ram, Director, IPL, personal communications, 
April 4, 2006). Besides, the customer had a wide choice owing to higher supply 
against demand. 
Supplier Relations: "When IPL was not doing well, it was unable to pay Suppliers 
in time. Also since the company became sick, no one wanted to lend them money". 
Also owing to the transport cost the physical distance from the supplier was a major 
concern. 
Financial Institutions: When the new management took over, IPL owed INR 1500 
mn debt to financial institutions. Naturally, they were not ready to give extra loans. 
"It was tough because they were not ready to give any loans and we had exhausted 
our WC. Other problems such as the refusal to increase the LC limits forced us to 
work through another company for buying our raw material. This company would 
then sell to us high seas." (Narendra Kumar, personal communications, 24 November 
2005). 
Internal Issues 
Uneconomical production capacity: IPL was producing small quantities (90 
tons per day) of PSF and thus the cost of production was uneconomical. Since PSF 
was a commodity fibre it was difficult for IPL to sell it, owing to high costs, although 
there was otherwise high demand for the white colour PSF being produced by IPL. 
Limited exposure to market demand: "It was hard for IPL to believe that big 
(90 tons/day) quantities of black fibre, which is not as big a market as the white fibre, 
could be sold in the market This was more so because they had been selling fibre 
only within the national boundaries and had no exposure to international demand^' 
says Raja Ram, 
Resistance to producing Black Fibre: IPL for a long time had been producing 
white fibre. Switching to black fibre meant dealing with a new process. This new 
process produced a waste which was now black instead of white. The work area 
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would therefore be dirty. "There were imaginary problems in handling the black 
waste which was not good to feel as the workers were more accustomed to the white 
waste " shares Raja Ram 
Bottlenecks: There were technological bottlenecks that limited the production 
capacities. 
Internal Strategy 
"The one good thing at IPL was that the production norms were outstanding and the 
Company had bagged a National Energy Award" (Narendra Kumar, personal 
communications, 24 November 2005). Commitment, motivation, clean and safe 
environment, health of employees were prime concerns. Camaraderie and working 
culture were important. The uniform was adopted at IPL to further team spirit. 
Meeting the challenge of marketing: Just before Reliance takeover, IPL had 
signed Conversion agreements with several customers like Bombay Dyeing, Reliance 
and the likes. Under these agreements the customer supplied the raw material and IPL 
converted it to the end product and supplied it back to the customer. 
In 1998 IPL had a strategic alliance with Reliance Petro-products P. Ltd. Thereafter, 
it had a conversion agreement with RPCL for 100% of its produce. It thus received all 
the raw material from Reliance group companies and Reliance picked up the 
complete produce. The marketing effort was thus passed on to the Reliance Group. 
De-bottlenecking: The capacity was gradually increased from 1500 MT/annum to 
22,400 MT per annum by de-bottlenecking. 
Uneconomical capacity converted into niche product facility: The new 
management accepted that it could not do away with the shortcomings of locational 
disadvantage. Besides, the capacity for production was uneconomical for a 
commodity fibre. It therefore decided to innovate and value-add to produce a niche 
product that was difficult to replicate and could fetch a higher price tag. 
So, IPL became the first company to produce Dope Dyed Black Polyester Fibre in 
1999. The objective was to diversify with manufacturing of specialty fibre, for future 
survival. Despite considerable risks of failure, the Company chose to implement an 
untried and unique process. Necessary changes and modifications in plant and 
machinery were carried out to undertake test/ trial runs for ascertaining technical 
viability, determining modifications and additional equipment required for sustained 
operations and simultaneously adhere to the desired quality levels. 
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At the time of the interview, the Company is producing Dope Dyed Black Polyester 
fibre, which was sold at a premium of 25% over normal fibre. "It is the first time that 
Black fibre has been produced by continuous process on PTA route anywhere in the 
world. Today, IPL is the largest producer of Dope Dyed Black Polyester Staple Fibre 
in the world and about 40% of its production is exported" (Narendra Kumar, personal 
communications, 24 November 2005) 
Communicating We Vision and IVIission: "Communication is very important no 
doubt, because it is only through effective communication that people can be made 
aware of the problems of the organization. In running any business, in general and 
during a turnaround process specifically it is very important that the organizational 
members understand the Vision and Mission of the Company because only then they 
will be able to work towards one objective. Thus, communication makes a team 
homogeneous. The vision and mission of IPL was thus very widely circulated and 
shared to ensure a complete buy-in by the employees. " (Narendra Kumar, personal 
communications, 24 November 2005) 
Sapra, the new Chairman of IPL, initiated the process by personally visiting the 
factory to address the staff and the workers very persuasively and share the future 
plans with them. The technical and marketing team members kept visiting IPL factory 
to share success stories with the employees. 
Discussion groups of 15-20 people were regularly organized to share the vision and 
mission of the company. The mission was reviewed periodically to refocus the 
Company's strategies. Departmental missions and actions plans were drawn, 
implemented and monitored accordingly. (Narender Kumar, Transformation at IPL-a 
case study, 2002) 
To share the strides of success that the Reliance Group was making a newsletter was 
started. "This made the employees feel that they were part of a big group and could 
feel proud of the progress that they were making as apart of it" (Raja Ram, personal 
communications, April 4, 2006) 
Walk the talk is the primary principle of good communications. For instance IPL has 
adopted a safety policy which lists a speed limit. "I make sure that I check my driver 
if he overshoots the speed any time ". (Narendra Kumar, personal communications, 
24 November 2005) 
The demonstration has to be on a continuous basis for instance we have a uniform 
dress code that each IPL employee must adorn every day. When the Princess of 
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Denmark visited IPL, the MD met her at IPL in the IPL uniform. "This develops a 
sense of pride amongst the employees who then proudly wear the same uniform as the 
MD. Similarly, goes the punctuality norm at the Company. " (Narendra Kumar, 
personal communications, 24 November 2005) 
When IPL issued a policy of checking the car storage areas before any car left the 
office there was a major uproar. Employees claimed that the policy reflected lack of 
trust. "That day I purposely left the office at the same hour when the other employees 
leave IPL for home. Right amidst all of them, I parked my car, got my car storage 
area checked and left. There was no murmuring on the issue thereafter (Narendra 
Kumar, personal communications, 24 November 2005) 
This is visible from various communications floating through the organization. 
Messages were also carefully phrased and communicated in the organization. For 
instance posters on how to 'Make your Work easier' or to promote health and safety 
precautions in the factory were put up all over the factory premises. Thus yet another 
principle underlying the communications floated at IPL was to 'Take care of people 
and ask them to take care of themselves'. 
Then, there was resistance to producing Black fib re that had to be addressed. 
"Narendra Kumar was very supportive of the change and he could see that this was 
the only way the Company could survive the emerging challenges. He therefore did a 
lot of persuading and explaining to address the concerns. As workers realized that 
complaints were imaginary and the change was for the better the complaints faded 
away over a period of time "(Raja Ram, personal communications, April 4, 2006). 
Enhancing Communication for improving efficiency and Cost 
Competitiveness: "The communication strategy wasn 't documented but the 
strategy was very clear and it came in phases, module wise " (Narendra Kumar, 
personal communications, lA November 2005). IPL believed that there were 
inefficiencies owing to lack of smooth communicatio n flow and the challenge was to 
reduce cost of operations through efficient communication. 
"The aims of the communication strategy were: 1. Make Communication faster (With 
email communication adopted as official communication, the system of photocopying 
was rendered useless. IPL became an almost paperless organization with much faster 
communication flow) 2. Improve process flow for better and faster knowledge sharing 
3. Better communication for more involvement of people 4. Maintain focus of 
employees on what management wants them to do so that the focus is not lost. This 
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strategy may not be in black and white but communication was a high priority. This 
was evident from the extensive communication technology adaptation that IPL went 
for, in that phase". (Narendra Kumar, personal communications, 24 November 
2005) 
Every PC in the Company was connected to the LAN. The emails were enabled by 
Lotus Notes. They had fully enabled all modules of SAP including those of materials 
and plant management, finance and accounts, production, SAP & HR etc. The SAP 
had complete handshake with the Reliance system. This facilitated resource sharing 
in the sister concerns. Thus, if a machine part was required at IPL, they could just log 
on and check inventories at all Reliance sites to source it from where it was available. 
They had knowledge sharing portals, online tracking system for everything, capital 
expenditure, complaints and customer visits. 
The advantages were immense, for instance, if anybody from any branch visited a 
customer, it was reflected on the terminal so that any IPL employee visiting the 
customer thereafter was well informed of the history of IPL transactions with that 
customer. Similarly, the communication technology had also enabled a forward flow 
of communication through right channels. With proper authorization to create, to 
change, to approve or to let capex or vouchers or any file flow, well defined, the 
progress was transparent and well tracked. This enabled a smooth flow of 
communications and efficient transactions. 
We ensured regular communication with employees, customers, shareholders, 
financial institutions and banks, and suppliers 
This also ensured that IPL was in the ReUance fold. "The main focus was to ensure 
uniformity of systems. Thus IPL became an integral part of Reliance Group". (Raja 
Ram, personal communication, April 4, 2006) 
While Reliance spent all the money to extend its SAP platform to IPL, IPL in turn 
spent all the money to train the workers and staff to completely adopt the SAP 
software. Every official communication in IPL was made in soft copy - a leave 
application, an approval, salary processing, bill processing and almost any internal 
transaction. Yet another benefit of SAP was that IPL was able to benchmark against 
other factories or sites of Reliance. Inter-site comparison was an ongoing process 
and that enabled the development of action plans. 
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Higher end communication technologies have been adopted in IPLfor instance video 
conferencing between Germany, Mumbai, two plants in Hazirabad and IPL Bara 
Banki is a regular weekly feature. 
The mobile phones increased the pace of communication. SMS was not used 
extensively. Internet was used for more information, literature survey, Supplier 
information and the likes. IPL did not develop a website as it never felt the need to 
market its product 
Involvement for continuous innovation: 'Suggestion Scheme' was a great 
success at IPL. for every suggestion received in the box, the Company gave away 
token gifts. After the suggestions were evaluated by the department the suggestions 
monetary rewards are given away on the basis of specific guidehnes. Each 
presentation also fetched a gift from the Company. "The idea was a roaring success to 
the extent that when family members did not get a gift for a long time, they checked 
whether all was well. These were token gifts like calculators, insulated plastic bottles, 
Thermos or any other item. (Narendra Kumar, Quality Manager, personal 
communications, 24 November 2005) 
Performance Reviews! Team Spirit: Regular monthly performance review 
meetings were held where 20 to 25 senior people got together to review the 
performance. All members therefore were abreast of developments in every other 
sphere. This enabled them to appreciate cost of production, performance of other 
departments, issues faced by IPL and forward paths. Thus, no one is working in 
isolation and a team spirit is fostered. 
Other Communication Interventions 
News letter: To keep the employees up-to-date with the latest developments, IPL 
started a quarterly newsletter - The IPL Times. This encouraged all employees to 
share their experiences. 
Quality Centre: The quality centre in the plant was the central place for 
information sharing with the operating personnel. All the key parameters of plant and 
customer complaints and different plant models were at this location. 
Communication for safety measures: IPL being a petrochemical based plant, 
its approach towards safety was "Safety of a person overrides all production 
targets". It took several measures to communicate the message - a formal 
programme to educate the employees, posters and talks to educate employees, posters 
all over the factory, learning with fun by organizing slogan writing competitions and 
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other activities for employees and their families etc. (Narender Kumar, 
Transformation at IPL - a case study, 2002) 
Well documented quality, training, performance, safety and other policies that were 
extensively shared with all the employees. 
External Communications at IPL 
Financial Institutions and Banl<s: IPL had to pay roughly INK 1500 million to 
the financial institutions. Protracted negotiations led by Indu Bhai Sheth and the 
merger and acquisition team of Reliance took place with financial institutions. 
"These were endless hours and days of waiting to see who blinks first" (Raja Ram, 
personal communications, April 4, 2006). We knew we had to pay but we also knew 
that they know we will make a success story. Finally, a deal in which one third was 
paid in cash, IPL expanded its share capital base and one third was converted to 
equity while one third was converted to zero coupon debenture for 13 years. The 
negotiated deal was submitted to BIFRfor ratification and signed thereafter. 
When the Company was in red, continuous communication through regular meetings, 
presentations and discussion of problems was required until one final settlement was 
reached. 
Persistent Interactions and Presentations to Convince: The marketing team 
visited the customers and made presentations to convince them. "We emphasized that 
the raw material was now the same as in any other Reliance facility and that there is 
no difference in the quality produced at Hazira or BaraBanki". The team built 
credibility by sharing the example of JCT (that Reliance had recently acquired) 
where the product quality was not as their standards, and the Company junked the 
entire produce of 4/5 months as waste. 
"While the initial concern of IPL was whether it will be possible to sell such 
quantities of Black fibre, today the market penetration has hcreased so much, that 
given the challenge to sell all of Black polyester fabric in India we can do it. We 
maintain exports because of our interest in exports and not because we do not have 
local markets" claims Raja Ram 
However, initially a major part was exported for instance to the Middle East where 
Burkas are made out of polyester fabric. 
Ensuring quality to ensure customer satisfaction was another focus area. "There are 
regular plant visits organized for the Reliance employees. Country wide Customer 
195 
Satisfaction surveys are conducted annually. Customer Satisfaction Index for each 
mill gives a rating to measure performance. Action plans are then drawn up for 
improved performance. Customer satisfaction is ensured through product quality, 
timely delivery, after sales service, effective pricing and packaging" shares Narendra 
Kumar. 
Suppliers: The most important raw material in a polyester plant is PTA and MEG 
These constitute 70% of the total inputs. The balance includes packaging, machinery 
supplies etc. Reliance produces PTA and MEG and thus became the sole supplier for 
IPL. for other materials as well, Reliance employed common platform to source 
material for all of its polyester units. "The suppliers were delighted to know that 
Reliance was now a promoter. This gave hope that their payments would now come 
through" says Raja Ram. 
As regards other Suppliers, IPL had to build credibility. It therefore decided to build 
the confidence by being transparent and fair. "For instance, IPL had five 
transporters and issue of payment cropped up now and then. We decided to release 
equal (pro rata) payments to each one of them as and when they received any 
payments or IPL was ready to make payments. This saved the transporters the anxiety 
that the accounts section was being partial and also kept giving each one of them 
some hope that the money would keep flowing in although slow. After that we had no 
complaints whatsoever regarding the payments" (Narendra Kumar, personal 
communications, 24 November 2005) 
Supplier's interest is in payment and long term business. When SAP was 
implemented, automatic cheque processing and printing became a reality. The 
purchase planning was done much in advance and suppliers were kept informed of 
the purchase plans. This greatly enhanced effic iency and kept the Suppliers happy. 
"We thus were able to maintain excellent relations with our Suppliers and were able 
to develop Suppliers for special needs by educating them and making them partners 
in the process "says Narendra Kumar. 
Government: Getting Interactions: Communication with Government or 
environmental agencies were as per statutory requirements. Voicing concerns about 
the policy was done through the industry associations. 
Narendra Kumar alongwith Vinod Arora dealt with the concerned government 
authorities to get exemptions, if applicable, for instance, there was a state 
government policy that if any Company invested more than INK 500 mn to diversify 
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then it would get a sales tax exemption. Since IPL had invested almost INR 700 mn 
for diversification, it got the ST exemption. 
Shareholders: Regular communications were sent to keep the shareholders 
informed and interested, for instance the change in management, 100% buy-sell 
arrangement between Reliance and IPL were publicized. "However, share holder's 
interests are to get dividend, bonus shares or market value of shares and those 
expectations are still to be met though all this is a preparation towards that" says 
Narendra Kumar. 
Media: "We remained aloof from the media because public at large was not a 
customer for us." Also, Since IPL was producing an industrial product there was 
neither a need for advertising nor for any media coverage. "Some stories about 
tumaround did appear but they were at the initiative of the media. We neither blocked 
nor promoted media relations" says Raja Ram. 
"Moreover, Bara Banki is a town notorious for rioting by locals. We therefore try to 
maintain a low key image. Infact, the previous President Kukereja managed 
operations from Lucknow and interacted extensively with the media as liasoning with 
the government agencies for marketing IPL products was his focus. However, 
maintaining contacts and entertaining IAS officers and the likes did not pay off' 
laments Narendra Kumar. 
Collaborators: IPL had a technological collaboration with Du-Pont in the initial 
stage but that had expired as Du-Pont's interest in Polyster had diminished 
worldwide. Though any technical assistance could still be sought on a payable basis. 
This collaboration had no implications for the tumaround process. 
Industry Associations: IPL had always been a member of the Lucknow Industry 
Association and continued to be so. The industry concerns such as on electricity rates 
etc could be voiced through these associations. "While Industry Associations dd 
voice the industry concerns they had no role to play in the tumaround process" says 
Raja Ram, RPCL. 
Analysis 
The case of tumaround of IPL strongly supports the first stage of the theoretical 
model suggested. The environmental changes triggered by change in the industrial 
policy of Government of India rendered the company sick. Thus, as suggested by the 
model, when the company did not respond to the environmental changes, it declined 
to the extent of sickness. 
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When IPL was sick, the financial institutbns, customers and Suppliers were all 
exerting disabling forces on the sick organizations. However, unlike what is 
suggested in the model the internal stakeholders, namely the employees were not 
exerting disabling forces though it appears that they were also not exerting enabling 
forces by working to find a solution to the problem. Thus we may need to slightly 
modify the model to introduce the aspect of neutral forces being exerted by some 
stakeholders such as employees, collaborators, mass media and industry associations 
in this case. 
The case strongly supports the third stage of the model that purports the central role 
that a management has to play by taking charge of the situation, planning a strategy 
and then enabling the turnaround through communicatio n actions. In this case, when 
Reliance took over IPL, it addressed the core issues of cost competitiveness by 
introducing a niche product. This, besides investing in funds required the organization 
to whole heartedly accept the proposition and implement it with great efficiency and 
quality. This meant addressing issues of resistance to the black dust that had to be 
managed, to gather momentum and acceptance, to develop faith in the proposal, to 
downplay the fact that the company had been acquired, to continue to improve the 
health, quality and safety measures and to improve efficiency by using 
communication technology interventions. 
IPL was able to achieve not just a turnaround but a healthy growth after the 
turnaround. 
As per findings from this study, the model must be changed to indicate that some 
stakeholders might exert neutral forces. The communication actions employed in the 
case of IPL are documented against the model in the following Framework 5.7 
Framework 5.7 
The Match between the CS for OTA framework and the communication 
strategy of IPL during turnaround 
X No —Don't Know • Yes iV '^Jf - Newly Identify 
Theoretical Pattern Case Pattern 
Stakeholder/ Turnaround Element (objective)/ 
Possible Communication Action 
1. Board of Directors/Shareholders «/ 
1.1. Gain support and time in the future — 
1.1.1. Present detailed tum-around plan ^ 
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2 . Staff and Employees «/ 
2 .1 . Credibility building actions by the new management x* 
2.1 .1 . Document , and communicate a strategic turnaround p lan </ 
2.1.2. Publicize success in resolving a current crisis or problem «/ 
2.1.3. M a k e decisions transparent </ 
2.1.4. Exercise Communication Control (control on promises rolled 
out)— 
2.2. Initial Control ^ 
2.2.1. Order preparation of daily, weekly and monthly cash 
forecasts ^ 
2.2.2. Exercise Communicat ion Control. ^ 
2.2.3. Seek views on the general well being of the employees . v 
2.3. Mobilization of organization for turnaround <y 
2.3 .1 . Include key managers for development of industry wisdom v 
2.3.2. Include only key managers for development of vision X 
2.3.3. C E O should deliver the vision presentation in person and as 
often as possible. ^ 
2.3.4. Hold special sessions for non-part icipat ing managers after 
vision has been developed to share planned vision </ 
2.3.5. Inject urgency in the communica t ions plan. Expla in what 
needs to be done and why • 
2.3.6. Listen to the views of all managers . Gauge their reaction •y 
2.3.7. Understand perceptions and focus minds o f manag ing team. 
Set the scene for turnaround. ••/ 
2.3.8. Ensure all employees know what is going on, for what reason 
and how it will occur. ^ 
2.3.9. Share the pulpit (Empowerment ) ^ 
2.3.10. Deal with concerns of employees in open and honest manner. 
Offer Follow up sessions -^ 
2.3.11. N o t e any comments or queries and provide answers asap. >/ 
2.3.12. C E O must get out of the office to interact with the employees 
and to listen to them </ 
2.3.13. Employ open ended communicat ion style that encourages 
employees to find answers, take decisions. X 
2.3.14. Repeatedly affirm the C o m p a n y ' s miss ion, core values , and 
the primary goals of profit and growth. «/ 
2.3.15. Articulate a few highly concrete targets for the company for 
the next few months >/ 
2.3.16. Involve the staff to identify solvable p rob lem areas and have 
their v iews on uninvolved areas. «/ 
2.3.17. Rephrase peop le ' s roles to clarify managerial 
responsibili t ies. X 
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2.3.18. Top managers must emphasize on integrity, fairness, hard 
work, resourcefulness and concern for the staff during 
interactions with the staff. ^ 
2.3.19. Publicize and celebrate every employee and team success. 
2.4. Internal Co-ordination ^ 
2.4.1. Offer constant feedback to keep organization on track ^ 
2.4.2. Set up co-ordination committees for co-ordinating 
interdependent departments </ 
2.4.3. Institute a monthly performance review meeting of all senior 
managers chaired by the chief executive. v 
2.4.4. Insist that lower level disputes be settled at that level on a 
face to face basis — 
2.4.5. Keep the atmosphere light. — 
2.4.6. Keep enhancing communication technology - email, mobile, 
ERP >/ 
3. Unions X 
3.1. Negotiation of support of Unions and neutralization of Unions' 
pressures X 
3.1.1. Brief unions on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative turnaround plan. X 
3.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps X 
3.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the unions X 
3.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
3.1.5. Keep unions posted on the progress of the tumaround X 
4. Banks and Financial Institutions >/ 
4.1. Negotiation of support of Banks and/or FIs and neutralization of 
Banks and/or FIspressures ^ 
4.1.1. Brief Banks and/or FIs on the problems and strengths of the 
unit and some tentative tumaround plan v/ 
4.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps — 
4.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from Banks and/or FIs ^ 
4.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy — 
4.1.5. Keep Banks and/or FIs posted on the progress of the 
tumaround ^ 
4.1.6. Protracted negotiations with the banks and Financial 
institutions NEW 
4.1.1. Educate the concerned bank officials on the working of the 
business/ industry NEW 
4.1.8. Requires personal interaction of promoter/ top management 
with Bank senior officials NEW 
5. Government </ 
5.1. Negotiation of support of Government and neutralization of 
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Government pressures ^ 
5.1.1. Brief relevant government departments on the problems and 
strengths of the unit and some tentative turnaround plan. ^ 
5.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps — 
5.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the government </ 
5.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy — 
5.1.5. Keep the government posted on the progress of the 
tumaround ^ 
5.1.6. Maintain direct contact; avoid via ntedias or advisors NEW 
6. Suppliers ^ 
6.1. Negotiation of support of suppliers and neutralization of 
Supplier's pressures -^ 
6.1.1. Brief suppliers on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative tumaround plan. >^ 
6.1.2. Get suppliers to suggest tumaround steps X 
6.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from suppliers ^ 
6.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
6.1.5. Keep suppliers posted on the progress of the tumaround ^ 
6.2. Build Credibility 
6.2.1. Commit payments to build credibility NE W 
7. Customers ^ 
7.1. Negotiation of support of customers and neutralization of 
Customer's pressures v 
7.1.1. Brief customers on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative tumaround plan. ^ 
7.1.2. Get customers to suggest tumaround steps X 
7.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from customers X 
7.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
7.1.5. Keep customers posted on the progress of the turnaround ^ 
7.2. Sourcing industry information for quick cost reduction •y 
7.2.1. Increase costs incurred on communication technologies, if 
need be, for sourcing industry (market) information </ 
7.3. Revenue Generation ^ 
7.3.1. Unfocused advertising and promotion be more sharply 
focused V 
7.3.2. Build Brand Image NEW 
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Validating the propositions 
Proposition P,A'- Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the communication objectives given in the framework 
though not necessarily aU. 
Framework 5.7 indicates that IPL management addressed 10 (2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 4.1, 
5.1, 6.1, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3), did not address 1 (3.1) and did not share any information on 1 
(1.1) of the 12 communication objectives listed in the theoretical framework 
proposed. 
Thus, the IPL management addressed some of the list of objectives given in the 
proposed framework but not all. It thus supports Proposition P,A. 
Proposition P,B: The list of communication objectives given in the proposed 
theoretical framework is comprehensive 
Framework 5.7 indicates that IPL management addressed 10 (2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 4.1, 
5.1, 6.1, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3), did not address 1 (3.1) and did not share any information on 1 
(1.1) of the 12 communication objectives listed in the theoretical framework 
proposed. 
Thus, for the turnaround of IPL, the list of communication objectives given in the 
framework was comprehensive. It thus supports Proposition P,B-
Proposition P2A- Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the critical stakeholders given in the framework. 
Framework 5.7 indicates that the IPL management addressed 6 (1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7) of the 
7 critical stakeholders during the turnaround of IPL. The only stakeholder not 
earmarked as being addressed is the Union (3). 
The turnaround of IPL therefore does not support Proposition P2A 
Proposition P2B: The list of critical stakeholders to be addressed during a 
turnaround is comprehensive. 
Framework 5.7 indicates that the IPL management addressed 6 (1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7) of the 
7 critical stakeholders during the turnaround of IPL. The only stakeholder not 
earmarked as being addressed is the Union (3). However, IPL management did not 
consider any stakeholder other than listed in the framework as critical. 
Thus, for the turnaround of IPL the list of critical stakeholders was comprehensive. It 
thus supports tfte Proposition P2B 
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Proposition PSA'. At least one of the communication actions listed in the proposed 
theoretical framework, is employed to realize a corresponding communication 
objective during turnaround. 
Framework 5.7 indicates that for each of the 10 communication objectives listed in 
the theoretical framework and addressed by IPL management, at least one 
communication action listed thereof was employed by the IPL management during 
turnaround. However, it also indicates 6 new communication actions (4.1.6, 4.1.7, 
4.1.8, 5.1.6, 6.1.6, 7.3.2) adopted by IPL management for addressing these 10 
communication objectives during turnaround. 
Thus, the turnaround of IPL indicates that i employed atleast one communication 
action listed in the proposed theoretical framework to realize a corresponding 
communication objective. It thus supports Proposition PIA-
Proposition PSB'. The list of communication actions recommended for achieving 
the communication objectives is not comprehensive 
Framework 5.7 indicates that IPL management adopted 40 communication actions; 
did not adopt 13 communication actions; and did not provide information on 7 
communication actions of the total of 60 communication actions listed in the 
theoretical framework proposed. It also indicates that IPL management employed 6 
new communication actions (4.1.6, 4.1.7, 4.1.8, 5.1.6, 6.1.6, 7.3.2). These actions 
were not listed in the theoretical framework proposed. 
The turnaround of IPL thus suggests that the list of communication actions given in 
the theoretical framework proposed is not comprehensive. It thus supports 
Proposition Pjg-
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Cases 
ASIA FAB LIMITED ( A F L ) 
Deciphering Communication during Turnaround 
Bacl<ground 
Asia Fab Limited (AFL) was established in 1992 by Black Rose Exports Pvt. Ltd., a 
trading company engaged in the export of cotton yam from India. The objective of 
AFL was to produce and export high quality suiting and other fabrics worldwide 
using Black Rose's strong communications with Japanese and other textile trading 
houses. Owing to internal management problems at Black Rose, neither AFL nor 
Black Rose Exports performed well. (Anup Jatia, Director Black Rose Pvt. Ltd., 
email communication, April 4 2006). The ownership of Black Rose exchanged hands 
twice to be finally with Atma Ram Jatia in 1995. Atma Ram Jatia alongwith his son 
Anup Jatia aspired to develop it as a trading house for textiles and chemicals. 
The performance of AFL kept declining and in 1998 the company's networth turned 
negative. By 2001 it had eroded to INR -25 mn but it turned around in 2002 to INR 2 
mn and improved thereafter. (See Table 5.8.1 and Chart 5.8.1). 
Table 5.8.1: Performance of AFL during 1996-2005; turnaround in 2002 
Asia Fab Ltd. 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Gross 
sales 
(inmn) 
26 42 35 12 15 18 34 55 69 77 
Net worth 
(inmn) 
3 3 -3 -17 -24 -25 2 8 27 33 
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Chart 5.8.1: Performance of AFL during 1996-2005; turnaround in 2002 
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Unraveling the turnaround 
Internal Issues 
Jatias after taking over the firm, found that the dyeing unit of the Company was 
unable to compete in the market place. "This was because competitor companies in 
the industry were indulging in rampant excise evasion. Since the excise duty was very 
high at that time, the choice before us was to either join the bandwagon or quit" 
(Anup Jatia, personal communications, October 18, 2005). Besides, AFL's dyeing / 
processing unit capacity was more than the weaving capacity, and hence the variable 
cost of the dyeing and processing unit was higher than the realization. 
The weaving unit was a relatively small labour intensive unit that reaped little returns. 
Again, the variable costs and the overheads were high and local outsourcing was 
more cost effective. 
There were also issues of lack of accountability owing to misuse of communication 
gaps. "An example is that you send an email and they claim that they haven't 
received the email - the server was dovra, or make some other excuse. What do you 
do? You install a hotline and then you notice that all the work is communicated on the 
hotline. Since there are no records, so there is no way to find out who is responsible. 
To meet this challenge, if the management seeks written communication, then that is 
an excuse for slowing down the work. So where to draw the line? Because of such 
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irresponsible behaviour, checks and balances or follow up is extremely important. 
Any possibility of communication gap has to be removed so that there can be no 
excuse for an error''. (Anup Jatia, personal communications, October 18, 2005). 
There was no desire amongst the workers to work effectively. Crucial to future of the 
unit was a change of culture - a culture where people wanted to work. 
Jatias had decided to continue the weaving unit to weave yam internally and if need 
be get it dyed outside and then export it. However, they found it very difficult to 
function smoothly because the factory was located at Kolhapur and the office in 
Mumbai. The work culture at the two locations was very different. The systems were 
not in place both at Kolhapur and Mumbai. Problems were aggravated because the 
communication was not smooth. Somewhere in the communication chain, the 
message was getting lost. Thus, it became extremely difficult to continue operating 
the office from Mumbai and set up the systems at Kolhapur, the way they wanted. 
Jatias realized that smooth communication was extremely important in the 
turnaround process. 
In an attempt to revive the weaving unit (after closing the dyeing unit) the 
management adopted various communication tools available, such as internet, 
hotline, telephone line, emails etc. However, they found that since people did not have 
the intent of using these for the organizational purpose, these were not used for the 
organizational work and there were innumerable negative effects of communication 
technology. "Rampant use of SMS, mobile, emails, web downloads for personal use is 
common practice." (Anup Jatia, personal communications, October 18, 2005) 
External Issues: Owing to various internal problems, AFL decided to switch to 
another product as a turnaround strategy. However, the process of setting up the new 
product required AFL management to tackle issues with several external 
stakeholders. 
Supplier Issues 
"No one was willing to give material to AFL on credit, as AFL's credibility was low. 
AFL therefore had to build credibility to manage better rates and credit period from 
suppliers." (Ram Nath, personal communications, October 18, 2005) 
Owing to the high quality yam that AFL needed for its processes, there was a need to 
educate the suppliers to meet its requirements. "For instance the cotton yam that one 
normally gets in India is littered with waste while our process requires a very high 
quality neat yam. The process involved communicating with the suppliers to ensure 
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that they have systems to meet this requiremenV (Anup Jatia, personal 
communications, October 18, 2005). Sourcing high quality yam was crucial to the 
success of the new product. Creating quality consciousness amongst the suppliers was 
therefore important. 
Customer Issues: AFL had only one customer for itsproduct. This customer was a 
Japanese organization. 
With the Japanese customer, language was a barrier and therefore simple clear 
communication with a constant eye on feedback to ensure that correct meaning was 
conveyed was crucial. 
The management maintained that when dealing with Japanese people relationship was 
very important. So they ensured that AFL employees maintained careful, sensitive 
and consistent communication with the customer. This was to be taught to 
employees so that communication with customer was effective. 
Public at large: Since AFL dealt in a security product, they were supposed to 
neither develop any other customer nor reveal any information to public at large. As 
per legal requirements, only financial statements were issued for shareholder 
communication. 
Internal Communication Strategy: Jatias decided that they would not step into 
the swamp of excise evasion or any other illegal activity. Also, they knew they would 
not be able to compete in the face of heavy excise levied by the Government. The 
bold decision of closing the dyeing unit was the only option left and they decided to 
implement it. The dyeing unit was accordingly closed in July 1998. 
While there were some labour problems that were to be resolved, broadly the workers 
were willing to quit. "Shutting down wasn't very tedious because we were ready to 
pay the workers whatever money the workers were entitled to. Also, legally we had 
an upper hand because we had gradually reduced our workforce to 100 where after 
retrenchment is allowed legally." (Anup Jatia, personal communications, October 18, 
2005). 
Most of the negotiations were handled by factory seniors. These pertained to 
compensations and some financial disclosures that had to be made. The workers were 
satisfied because they got their salaries and some extra money. 
The management decided to be honest and transparent. It was announced that all 
workers would get what they legally deserve. If anyone approached AFL management 
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to find out about their or company's fixture the management minced no words so that 
the workers could start looking for jobs elsewhere, for the workers who were asked to 
leave, the management attempted to communicate the company's constraints and 
plans, and to ease any unrest and facilitate easy and fast transition. The intent was to 
get it done at the eariiest, as there was no point in lingering on with a bleeding unit. 
The factory manager interacted with the workers at the time of closure. The workers 
often did not understand the seriousness of the issues. At the time of the 'process 
house' closure, however, the workers were clear in their financial demands and they 
were settled mostly amicably hrough dialogue. This made it uimecessary for us to 
obtain any government approvals. At the time of the weaving unit closure, the 
workers were being guided by their lawyer, who interacted with the management's 
lawyer. In this case, too, there was no need to communicate with any government 
agency. 
Jatias realized that it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, for them to institute a 
new culture in Kolhapur while maintaining the corporate office function in Mumbai. 
Also, considering the various constraints earlier, the Board decided to close the 
weaving unit in December 2000. During this period they had already started to look 
for better alternatives to address the cultural and distance communication issues. 
Two important issues, that Jatias however recollect from their experience with the 
Kolhapur dyeing and weaving units were: need for cultural change and institution of 
accountability. Critical for enabling this was seamless communication between the 
management and the employees. 
But the management was just not interested in spending energies to set the 
communication systems in place. It seemed to be an impossible task to manage the 
factory from a distant location. 
It was therefore, decided that AFL would switch from the current business to a 
business that ensures least manual and communication effort at the Kolhapur factory. 
"There were close to 200 workers when all the units were in operation. Today there 
are around 15 in total'. (Anup Jatia, email communication, April 4, 2006) 
Jatias developed a customer in Japan for a specialized security product"^ that they 
decided to manufacture in India. This product requked AFL office to procure a very 
specialized yam and supply it to the factory. In the factory, this yam was to go 
42 Owing to security reasons, AFL did not divulge information of the product and the customer 
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through a speciahzed process on a speciahzed machine, and then be exported to 
Japan. The difficult part was procurement of specified yam and this function was 
retained by the Mumbai office. A highly automated plant was set up at Kolhapur and 
few workers were required to man the entire unit. Thus, very little human intervention 
and thereby very little communication was needed to make it run smoothly. The 
flinction of export of the finished product was retained in the Mumbai office. 
The management expected three things from the workers: the workers should not go 
on strike, they should not form a union and they should not stop production. 
Therefore, the management made sure that salary levels were maintained. Incentive 
schemes were also adopted to improve productivity despite the fact that AFL was in 
red. 
The workers were advised to change and accept the new environment. Concepts of 
customer satisfaction were repeatedly drilled into the minds of the workers. Simple 
messages such as importance of cleanliness etc. were put across the premises to 
create awareness and motivate people to change the workplace to be a better place to 
work. Infact, people took initiatives to clean up places in the factory and even 
maintain lawns. 
Instituting professionai cuiture at Mumbai office: Jatias were now only 
concerned about the culture and work environment at the Mumbai office. The aims of 
the communication strategy adopted at Mumbai were to improve accountability, 
ownership, process flow, efficiency and receiver orientation. 
Improve Process Co-ordination and Communication flow for itigiier 
Accountability: Accountability was a serious problem at AFL and Jatias took several 
measures to improve it. These were.' 
1. Honest and Transparent Communication: AFL management believed in 
honest and transparent communication would ensure smooth process flow, 
reduce errors and improve efficiency. They encouraged people to own up 
responsibility when they err. Lying to hide petty mistakes was just not 
acceptable and people could be asked to leave the organization just on that 
pretext. / emphasized over and over again that telling the truth makes people 
strong internally and we demonstrated th e through our own actions ". (Anup 
Jatia, Personal Communication, Oct 18, 2005) 
The new management believed in open communications to Esolve disputes 
and sometimes took harsh decisions, if needed. 
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Feedback Process: There was no formal Feedback Process and most of the 
communication flowed up and down between the adjacent levels in hierarchy 
though there was informal communication also amongst the employees and 
the management. 
While efforts were made to make people appreciate the importance of clear, 
honest and transparent communication there were no messages formally 
coined to instill this attitude in the people's mind 
Communication hfrastructures: The Mumbai office and the factory were 
cormected through a hotline all along and the link was maintained. However, 
it was stipulated that all official communication was to be documented on the 
email/mail. 
Fresh young and efficient staff and workers who could be groomed to adopt a 
new culture were recruited. "Today we have very smooth communication 
flow enabled by LAN, our factory is online, we have a broadband 
connectivity and everything like supplies, deliveries, couriers etc are 
technologically tracked. There are no excuses anywhere in the system or 
process. In fact we use the communication technology to ensure 
accountability in the system" (Anup Jatia, Personal Communication, Oct 18, 
2005) 
Email as mode of official communication: AFL installed Lotus notes for 
internal email communication and Phytheas software for external email 
communication. The mail gate segregated mail and transferred these to 
concerned people. 
All official communication was over the email. So even if the office layout 
was open and employees were sitting in adjoining cabins, they were required 
to send an email for work request. The recipient was expected to respond by 
the end of the day, whether the task was done, was in process or was not to 
be done. 
Monitoring Communication: A copy of each mail was automatically copied to 
the directors' account by the server. Since it was not a very large company so 
reading all mails entailed reading only 400 to 500 emails a day. (each 
director gets a mail relevant to his/her area). 
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This according to Anup Jatia had several advantages: 
1. Everyone in the company knew that the mails were being copied to his 
account so there was no element of spying on 
2. He provided a backup for any possible lapse. 
3. No one used office hours for personal mails. "If they had to send personal 
mails they could do so from the common area. The inertia was higher in 
that case and the employees did so, only if necessary." 
Limited Internet Access: Broad band connectivity was established but the 
access was made available only to the Directors and to a terminal in the 
common area. Therefore, if a person wanted to access the net he/she had to 
walk upto the common area and access it. 
This again had several advantages 
1. It restricted usage of internet to organizational purpose. If there was an 
urgent need, the employee was free to use the internet for personal 
purposes as well but not otherwise. 
2. It made people organize their work and use intemet for optimum time. 
3. Kept the staff moving and therefore interacting with each other 
4. Helped avoid virus problems 
5. Issues of unacceptable downloads etc were also checked in this case. 
"We haven't had any such problem but cases of pomographic material 
being downloaded are common" warns Anup Jatia. "I know of a case in 
UK where an employee indulged in dovmloading child pom material. 
The management had no clue but when the cyber police discovered, the 
Company was held accountable for all that's transacted on their network. 
Such problems I believe can be checked to a large extent, through such 
simple means" he adds. 
Documentation for Transparency: Several Information documentation 
practices were adopted. These included 
i) The Company believed in continuously updating employee 
information. The HR document stipulates "Salaries of those 
employees who have not submitted EIF in the month of joining 
service or who have not submitted the updated EIF in any quarter 
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ending month, be withheld till the duly filed in forms are received 
from them". The policy indicates the emphasis this company gives to 
maintaining updated information systems. 
ii) Access to information based on the process flow and position or role 
in the process flow. Most of this information is on the intranet 
iii) However, policies are not yet formally coined and hence are not 
posted on the intranet 
iv) To ensure ethical practices AFL insisted that no brokerage be paid to 
any person who was not a Company approved broker. Head Office 
accounts had a list of all company approved brokers and their 
agreements. The Purchase order received from the customer and the 
AFL invoice endorsed or mentioned the name of the broker. 
If the immediate senior was unable to handle the grievance the employees were free 
to walk into the Director's office and share their concern. Since the number of 
employees was small, the Director personally attended to the grievance if need be. 
Most of the Counseling was done by the immediate senior or else the Director, Anup 
Jatia. 
Initially, the mobile phones were used freely in the office. But the management started 
getting complaints of loud, incessant calls being received by fellow staff members. 
This went on to the extent that it became a nuisance for others. 
The management therefore decided to restrict mobile phones usage to only those who 
needed the mobile phones for organizational work. This broadly meant that only the 
sales and marketing staff would use mobile phones in the office. "The office has ten 
PBX lines and it is easy for anyone to get through. So if any outsider has to speak to 
our staff, they are welcome to do it over the landlines. We found out that the number 
of calls reduced significantly, the duration of calls is also reasonable as now the staff 
knows that unlike the case of mobile phones, where management has no clue of 
what's happening on that channel, the land line can be monitored, if need be" (Anup 
Jatia, Personal Communication, Oct 18, 2005) 
This has also done away with the nuisance of SMS disturbance. The management sees 
no reason why employees must keep exchanging SMS for personal reasons as that 
causes both time wastage and distraction. Next, the issue ofMMS was also taken care 
of as a result. 
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Initially, there was a resistance especially from those who were constantly hooked on 
to the mobile phones, but eventually they accepted the decision. Adopting ISO 9000 
standards helped AFL to document its vision and processes. 
Formal documentation of policies of AFL was still pending. However, AFL did share 
the informal documentation ofHR policies with the researcher, which the researcher 
found, appeared to have been adequately circulated. 
External Communications at AFL 
An important message that AFL decided to send out to both suppliers and customers 
was that AFL could be relied on. Credibility building was considered very important 
and AFL decided to demonstrate that through action. 
Supplier Strategy: Initially, when AFL was in the red, the Company's equation 
with the suppliers was not very smooth. Therefore, AFL made all purchases in cash 
promptly and slowly they built their credibility with the suppliers and hence their 
company's image. 
The successful production of the new product of AFL was dependant on quality of 
yam used. High quality yam needed was not easily available and required that the 
suppliers be educated on the quality that the Company sought. Naturally, the 
management had to educate the suppliers on what they were looking for. 
"It was very difficult to explain to the suppliers regarding the quality of yam required. 
This is because our yam is not required for a textile end-use, and textile-related 
quality parameters are not relevant to us. We had to explain this by stationing our 
staff in their factories throughout the entire period that our goods were being 
produced, by explaining to them how to process the cotton and the yam or to set their 
machine parameters in a way that would suit us, etc. In other words, we had to leam 
the techniques of yam production ourselves and then explain them exactly how to 
make our yarn. Despite all our efforts, we often could not procure the quality we 
needed as some suppliers would change parameters during production to suit 
themselves and some suppliers would finally not understand the seriousness of our 
requirements. Further, market forces often made suppliers change their production 
planning which started affecting our supplies. Currently, therefore, we have 
concentrated all our production with one supplier who is more dependent on our 
business, and we procure the raw cotton required and pay them a conversion fee for 
this business" (Anup Jatia, email communication, April 4, 2006) 
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Customer Relations: At the customer end too AFL maintained that credibihty 
building was important, for instance, they once sold some material to an international 
buyer at a specific price. They signed a deal and had to effect the shipment in three 
months time. After concluding the deal, cost of raw material went up in national and 
intemational markets but they did not go back to the buyer. In/act, they honoured the 
deal and such actions they think were crucial to building their good-will. These were 
actions that were strong communications. 
Bridging language and cultural barriers: The sole customer of AFL was a 
Japanese Company. While the MD Atmaram was stationed in Japan, Anup Jatia 
traveled and actively managed the show in India. However, Anup Jatia was bom and 
brought up in Japan. He therefore not only spoke and understood Japanese language 
but also understood the Japanese culture. He knew their needs and made sure that 
they are met. To do this, he continuously educated and monitored his staff to ensure 
smooth communication for trustworthy relationship. "I know the Japanese work on 
trust in relationships. It is therefore important to have patience in the initial phase and 
build relationships. Once you are part of the chain, it is extremely difficult for a 
competitor to replace you. No small time notary incentives can lure them so long as 
you are clear in your communication and relationship. Since they are not very 
conversant with the English language, language usually is a big barrier. I have to 
constantly keep reminding my own people to speak very slowly and clearly to them " 
shares Jatia. 
Others Stakeholders: Shareholder Communications were not considered of 
significance and a short annual report was published to share annual financial details 
as per legal requirements. AFL also did not feel the need to interact with the 
Government of India for any reason. There was also no need felt to interact with the 
Industry Associations or any international Agency. 
AFL product was raw material for a security product and it had only one customer in 
Japan. The product was such that the Japanese customer was the only customer and 
there were only two suppliers across the world. There was no need for mass 
communication. In fact, owing to security reasons it could be damaging to the 
business. So AFL had no brochures, no advertising and no other mass 
communication strategies, for the same reason, AFL did not develop a website. 
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Integrating the External and Internal strategy 
It was pertinent to integrate internal and external communication strategy. The 
Japanese culture and language was distinctively different from that of Indians. The 
work orientation and communication style was different, for smooth functioning it 
was essential to bridge the gap. Also, to establish transparency, integration was 
essential. "For instance, if one wanted to communicate to the customer that one is 
highly credible then there is need to build the culture internally for being actually 
credible and that requires continuous communication through word and action to 
demonstrate how it works and how important it is for the organization to own this 
behaviour". (Anup Jatia, personal communication, Oct 18, 2005) 
The management educated their people on Japanese culture and language. The 
director, Anup Jatia, himself pitched in whenever required. 
The management discreetly accepts that HR was a crucial shortcoming. With poor 
HR, no communication strategy could be successfully implemented. As a result, it 
was decided to focus on activities which required less HR and less communication. In 
other words, the communication strategy adopted was to keep it on a need-to-know 
basis, and to keep it very simple, so as to not let any misunderstandings (intentional 
or unintentional) to affect the functioning of the business. 
Analysis 
The case of the turnaround of AFL supports the first stage of the theoretical model 
proposed in Figure 3.1. It reveals how owing to the rampant excise evasion in the 
textile industry, AFL failed to compete and had to finally close down its dyeing unit. 
Also, owing to the poor work environment, lack of smooth intemal communications 
and lack of management control on factory premises, the weaving unit also had to be 
closed down. Thus, the case demonstrates how environment and managerial decisions 
impacted AFL and led to its decline. Thus the case supports stage 1 of the theoretical 
model. 
Lack of accountability and a de-motivated workforce along with the suppliers 
awaiting payments were all exerting disabling forces on the sick enterprise. The case 
thus supports stage 2 given in Figure 3.2 of the theoretical model proposed. 
AFL management installed an automated plant at Kolhapur (the distant factory 
location) and adopted communication technologies and various other communcation 
actions such as educating on cross cultural communication and the likes to enable the 
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turnaround. The case thus also supports stage 3 of the theoretical framework 
suggested in this study. The list of communication actions adopted to enable the 
tumaround elements is given below Framework 5.8: 
Framework 5.8 
The Match between the CS for OTA framework and the communication 
strategy ofAFL during turnaround 
X No —Don't Know ^ Yes yV£'W'-Newly Identify 
Theoretical Pattern Case Pattern 
Stakeholder/ Turnaround Element (objective)/ 
Possible Communication Action 
1. Board of Directors/Shareholders X 
1.1. Gain support and time in the future X 
1.1.1. Present detailed turn-around plan — 
2. Staff and Employees ^ 
2.1. Credibility building actions by the new management X 
2.1.1. Document, and communicate a strategic tumaround plan X 
2.1.2. Publicize success in resolving a current crisis or problem X 
2.1.3. Make decisions transparent v* 
2.1.4. Exercise Communication Control (control on promises rolled 
out) </ 
2.2. Initial Control ^ 
2.2.1. Order preparation of daily, weekly and monthly cash 
forecasts %/ 
2.2.2. Exercise Corrmiunication Control. ^ 
2.2.3. Seek views on the general well being of the employees, 
(informally-new) ^ 
2.3. Mobilization of organization for turnaround ^ 
2.3.1. Include key managers for development of industry wisdom X 
2.3.2. Include only key managers for development of vision X 
2.3.3. CEO should deliver the vision presentation in person and as 
often as possible. X 
2.3.4. Hold special sessions for non-participating managers after 
vision has been developed to share plaimed vision X 
2.3.5. Inject urgency in the communications plan. Explain what 
needs to be done and why ^ 
2.3.6. Listen to the views of all managers. Gauge their reaction >/ 
2.3.7. Understand perceptions and focus minds of managing team. 
Set the scene for tumaround. X 
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2.3.8. Ensure all employees know what is going on, for what reason 
and how it will occur. X 
2.3.9. Share the pulpit (Empowerment) X 
2.3.10. Deal with concerns of employees in open and honest manner. 
Offer Follow up sessions >^  
2.3.11. Note any comments or queries and provide answers asap. v 
2.3.12. CEO must get out of the office to interact with the employees 
and to listen to them «/ 
2.3.13. Employ open ended communication style that encourages 
employees to find answers, take decisions. X 
2.3.14. Repeatedly affirm the Company's mission, core values, and 
the primary goals of profit and growth. </ 
2.3.15. Articulate a few highly concrete targets for the company for 
the next few months • 
2.3.16. Involve the staff to identify solvable problem areas and have 
their views on uninvolved areas. X 
2.3.17. Rephrase people's roles to clarify managerial 
responsibilities. X 
2.3.18. Top managers must emphasize on integrity, faimess, hard 
work, resourcefulness and concem for the staff during 
interactions with the staff. ^ 
2.3.19. Publicize and celebrate every employee and team success. 
2.4. Internal Co-ordination • 
2.4.1. Offer constant feedback to keep organization on track ^ 
2.4.2. Set up co-ordination committees for co-ordinating 
interdependent departments X 
2.4.3. Institute a monthly performance review meeting of all senior 
managers chaired by the chief executive. • 
2.4.4. Insist that lower level disputes be settled at that level on a 
face to face basis X 
2.4.5. Keep the atmosphere light. X 
2.4.6. Keep enhancing communication technology - email, mobile, 
ERP V 
2.4.7. Exercise control on communication technology NEW 
3. Unions v/ 
3.1. Negotiation of support of Unions and neutralization of Unions' 
pressures X 
3.1.1. Brief unions on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative turnaround plan. X 
3.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps X 
3.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the unions X 
3.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
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3.1.5. Keep unions posted on the progress of the turnaround X 
3.2. Managing retrenchment of a dying unit NEW 
3.2.1. Make it clear to he workers that the management would 
ensure a fair deal for them NEW 
2)22. Let a manager who has dealt with workers and enjoys their 
goodwill handle the negotiations NEW 
3.2.3. Do not hide the decision of closing down the unit, from 
anyone who enquires NEW 
4. Banks and Financial Institutions 
4.1. Negotiation of support of Banks and/or FIs and neutralization of 
Banks and/or FIs pressures — 
4.1.1. Brief Banks and/or FIs on the problems and strengths of the 
unit and some tentative tumaround plan — 
4.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps — 
4.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from Banks and/or FIs — 
4.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy — 
4.1.5. Keep Banks and/or FIs posted on the progress of the 
tumaround — 
5. Government 
5.1. Negotiation of support of Government and neutralization of 
Government pressures X 
5.1.1. Brief relevant government departments on the problems and 
strengths of the unit and some tentative tumaround plan. X 
5.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps X 
5.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the government X 
5.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
5.1.5. Keep the government posted on the progress of the 
tumaround X 
Suppliers ^ 
6.1. Negotiation of support of suppliers and neutralization of 
Supplier's pressures • 
6.1.1. Brief suppliers on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative tumaround plan. v 
6.1.2. Get suppliers to suggest tumaround steps X 
6.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from suppliers y* 
6.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
6.1.5. Keep suppliers posted on the progress of the tumaround X 
6.2. Build Credibility 
6.2.1. Commit payments to build credibility NEW 
622. Always keep your word NEW 
6.3. Ensure desirable quality of raw material supplied NEW 
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6.3.1. Ensured regular educating sessions for ensuring quality NEW 
6.3.2. Posted quality managers at the supplier site NEW 
7. Customers >^  
7.1. Negotiation of support of customers and neutralization of 
Customer's pressures X 
7.1.1. Brief customers on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative turnaround plan. X 
7.1.2. Get customers to suggest tumaround steps X 
7.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from customers X 
7.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
7.1.5. Keep customers posted on the progress of the tumaround X 
7.2. Ensure smooth cross cultural communication with customer NEW 
7.2.1. Continuously educate employees on customer's cultural 
values NEW 
7.2.2. Continuously educated employees on bridging language 
barriers with foreign customer NEW 
7.2.3. Continuous monitoring of all employee's communications 
with customer to cover up noise due to cultural and 
language differences NEW 
13. Sourcing industry information for quick cost reduction X 
7.3.1. Increase costs incurred on communication technologies, if 
need be, for sourcing industry (market) information •/ 
7.4. Revenue Generation X 
7.4.1. Unfocused advertising and promotion be more sharply 
focused X 
Validating the propositions 
Proposition Pi A'. Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the communication objectives given in the framework 
though not necessarily all. 
Framework 5.8 indicates that AFL management addressed 4 (2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 6.1), did 
not address 7 (1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 5.1, 7.1, 7.3, 7.4) and did not share any information on 1 
(4.1) of the 12 communication objectives listed in the theoretical framework 
proposed. 
Thus, the AFL management addressed some of the objectives listed in the proposed 
framework but not all. It thus supports Proposition P,A. 
Proposition P,B: The list of communication objectives given in the proposed 
theoretical framework is comprehensive 
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Framework 5.8 indicates that AFL management addressed 4 (2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 6.1), did 
not address 7 (1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 5.1, 7.1, 7.3, 7.4) and did not share any information on 1 
(4.1) of the 12 communication objectives listed in the theoretical framework 
proposed. However, AFL management additionally addressed 3 new communication 
objectives (3.2, 6.2, 7.2) during turnaround. 
Thus, for the turnaround of AFL, the list of communication objectives given in the 
framework is suggestive but not comprehensive. It thus does not support Proposition 
PlB-
Proposition P2A- Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the critical stakeholders given in the framework. 
Framework 5.8 indicates that the AFL management addressed 4 (2, 3, 6, 7) of the 7 
critical stakeholders during the turnaround of AFL. 2 stakeholders (1, 5) are 
earmarked as being not addressed while information for 1 stakeholder (4) was not 
made available to researcher. 
The turnaround of IPL therefore supports Proposition PZA 
Proposition IIB- The list of critical stakeholders to be addressed during a 
turnaround is comprehensive. 
Framework 5.8 indicates that the AFL management addressed 4 (2, 3, 6, 7) of the 7 
critical stakeholders during the turnaround of AFL. 2 stakeholders (1, 5) are 
earmarked as being not addressed while information for 1 stakeholder (4) was not 
made available to researcher. However, AFL management did not consider any 
stakeholder other than listed in the framework as critical. 
Thus, for the turnaround of AFL, the list of critical stakeholders was comprehensive. 
It thus supports the Proposition P2B-
Proposition PIA'. At least one of the communication actions listed in the proposed 
theoretical framework, is employed to realize a corresponding communication 
objective during turnaround. 
Framework 5.8 indicates that for each of the 4 communication objectives listed in the 
theoretical framework and addressed by AFL management, at least one 
communication action listed thereof was employed by the AFL management during 
turnaround. However, it also indicates 11 new communication actions (2.4.7, 3.2.1, 
3.2.2, 3.2.3, 6.1.6, 6.1.7, 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.2.3) adopted by AFL 
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management for addressing one of these (6.1) and 3 new (3.2, 6.2, 7.2) 
communication objectives during turnaround. 
Thus, the turnaround of AFL indicates that it employed atleast one communication 
action listed in the proposed theoretical framework to realize a corresponding 
communication objective. It thus supports Proposition P34. 
Proposition P}B- The list of communication actions recommended for achieving 
the communication objectives is comprehensive 
Framework 5.8 indicates that AFL management adopted 19 communication actions; 
did not adopt 35 communication actions; and did not provide information on 6 
communication actions of the total of 60 communication actions listed in the 
theoretical framework proposed. It also indicates that AFL management employed 11 
new communication actions (2.4.7, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 6.1.6, 6.1.7, 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 7.2.1, 
7.2.2, 7.2.3). These actions were not listed in the theoretical framework proposed. 
The turnaround of AFL thus suggests that the list of communication actions given in 
the theoretical framework proposed is not comprehensive. It thus does not support 
Proposition Pjg. 
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Case 9 
NAMBURNADI TEA CO. LTD. 
Deciphering communication during turnaround 
Background 
Namburnadi Tea Company Ltd (NTCL) located h Assam'*^ was a British Company 
that was bought by the Saharia Group in 1970s. Towards the end of 1990s, NTCL 
started running into losses. However, NTCL had a lot of virgin land which was very 
suitable for tea plantation. Land was in short supply in Assam. The quantum of 
produce that was possible by extra plantation lured Assam Tea Company Ltd. 
(ATCL) to acquire NTCL in 2001. However, by this time the networth of the 
company had eroded to INR (30) mn. The new management turned around the 
Company & the networth increased to INR 49mn in 2002. NTCL performance 
consistently improved thereafter (See Table 5.9.1 and Chart 5.9.1). 
Table 5.9.1: Performance of NTCL during 2000-2004; turnaround in 2002 
Namburnadi Tea Co. Ltd. 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Gross sales 28 10 19 29 20 
Net worth -6 -30 49 57 59 
Chart 5.9.1: Performance of NTCL during 2000-2004; turnaround in 
2002 
Namburnadi Tea Co. Ltd. 
Year 
Gross sales ' 'Net worth I 
43 Assam is a north-eastern state of India 
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Unraveling the turnaround story 
A team of four members of ATCL visited the NTCL tea gardens to take note of all 
aspects that demanded immediate attention. The internal and extemal issues identified 
were as follows: 
Internal Issues 
Employees: The various issues pertaining to employees were as follows: 
Misappropriation of funds and resources: It was during physical verification 
carried out by the team that the new management found a large number of assets 
missing. It was found that when the erstwhile promoter was on the verge of 
bankruptcy, he decided to sell off the Company. A third party at this time, offered to 
provide them loan to pay salaries to the workers and also to induct a manager for due 
diligence to decide whether or not to buy the garden. The promoter agreed and thus 
the manager, a nominee of the third party, was taken on board. This manager 
however, developed vested interests. He took over some land from the neighbourhood 
and a part of the input coming to the garden was sneaked to this adjoining garden. 
This set the rotting process mentioned above, rolling. 
A group of clerks, union leaders and a few others on the estate along with the 
manager cheated the workers and continued to pocket their dues. Be it wages, 
medicines or food allowances, everything was misappropriated while the uneducated 
worker did not know how to deal with the rampant exploitation. "Almost 50% of the 
PF was gobbled by the coterie of men cheating the workers" (Amir Ahsan, Director 
Incharge, personal communications, March 24, 2006) 
Low Worker Morale: Payments long overdue: There was much to be done at the 
worker's front as well. NTCL had not paid the gratuity to retired employees for 
several years. It had therefore, taken these retired workers on rolls. Morale of the 
employees was an all time low. They had a feeling that sooner or later the estate 
would close down. 
Besides, tea gardens were big vote banks. NTCL had approximately 1500 to 2000 
workers which no political party liked to ignore. Naturally, shades of politics were 
seen on the estate as well. "For instance, an MLA who happened to be the son of a 
worker, lived in the garden and initially attempted to mislead the workers to project 
himself as the sole savior. This was a tough challenge. Further, terrorism in Assam 
naturally had implications for the estate dwellers." (Amir Ahsam, personal 
communications, March 24, 2006) 
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"Politics, cheating, exploitation, no work - name the ill and it was there." (Amir 
Ahsan, personal communication, March 24, 2006) 
Deteriorating Quality of thie produce: There had been no fund infusion in the 
company for a long time. Essential jobs such as adding requisite fertilizers & 
nutrients in the soil had not been undertaken for over three to four years. The garden 
had gone back to infancy stage. The workers had forgotten simple things such as the 
proper technique of plucking leaves. Productivity was as low as 13 kg per day per 
person. Living conditions were poor. Thus, when ATCL took it over from Saharia 
Group in 2001, NTCL was a case of vested interests and sheer mismanagement. 
Inadequate Communication Infrastructure in North-Eastern states of India: In 
Assam, especially in this area, communication and movement was a big problem. 
BSNL which had ignored North Eastern part of India (NE) later enabled phone links 
and internet connectivity. "But every other day there is a strike for one reason or 
another". (Abhay Chowdhary, CFO ATCL, personal communication, Dec 14, 2005) 
Lack of trust in Management: The management at NTCL, for years together was 
corrupt and had exploited the workers. Naturally, the workers had little reason to 
believe that the new management would be any different. Also there were always 
some elements to promote anti-establishment sentiment for varied personal interests. 
Shareholders: ATCL bought 92% shares of NTCL. Thus, there were no other 
significant share holders. Hence, there was no significant communication with the 
shareholders except as per statutory requirements. 
External Issues 
Banks: NTCL had a major default with Allahabad bank and the account was 
classified as an NPA. ATCL had to clear the accounts and also fetch more funds to 
ftirther the business. 
Government: The Government of Assam provided subsidy for re-plantation of 
damaged bushes. Since the bushes in NTCL were old and matnutrition, the new 
management had to convince the Tea Board that there was a need to replace the 
bushes and claim re-plantation subsidy. 
Customer: NTCL had not been producing good quality tea for some time. 
Naturally, the image of the company was tarnished and there was need to re-build the 
same. Since, ATCL intended to export NTCL Tea, NTCL image was to be promoted 
abroad as well. 
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Internal Communications at NTCL 
If there is one mantra that Ahsan recommends, it is the need to back verbal 
communication with real time action. This he insists is the only way to build 
credibiHty which is crucial for a turnaround. ''If you say something, do it on high 
priority, for instance if in a meeting you insist that you will ensure justice and will be 
tough on those who perpetuate injustice, then make sure you find out the corrupt 
people and take tough action. In our case, we sacked three corrupt employees. This 
can be tough as such people would usually have a clout and the general public is 
scared of dealing with them. 
Yet another instance was owing to politics in the garden, which too had to be dealt 
with very firmly. "We went to the MLA on the garden (mentioned earlier) and told 
him that we were ready to talk cx\ any of the issues or show to him our plans or talk to 
him over dinner, if need be. However, if he tried to disestablish then we will have to 
fight back and sort him out. The message was clear that the management would not 
permit him to have his way". (Amir Ahsam, personal communications, March 24, 
2006). 
However, if the management has committed it must stand by it. ''People are weary of 
those who talk, make several promises and do not deliver. However, if the employees 
see that action follows the talk, the trust can be builtT Ahsan explains with another 
example, "If you promise to improve some working condition, say, get tractors in 10 
days and in retum ask for increased productivity then make sure that the tractors 
arrive within the 10 days and no later. Only then, can (or should) an issue of 
productivity be raised." 
Thus, building credibility was the single foremost goal that NTCL turnaround 
management set for itself Once that came through, the rest followed. 
Day-to-day monitoring: A check on pilferage: Considering that the Company 
taken over was sick owing to lack of vigilant monitoring on a day-to-day basis, a 
deputy manager who was incharge of Hajua (ATCL's best tea estate) was promoted 
and sent tiere as manager NTCL and an accountant was appointed to set right the 
records and check pilferage. 
Strict action was taken against the corrupt employees. This sent a positive message 
through the garden and workers started to notice the management action. 
SC Ghosh, who had extensive experience in managing tea estates, was appointed as 
the visiting Director. He had frequent meetings with the workers and the union 
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officials (every 15 to 20 days) to ensure that the plans were followed and targets were 
met. No numbers were arrived at but the progress and cost savings were indicators of 
the success of communication. 
Addressing Grievances and boosting morale: A message of revival had to be 
sent through the garden to revive hope and to encourage an effort for revival. The 
labour in the garden did not understand vision and mission statements. The message 
for them was that the management will take care of all their statutory dues and they 
must improve the garden. "We told them that their association with the garden has 
been for several generations and thus they must extend support to improve it. Thus, 
we asked for support and felt that since they are more closely associated they would 
extend it" (Abhay Choudhary, personal communications, December 14, 2006) 
In a tea garden, the worker is entitled to free or subsidized supplies of food, 
medicines, schooling, health care etc. The management restored the rights of the 
workers. The dialogue to settle the dues of the workers also started. NTCL 
management philosophy was that 'ignoring injustice amounts to being part of it'. 
Therefore, they laid down processes such as opening bank accounts, educating them 
on operating accounts, ensuring PF was given and the likes. "The image that one 
builds is that if this management stays our rights will be looked after. Then 
everything falls in place." (Amir Ahsan, personal communications, March 24, 2006) 
200 acres of fresh area was planted. This called for investment and concerted effort. It 
therefore demonstrates the managements' desire and intent to stay there for good. 
Also, the living conditions of the workers improved and they naturally became 
positively inclined towards the new management. 
It took them one and a half year of continuous demonstration of intent to improve the 
garden and gain worker trust. However, when the expenses became very high and 
they explained the problems to the workers, the latter offered to accept minimum 
wages and minimum bonus (a cut of 20% on each for contractual employees) for a 
span of three years. Ahsan insists that it was an offer and not a decision forced on the 
workers. He claims that this is evidence of what success credibility can bring with it. 
The agreement was till December 31 2005 and from January 1 2006 the Company has 
restored normal salaries of the employees. 
Workers were encouraged to take several measures through programmes such as 
family planning, fight malaria, clean environment etc. and the management provided 
support for all such actions. This endeared the management to the workforce. 
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Who did it? Ahsan, had previously been a deputy manager and later manager before 
rising to the post of a director of tea estates of NTCL. He, therefore, had considerable 
experience in running tea estates and handling labour. He was like an advisor at the 
top. He had very good communication skills and could relate to the needs and desires 
of the people on the garden. The Manager alongwith the newly appointed deputy 
manager had several meetings with the labour unions. Realizing that the workers 
were an uneducated lot, it was important to reach them through representatives. The 
new team thus met the Sardars regularly to explain to them various issues and 
encouraged them to take a proactive role in boosting the morale and efficiency of the 
workers. 
The labour unions and sardars understood the situation and were very cooperative. 
"They ensured that after the takeover the new management did not face much 
problem." (Abhay Choudhary, personal communications, December 24, 2006) While 
the deputy manager and accountant vere on the job day-to-day, SC Ghosh had 
frequent meetings with them and the union officials (every 15 to 20 days) to ensure 
that the plans were followed and targets were met. Protracted negotiations took place 
among SC Ghosh, Ahasan, the Union Leader and the Sardars. Gratuity liability was 
phased out (in installments) and the union agreed to minimum bonus for the workers 
until the estate had started doing well. 
Besides meeting the managers or committees once in 3 to 4 months, Ahsan insisted on 
having a direct communication with the workers. "For instance, I would stand next to 
a queue and share some developments. Listen to how they responded and this gave 
great insights and also a confidence and link with the worker. Direct and informal 
communication also played an important role." (Amair Ahasan, personal 
communications, March 24, 2006). 
Two-way communication model for regular feedbacl<: According to ATCL, 
good communication implied exchange of right information between relevant people 
at the right time (information load). It was important that the information was 
accurate, timely and at the same time it did not cause an overload. Thus, information 
was not disseminated indiscriminately but was collated to make it available in the 
background so that anyone who requires the information can easily access the same. 
ATCL ensured this by implementing the two-way communication model (the model is 
documented) at NTCL. forms to carry out regular communication were designed and 
made available. According to this model, NTCL sent supplies to the Head Office 
(HO) at Kolkata, the HO continuously sent to them the tea quality reports, the price it 
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was able to fetch alongwith comments and directions on how these could be improved 
in future on daily, weekly and monthly basis. Thus, constant monitoring of the estate 
took place through this model. Also, the estate managers remained posted on the 
market feedback to their produce and clear information on scope for improvement 
was available. 
Training for SIdll Building: Training was thus organized to train them on 
identifying or appreciating tea leaf quaUty and how to pluck the leaves. Training for 
improving the manufacturing process was also organized. 
Improving Productivity: This again was a joint effort. Committees were organized 
to see how productivity could be enhanced, for instance, when the workers pointed 
out that they had to carry their leaves to a long distance to have them weighed every 
day, the management opened some of the roads and arranged tractors for the workers 
to make the process easier and faster for them. Similar measures increased the 
productivity from 13 kg per day per person to 21.8 kg per day per person. Thus, 
listening carefully to the workers helped in improving productivity. 
Ensuring Communication Infrastructure: Since, in the North-Eastern states of 
India, both communication and travel infrastructure were not well developed, ATCL 
extended its V-SATfacility to maintain email link with the estate. In event of frequent 
strikes or faulty phone lines, the communication link was up and running. This was 
more so because communication was considered important and inferior 
communication infrastructure in the North -Eastern states of the country had to be 
taken care of. 
The garden was then connected to the internet. The inhouse web-enabled intranet was 
set-up to serve as the backbone of the information flow mechanism at the NTCL. The 
priority, needs and access rights were designed as per the needs of the garden. NTCL 
considered communication as extremely important and herefore made concerted 
efforts to enable multilocation ERPpackage. All ATCL estates have adopted Harvest 
IT ERP package, a package designed specifically for tea estates. Thus, like other 
gardens of ATCL, NTCL also adopted the single estate ERP package, which was fully 
functional. However, ATCL has been facing technical problems in establishing 
multilocational ERP package but is working towards it. 
External Communications at NTCL 
Bankers: The new management paid off all dues to Allahabad Bank and got new 
fmancing from PNB. This, however, required ATCL/ NTCL to sell its ideas to PNB. 
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Several meetings and presentations were organized. A PNB representative visited the 
estate once in ten months. A corporate guarantee from the parent Company was also 
given to gpt the financing approval. Regular information such as monthly stock 
statements, sales status reports etc had to be submitted to maintain their confidence. 
Government: The Government of Assam offered subsidy on replanting old bushes. 
To avail this subsidy ATCL attempted to convince the TEA Board of the Government 
of Assam. "NTCL however has not yet received the replanting subsidy". (Amir 
Ahsam, personal communications, March 24, 2006). 
Suppliers: There were three types of suppliers to NTCL - suppliers of fertilizers, 
machine components and machines . According to the sale agreement with NTCL, 
its erstwhile owner had to settle the accounts with the suppliers. The new 
management therefore started afresh and thus employed services of existing suppliers 
of ATCL. 
This was because ATCL had 16 gardens and bought supplies in bulk, which gave 
them better rates and hence cheaper supplies. 
Customers: ATCL sold tea through two channels - directly to companies such as 
HLL, Tata, Tetley, Grinard or various brokers and through auction houses. The same 
policy was adopted for NTCL as well. 
Extensive one-to-one communication with the auction houses and the private 
customers was undertaken. But most of it was selling and not marketing the product. 
Both cost and quality were important. Understanding of tastes of different regions 
was important. Thus, the sales effort involved sending samples of the NTCL tea 
alongwith competitive prices. The platform used was that of ATCL. 
In foreign markets, Dunken McNeil were agents of ATCL. They marketed tea 
globally and NTCL tea was also sold in foreign markets through them. 
Industry Associations: NTCL was a member of Indian Tea Association and Tea 
Association of India, the two major tea associations in Assam. Companies conveyed 
their views to the Government through these associations. However, this membership 
did not play any role in the process of tumaround. 
Other stakeholders: NTCL had no agency or principals to work with nor did it 
seek or get any aid from any international agencies. Since the Company was not 
'*'' machines such as Rolling, CTC, Drying and Sorting machines 
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ready for any kind of media coverage, media relations were not promoted. Public at 
large was also not a customer as the sales were through brokers or to institutions. 
Surrounding the tea garden were villages that had small hotels, restaurants and other 
businesses that heavily depended on the well-being of the garden workforce. As the 
living conditions in the garden improved it started impacting the lives of the villagers. 
"After 3 to four years of takeover, we started receiving a pleasant nod from these 
villagers. This was an acknowledgement of our good work" shares Ahsan with a 
sense of deep satisfaction though he insists that they still have to go a long way. 
Analysis 
The turnaround of NTCL supports the first stage of the theoretical framework 
suggested in this study in Figure 3.1. While the case does not suggest any external 
environmental changes to have impacted the organization or its managerial decisions 
but it does implicate faulty managerial decisions for the decline of the Company. The 
faulty decisions were owing to resource constraints and lack of interest of the 
management in turning around the Company. The impact of the managerial decisions 
caused the organization to deteriorate to the extent of sickness. Thus the case supports 
the first stage of the theoretical model that is demonstrated in Figure 3.1. 
When NTCL was sick there were disabling forces exerted by corrupt employees who 
employed unethical means to cheat the workers. The workers themselves were de-
motivated and had forgotten the skill required for performing their jobs. Political 
forces were also getting nurtured. Banks had classified it as an NPA and its image 
amongst the customers was tamished. Thus, there were disabling forces exerted by 
various external and internal stakeholders that were much stronger than the feeble 
enabling forces exerted by government (offering assistance for re-plantation) etc. 
Thus the case of turnaround of NTCL supports the second stage of the theoretical 
model suggested in this study and shown in Figure 3.2. 
When ATCL acquired NTCL, the new management assumed the central 
responsibility for turning around the company. It then enabled several tumaround 
elements by strategizing and interacting with various stakeholders. Credibility 
building, initial control, coordination, mobilization of organization, negotiations with 
unions, dealing with banks, suppliers and customers were all tumaround elements 
enabled through communication actions during the process of tumaround of NTCL. 
These communication actions are listed in the Framework 5.9 given below. Thus the 
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case of NTCL strongly supports the stage 3 of the theoretical model proposed in this 
study. 
Framework 5.9 
The Match between the CS for OTA framework and the communication 
strategy of NTCL during Turnaround 
X No —Don'tKnow ^ Yes A'E^f-Newly Identify 
Theoretical Pattern Case Pattern 
Stakeholder/ Turnaround Element (objective)! 
Possible Communication Action 
1. Board of Directors >/ 
1.1. Gain support and time in the future ^ 
1.1.1. Present detailed turn-around plan v 
2. Staff and Employees 
2.1. Credibility building actions by the new management >/ 
2.1.1. Document, and communicate a strategic turnaround plan >/ 
1X1. Publicize success in resolving a current crisis or problem s/ 
2.1.3. Make decisions transparent ^ 
2.1.4. Exercise Communication Control ^ 
2.2. Initial Control </ 
ll.\. Order preparation of daily, weekly and monthly cash 
forecasts v* 
2.2.2. Exercise Communication Control. >/ 
l.l.'h. Seek views on the general well being of the employees. x* 
2.2.4. Confront employees attempting anti-establishment 
sentiment NEW 
2.3. Mobilization of organization for turnaround >/ 
2.3.1. Include key managers for development of industry wisdom X 
2.3.2. Include only key managers for development of vision X 
2.3.3. CEO should deliver the vision presentation in person and as 
often as possible. X 
2.3.4. Hold special sessions for non-participating managers after 
vision has been developed to share planned vision X 
2.3.5. Inject urgency in the communications plan. Explain what 
needs to be done and why ^ 
2.3.6. Listen to the views of all managers. Gauge their reaction </ 
2.3.7. Understand perceptions and focus minds of managing team. 
Set the scene for turnaround. X 
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2.3.8. Ensure all employees know what is going on, for what reason 
and how it will occur. ^^  
2.3.9. Share the pulpit (Empowerment) >^  
2.3.10. Deal with concerns of employees in open and honest maimer. 
Offer Follow up sessions • 
2.3.11. Note any comments or queries and provide answers asap. v 
2.3.12. CEO must get out of the office to interact with the employees 
and to listen to them ^ 
2.3.13. Employ open ended communication style that encourages 
employees to find answers, take decisions. */ 
2.3.14. Repeatedly affirm the Company's mission, core values, and 
the primary goals of profit and growth. <^ 
2.3.15. Articulate a few highly concrete targets for the company for 
the next few months s/ 
2.3.16. Involve the staff to identify solvable problem areas and have 
their views on uninvolved areas. ^ 
2.3.17. Rephrase people's roles to clarify managerial 
responsibilities. X 
2.3.18. Top managers must emphasize on integrity, faimess, hard 
work, resourcefulness and concern for the staff during 
interactions with the staff. ^ 
2.3.19. Publicize and celebrate every employee and team success. ^ 
2.4. Internal Co-ordination ^ 
2.4.1. Offer constant feedback to keep organization on track ^ 
2.4.2. Set up co-ordination committees for co-ordinating 
interdependent departments X 
2.4.3. Instimte a monthly performance review meeting of all senior 
managers chaired by the chie f executive. ^ 
2.4.4. Insist that lower level disputes be settled at that level on a 
face to face basis X 
2.4.5. Keep the atmosphere light. — 
2.4.6. Keep enhancing communication technology - email, mobile, 
ERP ^ 
Unions >/ 
3.1. Negotiation of support of Unions and neutralization of 
Unions' pressures ^ 
3.1.1. Brief unions on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative tumaround plan. v' 
3.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps ^ 
3.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the unions >^  
3.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy v* 
3.1.5. Keep unions posted on the progress of the tumaround >/ 
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4. Banks and Financial Institutions ^ 
4.1. Negotiation of support of Banks and/or FIs and neutralization of 
Banks and/or FIs pressures ^ 
4.1.1. Brief Banks and/or FIs on the problems and strengths of the 
unit and some tentative turnaround plan X 
4.1.2. Get them to suggest turnaround steps X 
4.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from Banks and/or FIs ^ 
4.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy X 
4.1.5. Keep Banks and/or FIs posted on the progress of the 
tumaround v 
4.1.6. Educate the concerned bank officials on the working of the 
business/industry NEW 
5. Government >/ 
5.1. Negotiation of support of Government and neutralization of 
Government pressures </ 
5.1.1. Brief relevant government departments on the problems and 
strengths of the unit and some tentative tumaround plan. ^ 
5.1.2. Get them to suggest tumaround steps X 
5.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from the government v 
5.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
5.1.5. Keep the government posted on the progress of the 
tumaround X 
6. Suppliers X 
6.1. Negotiation of support of suppliers and neutralization of suppliers' 
pressures X 
6.1.1. Brief suppliers on the problems and sfrengths of the unit and 
some tentative tumaround plan. X 
6.1.2. Get suppliers to suggest tumaround steps X 
6.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from suppliers X 
6.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
6.1.5. Keep suppliers posted on the progress of the tumaround X 
7. Customers ^ 
7.1. Negotiation of support of customers and neutralization of 
customers 'pressures -/ 
7.1.1. Brief customers on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative tumaround plan. X 
7.1.2. Get customers to suggest tumaround steps »/ 
7.1.3. Seek support, concessions etc. from customers X 
7.1.4. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy X 
7.1.5. Keep customers posted on the progress of the tumaround ^ 
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7.2. Sourcing industry information for quick cost reduction «/ 
7.2.1. Increase costs incurred on communication technologies, if 
need be, for sourcing industry (market) information v 
7.3. Revenue Generation 
7.3.1. Unfocussed advertising and promotions be more sharply 
focussed •/ 
7.3.2. Build Brand Image NEW 
Validating the propositions 
Proposition P,y. Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the communication objectives given in the framework 
though not necessarily all. 
Framework 5.9 indicates that NTCL management addressed 11 (1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 
3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3) and did not address 1 (6.1) of the 12 communication 
objectives listed in the theoretical framework proposed. 
Thus, the NTCL management addressed some of the objectives listed in the proposed 
framework but not all. It thus supports Proposition P,A. 
Proposition PJBI The list of communication objectives given in the proposed 
theoretical framework is comprehensive 
Framework 5.9 indicates that NTCL management addressed 11 (1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 
3.1, 41, 5.1, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3) and did not address 1 (6.1) of the 12 communication 
objectives listed in the theoretical framework proposed. However, NTCL 
management did not address any communication objective other than those listed in 
the theoretical framework proposed. 
Thus, for the turnaround of NTCL, the list of communication objectives given in the 
framework is comprehensive. It thus supports Proposition Pig. 
Proposition P2A'- Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the critical stakeholders given in the framework. 
Framework 5.9 indicates that the NTCL management addressed 6 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7) of 
the 7 critical stakeholders during the turnaround of NTCL. 1 stakeholders (6 -
supplier) is earmarked as being not addressed. However, NTCL management did not 
consider any stakeholder other than listed in the framework as critical. 
The turnaround of NTCL therefore supports Proposition P2A 
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Proposition PB- The list of critical stakeholders to be addressed during a 
turnaround is comprehensive. 
Framework 5.9 indicates that the NTCL management addressed 6 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7) of 
the 7 critical stakeholders during the turnaround of NTCL. 1 stakeholders (6 -
supplier) is earmarked as being not addressed. However, NTCL management did not 
consider any stakeholder other than listed in the framework as critical. 
Thus, for the turnaround of NTCL, the list of critical stakeholders was 
comprehensive. It thus supports Proposition P2B 
Proposition PJA' At least one of the communication actions listed in the proposed 
theoretical framework, is employed to realize a corresponding communication 
objective during turnaround. 
Framework 5.9 indicates that for each of the 11 communication objectives listed in 
the theoretical framework and addressed by NTCL management, at least one 
communication action listed thereof was employed by the NTCL management during 
turnaround. However, it also indicates 3 new communication actions (2.2.4, 4.1.6, 
7.3.2) adopted by NTCL management for addressing 3 of these (2.2, 4.1, 7.3) 
communication objectives during turnaround. 
Thus, the turnaround of NTCL indicates that it employed atleast one communication 
action listed in the proposed theoretical framework to realize a corresponding 
communication objective. It thus supports Proposition P34. 
Proposition Pss'. The list of communication actions recommended for achieving 
the communication objectives is comprehensive 
Framework 5.9 indicates that NTCL management adopted 37 communication actions; 
did not adopt 22 communication actions; and did not provide information on 1 
communication actions of the total of 60 communication actions listed in the 
theoretical framework proposed. It also indicates that NTCL management employed 3 
new communication actions (2.2.4, 4.1.6, 7.3.2). These actions were not hsted in the 
theoretical framework proposed. 
Framework 5.9 thus confirms that for tumaround of NTCL the list of communication 
actions given in the theoretical framework proposed was not comprehensive. It thus 
does not supports Proposition Pss. 
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Results and Discussion 6 
Section I: Cross-Case Synthesis for validating the propositions 
In Chapter 5 Observations and Analysis, analysis and discussion on validity of Figure 
3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 for each case was presented at the end of the respective case 
presented. All the cases supported all the stages in each exhibit. However, in case of 
IPL, the study reveals that some of the stakeholders exert neither enabling nor 
disabling forces. They remain neutral and thus they exert neutral forces on the 
organization. The three exhibits are presented again to establish the context in which 
organizational turnarounds happen, the process of initializing turnaround, and the role 
of management action and communication in the process of Tumaround. 
The h^otheses to establish the proposed theoretical framework of Communication 
Strategies for Organizational Tumaround ^ S for OTA) were evaluated for each 
organization and presented at the end of the case written for the respective 
organization. The results of the hypotheses for each case are brought together and 
tabulated in Table 6.1 (Appendix 61) and discussed below to carry out a cross-case 
synthesis. 
Proposition Pi A: Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the communication objectives given in the framework 
though not necessarily all. 
Result: Yes-9; No-0 
Interpretation: 
Results tabulated against Proposition P,A indicate that although each of the nine 
companies studied, did not deem it necessary to address all the communication 
objectives given in the proposed theoretical framework during tumaround, it is 
important to note that all of them without exception definitely addressed one or more 
of the communication objectives given in the proposed theoretical framework. The 
above findings indicate that all the 9 companies studied, support Proposition P^. 
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Proposition P,B: The list of communication objectives given in the proposed 
theoretical framework is comprehensive. 
Result: Yes-4; No-5 
Interpretation 
Results tabulated for Proposition PB indicate that for 4 of the 9 turned around 
companies studied, the list of communication objectives was comprehensive but it 
was not so for the other 5 companies that addressed communication objectives other 
than those listed in the proposed theoretical framework. Thus, the above findings 
indicate that 5 of the 9 companies studied do not support Proposition P/B. 
Proposition P2A' Every company that undergoes a turnaround would necessarily 
have to address some of the critical stakeholders given in the framework. 
Results: Yes-9; No-0 
Results tabulated for Proposition P2A indicate that all the 9 turned around companies 
studied as part of this research study, addressed atleast one of the critical stakeholders 
listed in the theoretical framework suggested. The above findings indicate that all the 
9 companies studied support Proposition P2A • 
Proposition I^B' The list of critical stakeholders to be addressed during a 
turnaround is comprehensive. 
Results: Yes-6; No-3 
Results tabulated for Proposition P2B indicate that 6 of the 9 turned around companies 
studied, addressed some or all of the stakeholders during turnaround, for the 
turnaround of these companies, the list of critical stakeholders listed in the proposed 
theoretical framework is comprehensive. However, TBEL additionally addressed a 
Social Activist Group while ESCL and NJMCL had to additionally interact with 
Industry Associations during their turnaround period. The findings indicate that 3 of 
the 9 companies studied, did not support Proposition P2B-
Proposition PJA' At least one of the communication actions listed in the proposed 
theoretical framework is employed to realize a corresponding communication 
objective during turnaround. 
Results: Yes-9; No-0 
Results tabulated for Proposition PJB in Table 6.1 indicate that each of the 9 
companies employed atleast one communication action to achieve the corresponding 
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communication objective, provided it had identified the objective as its objective 
during turnaround. The findings indicate that all the companies studied, support 
Proposition PSA-
Proposition PJB'. The list of communication actions recommended for achieving 
the communication objectives is comprehensive 
Results: Yes-0; No-9 
Results tabulated for Proposition PSB mdicate that all the 9 turned around companies 
studied as part of this research study, employed some communication actions other 
than those listed in the framework prepared on the basis of the literature review. The 
findings indicate that all the 9 companies studied, do not support Proposition PSB-
Section II: Appreciating role and impact of communication during 
turnaround 
The 6 Proposition devaluated on the basis of cases written for different organizations, 
studied as part of this research study, reveal that the list of stakeholders, objectives 
and communication actions prepared from the literature review were mandatory to the 
extent that one or more of the objectives and communication actions suggested to 
achieve these thereof, were adopted by each turnaround management during 
tumaround. However, all the three lists - stakeholders, objectives and actions 
proposed in the theoretical framework were incomprehensive. Discussion of 
Proposition Pthus indicates that in all organizations without exception, 
communication played a role in enabling tumaround elements/ objectives. 
Managements of all the 9 companies studied, also shared instances that clearly depict 
the impact of communication during tumaround. for instance, when TBEL was faced 
with the grave situation of asking the female workers of the factory, to remove sacred 
artifacts while working in the factory premises, there was a major uprising among the 
workers. Accepting the demand of the management was unthinkable for the workers 
and TBEL management took almost three months of regular dialogue with the 
workers to make them understand the importance of the decision and implications of 
the otherwise. With tremendous satisfaction, Juhi Raikhy**' shared how on a given day 
the workers voluntarily removed all the artifacts. TBEL completely attributes the 
success of the event to the continuous informal communications with the workers. 
Juhi Raikhy was the key spokesperson of the management who interacted with the female 
workers 
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ABCL management, on the other hand, shared how important it was to keep the 
government departments and local administration informed about their plans of 
retrenchment, during closure of one of its units. They insist that not communicating 
their plans in time, would have impacted the negotiations with the workers. It was 
thus considered very important to present their plans and views to the relevant people. 
AFL switched its very business to a product that required an automated plant and 
minimal communication because of its incapability or lack of interest in resolving the 
communication problems. Jatias revealed that communication could majorly impact 
their business, owing to cross cultural communication that came into play. The 
management strongly believed that communication had a very significant impact, to 
the extent that the Director personally monitored all the email communication of all 
the employees of the company, regularly on a day-to-day basis. 
Ahsan of NTCL shared how when the expenses became very high and the 
management explained the problems to the workers, the latter offered to accept 
minimum wages and minimum bonus (a cut of 20% on each for contractual 
employees) for a span of three years. Ahsan insisted that it was an offer and not a 
decision forced on the workers. He claimed that this was evidence of success of 
credibility of management. During his entire discourse Ahsan shared numerous 
communication interventions employed to build credibility among the employees. 
The impact of communication was thus quite evident from the turnaround 
management's experiences. 
Thus, it was quite evident that while each of the companies was conscious of the 
impact that communication could have and was consciously strategizing its 
communication actions, the action strategy was not documented as a 'communication 
strategy document'. Interestingly, the pattern of documentation in the tumaround 
literature is similar. While there is enough evidence to substantiate the need for 
communication strategy during tumaround, no separate study was found on the 
subject. The need to develop a communication strategy to enable an organizational 
tumaround is therefore established. 
Section III: Developing and Analyzing revised framework for CS for OTA 
If Framework 3.2 is augmented by adding all the new stakeholders, new 
communication objectives and new communication actions suggested in various case 
studies, irrespective of ther popularity or significance. Framework 6.1 emerges. This 
framework is therefore a more comprehensive framework of CS for OTA. 
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Framework 6.1 
More comprehensive framework ofCS for OTA 
Theoretical Pattern augmented by Case Pattern 
Stakeholder/ Turnaround Element (objective)/ Possible Communication Action 
1. Board of Directors/ Shareholders 
1.1. Gain support and time in the future 
1.1.1. Present detailed tum-around plan 
2. Staff and Workers/ Employees 
2.1. Credibility building actions by the new management 
2.1.1. Make decisions transparent 
2.1.2. Exercise Communication Control (Do not over-promise) 
2.1.3. Document, and communicate a strategic turnaround plan 
2.1.4. Publicize success in resolving a current crisis or problem 
2.2. Initial Control 
2.2.1. Exercise Communication Control (Check the number of or 
participation in meetings) 
2.2.2. Seek views on the general well being of the employees. 
2.2.3. Order preparation of daily, weekly and monthly cash forecasts 
2.2.4. Confront employees attempting anti-establishment sentiments 
2.3. Mobilization of organization for turnaround 
2.3.1. Inject urgency in the communications plan. Explain what needs to be 
done and why 
2.3.2. Deal with concerns of employees in open and honest manner. Offer 
follow up sessions 
2.3.3. Articulate a few highly concrete targets for the company for the next 
few months 
2.3.4. Top managers must emphasize on integrity, faimess, hard work, 
resourcefulness and concern for the staff during interactions with the 
staff 
2.3.5. Listen to the views of all the managers. Gauge their reaction 
2.3.6. Repeatedly affirm the Company's mission, core values, and the 
primary goals of profit and growth. 
2.3.7. Understand perceptions and focus minds of managing team. Set the 
scene for tumaround. 
2.3.8. Ensure all employees know what is going on, for what reason and 
how it will occur. 
2.3.9. Share the pulpit (Empowerment) 
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2.3.10. Note any comments or queries and provide answers asap 
2.3.11. Involve the staff to identify solvable problem areas and have their 
views on uninvolved areas 
2.3.12. Include key managers for development of industry wisdom 
2.3.13. CEO must get out of the office to interact with the employees and to 
listen to them. 
2.3.14. Publicize and celebrate every employee and team success 
2.3.15. Organize seminars for educating workers on their rights and 
developments in industry. This dispels misconceptions. (Educate 
employees on their rights and openly discuss them) 
2.3.16. Hold special sessions for non-participating managers after vision has 
been developed to share planned vision 
2.3.17. Employ open ended communication style that encourages employees 
to find answers and take decisions 
2.3.18. Emphasize that employee 's loss or gain is very high 
2.3.19. Exercise Control on Communication Technology 
2.3.20. Convey and display vision and mission statement 
2.3.21. CEO should deliver the vision presentation in person and as often as 
possible. 
2.3.22. Include only key managers for development of vision 
2.3.23. Rephrase people's roles to clarify managerial responsibilities. 
2,4. Internal Co-ordination 
2.4.1. Keep enhancing communication technology - email, mobile, ERP 
2.4.2. Offer constant feedback to keep organization on track 
2.4.3. Institute a monthly performance review meeting of all senior 
managers chaired by the chief executive. 
2.4.4. Set up co-ordination committees for co-ordinating interdependent 
departments 
2.4.5. Exercise Control on Communication Technology (NEW) 
2.4.6. Insist that lower level disputes be settled at that level on a face to face 
basis 
2.4.7. Keep the atmosphere light 
3. Unions 
3.1. Negotiation of support of Unions and neutralization of Unions' pressures 
3.1.1. Brief unions on the problems and strengths of the unit and some 
tentative turnaround plan 
3.1.2. Seek support, concessions etc. fi'om the unions 
3.1.3. Keep unions posted on the progress of the turnaround 
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3.1.4. Get them to suggest turnaround steps 
3.1.5. Collect informal feedback for better negotiations 
3.1.6. Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy 
3.2. Managing Retrenchment 
3.2.1. Make it clear to the workers that the management would ensure a 
fair deal for them 
3.2.2. Let a manager who has dealt with workers and enjoys their goodwill, 
handle negotiations 
3.2.3. Address all the workers directly and together to avoid 
misunderstandings and rumours 
3.2.4. Quantity of information shared at a time should be controlled and 
based on capacity ofrecipients to absorb it 
3.2.5. Do not hide the decision of closing down the unit, from anyone who 
inquires 
4. Banks and Financial Institutions 
4.1. Negotiation of support of Banks and/or FIs and neutralization of Banks 
and/or FIs pressures 
4.1.1. Seek support, concessions etc. from Banks and/or FIs 
4.1.2. Keep Banks and/or FIs posted on the progress of the tumaround 
4.1.3. Brief Banks and/or FIs on the problems and strengths of the unit and 
some tentative tumaround plan 
4.1.4. Educate the concerned bank officials on the working of 
thebusiness/industry(New) 
4.1.5. Protracted negotiations with the banks and Financial institutions 
4.1.6. Requires personal interaction of promoter/ top management with 
Bank senior officials 
4.1.7. Get them to suggest tumaround steps 
4.1.8. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy 
5. Government 
5.1. Negotiation of support of Government and neutralization of Government 
pressures 
5.1.1. Seek support, concessions etc. from the government 
5.1.2. Brief relevant government departments on the problems and strengths 
of the unit and some tentative tumaround plan 
5.1.3. Keep the government posted on the progress of the tumaround 
5.1.4. Maintain direct contact; avoid via medias or advisors 
5.1.5. Approach Government through industry associations 
5.1.6. Get relevant government officials to suggest tumaround steps 
5.1.7. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy 
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5.2. Managing Retrenchment 
5.2.1. Proactively keep all relevant government officials and departments 
posted on the fair deal being offered to workers (to be retrenched) 
Suppliers 
6.1. Negotiation of support of suppliers and neutralization of suppliers' 
pressures 
6.1.1. Seek support, concessions etc. from suppliers 
6.1.2. Seek new suppliers who are willing to give credit and cooperate 
6.1.3. Brief suppliers on the problems and strengths of the unit and some 
tentative turnaround plan. 
6.1.4. Educate Supplier for better quality and quantity 
6.1.5. Keep suppliers posted on the progress of the tumaround 
6.1.6. Get suppliers to suggest tumaround steps 
6.1.7. Evolve jointly a broad tumaround strategy 
6.2. Build Credibility among suppliers 
6.2.1. Commit payments to build credibility 
6.2.2. A Iways keep your word (NE W) 
6.3. Ensure Desirable Quality of Supplies 
6.3.1. Seek new suppliers who are willing to cooperate 
6.3.2. Ensure regular educating sessions for ensuring quality 
6.3.3. Post quality manager at supplier's site 
Customers 
7.1. Negotiation of support of customers and neutralization of customers' 
pressures 
7.1.1. Brief customers on the problems and strengths of the unit and some 
tentative tumaround plan 
7.1.2. Keep customers posted on the progress of the tumaround 
7.1.3. Get customers to suggest tumaround steps 
7.1.4. Seek support, concessions etc. from customers 
7.1.5. Evolve jomtly a broad tumaround sfrategy 
7.2. Ignore current market and find a new market 
7.2.1. Design communications to suit customer/ consumer needs and tastes 
7.2.2. Build brand image 
7.2.3. Make communications consistent 
7.2.4. Train people on cross cultural communication 
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7.2.5. May rename products 
7.2.6. May redesign packaging 
7.2.7. May redesign logo 
7.2.8. Ojfer Support, concessions etc. to customers 
7.2.9. Ojfer advice or assistance in customer's times of crisis. Assume the 
role of a consultant 
1.3. Ensure sooth Cross Cultural Communication with customer 
7.3.1. Continuously educate employees on customer's cultural values 
7.3.2. Continuously educate employees on bridging language barriers with 
foreign customer 
7.3.3. Continuous monitoring of all employee communications with 
customers, to cover up noise due to cultural and language differences 
7.4. Sourcing industry information for quick cost reduction 
7.4.1. Increase costs incurred on communication technologies, if need be, 
for sourcing industry (market) information 
7.4.2. Active participation in industry association activities 
7.4.3. Develop informal contacts with peers in industry 
7.5. Revenue Generation 
7.5.1. Unfocused advertising and promotion be more sharply focused 
7.6. Build Brand Image 
8. Social Activist Groups 
8.1. Gain Support and neutralize pressures of Social Activist Groups 
8.1.1. Maintain transparent and direct contact 
9. Industry Associations 
9.1. Influence Government Policies 
9.1.1. Build image of senior member of Company as significant opinion 
holder 
9.1.2. Actively participate in industry Association activities 
9.2. Keep track of industry developments 
9.2.1. Actively participate in industry Association activities 
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Analyzing the revised framework: of CS for OTA 
In order to carry out a cross-case synthesis on the revised framework proposed, the 
table prepared at the end of each case study (that reflects the match of the theoretical 
framework and the turnaround in respective organizations studied) is tabulated 
against revised framework given in Framework 6.1. The outcome is given in Table 
6.2 (Appendix 6.2). 
Stakeholders addressed during TA 
Total No. of stakeholders addressed during turnaround by the turnaround 
managements of the companies studied, are given in Table 6.3a & 6.3b and plotted in 
Chart 6.1. 
Table 63a: Number of stakeholders addressed by each company studied 
Table 63b: Frequency of addressing a given number of stakeholders 
Table 6.3a 
Company No of 
stakeholders 
TBEL 7 
ESCL 7 
ABCL 5 
VPL 6 
HJMCL 6 
NJMCL 7 
IPL 6 
AFL 4 
NTCL 6 
Table 6.3b 
No. of stakeholders 
addressed 
Frequency of 
occurrence 
4 1 
5 1 
6 4 
7 3 
Chart 6.1: Frequency of number of stakeholders addressed 
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Table 6.3a & 6.3b and Chart 6.1 indicate that of the 9 companies that turned around 4 
companies addressed 6 stakeholders while in 3 companies management addressed 7 
stakeholders. The range observed in the given study was found to be between 4 to 7. 
The mode value was 6. 
The total number of companies that addressed a given stakeholder are given in Table 
6.4 and plotted m Chart 6.2. 
Table 6.4: Frequency of companies addressing a given stakeholder 
Stakeholder Total companies that addressed 
the stakeholder 
Staff and Workers/Employees 9 
Customers 9 
Unions 8 
Banks and Financial Institutions 8 
Government 8 
Suppliers 7 
Industry Associations 3 
Board of Directors/ Shareholders 2 
Social Activist Groups 1 
Chart 6.2: Frequency of companies addressing a given stakeholder 
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Table 65 indicates that all companies without exception addressed the 'staff and 
workers/ employees' and 'Customers' during turnaround; 8 out of 9 companies 
(88.8%) companies had to address communication objectives pertaining to Unions, 
Banks and Financial Institutions and Government; 7 of the 9 companies studied 
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(77.8%) addressed issues pertaining to suppliers; 3 of the 9 (33.3%) companies 
addressed industry associations; 2 of the 9 companies (22.2%) addressed objectives 
pertaining to Board of Directors; and only 1 of the 9 companies (11.1%) had to 
address objectives pertaining social activist groups. 
We may thus interpret that the 6 stakeholders addressed by maximum number of 
tumaround managements studied, were employees, customers, unions, banks and FIs 
government and suppliers. Every management addressed the employees and the 
customers. While there might be unique circumstances such as the new management 
gets all personal equity and does not believe in taking credit (an old school of thought 
in some cultures) would not interact with the Banks as was the case of VPL; when the 
union is extremely co-operative as was the case of IPL; or when a company 
consciously decides to minimize government interactions and fights back to relieve 
itself of day-today petty corrupt practices; or when the company that has acquired the 
sick unit is a supplier of the raw material and thus interaction with suppliers would 
assume minimal importance as was for IPL, NTCL and HJMCL, that we may say that 
these organizations do not find it critical to strategize communications with these 
stakeholders. Otherwise most of the organizations would address some issues 
pertaining to each of these stakeholders. 
Interactions with industry associations and social activist groups may be considered 
as critical by some organizations in unique situations, for instance, when it is critical 
to influence government policies and the promoters are influential themselves then 
interaction with industry associations may play a critical role. Similarly, if some 
social activist groups are active and influential in a region, an organization may have 
to address their concerns to neutralize their pressures. Thus, these two stakeholders 
may be included in the list of critical stakeholders to make the list comprehensive but 
their significance as against other stakeholders is much low and would depend on the 
unique situation of the Company. 
Similarly, the need to address concems and solicit support of Board of Directors 
arises only when the top management and the Board of Directors are a non-
overlapping group. If they happen to be the same, then this stakeholder becomes 
irrelevant in the process. 
Objectives that demanded communication intervention 
Table 6.5 gives the number of objectives that each company studied, addressed during 
tumaround and Chart 6.3 depicts the resuhs given in Table 6.5. 
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Table 6.5: Frequency of employing given number of objectives 
No. of objectives addressed througli 
communication (X) 
Freq of Companies employing 
communication for X no. of objectives 
13 1 
11 1 
10 1 
9 2 
8 2 
7 1 
6 1 
Chart 63: Frequency of addressing turnaround objectives tlirough 
communication 
Addressing TA Objectives through Communication 
13 11 10 9 8 7 
Number of Objectives addressed through Communication 
Table 6.5 and Chart 63 indicate that 44.4% companies employed communication 
interventions to address 8 or 9 objectives. These are also the mode values and hence 
the most probable values. 
Table 6.6 shows the number of companies that addressed a particular objective during 
TA. The results are depicted in Chart 6.4. 
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Table 6.6: Frequency of addressing a given objective 
Communication Objectives/ Organization (O) Total no. of companies tliat 
addressed the objective 
Mobilization of organization for turnaround 9 
Initial Control 8 
Internal Co -ordination 8 
Negotiation of support of Banks and/or FIs and 
neutralization of Banks and/or FIs pressures 
8 
Negotiation of support of Government and 
neutralization of Government pressures 
8 
Negotiation of support of suppliers and 
neutralization of suppliers 'pressures 
7 
Sourcing industry informationfor quick cost 
reduction 
7 
Revenue Generation 7 
Building Credibility among employees 6 
Ignore current market and find a new market 6 
Negotiation of support of Unions and neutralization 
of Unions 'pressures 
5 
Negotiation of support of customers and 
neutralization of customers' pressures 
5 
Build Credibility among suppliers 5 
Ensure Desirable Quality of Supplies 4 
Keep track of industry developments 4 
Managing Retrenchment in a dying unit (Union) 3 
Managing Retrenchment of dying unit (Govt.) 3 
Influence Government Policies 3 
Ensure Smooth Cross Cultural Communication with 
customer 
2 
Gain support and time in the future 1 
Gain Support and neutralize pressures of Social 
Activist Groups 
1 
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Chart 6.4: Turnaround objective addressed through communication 
Turnaround Objective Address through Communication 
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All the turnaround managements had to mobilize the organization while 88.8% 
managements addressed initial control, intemal coordination, negotiation of support 
from Banks and FIs and negotiation of support from Government by employing 
communication actions. 77.7% companies employed negotiatbn of support from 
suppliers and neutralization of supplier's pressures, sourcing industry information for 
quick cost reduction and revenue generation. 66.6% companies employ 
communication actions to build credibility among employees and develop a new 
market. 
While the number of companies addressing other communication objectives is 
comparatively less, the importance of these actions cannot be considered any less for 
the organizations that did employ communication actions to address these issues, for 
instance, there were companies in the sample that did not retrench the workers and 
hence did not employ communication actions for this objective. Similarly, for the 
companies that exported its end products, cross-cultural communication and brand 
image became exfremely important objectives and in their interviews the management 
commented on communication playing an extremely critical role in enabling a 
turnaround (TBEL and AFL). While the number of companies addressing these 
objectives was less, the importance of these communications for the companies that 
did employ these actions was very high. 
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However, the significance of the objective of gaining support and time of Board of 
Directors did not come out as clearly as for the other objectives. Since the promoter 
and Board of Directors happened to be the same in most of the organizations studied, 
the objective was not addressed in most of the companies but if the promoter and 
management would have been different, the objective could have been important. The 
evidence for this however, is relatively weak as in some companies that did have a 
separate management and promoter, the role of sharing the plan to gain support and 
time was not very vocally advocated by the management. 
Thus, it may be concluded that while some objectives are addressed by most of the 
companies, other objectives may not be considered any less important and thus it is 
important in this case to prepare a comprehensive list in the framework and leave it 
for a practitioner (turnaround management) to employ what is deemed suitable in its 
particular situation. 
The nine new communication objectives identified by the study of the 9 tumarounds 
include developing new markets, building credibility amongst suppliers, ensuring 
desirable quality of supplies, managing unions and government during retrenchment 
in a dying unit, ensuring smooth cross cultural communication, keeping track of 
industry information, influencing government policies and gaining support of social 
activist groups. 
Communication actions! interventions employed to achieve tfie 
objectives 
Table 6.7 (Appendix 6.3) is prepared by reorganizing Framework 6.1 to indicate the 
popularity of communication actions employed for achieving the turnaround 
objectives. The communication actions have been arranged in the descending order 
under each objective. Chart 65, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, 6.10, 6.11, 6.12, 6.13, 6.14, 6.15, 
6.16, 6.17, 6.18, 6.19, 6.20, 6.21, 6.22, 6.23, 6.24 and 6.25 pictorially depict the 
popularity of communication actions for achieving the said objective. 
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Chart 6.5: Frequency of companies adopting CAs to gain support and time in 
the future 
2.5-
::: 1.5-
0.5-
Present detailed turn-around plan 
Table 6.7 and Chart 6.5 reveal that 3 of the 9 companies studied presented a detailed 
turnaround plan to the Board of Directors in the initial phase of turnaround. 
Chart 6.6: Frequency of companies adopting various CAs for credibility 
building 
5 5-
2-
1-
1 
Make decisions Exercise Document, and Publicize success 
transparent Communication communicate a in resolving a 
Control strategic TA plan current crisis or 
problem 
Communication Action 
Table 6.7 and Chart 66 reveal that 'making decisions transparent' was the most 
popular action taken to build credibility. The second most popular action was 
'exercising communication controF to keep a check on promises made rather than 
failing to achieve the same. Documenting and sharing a strategic turnaround plan and 
capitalizing on the success in resolving a crises was also employed by 4 and 3 
companies respectively. 
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Chart 6.7: Frequency of companies adopting various CAs for initial control 
Exercise Seek views on Order Confront 
Communication well being of preparation of employees 
Control. employees. cash forecasts attempting anti-
establishment 
sentiments 
Communication Action 
Table 6.8 and Chart 6.7 indicate that 6 of the 9 companies studied exercised 
communication control and sought views on well being of employees to gain initial 
control. 5 of the 9 companies studied, ordered preparation of cash forecasts and 1 of 
the 9 confronted employees attempting anti establishment sentiments to gain initial 
control. 
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Chart 6.8: Frequency of companies adopting various CAs for mobilization of 
organization 
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Injecting urgency in the communication plans was the most popularly adopted action 
followed by 'dealing with the employees concems in an open and honest manner, 
articulating concrete targets and emphasizing on integrity, fairness and hardwork, 
resourcefulness and concern for staff 
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Chart 6.9: Frequency of companies adopting various CAs for Internal Co-
ordination 
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Table 6.7 and Chart 6.9 reveal that enhancing communication technologies and 
providing constant feedback were the most popular communication actions adapted 
by the companies studied to improve internal coordination. Popularity of other 
communication actions for the purpose is also pictorially presented in Chart 6.9. 
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Chart 6.10: Frequency of companies adopting CAs for negotiating sipport of 
union 
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Briefing unions on the problems and strengths of the unit, sharing the tentative 
turnaround plan and seeking support and concessions from the unions were the most 
popularly adopted communication actions by the companies studied. 
Chart 6.11: Frequency of companies adopting CAs for managing retrenchment 
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Assigning a manager who enjoys goodwill and informing the workers that 
management would ensure a fair deal were the most popular actions employed for 
managing retrenchment. 
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Chart 6.12: Frequency of companies adopting CAs for Negotiation of support 
of Banks/FIs 
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The most popular communication actions for Negotiation of support of Banks / FIs 
were seeking support, concessions and keeping them posted on the progress of the 
turn around. 
Chart 6.13: Frequency of companies adopting CAs for negotiating support of 
government 
Evolve jointly a broad turnaround strategy 
Get them to suggest turnaround steps 
c 
•a Approach Government through industry associations 
< 
c 
,o 
g Maintain Direct contact; avoid via medias or advisors 
"c 
3 
E 
E Keep the government posted on the progress of the 
o turnaround 
Brief relevant government departments on the problems 
and strengths of the unit and some tentative turnaround 
plan. 
Seek support, concessions etc. from the governmeni 
•1^ 
«<* -^p •^^^^s^^ \^ | 3 
v ^ l ^ *^ ^ ^ ^ 1' 
^ - . ^ , r H-W' ' U' 
" ' • ^ i ' ^ *"' "^^ 1 
zi-
| 8 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Frequency of Addressing (Number of Companies) 
The most popular communication actions for negotiating support of the government 
were seeking support, concessions and briefing relevant government department on 
the problem and strengths of the unit and some tentative tum around plaa 
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Chart 6.14: Frequency of companies adopting CAs for managing retrenchment 
of dying unit 
Proactlvety keep all relevant government officials and 
departments posted on the fair deal being offered to 
workers to t » retrenctied 
Proactively keep all relevant govemment officials and departments posted on the fair 
deal being offered to workers to be retrenched was adopted by 5 of the 9 companies 
studied. 
Chart 6.15: Frequency of companies adopting CAs for negotiating support of 
suppliers 
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Seek support, concessions from suppliers and seek new suppliers who are willing to 
give credit and cooperate were the most popular actions adopted by companies 
studied in order to negotiate support of suppliers. 
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Chart 6,16: Frequency of companies adopting CAs for building 
credibility among suppliers 
Commit payments to build credibility 
6 of the 9 companies studied committed payments to build credibility among 
the suppliers. 
Chart 6.17: Frequency of companies adopting CAs for desirable quality and 
quantity from supplier 
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Seek new suppliers who are willing to cooperate and ensure regular educating 
sessions for quality were the most popular actions adopted by companies studied in 
order to ensure desirable quantity and quality. 
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Chart 6.18: Frequency of companies adopting CAs for negotiating support of 
customers and neutralization of customer's pressures 
Evolve Jointly a broad turnaround strategy 
E 
E 
o 
o 
Seek support, concessions etc. from customers 
Get customers to suggest turnaround steps 
Keep customers posted on the progress of the 
turnaround 
1 
1 
3 
3 Brief customers on the problems and strengths of the 
unit and some tentative turnaround plan. 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 
Frequency of Addressing (Number of Companies) 
Brief customers on the problems and strengths of the unit and some tentative 
turnaround plan and keep customers posted on the progress of the turnaround were 
the most popular actions adopted by companies studied in order to negotiate support 
of customer. 
Chart 6.19: Frequency of companies adopting CAs to find a new market 
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Design communications to suit customer needs and tastes was the most 
popular action adopted. 6 of the 9 companies studied and all the 6 companies 
that address the addresses adopted this action. 
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Chart 6.20: Frequency of companies adopting CAs to ensure smooth cross-
cultural communication 
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Continuously educate employees on customer's cultural values and bridge language 
barriers with foreign customer were the most popular actions adopted by companies 
studied In fact both the companies that addressed the objective of cross culture 
communication adopted these two communication actions. 
Chart 6.21: Frequency of companies adopting CAs to source industry 
information 
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Increase costs incurred on communication technologies, for sourcing industry 
information was the most popular action adopted by companies studied. In fact all the 
7 companies that addressed the objective of sourcing industry information adopted 
this communication action. 
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Chart 6.22: Frequency of companies adopting CAs for revenue generation 
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Unfocused advertising and promotion be more sharply focused and Build Brand 
Image were the most popular actions adopted to enhance revenue generation. All the 
7 companies that addressed this objective adopted both the communication actions. 
Chart 6.23: Frequency of companies adopting CAs for negotiating support of 
social activist groups 
Maintain transparent and direct contact 
The only company that addressed the objective of negotiating support of social 
activist groups maintained transparent and direct contact with them. 
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Chart 6.24: Frequency of companies adopting CAs to influence government 
policies 
Communication Action 
4 of the 7 companies studied actively participated in industry association activities 
and built image of a senior member of their Company as significant opinion holder 
with the objective of influencing government policies. 
Chart 6.25: Frequency of companies adopting CAs to tracli industry 
developments 
Actively participate in Association activities 
4 of the 9 companies studied actively participate in association activities in order to 
track industry developments. 
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Appreciating Criticaiity of Variables 
The criticaiity of each component of the communication framework proposed varied 
from one company to another, for instance communication with Banks was very 
critical in case of TBEL which was taken over by a group of professionals who could 
not have brought in equity to meet the outstanding debts of the sick company. On the 
other hand, NTCL which was taken over by Assam Tea Company Ltd. (ATCL) had 
no financial crisis and therefore its communications with the banks were not as 
critical as were for TBEL. 
SimilarJy, for AFL, which was producing a security product wherein the quality of 
raw material was extremely critical for ensuring desired quality of the security 
product produced, suppliers role was very critical, hi case of NJMCL also, the 
communication with suppliers was a very critical factor as there was rampant 
exploitation by traders and brokers of raw material. Companies which did not have 
the mettle to stock raw material for lean periods of jute supply, had to play in the 
hands of these traders. The company therefore had to constantly sfrategize to beat the 
cobweb. On the other hand, NTCL which was taken over by ATCL conveniently 
began sourcing its raw material from the ATCL's suppliers. Hence communication 
with suppliers was not critical, hi case of IPL which came under the umbrella of the 
Reliance group there was instant relief from issues pertaining to supplies. While 
initially it was at a disadvantage because its suppliers were located at far off location 
it now benefited the parent company as the latter was itself a supplier of the raw 
material. There was therefore no issue left pertaining to major raw material supplies. 
Hence communication with suppliers in case of NTCL and IPL were not critical at all 
while they were exfremely critical in case of AFL and NJMCL. 
Yet another variation was noticed in case of communications with employees. 
HJMCL considered employee communication during turnaround as most critical and 
the management actually employed the accommodation model wherein it asked its 
employees to ensure their own welfare by managing the Mill in an open system. On 
the other hand, ESCL management knew that its workers had no choice but to comply 
with the directions given by the management and hence employed what appears to be 
more of an excltange model. AFL was yet another case where the management 
decided that it would not be able to manage employee communications at its distant 
factory, as it found a major difference in the communication style of the employees 
and the management. The management felt that since their customer was Japanese it 
was important that the communication style of AFL employees matched that of the 
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Japanese and hence it attempted to automate its plant and reduce communication to a 
minimal level. One can again see traces of exchange model being applied in case of 
AFL. It is interesting to see however, that TBEL in a similar situation of cross 
cultural communication between Indian factory at a distant location and market in the 
US decided to shift its base closer to the factory and adopt a socialization model to 
communicate with the employees. It organized various innovative programmes to 
promote group working and informal networks to promote self-actualization. The 
variation in approach may be attributed to the background of the turnaround 
management that had to bring about the change. While the Jatias were of Indian 
origin they had settled in Japan and Anup Jatia, who was actively managing the show 
in India was brought up in Japan and later educated in the US. They therefore found it 
difficult to manage communications with its Indian employees. On the other hand, 
most of the members of the TBEL management had worked in India for a long time 
and were therefore at ease with their employees. Thus, we see that the approach 
adopted for employee communication varied according to the situation as in case of 
HJMCL and ESCL and also according to the management's level of comfort or 
competence as in case of AFL and TBEL. 
Another contrasting approach was observed between interactions of turnaround 
management of NJMCL and IPL with their respective industry associations. The jute 
industry was heavily dependant for its welfare on the government policies. Since, the 
government was also a major customer, it was important to both, follow and if 
possible influence the government policies. On the other hand, IPL MD Narendra 
Kumar revealed that the erstwhile Chairman of IPL had been wasting energies on 
networking in industry and political circles and the turnaround management refrained 
from doing so, as it brought minimal advantage to the Company. Thus, we see that 
criticality of communications with industry associations varied from one industry to 
another. 
We may therefore conclude from the above discussion that criticality of 
communication with various stakeholders varies owing to numerous factors ranging 
from variation in financial capabilities of the tumaround management, background of 
the tumaround management, product or customer requirements, industry etc.. Thus, 
we find that the results of this research study support the contingency theory or the 
RBV theory as the tumaround management is expected to understand its own unique 
situation and identify the tumaround objectives suitable for its unique situation. The 
Communication Strategy framework suggested hereof may then be consulted to 
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understand what communication intervention turnaround companies have been 
employing to address those objectives. 
Communication Resources for implementing CS for OTA 
In order to analyze the communication technologies employed during tumaround, 
Table 6.7 (Appendix 6.4) was prepared to reflect the approach of the 9 companies 
studied. Table 6.8 reveals that while computing facilities were incorporated in all 
companies there was no consensus as to whether intemet surfing facility should be 
provided at all terminals or not. Two companies, namely ABCL and AFL very 
strongly advocated the need for common computing area for some computing 
functions especially net surfing. Bajaj of ABCL thought that common computing area 
promoted personal interaction and communication, as it forced the employees to leave 
their seats and in the process interact with fellow colleagues. Jatia of AFL on the 
other hand thought that it permitted a check on external communications. He shared 
with the researcher, how a company in Europe had to bear a law suite for regular 
illegal website access and external communications of one of its employees. He 
therefore advocates the need for keeping a check on the websites visited, to ensure 
law abiding and official usage of the net. Bajaj of ABCL also felt that facilities such 
as the net connectivity had to be provided with discretion. This he felt was required 
for ensuring better intemal coordination and control. Exercising control on 
communication technology was thus suggested as an intervention for ensuring that 
external communications were legal and official and intemal co-ordination was 
improved. "Lack of this control could have serious impact on a company" (Jatia, 
personal communications,October 18, 2005) However, the 7 other companies did not 
think so and provided uninterrupted net access at all terminals. 
Table 6.8 also shows that all the companies accepted email as an official 
communication document. However, there is again a disagreement on whether the 
email communications of employees should be monitored or not. While 3 companies 
namely AFL, IPL and NTCL confirmed that all external email communications were 
monitored, two namely TBEL and VPL did not follow the process. However, in the 
second meeting with the researcher, Nigam of TBEL shared that upon deliberation 
after facing the researcher's question, TBEL is realizing the need to incorporate a 
system of monitoring external communications, as their industry was very 
competitive and the company could not afford a leak of marketing and product 
development decisions. This was more because the ideas themselves carried value 
and implementation was not a formidable task for a competitor. Thus most of the 
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companies (4) felt that external communications could seriously impact the business. 
Jatia of AFL felt this was necessary to ensure that cross cultural communication gaps 
between them and the Japanese customer did not impact the business. He knew that a 
Japanese customer was difficult to develop but once developed could be a lifetime 
customer provided the relationship was carefully nurtured. To add to this, AFL was 
working for only one customer and any gap in communication could seriously impact 
the entire business. Jatia therefore personally monitored all the emails every day to 
ensure smooth external communications. Similarly, NTCL and IPL also believed that 
it was important to keep a check on external communications. 
LAN was essentially employed by all companies studied. It was considered as an 
obvious essential communication technology to ensure smooth internal 
communications and process flow. WAN was considered ambitious target by some 
though two of the 9 companies (IPL and TBEL) had impbmented it successfully. 
Interestingly, all the turnaround leaders were unaware of the type of connectivity 
employed to connect distant locations. Thus, role of communication technology in 
enabling smooth internal coordination and process flow is complete^ established. 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software was fiilly adopted by two companies 
and partially implemented at two companies studied. It was seen by these companies 
as a platform for ensuring real time communication of data amongst relevant parties 
responsible for carrying out the business. The fast pace of communication enabled by 
the software was seen to have a tremendous impact on the business. This was evident 
from the fact that these companies decided to incur the expense of adopting this 
package even if it was difficult to afford the money during the turnaround period. 
TBEL invested INR 4.5 million on procuring and implementing the ERP package in 
1999 when its tumover was merely INR 31 million. This is to say that it invested 14.5 
% of its gross sales in that year to ensure communication infrastructure for smooth 
process flow. ABCL also invested more than INR 10 million on ERP during its 
turnaround period. Both ABCL and TBEL management also explained benefits of 
ERP software and described its impact as the second major change at their 
organization besides turnaround. All the four companies struggled tremendously to 
ensure its smooth implementation and called it a continuous ongoing process. Other 
companies however had not adopted the ERP software though HJMCL indicated its 
plan to implement it in the near future. While IPL and TBEL had successfiilly 
implemented multi-location ERP packages, NTCL and ABCL had succeeded in 
enabling it at all individual sites only and were struggling to connect nxilti-locations 
for ensuring complete benefits. However, this was considered a highly challenging 
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task to implement. Considering the impact of communication technology, it believed 
that the effort was worth the returns it promised. 
Interestingly, the use cf mobile phones was an unquestioned reality but a striking 
difference of opinion was found on the extent of its usage. On one hand were 
management of HMCL, NJMCL and VPL that believed that mobile phones enhanced 
efficiency so extensively that it was given to almost anyone who required it, 
begiiming from a peon. On the other hand, TBEL, ABCL, AFL and IPL shared with 
the researcher, the restrictions that had to be imposed owing to distractions that must 
be avoided in factory working areas. AFL also shared how it was forced to restrict 
extent of usage in the office premises, owing to indiscretion displayed by employees 
in using it in open office settings. 
While 4 of the 9 companies did not have active websites, three others that did have 
one, confessed using it only for information dissemination and not for active 
marketing objectives. TBEL acknowledged that the website could prove to be a 
captive audience for one of its market segments (in Silicon valley) however it had not 
yet employed it to reap the benefits. SMS was not seen as anything more than a cheap 
messaging device for day to day communication and was not employed by any of 
them for any other purpose. Bajaj of ABCL though mentioned that he was studying 
prospects of employing SMS for mass gaming as a promotional tool that many other 
companies were successfiilly employing currently. Video conferencing facility was 
effectively employed only at IPL whereas others except TBEL had not given it much 
consideration. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 7 
The purpose of the study was to identify communication strategies adopted by 
companies and if possible propose a framework for developing a communication 
strategy for organizational turnaround. Organizational turnaround for the purpose of 
this study was further defined as the improvement in organizational performance 
indicated by a change in networth of the organization from a negative to a positive 
amount. To ensure that the turnaround was sustainable a turnaround cycle time of 6 
years was considered. 9 organizatbns that had turned around during 1995-2005 were 
selected for the study and case studies of communication during turnaround of each 
organization were written. Following conclusions are drawn & recommendations are 
made on the basis of this study 
1. Lack of attention to Communication, in current turnaround literature 
On the basis of literature review, role and impact of communication during 
turnaround was established. Although no turnaround study was found to be 
completely devoted to communication during turnaround, several turnaround studies 
mentioned the role and impact of communication during turnaround, ^algobin & 
Pandit, 2001; Harker & Sharma, 2000; Khandwalla, 1989, 1992; Kow 2004; 
Meliones, 2000). 
2. Need to constantly align managerial decisions to environmental 
reality 
Case studies of 9 companies that had turned around during 1995-2005, were written. 
Each case study was analysed to identify whether it's sickness was due to 
environment or managerial decision making or misalignment of the two. The results 
support the arguments of Sheppard and Chowdhury (2005) who asserted that "failure 
is not typically the fault of either the environment or the organization, rather it must 
be attributed to the misalignment of the organization to the environmental realities". 
The results of analysis of various cases support this view. ABCL took ten years to 
realign itself to changes brought in by globalization of hadian economy and the loss in 
the process was so significant, that it had to close down one of its units producing 
hydrogenated oil. AFL realized that there was rampant excise evasion in the industry 
269 
and one of its units could not survive unless it aligned itself to the environmental 
reality. It resolved to maintain its ethical standard; it closed down the unit and 
diverted its energy to find an alternative route. TBEL realized that it had launched 
RTS food much before the Indian consumer was ready to consume it. It was 
eventually forced to switch its focus on markets abroad where the environment was 
ready to accept their products. The results are interesting as in the first organization 
(ABCL) the company owing to inability to realign in time was forced to close down 
one of its units; in the second organization (AFL) it purposely decided not to align 
itself to the environmental demands and therefore changed its fiiture course. The third 
organization (TBEL) accepted the new reality and quickly realigned itself to the 
environmental demands and thereby exhibited a very quick recovery. Thus, the 
results support the view that both environment and managerial decisions contribute 
towards defining the fate of an organization. They further support the view that often 
managers make inadequate managerial decisions owing to blindness to environmental 
change (ABCL) or resource constrahts or inadequate information etc. and may make 
wrong managerial decisions that finally lead to sickness in an organization. 
3. Turnaround: a miraculous achievement 
From a list of 5787 listed companies (source: Prowess, CMIE), 705 companies were 
found to have turned sick during 1995-2005. However, only 39 companies fi-om these 
705 (7.69%) were able to tumaround. When these companies were contacted for 
research study, 6 companies were found to have just turned around owing to equity 
brought in by the promoter but were still struggling to set themselves on the growth 
path. It is evident irom this result that tumaround in sick organizations is a 
miraculous achievement worth a study and that many organizations, when faced with 
such tough times, may land up into any of the new states ranging fi-om liquidation, 
languishing, struggling to tumaround. 
4. Sick state: A result of disabling forces emanating from stakeholders 
When an organization is in a sick state it faces numerous internal and extemal 
challenges Richardson, Nwankwo & Richardson (1994) note that such crises, 
damage the quality of life for the different groups of people associated with the 
organization, for example, at a personal level, big emotional and social costs are 
incurred as the organization becomes a less rewarding place in which to work 
(employees) or with which to do business (suppliers, customers, banks etc.). 
Organizational restructurings, lay-offs, redundancies, customer delivery breakdowns 
and failures to pay creditors, for example worsen traditional standards of working and 
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living for a host of stakeholders. These challenges act as disabling forces emanating 
from various stakeholders and directed towards the sick company and also each other. 
They are depicted in Figure 3.2 Theoretical Framework and Propositions. In each of 
the organization studied, the results support the view, as each turnaround 
management interviewed, shared its experiences of challenges faced in dealing with 
various stakeholders. 
5. Central role of the top management 
In order to turnaround a sick Company, the theoretical model proposed in this study 
purported that the first and foremost condition for initiation of turnaround effort was 
that the top management takes responsibility of enabling a turnaround of the sick 
company. (Marker & Sharma, 2000; Hofer, 1980). Other researchers have emphasized 
on the importance of role of triggers and necessary managerial role of recognizing 
and analyzing these triggers to enable a turnaround. (Francis & Mariola, 2003; 
Gopinath, 2005; Scherrer, 2003). Khandwalla (1989) goes to the extent of outlining 
'Change in Top Management' as an essential element for turnaround. This was 
depicted in thechapter3 Figure 3.3 by placing the management into the central 
position and indicating it as the entity that now manages the enabling and disabling 
forces emanating from other stakeholders. The exhibit further depicts the role of 
managerial action required, to manage these forces, to enable a turnaround. The 
results of this study support the theoretical proposal, as in all organizations studied, 
the management, when the promoter and management were separate and the 
management was responsible (IPL, NTCL), and the promoter management when the 
two were the same (TBEL, ABCL, NJMCL, HJMCL, AFL), consciously assumed 
responsibility to turnaround the ailing company. In all the cases, the management was 
clear on the objectives it had set for each stakeholder, to achieve the turnaround. The 
managerial actions taken thereafter resulted in the change for the better. 
6. Role of communication: an undocumented reality 
It is notable that none of these 9 companies had separately documented a 
commimication strategy or plan though all of them strategized the actions to be taken 
Partial documentation under varying tit les was noticed in different companies studied. 
TBEL termed its mobilization efforts as Fun at Work programmes while NTCL 
employed what they call a two-way communication model for regular monitoring. 
ABCL on the other hand said it documented its decisions as minutes of the meeting 
while ESCL insisted that communication plarming was an important regular ongoing 
process. 
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7. Proposed theoretical framework: mandatory but Incomprehensive 
Each component of the theoretical framework proposed in Framework 3.2, was 
completely or partially employed by all the 9 companies studied. This is to say that 
every turnaround management addressed atleast one of the objectives for atleast one 
of the stakeholder listed in the framework. It was also established that for the 
objective addressed, atleast one of the listed communication actions was employed by 
the turnaround management. However, the set of Proposition Ptested, further 
established that each of the framework components - list of stakeholders, objectives 
and communication actions, was incomprehensive. 
8. Framework 6.1: a more comprehensive framework 
The proposed communication framework inchapter3 Framework 3.2 was augmented 
by adding to the list of stakeholders, the additional stakeholders that the 9 companies 
studied, had addressed. Similarly, the list of objectives and the communication 
actions employed thereof, by each company studied, were compared with the list of 
objectives and communication actions mentioned for each stakeholder and the lists 
given in the framework were augmented. The resulting framework given in 
Framework 6.1 is proposed as a more comprehensive framework than that proposed 
in Framework 3.2. The validity of the framework is established as it is based on 
primary research data though whether it takes care of all the possible situations or 
challenges in different organizations is still not established. 
9. Mosf frequently addressed stakeholders 
A closer look at the stakeholders addressed during turnaround reveals that the 6 
stakeholders mostly addressed by the 9 companies studied, were employees, unions, 
customers, banks and financial institutions, government and suppliers. Most of the 
turnaround strategy literature deals with employee communication (Balgobin & 
Pandit, 2001; Marker & Sharma, 2000; Khandwalla, 1989; Kow, 2004a, 2004b; 
Meliones, 2000) though Harker & Sharma (2000) also indicate the need to present a 
detailed tumaround plan to Board of Directors and Banks and Financial Institutions, 
to gain their support. However, Khandwalla (1989) in his study additionally identified 
communication actions adopted to address objectives set for unions, government, 
suppliers and customers. 
The results of the present study indicate that these six stakeholders were addressed 
most frequently by the 9 companies studied. Further, management of all the 9 
companies studied, addressed the employees and the customers for some tumaround 
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objective. The other four stakeholders however were not essentially addressed by 
managements of all the 9 companies studied 
10. New Stakeholders: less frequent though critical 
The two additional stakeholders addressed by some of the companies studied and not 
mentioned in the theoretical framework proposed, were Industry Association and 
Social Activist groups. TBEL had to address a social activist group as this group 
actively interacted with the union and the workers, and could influence the latter. To 
ensure that no anti-establishment sentiment was promoted, the management interacted 
with the group, as and when required. Ravi Nigam shared how they had to address the 
hostile perceptions of this group towards the American origin of the new promoters. 
Both ESCL and NJMCL actively participated in the industry association activities as 
voicing their concems to the government or interacting with peers to keep track of 
industry developments, had a significant impact on their business. In case of ESCL, 
the government's decisions on sugar levy and in case of NJMCL the government's 
decision on JMPA were very critical. These companies had to remain updated on 
latest industry developments. Also, owing to their strong positions in the industry 
associations, they could influence the government and hence attempted to benefit 
from the clout. Thus, these two stakeholders though not addressed frequently cannot 
be rejected as less critical. 
It is therefore recommended that a tumaround management must consciously identify 
the stakeholders that may have the capacity to affect the company's performance. 
11. Most frequently addressed objectives 
The 10 most frequently addressed objectives by the 9 companies studied, were found 
to be: mobilization of organization, initial control, internal co-ordination, negotiation 
of support of banks and FIs and neufralization of their pressures, negotiation of 
support of govenraient and neufralization of its pressures, negotiation of support of 
suppliers and neufralization of their pressures, sourcing industry information for 
quick cost reduction, revenue generation, building credibility among employees, 
ignore current market and find a new market. 
The results support the literature as the 9 most frequently addressed objectives by 
tumaround managements of companies studied, were also listed in the theoretical 
framework proposed originally inchapterS Framework 3.2. 
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However, the tenth most popular objective, 'Ignore current market and fmd a new 
market', identified from the 9 companies studied, was found to be more popularly 
addressed (6 out of 9 companies addressed it) than the two objectives (negotiation of 
support of Unions and neutralization of Union's pressures and negotiation of support 
of customers and neutralization of customer's pressures) listed on the basis of 
literature review in the theoretical framework given in Framework 3.2. 
12. Additional Objectives identified 
Nine new objectives namely, 'ignore current market and develop new market', 'build 
credibility among suppliers', 'ensure desirable quality of supplies', 'keep track of 
industry developments', 'managing refrenchment', 'influencing the government 
policies', 'ensuring cross cultural communication with customers' and 'gaining and 
neutralizing the support of Social Activist groups' were identified. The number of 
companies that addressed these objectives varied (6 for 1 st objective, 5 for 2"^ " and 4 
for next 2 objectives, 3 for next 3, 2 for 1 and 1 for last 2 objectives). As discussed in 
chapter 6 Results and Analysis the importance of these objectives was high. The list 
prepared by assimilating these objectives is presented in Framework 6.1 and is more 
comprehensive than that proposed on the basis of literature review. 
13. IVIost frequently employed communication actionsi interventions 
Table 6.7 indicates actions that the 9 turnaround Companies adopted to achieve a 
given objective. One may implicate from this table that those communication actions 
that were employed by most of the companies to achieve a given objective, have a 
significant impact on the outcome of the attempt to achieve the objective. 
Some of the more frequently adopted communication actions (7 or more companies 
adopted these actions) were 'make decisions transparent', 'inject urgency in the 
communication plan', deal with concerns of employees in an open and honest 
maimer. Offer feedback sessions', 'articulate a few highly concrete targets for the 
company for the next few months', 'top managers must emphasize on integrity, 
fairness, hard work, resourcefulness and concern for the staff during interactions with 
the staff, 'keep enhancing communication technology', 'offer constant feedback to 
keep the organization on frack, 'seek support and concessions etc. from Banks and/or 
FIs', 'keep Banks and FIs posted on the progress of the turnaround', 'seek support, 
concessions etc. from the government' and 'brief relevant government departments 
on the problems and strengths of the unit and some tentative tumaround plan, 'focus 
advertising and promotion to be more sharply focussed'. All these objectives were 
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also listed in the initial proposed framework developed from the literature. Thus the 
finding support the turnaround literature. 
14. New Communication Actions! Interventions identified 
Forty one new communication actions/ interventions have been added to the initial 
framework and presented in Framework 6.1. This new list of 100 communication 
actions adopted by tumed around companies is thus more comprehensive. Further 
studies may be done to make it still more comprehensive, if possible. 
15. Net Surfing: A skeptical though essential acceptance 
While all companies studied, provided net surfing facilities to its employees, some of 
them have highlighted benefits of providing these facilities in common computing 
areas. These benefits include increased interaction, improved time management, 
higher resource sharing, security checks and better discipline. 
16. Email: an official but monitored communication channel 
All companies studied, employed email as an official channel of communication. 
However, some companies adopted a policy of monitoring the email communications 
for reasons such as security and cross-cultural communication gaps. 
17. LAN more popularly implemented than WAN 
While LAN was implemented to smoothen the communication flow within an office, 
several companies are still struggling to have a WAN in place. 
18. ERP: a daunting challenge, worth the effort 
All companies that had employed ERP package agreed that implementing ERP was a 
major expense for a company reviving from sickness. However, all of them also 
agreed that it was a major challenge to implement it owing to the discipline required 
to reap its benefits. There was also a consensus that ERP implementation brought 
with it a significant improvement in performance 
19. Not so popular Communication technologies 
Many communication technologies such as SMS and websites still do not seem to 
have made a mark in proving their worth to reviving companies. These technologies 
were not extensively employed by the companies studied. 
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20. Need to customize the proposed framework 
It would be pertinent to mention here that even for the limited number of 
organizations studied in this research work, no consistently applicable communication 
strategy was found. The strategy varied depending on the unique situation in which 
the organization was poised. 
Thus, any management preparing to turnaround a company may benefit from the 
communication strategy framework presented in this study in Framework 6.1, if it 
integrates it with the turnaround strategy of the company by prudently identiiying the 
turnaround objectives for each stakeholder. 
Overall recommendation for employing the CS for OTA 
A management attempting to turnaround a declining organization, must identify the 
stakeholders that have to play a critical role in enabling the turnaround strategy 
adopted. The critical stakeholders mentioned in the framework may be referred to as a 
checklist to ensure that all critical stakeholders have been considered before finalizing 
this list. 
For each stakeholder identified as critical, the management must identify 
communication objectives on the basis of the turnaround strategy adopted. The 
communication objectives for each stakeholder, mentioned in the framework may be 
reffered to as a checklist to ensure that possible relevant communication objectives 
have been considered. 
Thereafter, the framework guides on what communication actions/ interventions must 
the management adopt to achieve the communication objectives identified. Thus, CS 
for OTA framework provides guidelines to both strategize and implement the 
communication strategy desirable for enabling an organizational tumaround. 
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Limitations of thie Study and 
Directions for Future Research 
Section I; Limitations of the Study 
This chapter identifies the limitations of the study The findings of the study propose a 
communication strategy for enabling organizational turnaround. The turnaround 
communication objectives, stakeholder communications and communication 
interventions have been studied. Organizational and managerial communication 
actions for enabling the turnaround of a sick company have been recranmended. 
However, no research endeavour is final and there are limitations too. In the 
following section, limits of this research are captured: 
• Case studies were primarily based on interviews of members of the top 
management. Their biases and perceptions might have affected their 
discourse of the turnaround experience. While an attempt to verify facts from 
secondary sources was made, there is scope for more thorough verification. 
8 
• It was observed that many turnaround managements had not discretely 
identified a communication strategy. Thus, they left it to the researcher to 
identify communication elements or strategy from their turnaround 
experiences. It is possible that many experiences of communication 
interventions were not shared. A repeat study on the same pattern and 
methodology may make the list of stakeholders, objectives and 
communication interventions more comprehensive. 
It was observed in many organizations that the top management was reluctant 
in sharing some information. Some information therefore may not have been 
shared. 
The study focused on the strategy adopted by the top management and not on 
how it was perceived by other stakeholders. It was assumed that a successfiil 
turnaround was indicator of successful strategy. Further study may include 
views of other stakeholders too. 
Communication amongst various stakeholders also impacts turnaround. 
Further studies may focus on effect of these communications. 
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• Given more time, a validated questionnaire on various communication 
dimensions could have been developed and administered to add more rigour 
to the study. 
• The conclusions of this study are not generalizations. These are suggestive 
and not prescriptive. 
Section II: Future Research Directions 
This chapter maps the direction for further research in future studies. Keeping in mind 
the limitations and also the increasing importance and interest in the subject, the 
following section suggests fiiture research directions: 
• This study focused on the strategy adopted by the top management and not on 
how it was perceived by other stakeholders. A study that includes views of 
other stakeholders could provide better understanding of communications 
during turnaround. 
• Communication amongst various stakeholders also impacts turnaround. 
Further studies may focus on effect of these communications. 
• Communication pattems in different regions may vary owing to differences 
in cultural variations. Comparison of communication in organizations from 
different regions may give revealing results. 
• While cultures in a country, especially as diverse as India, cannot be called 
homogenous, yet one could expect variations in communication pattems 
adopted in different countries. Thus, other studies based on the same design 
but carried out in other countries could uncover several findings. 
• This study has adopted the replication logic. Further studies may adopt 
theoretical replication and study communication strategies employed in sick 
companies. A comparison of communication pattems in tumed around 
successes and tum around failures may further support the outcomes of this 
study. 
• It is possible that communication strategies of organizations following theory 
E and organizations following theory O may differ. Further study exploring 
variations in communication strategies in organizations adopting these 
different theories of change may be undertaken. 
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• Content analysis technique can also be applied to study communication 
strategies for turnaround. 
• Further studies may explore quantitative methods to measure impact of 
communication on tumaround. 
• A study of communication pattem in the next phase (growth) of these 
organizations may reveal variation in communication strategies adopted 
during tumaround and communication strategies adopted during growth. 
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Appendix 4.1 
Interview Checklist 
1. According to you, how important is communication in the process of tumaround? 
2. What, according to you, are principles of good communication? 
2. Did your Company prepare a communication strategy to enable the tumaround? 
3. Is the communication strategy documented? 
4. If yes, please let me have a copy of the communication strategy you developed? 
5. If no, then which stake holders did you identify for Regular/ Intermittent/Blocked 
communication? Circle the correct option. 
i. Employees 
ii. Bankers 
iii. Institutional Shareholders 
iv. Agency Principals, if any 
V. Government 
vi. Industry associations 
vii. Customer 
viii. Supplier 
ix. International agencies, if any 
X. Media Relations 
xi. Public at large 
xii. Any other 
6. For eacli stake holder mentioned above, please answer the fol 
a. Employees 
i. What were the communication objectives? 
ii. What messages did you wish to deliver? 
iii. Who did you select for carrying out this task and why? 
iv. How did this person/ group convey the message? 
V. Did you attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of this communication 
process? 
vi. If yes, how? 
(These may include several measures/ interventions planned by you. I would 
like to have inputs on all these initiatives) 
b. Banks & Financial Institutions 
i. What were the communication objectives? 
ii. What messages did you wish to deliver? 
R I B 
R I B 
R I B 
R I B 
R I B 
R I B 
R I B 
R I B 
R I B 
R I B 
R I B 
R I B 
l lowing questions 
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iii. Who did you select for carrying out this task and why? 
iv. How did this person/ group convey the message? 
V. Did you attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of this communication 
process? 
vi. If yes, how? 
c. Shareholders 
i. What were the communication objectives? 
ii. What messages did you wish to deliver? 
iii. Who did you select for carrying out this task and why? 
iv. How did this person/ group ccHivey the message? 
V. Did you attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of this communication 
process? 
vi. If yes, how? 
d. Agency Principals, if any 
i. What were the communication objectives? 
ii. What messages did you wish to deliver? 
iii. Who did you select for carrying out this task and why? 
iv. How did this person/ group convey the message? 
V. Did you attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of this communication 
process? 
vi. If yes, how? 
e. Government 
i. What were the communication objectives? 
ii. What messages did you wish to deliver? 
iii. Who did you select for carrying out this task and why? 
iv. How did this person/ group convey the message? 
V. Did you attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of this communication 
process? 
vi. If yes, how? 
f. Industry Associations 
i. What were the communication objectives? 
ii. What messages did you wish to deliver? 
iii. Who did you select for carrying out this task and why? 
iv. How did this person/ group convey the message? 
V. Did you attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of this communication 
process? 
vi. If yes, how? 
288 
g. Customers 
i. What were the communication objectives? 
ii. What messages did you wish to dehver? 
iii. Who did you select for carrying out this task and why? 
iv. How did this person/ group convey the message? 
V. Did you attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of this communication 
process? 
vi. If yes, how? 
h. Suppliers 
i. What were the communication objectives? 
ii. What messages did you wish to deliver? 
iii. Who did you select for carrying out this task and why? 
iv. How did this person/ group convey the message? 
V. Did you attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of this communication 
process? 
vi. If yes, how? 
i. International agencies, if any 
i. What were the communication objectives? 
ii. What messages did you wish to deliver? 
iii. Who did you select for carrying out this task and why? 
iv. How did this person/ group convey the message? 
V. Did you attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of this communication 
process? 
vi. If yes, how? 
j . Media Relations 
i. What were the communication objectives? 
u. What messages did you wish to deliver? 
iii. Who did you select for carrying out this task and why? 
iv. How did this person/ group convey the message? 
V. Did you attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of this communication 
process? 
vi. If yes, how? 
k. Public at large 
i. What were the communication objectives? 
ii. What messages did you wish to deliver? 
iii. Who did you select for carrying out this task and why? 
iv. How did this person/ group convey the message? 
289 
V. Did you attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of this communication 
process? 
vi. If yes, how? 
1. Any other 
i. What were the communication objectives? 
ii. What messages did you wish to dehver? 
iii. Who did you select for carrying out this task and why? 
iv. How did this person/ group convey the message? 
v. Did you attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of this communication 
process? 
vi. If yes, how? 
7. Which of the following communication technologies play a role in enabling the 
turnaround process? 
Y N 
Y N 
Y N 
Y N 
Y N 
8. For those technologies that did play a role, please answer the following: 
a. When did you implement this communication technology? 
b. Why? 
c. What did the process of implementation entail? (How easy or difficult was 
it?) 
d. Is the technology implemented to its full capacity? 
e. What were the benefits accrued thereof? 
9. Was it required to integrate the internal (with intemal stakeholders) and external (with 
external stakeholders) communication strategy? 
10. What were the issues that made this integration pertinent? 
11. How did you integrate the two strategies? 
i. LAN 
ii. Internet 
iii. ERP 
iv. Mobile phone 
V. SMS 
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